1. The present petition is directed against the order dated 26.06.2012 passed by the learned District Judge below application Exh.4 in Misc.
Civil Appeal No.15/06 whereby the learned District Judge has set aside the order below application Exh.5 and has further granted injunction restraining the defendant from entering over the suit property and has further restrained the defendant from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff or of creating any obstruction to the plaintiff in the possession of the suit property.
2. I have heard Mr.B.B. Naik with Mr. Mishra with Mr.Rupera for the petitioner and Mr.Pandya for the respondent.
3. Upon perusal of the application Exh.4 and the impugned order passed by the District Judge, it shows that the Misc. Civil Appeal No.15/06 is still pending and the learned District Judge was required to examine the aspects of interim stay pending the appeal. However, the learned District Judge has set aside the the order passed by the Civil Judge below Exh. 5 which can be said as resulting into allowing the appeal. It is hardly required to be stated that when the application is for interim injunction pending the appeal, the Court is required to examine the aspect as to whether the order passed by the Civil Court against which the appeal has been preferred deserves to be suspended or not or whether any further interim order deserves to be passed or not. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the jurisdiction of the Court would be attracted resulting into allowing the appeal. When any interim application is filed, the Court is expected to pass an interim order, may be in a given case, such interim order may create a situation which may be as good as final relief, but the jurisdiction will be available to the Court only for the purpose of passing interim order pending the appeal and not beyond the same. The fact that the learned Sessions Judge has set aside the whole order passed below application Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No.218/04 would mean that while deciding the interim application, the learned District Judge has allowed the appeal as if the appeal is finally heard and not the interim application. Such in my view can be said as an apparent error of jurisdiction on the part of the learned District Judge.
4. If the subsequent order, at para 2 of the operative portion, is based on the earlier order passed by the learned District Judge, then the same also cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The jurisdiction is exceeded for setting aside of the order. The fact remains that by virtue of the said order, the interim application Exh. 4 is disposed of. The Court for all purpose has treated as final disposal of the appeal because at the 4th paragraph of the operative portion, the record and proceedings are also returned back to the trial court. Be as it may, the impugned order for setting aside of the order below Exh.5 passed by the trial court by no stretch of imagination can be sustained in the eye of law since the learned Civil Judge has exceeded the jurisdiction.
5. Apart from the above, when the interim application is being heard, naturally the party would make submission for a decision on the interim application and not for finally allowing of the appeal or not. If the learned Judge was hearing the interim application Exh.4, naturally the party would make submission accordingly, but it appears that after hearing the interim application, the final order has been passed in the appeal and therefore, such could be said as in breach of principles of natural justice since parties were not put to notice that the appeal is finally heard.
6. Mr.Pandya, learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Babhutmal Raichand Oswal Vs. Laxmibai R. Tarte reported in AIR 1975 SC 1297 and another decision in the case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim reported in AIR 1984 SC 38 for contending that under Article 227, this Court would not have power to interfere with the finding of fact or for correction of error of law and therefore, he submitted that if the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is taken into consideration, it would be a case for no interference by the High Court.
7. In my view, neither in the present case the Court would be concerned with the finding of fact nor would be concerned with the error of law but as observed hereinabove, it is apparently an error of jurisdiction committed by the District Court while deciding the interim application in the appeal. When the District Court was hearing the interim application, it could decide interim application only and it could not decide the aspects of final relief to be granted in the appeal. When the appeal was against the order below Exh. 5 passed by the Civil Court, the final relief to be considered and granted by the Court would be to set aside the order passed by the Civil Court below Exh. 5 and such can be only when the appeal is finally heard but not at the stage when the application Exh. 5 or any interim application is to be heard. Therefore, when there is an error of jurisdiction committed by the learned District Judge, it would be a case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution and the said decisions are of no help to the learned counsel for the respondent.
8. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that after the impugned order was passed by the District Court on 26.06.2007, this Court, in the present petition, had passed an order for issuance of notice only on 08.08.2007 and no interim injunction was granted by this Court on 08.08.2007 and the interim injunction came to be granted by this Court only on 27.08.2007 whereby the Court observed for maintenance of status quo as on that day to be maintained. The said order of status quo was extended till 12.09.2008 and thereafter, the said status quo is not extended. He submitted that after the notice was issued by this Court on 08.08.2007, the petitioner by taking law in his hand, on 09.08.2007, had broke open the lock which was applied by the respondent on the premises and they have entered in the premises. It was submitted that the said action of the petitioner is in breach of the injunction granted by the District Court and therefore, the application is also made by the respondent original plaintiff before the learned Civil Judge under Order 39 Rule 2A of CPC. He submitted that the said application is still pending before the lower court but no decision is taken. In the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, until the petitioner purges from the contempt, he is not entitled to be heard either before this Court or before the lower court. He submitted that the police complaint was filed but no action is taken. In the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, the petitioner has acted all the while in a high handed manner in breach of injunction by taking law in his hand and therefore, this Court may issue suitable directions. He submitted that the trial court should first decide the application for breach of injunction and until that question is finalised, the suit may not proceed further and it is only after the purging from the contempt, if ultimately found, the suit may be further considered by the Court. The same is the stand of the respondent even in the proceedings of the appeal before District Court. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as per his information, the whole appeal is finally decided, but in the event this Court finds that the interim application was decided and the appeal is yet to be decided, then also, until the petitioner purges from the contempt, the appeal may not be further heard. In short, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the application for breach to the injunction under Order 39 Rule 2A of CPC should first be considered and decided by the Court and the other proceedings should be considered only thereafter. The learned counsel also submitted that in view of the breach committed by the respondent, this Court may not entertain the present petition and the petition may also be dismissed.
9. Whereas, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the direction is given to decide the application under Order 39 Rule 2A, the petitioner has no objection because as per the petitioner, he was in actual possession of the suit property. He submitted that the registered sale deed is there which is pressed in service by the original plaintiffrespondent herein but the said sale deed is not signed by the deceased Mahant Ramlaxman since he was using signature and not the thumb impression, whereas the sale deed executed by him is by application of thumb impression. Therefore, he submitted that the sale deed is not genuine and the Will has been executed in favour of the petitioner who has acquired the property.
10. Whereas, Mr.Pandya, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the sale deed has been executed by the owner of the property during his lifetime in presence of the Registrar, but as his health was not good and he was sick, thumb impression has been applied. The consideration is also paid by the respondent. Thereafter, the sale deed has been executed in presence of witnesses who are mentioned in the sale deed and therefore, he submitted that the Will may not be relied upon but the sale deed should be relied upon for undertaking inquiry about the rights of the parties. He submitted that as stated in the sale deed, the possession was entrusted to the respondent and he was in possession of this property and therefore when he relalised that his possession may be disturbed he had to file the suit.
11. Mr.Naik, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the petitioner came to know about the so called sale deed, a separate suit is also filed for setting aside the sale deed and the same is in fact pending. He submitted that the actual possession of the property has never been handed over to the respondent even during the life time of the deceased Mahant Ramlaxman and the petitioner has continued to be in possession all throughout of the property even after the so called sale deed. In his submission, if the possession was of the petitioner which was rightfully found by the trial court while deciding the application Exh. 5, there was no question of breach of any injunction as sought to be canvassed on behalf of the respondent.
