The petition seeks issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondent no.1 to grant benefit of Next Higher Pay Scale to the petitioner as per Government Order issued on 02.12.2000 by respondent no.1 after completing 14 years of service on the post of Review Officer on 01.01.2008 with arrear and all consequential benefits.
The petition also seeks issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondent no.1 to grant benefit of IInd Assured Career Progression (ACP) to the petitioner as per Government Order dated 05.11.2014 passed by respondent no.1 after completing 16 years of service for the post of Review Officer on 01.01.2010 with arrear and all consequential benefits.
Learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner was appointed in Civil Secretariat on the post of Typist on 25.10.1979 and later on he was promoted on the post of Upper Divison Assistant (presently known as Review Officer) on 01.01.1994. He after attaining the age of superannuation retired on 31.01.2012.
It is submitted that on 02.12.2000, the State Government issued a Government Order wherein it was provided that the employees who have completed eight years of service on the same post on 01.01.1996 or later will get the Selection Grade. He has submitted that the Selection Grade of the petitioner was due on 01.01.2002 after completing his eight years of service on the post of Review Officer but the same was not given to the petitioner. It is also submitted that vide the same Government Order dated 02.12.2000, the petitioner was also entitled for getting next higher pay scale after completing his 14 years of service on the post of Review Officer on 01.01.2008 but the same was also not granted to the petitioner.
Learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner was not granted two service benefits on 01.01.2002 and 01.01.2008 after completing his service of 8 years and 14 years. He has submitted that the petitioner is also entitled for the benefit of IInd ACP as per Government Order dated 05.11.2014, which was due on 01.01.2010.
Learned counsel has submitted that the petitioners have made several representations but nothing has been done till now.
Per Contra, learned counsel for the State has vehemently opposed the submissions made by petitioner's counsel and submitted that the petitioner has already superannuated on 31.01.2012. Service benefits which the petitioner are claiming are of the year 2002, 2008 and 2010 respectively. The petitioner has filed this writ petition after eight years of superannuation. No specific explanation has been given for not approaching the Court at the relevant time and the only explanation which has been contended is that the petitioner kept making representations but nothing has been done till now. It is settled law that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation, the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
From perusal of the record, it is apparent that by way of filing the instant petition, the petitioner is claiming services benefits all the way from 2002 although he has already superannuated in the year 2012 i.e. after 8 years. No justification has been given for not approaching the Court at the relevant time.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 2009 (2) SCC 479, S.S. Balu and another vs. State of Kerala & others pleased to observe as under:
"It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15.01.2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage."
Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of NDMC v. Pan Singh reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278 held as under:
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322).
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 524 and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628).
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: ((2007) 9 SCC p. 277, paras 9-10) "9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition has been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik, (1976) 3 SCC 579).
"10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It wold depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone."
In view of the above, this Court do not find any good reason to interfere with the matter after the lapse of about eight years.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay.
Order Date :- 19.1.2021 nishant/-