JUDGMENT Yatindra Singh, J.
1. This is a typical case : unfortunate one may say. One has heard, a brother contesting a case against other brothers : or a son against his father though rare but not unheard of--but this is a case between a daughter and her mother. They even deny the names of each other. One does not hear such cases ; at least I haven't. I wish this case could have been settled amicably. With the help of the advocates, efforts were made but were unsuccessful. Now. I have to undertake this painful duty to decide this matter on merits. Here are the facts.
FACTS
2. Sri Hardwari Lal and his wife (the mother) have three daughters. The dispute here is between the youngest daughter (the daughter) and wife of Hardwari Lal, the mother of the youngest daughter. Sri Hardwari Lal is a silent spectator in this dispute and the two other daughters are the players behind the scenes siding with their mother ; they have filed affidavits contradicting their younger sister's version and supporting the mother's.
3. The mother filed an application under Section 2A (5) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972 (the Act) for ejectment of the daughter from a part (the premises) of the house situate at mohalla Dilwaraganj. Thana Kotwall. Shahjahanpur. This application was filed on the ground :
The mother was the owner of the house. In whose part (the premises) the daughter was residing as a licensee. The ownership was claimed on the basis of the sale deed dated 18.10.1967 where the name of purchaser is mentioned as Rama Devi wife of Hardwari Lal.
A Joint Intimation of this licence same was given to the District Magistrate on 14.2.1996.
The daughter was refusing to vacate the same after the expiry and determination of the licence.
The name of the daughter is Ram Devi and not Rama Devi.
Her (the mother's) name is Rama Devi and not Ram Kali as claimed by the daughter.
4. The daughter did not agree and contested the case on the following ground :
She (the daughter) and not the mother is owner of the entire house.
The description of the purchaser in the sale deed dated 18.10.1967 is wrong. It should be 'daughter or Instead of 'wife or Hardwari Lal ;
Her (the daughter's) name is Smt. Rama Devi and not Ram Devi as claimed by the mother.
The sale deed could not be in favour of her mother as her name ts Ram Kali and not Rama Devi.
She (the daughter) has perfected her rights by adverse possession.
The daughter had also filed an Original Suit No. 692 of 1994 against her mother that mother may be restrained from dispossessing the daughter. This suit has been dismissed as withdrawn on 8.1.1999.
5. The parties claimed to be the owners of the house on the basis of the same sale deed dated 18.10.1967 where purchaser is Rama Devi wife of Hardwarl Lal. Both of them claimed their names to be 'Rama Devi' and denied that the name of the other was Rama Devi. The prescribed authority by its impugned order dated 4.5.1998 has directed the daughter to hand over possession within two months on the following findings :
The sale deed Is in favour of wife of Hardwari Lal. Neither any correction deed has been executed, nor any legal proceedings have been taken to correct it. The mother is prima facie owner of the house.
The daughter was a licensee.
A joint Intimation that the daughter was a licensee was given to the District Magistrate on 14.2.1996.
The licence has been terminated and yet the daughter has not vacated the premises.
Hence the present writ petition by the daughter.
POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
6. I have heard Shri Janardan Sahai for the daughter and Shri Atiq Ahmad for the mother. Following points arise for determination In the case :
(i) What was the status of the daughter ? Was the daughter a licensee under the Act ? Was she liable for eviction under the Act or should the mother file a regular suit ?
(ii) The period of licence under Section 2A of the Act is 3 months, which could be further extended by another 3 months. Are eviction proceedings barred ? Can a licensee claim adversely ?
1st Point : THE STATUS OF THE DAUGHTER
7. Both sides rely upon a sale deed dated 18.10.1967. The Prescribed Authority has held that the age of the daughter in the year 1967 was 11 years. There Is nothing to show how she got the money to purchase this house. And if Sri Hardwarl Lal. her father purchased it, then what was the special reason for doing so. Neither any correction deed has been executed, nor any other legal proceedings have been taken to correct the description from 'wife of to 'daughter of Hardwart Lal. The father, unless there is some special reason, will not purchase a property for his youngest daughter omitting his two other daughters and his wife. In these circumstances, the mother was rightly held to be prima facie owner of the house. Of course the proceedings under Section 2A of the Act are summary in nature and the findings are relevant for the purposes of these proceedings only. They do not bind a civil court.
