This revision is filed at the instance of the first defendant in the suit, challenging the order passed in I.A.No.588 of 2008 in O.S.No.485 of 2005. The suit was filed originally in O.S.No.652 of 1996 on the file of Sub Court, Trichy, which has been subsequently transferred and renumbered as O.S.No.485 of 2005 on the file of District Munsif, Trichy by the respondents 2 and 3 in the revision petition. Seeking the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants 3 to 6 therein from interfering with the day to day administration of the college running by the A.D.S. Educational trust being the second plaintiff, constituted by the first plaintiff and the first defendant.
2. A perusal of the said suit would show that it has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff and the first defendant as well. The first plaintiff in the said suit is the Managing trustee and the second plaintiff is the trust. The first defendant in the suit is the Vice Chairman of the trust and the defendants 3 to 6 are said to be the trustees. The suit is filed on the footing that the plaintiffs and defendants 1 and 2 are in enjoyment of the trust and defendants 3 to 5 are interfering with the administration after having relinquished their right. Pending the suit, number of applications have been filed, which was all been disposed of. It is also seen that this Hon'ble Court in C.R.P.Nos.359/2006, 1427/2007 and 1324/2008 has given specific direction to dispose of the suit in and by its order dated 26.04.2006, 28.09.2007 and 29.07.2008 respectively, thereby directing the trial Court to dispose of the suit expeditiously by fixing outer limit of few months.
3. Pending suit, the second defendant in the suit died on 15.12.1998. However, the legal representative of the deceased second defendant have not been brought on record. Under those circumstances, an application was filed in I.A.No.588 of 2008 by the first respondent in the revision petition seeking to implead himself as the defendant in the suit being the legal representative of the deceased second defendant. The said application has been filed basing reliance upon the Trust Expansion deed which has been marked as Ex.P2, dated 16.12.1987, in I.A.No.588 of 2008. According to the petitioner, in I.A.No.588 of 2008 in view of Clause 6 of the said Trust Expansion deed (Ex.P.2), the petitioner is entitled to be impleaded as a defendant.
4. The said application has been opposed by the plaintiffs as well as the first defendant. The Court has allowed the application by holding that as per Ex.P2, the petitioner in I.A.No.588 of 2008 is entitled to be implemented as a party. The Court below has further held that in view of the fact that there is no dispute that the petitioner in I.A.No.588 of 2008 is the eldest child of the deceased second defendant, the application will have to be ordered. Challenging the said order, the first defendant in the suit has preferred this revision.
5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the revision is maintainable at the instance of the petitioner, since the plaintiffs have filed the suit claiming the relief for the plaintiffs and the first defendant together. According to the learned counsel that Clause 6 of the said Trust Extension deed (Ex.P2) authorised the first respondent herein to be a trustee and in any case until and unless the same is approved by the Executive Committee, he has no locus standi to get himself impleaded.
6. On the contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that the very revision is not maintainable, since the plaintiffs have not chosen to file revision. It is further contended that there is a collusion between the plaintiffs and the petitioner and when a caveat has been filed by the first respondent and anticipating a revision by the plaintiffs, the present revision has been filed by collusion between the plaintiffs and the petitioner in order to get over the caveat filed by the first respondent. It is further submitted that a perusal of Clause 6 of the Trust Extension deed (Ex.P2) would clearly show that by consent, a person belonging to a family of the deceased trustee can be made as a trustee and even if any opposition from any member, then the eldest child will have to be the trustee. According to the learned counsel that therefore, the petitioner in I.A.No.588 of 2008 being the eldest child, he is entitled to be impleaded as a trustee.
