JUDGMENT Vinod Prasad, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the applicant and the learned A.G A.
2. An FIR was lodged by respondent Sri Raghunandan Lal Sharma as case crime No. 21 of 2004, under Section 409 I.P.C., P.S. Bichhuan, District Mainpuri.
3. The allegations, which were levelled in the first information report are that the present applicant Ramesh Chandra Tiwari, who is said be the manager, did not allow the amount of fees and other amount of various heads to be deposited in the bank. The further allegations in the FIR are that the present applicant withdrew the said amount totalling to Rs. 78,584/- and embezzled the same. The matter was investigated by the police and the charge sheet was said against the applicant in the Court which is now being prayed to be quashed through this application.
4. Disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is for the trial court to take the evidence and record a finding where the accused is guilty or not. From the facts which I have mentioned above, it is clear that there are serious allegations of defaultcation of money against the applicant. The informant has given a statement against the applicant anointing him with the offence under Section 409 I.P.C.. The informant must get a chance to substantiate his version which he has levelled in the FIR. Statement of the informant, if found to be true coupled with the documentary evidences will be sufficient to convict the applicant.
5. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that no offence at all is disclosed against the present applicant. Learned Counsel relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court . In paragraph 7 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has relied upon the categories, which are mentioned in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC (Criminal) 426. After relying upon the said judgment in Bhajan Lal's case, the Apex Court in paragraph 10 of the said judgment of 2006 has been pleased to observed thus;-
In all these cases there were either statements of witnesses or seizure of illicit distilled liquor which factors cannot be said to be without relevance. Whether the material already in existence or to be collected during investigation would be sufficient for holding the accused persons concerned guilty has to be considered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the charge it can be decided whether prima facie case has been made out showing commission of an offence and involvement of the charged persons. At that stage also evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Charge can be framed, if there are materials showing possibility about the commission of the crime as against certainty. That being so, the interference at the threshold with the FIR is to be in very exceptional circumstances as held in R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal cases.
6. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law as has been laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the applicant, it is clear that the law is that if after the charge sheet is laid no offence at all is disclosed only then the prosecution can be quashed. The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment relied upon by the counsel for the applicant itself has said in the aforesaid paragraph No. 10 that it is the duty of the trial court to critically appreciate the evidences and record findings. It is not the function of the High Court to quash the prosecution by such an exercise. The contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant are all based on disputed questions of fact, which can not be gone into in the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.. Learned Counsel further relied upon a judgment Pepsi Food Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate.
7. The said judgment is also of no help to the case of the applicant as it lays down the same principle which has been quoted above. Moreover, the facts of the aforesaid judgment in Pepsi Food were entirely different from the case of the present applicant, which is involved in the case of defaultcation of money.
8. In view of the above, I do not find any reason to quash the prosecution at the very initial stage.
9. This application is, therefore, dismissed.