JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J.
1. By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner Ramesh Jogi has questioned validity of his continued detention in pursuance of the order Under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) made by the District Magistrate, Mathura, on 13-1-1985. The grounds served upon the petitioner indicate that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, was based on two grounds.
2. The first ground of detention relates to an incident alleged to have taken place on 1-11-1984. The ground states that on 1-11-1984 at about 10 A.M. the petitioner with his companion Parmeshwar Dayal Sharma along with a crowd of 400 to 500 persons incited the people to ruin Sikhs at Kanhaiya Cloth Market. The petitioner is alleged to have incited the crowd against the Sikhs, as a result of which the crowd set fire to various cloth shops and looted their property. A first information report was lodged at Kotwali against the petitioner and his associates and crime No. 938 was registered Under Sections 147/148/149/436/380, I.P.C. against the petitioner. During investigation stolen goods including cloth were recovered from the petitioner. The incident caused terror and apprehension amongst the shop-keepers specially Sikhs and it disturbed public order. The ground further states that the petitioner was arrested on 5-11-1984 and sent to jail but he was enlarged on bail by Court. The second ground states that the petitioner along with his three other associates stopped Kedar Nath Kedar Nath son of Kali Charan at about 11 P.M. at Gali Seth Manik Chand on 22-12-84 while he was going back to his house. The petitioner was armed with unlicensed arms, he abused Kedar Nath and threatened him and the petitioner's companion Naresh fired a gun shot on Kedar Nath which caused serious injury on his neck. Hearing the gun shot witnesses reached the spot, whereupon the petitioner took out his revolver threatening that if anyone stepped forward he would be killed. On account of this incident people ran here and there and local residents closed doors of their houses. Crime No. 1215 Under Section 307, I.P.C. was registered at Police Station Kotwali. On the aforesaid two grounds the District Magistrate was satisfied that the petitioner was indulging into activities which were prejudicial to public order and with a view to preventing him from indulging into similar activities he passed the impugned order of detention.
3. learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the two grounds which formed the basis for the petitioner's detention do not relate to public order, instead they relate to law and order. As regards ground No. 1, we do not agree with the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the incident alleged therein does not relate to public order. Smt. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, was assassinated on 31-10-1984 by a Sikh, as a result of which there was great commotion in the country and members of the general public were agitated against Sikhs. The atmosphere was surcharged with anger and hatred against the Sikhs. In that situation the petitioner is alleged to have instigated a crowd of 400 to 500 people in the market to ruin the Sikhs and on his instigation the crowd looted the cloth shops and property belonging to Sikhs. This action of one community was directed against the other section of the community. The extent and reach of the incident had the potentiality to disturb public peace and tranquillity. It was bound to affect the even tempo of the life of the community as the incident was likely to create riot and public disorder. For all these reasons, it is difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that ground 1 had no nexus with public order.
4. learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner's detention on ground is not sustainable for another reason, namely, that the police authorities withheld relevant material from the District Magistrate. In this connection it is submitted that ground is founded on the recovery of the stolen goods from the petitioner's possession. Recovery memo which may have been prepared by the police at the time of the recovery of the stolen property was not placed before the District Magistrate. Moreover, a copy of the recovery memo which was a relevant material was not supplied to the petitioner. In the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents there is no express assertion that the recovery memo was placed by the police authorities before the District Magistrate. There is further no express averment that copy of the recovery memo was served on the petitioner along with the grounds. On the other hand, it is asserted in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents that the copy of the recovery memo was supplied to the petitioner in the criminal trial. The recovery of the stolen goods prima facie established the petitioner's involvement in the incident alleged to have taken place on 1-11-1984. The District Magistrate must have been influenced by the statement contained in ground 1 that stolen goods were recovered from the petitioner's possession, but he had no occasion to see the recovery memo as the police did not place that document before him. The recovery memo is a relevant material, but a copy of the same was not supplied to the petitioner as a result of which he was denied opportunity to make effective representation. This vitiates the continued detention of the petitioner.
5. After investigation of Crime No. 938 of 1984 which is the basis of ground 1, the police submitted charge-sheet against three persons and it did not submit any charge-sheet against the petitioner as no case appears to have been made out against him. Since the police has itself not found the petitioner involved in the incident and as the copy of the recovery memo was not supplied to the petitioner his constitutional right to make representation was adversely affected. For these reasons the petitioner's continued detention on ground 1 is not sustainable.
6. As regards ground No. 2, it is confined to an assault made by the petitioner and his associates on Kedar Nath at about 11 P.M. in a Gali, in respect of which a case Under Section 307,1.P.C. was registered. A solitary assault on a single individual in the dead of night ordinarily cannot have the potentiality to disturb public order. In view of the principles laid down in Ajay Dixit v. Union of India , the facts stated in ground No. 2 do not relate to public order, instead they relate to law and order. The petitioner's detention on ground 2 is therefore unsustainable.
7. In view of the above discussion, the petitioner's continued detention on the aforesaid two grounds is rendered illegal.
8. We accordingly allow the petition and direct the respondents to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith unless required to be detained in some other case.