7. The learned counsel for the first respondent has also submitted that the suit is on the trial stage and the evidence of P.W.1 is in progress. He further submitted that the plaintiffs have filed the amended plaint showing the first respondent, as the seventh defendant and therefore, no interference is called for at this stage. The learned counsel for the first respondent further submitted that the application lacks bona fide and hence, the revision has to be dismissed.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 4 submitted that in spite of specific directions obtained from this Hon'ble Court at the instance of the respondents 4 to 6, number of applications have been filed one after another, which are very frivolous in nature, with a sole view to drag on the suit, since the plaintiffs and the first defendants are in control of the administration. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the petitioner is nowhere prejudiced by the impleading of the first respondent. According to the learned counsel for the respondents 4 to 6, in spite of the orders of the Hon'ble High Court, the suit is not disposed of by continuous filing of applications. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents 4 to 6 submitted that the suit will have to be disposed of by an early date, so that a finality could be arrived between the parties.
9. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondents.
10. It is seen from the records that the suit has been filed as early as in the year 1996. It is also seen from the records that in spite of specific directions obtained from this Hon'ble Court, the suit is not able to proceed with.
11. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is entitled to challenge the order impleading the first respondent, in the opinion of this Court cannot be sustained. It is for the plaintiff to choose a party as a defendant, because the plaintiff is in a position of dominus litus in a suit. It has been held by the Hon'ble High Court in a case reported in 1999 (III) CTC 335 (Ramaswamy.S v. State of Tamil Nadu) that the plaintiff is a dominus litus in a suit. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the contentions raised by the respondents cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the plaintiff has not chosen to file the revision challenging the order of impleading and in view of subsequent development that he has in fact filed an application amending the plaint by showing the first respondent as the seventh defendant in the suit.
12. In so for as the contention on merit that the Clause 6 of the Trust Extension deed (Ex.P2) does not authorise the impleading of the first respondent is concerned, this Court is of the opinion that a reading of the Clause 6 would clearly show that by consent, a member of the family belonging to the deceased trustee can be made as a trustee. It is further stated that in the event of any dispute between the family members of the deceased trustee, then the eldest child would become the trustee. It is clearly stated that the said exercise should be done without delay and immediately. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that automatically that the first respondent cannot be made as a party defendant does not merit acceptance. In the present case on hand, if there is no dispute between other members, then the first respondent would be entitled to represent a family as a trustee. On the other hand, even if there is any dispute, the first respondent will again be entitled to represent the family as a trustee. Therefore, looking from any angle, the first respondent is entitled to be represent the family as a trustee of the trust.
13. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the name of the first respondent will have to be approved by the Executive Committee of the trust and therefore, until the same he cannot be permitted to represent the deceased second respondent also cannot be accepted. It is seen from the records, that the second respondent has been made by name as a defendant. Admittedly, the trust is a private trust. One has to see the object of the trust. The object of the trust is that if a trustee dies necessarily is estate will have to be represented from a member of his own family. Keeping that object in mind, the contention that unless and until the Executive Committee of the trust approves the name, the first respondent cannot be made to represent the deceased estate of the second defendant cannot be accepted. It is also seen when the second defendant died as early as on 16.12.1998, no steps have been taken so far to approve the name of the first respondent as a trustee. This Court is of the opinion that the actual approval of the first respondent as a trustee is only a procedural one and there is no power vested with the trust to reject the name of the first respondent from being a trustee. It is also seen on a perusal of the plaint that when the other trustees died their legal heirs have been brought on as a trustee without any objections. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first respondent cannot represent the estate of the second defendant.
14. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the order passed by the Court below does not merit any interference. This Court also feels that the revision is against misconceived, since the petitioner is not an aggrieved party and since the suit has been filed by the plaintiff and not by the petitioner, he has got no locus standi to challenge the same. However, it is made clear that the order passed in the interlocutory application as well as in the revision will not stand in the way by the respective parties from agitating all issues at the time of hearing the suit. As seen from the records, the suit has been filed in the year 1996. One way or another, it has been dragged on till now. As contended by the learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 6 that the suit will have to be disposed of at an early date in order to resolve the dispute between the parties. Therefore, the Court below is directed to dispose of the suit within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The trial Court is directed to submit a report before this Court after the disposal of the suit. With this observation, the civil revision petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.
jikr To The District Munsif Tiruchirapalli.