JUDGMENT Sen, J.
1. The facts of the case which have given rise to this appeal are set forth in the judgment of the lower appellate Court and need not be recapitulated. A decree for profits was passed against the appellant by the revenue Court on 30th October 1926. An appeal was filed in the Court of the District Judge on 17th January 1927. Ex facie the appeal was time barred. The lower appellate Court -dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. It is contended before us that the lower appellate Court has erred in computing the period of limitation having regard to the provisions of Section 12, Sub-section (2), Lim. Act. It is not necessary to examine this contention in detail because we are clearly of opinion that even upon computing the period of limitation most favourably to the appellant, the appeal is clearly time barred by at least three days. It was contended that the appellant was misled by the advice of some legal practitioner whose name we do not know, The Court below has evidently disbelieved this story. Where a Court below upon consideration of the facts before it and the surrounding circumstances comes to the conclusion that no proper case has been made out for exercising its discretion for extending the period of limitation under Section 5, Lim. Act and dismisses the appeal upon that ground, there does not appear to be any point of law involved in the case under Section 100, Civil P. C, for interference in second appeal. It has not been shown that the lower appellate Court either did not exercise its discretion at all, or acted arbitrarily in the exercise of its discretion. We are of opinion that this case calls for no interference and we accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs including in this Court, fees on the higher scale.