8. The word 'licence' is not defined under the Act. It Is defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 (the Easement Act). A person may grant a right to other to do something on his immovable property, which is otherwise unlawful. Such a right may be, (1) an easement or (2) an Interest in the immovable property. But if It is neither of the above two, then it is called licence. If a happily married daughter, starts living in her mother's house with mother's permission along with her husband (and even with her mother-in-law), then this neither amounts to an easement, nor an Interest in the mother's house : she lives there as a licensee. The daughter here did not claim to be a tenant : she resided therein along with her husband (and earlier with her mother-in-law before her death) merely as a licensee.
9. The counsel for the daughter has submitted that : no joint intimation was given to the District Magistrate ; the daughter is not a licensee under Section 2A of the Act ; and no proceedings under Section 2A (5) can be taken. This submission has no merits due to the following three reasons.
The Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding that a joint intimation was given to the District Magistrate on 14.2.1994. This finding is not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have reached.
The daughter could not establish any legal rights and is not entitled to invoke equity jurisdiction of this Court.
A single Judge of this Court has taken a view that, 'there is nothing In the provisions contained under Section 2A (5) to restrict the provision in cases of licence granted under Section 2A alone'. And 1 see no reasons to differ with this view.
The daughter was a licensee under Section 2A of the Act and was liable for eviction in proceedings under Section 2A (5) of the Act.
2nd Point : ARE EVICTION PROCEEDING BARRED ?
10. The joint Intimation was given on 14.2.1994. The licence was terminated by the notice dated 7.5.1996 and then the present proceedings were started. The counsel for the daughter has submitted that the licence can only be given for three months, which could be extended for another three months (i.e. for total period of six months only) and as the present proceedings were started much after expiry of six months, no proceeding for eviction can be taken.
Once a Licensee always a licensee
11. It is true that the licence was terminated much after expiry of six months and then the present proceedings for eviction were started, but the daughter's status as a licensee would not change merely for the reason that six months had expired. Even after termination of a licence, the possession though unauthorised does not become adverse. A licensee is estopped from challenging the status in view of the Section 116 of the Evidence Act. A licensee, who has obtained possession on account of the licence. must surrender possession before the licensee can be allowed to claim adversely, to the licensor. The daughter here has not yet surrendered the possession to the mother. She can neither claim adversely, nor the present proceedings for her eviction are barred.
12. It was more than a century ago that the English Courts have said :
Nothing worse can happen In a free country than to force people to be churlish about their rights for fear that their indulgence may be abused, and to drive them to prevent the enjoyment of things which, although they are matters of private property, naturally give pleasure to many persons besides the owner, under the fear that their good nature may be misunderstood.
A division bench of our Court three quarter of century ago approved it and said :
And if those acts (of grace and favour) by themselves are to be regarded as acts indicating adverse possession, there can be no doubt that the Zamindars will soon think of putting an end to all such ads of grace and favour.
Of course, these observations were in different setting. In the present context, I would like to add : An act of love and affection may not be misused lest the people may become wary of acting on these considerations.
13. Section 2A (5) of the Act merely grants the protection against the eviction for the period of licence and not after expiry of the same. The jurisdiction under Section 2A (5) of the Act depends upon following three factors :
(i) The period of licence must have expired
(ii) The licensee does not vacate and
(iii) The licensee has been given reasonable opportunity.
Here all the three conditions are satisfied. There is no illegality in the Impugned order.
Licensee is only entitled to reasonable time
14. A licence can be revoked unless it is covered by Section 60 of the Easement Act. In this case, there is nothing to show that licence was irrevocable. It is not covered by Section 60 of the Easement Act. The revocation of a licence could be express, implied, or by fiction of law (Sections 61 and 62 of the Easement Act). Here the revocation was express. Section 63 of the Easement Act clarifies that a licensee after revocation is only entitled to reasonable time to leave the premises and to remove his goods unless the case is covered under Section 64 of the Easement Act. The licence was neither for consideration, nor the licensee is being evicted before period of the licence--the case is covered by the Section 63 rather than the Section 64 of the Easement Act. The daughter is only entitled to reasonable time to remove her goods : which, looking Into circumstances and relationship of the parties, should be three months.
CONCLUSION
15. It is with some sadness that I have come to the end of this case : despite everyone's efforts the case could not be amicably resolved. But this does not mean that it can now be amicably settled. I leave this case with the hope that good sense will prevail and the mother, the daughter, the other family members will settle the matter amicably.
16. The daughter was a licensee liable for eviction in proceedings under Section 2A (5) of the Act. In case the daughter (the petitioner) does not vacate the premises within reasonable time of three months, she will be liable for eviction. The writ petition has no merits. It is dismissed but without any costs.