12. Having considered the above, it does appear that the application under Order 39 Rule 2A of CPC is produced by the petitioner at Annexure Z2 (III) at page 149, it has been mentioned that on 09.08.2007, the petitioner has entered the premises by breaking open the lock etc. Petitioner thereafter has undertaken other activities. The said contents of the application would atleast go to show that the respondent, as on today, when this Court is to consider the matter finally, is not in possession of the premises but the possession is of the petitioner subject to the contention of the respondent that the said possession has been illegally taken over. Even if the aspect of alleged breach of the injunction as stated by the respondent in the above referred application for breach of the injunction is to be considered, the Court would be required to consider the aspect as to who was in actual possession of the property on the date when the Suit was filed. Such can be concluded only after a fact finding inquiry by giving an opportunity to both the sides is undertaken. If the plaintiff was in actual physical possession of the property and the defendantpetitioner herein by taking law in his hand has taken over the possession of the premises, there may be a case to be further considered for passing appropriate orders in the application for breach of injunction. However, if it is found that the defendant was in possession and the plaintiff petitioner was not in actual possession and only sale deed was executed, then in that case, the application for alleged breach of injunction may not have any substance. I find it proper to leave the matter at that stage because the parties are yet to be given opportunity to lead evidence on the aspect of actual possession of the property on the date of the suit and thereafter, the application is yet to be finalised by the civil court. But suffice it to state that until that question of actual physical possession on the date of the suit by party to the proceedings is finalised, it is not possible to record the conclusion that whether any breach of the injunction was committed or not, but such aspects will be required to be considered and examined by the lower court, where the application is pending, in accordance with law. In any event, when the application is made for alleged breach of injunction, it would be required for the Court to decide the application in accordance with law as early as possible.
13. Another aspect which deserves to be considered is that if pending the proceedings before the Court either party to the proceedings has taken law in their hand and the possession is taken over, the Court may be required to consider the aspect for awarding of compensation towards deprivation of properties or otherwise. Further, even if it is found by the Court that the actual possession of the property was not of the original plaintiff and consequently, in spite of the fact that the sale deed was executed and the consideration was paid, the Court may be required to modulate the relief in the suit at the time of final disposal. When even as per the respondent, after 09.08.2007, the possession of the property is with the petitioner, on the face of the sale deed, it would be appropriate that the petitioner should deposit the amount of sale consideration with the reasonable interest in the Court until the application under Order 39 Rule 2A of CPC is finalised or until the suit is finalised. In order to see that at the ultimate disposal of the aforesaid application or the suit, as the case may be, the Trial Court may be in a position to pass appropriate orders by modulating the relief, if required in accordance with law, appropriate directions deserve to be issued.
14. It may be recorded that as such, if the petition is to be considered strictly, on the basis of the impugned order, under Article 227, the observations made hereinabove for the action taken by the party after passing of the impugned order may not be required. However, as the aforesaid development has taken place, after this Court issued notice and at one point of time it also granted interim injunction of maintenance of status quo and further in order to see that there may not be disturbance of law and order, when evidence came on record that the possession is not with the respondent after 09.08.2007, it appears to the Court that proper care deserves to be taken for subsequent development of the matter while finally deciding the present petition.
15. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussions, the impugned order passed by the learned District Judge below application Exh.4 is set aside with the further direction that
1) The appeal being Misc. Civil Appeal No.15/06 pending before the learned District Judge arising from the order below Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No.218/04 shall be put for final disposal and the decision shall be rendered as early as possible preferably within a period of three months from the receipt of the order of this Court after giving opportunity of hearing to both the sides.
2) Until final decision is taken in the appeal, status quo as prevailing on today qua the suit property shall be maintained by both the sides on the condition that the petitioner deposits the amount of Rs.75000 with interest at the rate of 8% p.a. from the date of sale until 30.11.2012 and the said amount shall be deposited with trial Court on or before 31.12.2012.
3) It is also directed that the Trial Court shall decide the application for breach of injunction dated 18.08.2007 after giving opportunity of hearing to both the sides in light of the observations made by this Court hereinabove in the present judgment and in accordance with law and such application shall be decided as early as possible preferably within a period of six months from the receipt of the order of this Court.
4) It is also observed that pendency of the appeal before the District Court being Misc. Civil Appeal No.15/06 shall not operate as a bar to the trial court in deciding the present application. It is also observed that the rights and contentions of both the sides shall remain open.
5) The trial court shall be at the liberty to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law on the basis of evidence available before it and the rights of either side shall not be prejudiced by any observations made by the trial court at the stage of Exh. 5 or by the District Court in the application Exh. 4 or by this Court in the present judgment.
16. Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Considering the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.
*bjoy (JAYANT PATEL, J.)