JUDGMENT
1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the notice dated March 24, 2003 (Annexure-10), issued by the Trade Tax Officer, Grade-II, Mobile Squad, Shamli, Muzaffarnagar, and further for direction to the respondents to release the Deshi Ghee detained from the vehicle in question.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that a vehicle was carrying the goods (Deshi Ghee), and as the proper documents were not found of the goods, the vehicle and the goods were seized by the respondent No. 2, Trade Tax Officer, Grade II and the order impugned was passed. Hence this petition.
3. Shri Rakesh Ranjan Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the seizure has been in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice and the statutory provisions. Allegation made by the respondent No. 2 that the goods were not accompanied by documents is totally false and the seizure memo etc., is liable to be quashed.
4. On the contrary, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that against the order impugned, remedy has been provided under the statute itself by making a representation under the provisions of section 13-A (6) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter called "the Act"), and therefore, this Court should not entertain the writ petition.
5. A Constitution Bench of the honourable Supreme Court, in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 192, held that as the Motor Vehicles Act is a self contained code and itself provides for appealable/revisable forum, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in matters relating to its provision.
6. Similar view has been reiterated in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. AIR 1985 SC 330 ; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura (1999) 1 SCC 472 and Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1999) 3 SCC 5.
7. In C.A. Abraham v. Income-tax Officer [1961] 41 ITR 425 (SC) ; AIR 1961 SC 609 and H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer Cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1990] 77 STC 1; (1992) (Supp.) 2 SCC 312, the honourable apex Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction.
8. The Constitution Bench of the honourable Supreme Court in K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 1089, considered the Privy Council judgment in Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council [1947] 15 ITR 332 ; AIR 1947 PC 78 and held that the writ Court can entertain the petition provided the order is alleged to be without jurisdiction or has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, or the provisions of the Act/Rules is under challenge.
9. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1983 SC 603, the honourable Supreme Court refused to extend the ratio of its earlier judgment in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86, wherein the court had held that prerogative writ can be issued to correct the error of the court or Tribunal below even if an appeal is provided under the statute under certain circumstances, i.e., the order is without jurisdiction or principles of natural justice have not been followed, and held that in case of assessment under the taxing statute, the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council [1947] 15 ITR 332 ; AIR 1947 PC 78 would be applicable for the reason that "the use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that use, is the test".
10. While deciding the said case, the honourable Supreme Court placed reliance on large number of judgments, particularly Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford (1859) 6 CB (NS) 336, Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. 1919 AC 368, and Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co., 1935 AC 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. AIR 1940 PC 105, wherein it had consistently been emphasised that the remedy provided by the statue must be followed and writ should not generally be entertained unless the statutory remedies are exhausted.
11. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks AIR 1999 SC 22 and Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1999] 112 STC 543 (SC) ; AIR 1999 SC 74 the apex Court came to the conclusion that writ should not generally be entertained if statute provides for remedy of appeal and even if it has been admitted, parties should be relegated to the appellate forum.
12. In Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh (1999) 1 SCC 209, the honourable apex Court has held that if the statute itself provides for a remedy of revision, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked.
13. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan 2001 AIR SCW 2993, the honourable Supreme Court while considering the issue of alternative remedy observed as under:-
"The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under section 20 and this fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available judicial prudence demands that the court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act."
14. A Constitution Bench of the honourable Supreme Court, in K.S. Rashid and Sons v. Income-tax Investigation Commission [1954] 25 ITR 167 ; AIR 1954 SC 207, held that article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. The said power is limited. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. Similar view has been reiterated by the apex Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah AIR 1955 SC 425, holding that the power of issuing writs are purely discretionary and no limit can be placed upon that discretion. However, the power can be exercised alone with recognised line and not arbitrarily and the court must keep in mind that the power shall not be exercised unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue and in other cases the parties must be relegated to the courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense.
15. Again a Constitution Bench of the honourable Supreme Court, in Union of India v. T.R. Varma AIR 1957 SC 882, held that it is well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. The apex Court held that existence of an another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue a writ ; but the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution unless there are good grounds there for.
16. Yet another Constitution Bench of the honourable Supreme Court, in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86, considered the scope of exercise of writ jurisdiction when remedy of appeal was there and held that writ would be provided where there is no other equally effective remedy. The court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of fundamental principles of justice. Therefore, in a proper case, powers of writ can be exercised, but should not be exercised generally where other adequate legal remedy is available though it may not be, per se, a bar to issue a writ of prerogative. The apex Court held that the remedy, being discretionary, cannot be asked as a matter of right, even if the order is a nullity, on the ground that it was passed by disregarding the rules of natural justice. The Court held as under :-
".........save in exceptional cases, the courts will not interfere under article 226 until all normal remedies available to a petitioner have been exhausted. The normal remedies in a case of this kind are appeal and revision. It is true that on a matter of jurisdiction or on a question that goes to the root of the case, the High Courts can entertain a petition at an earlier stage but they are not bound to do so and a petition would not be thrown out because the petitioner had done that which the courts usually direct him to do, namely, to exhaust his normal remedies before invoking an extraordinary jurisdiction..... The petitioner would have been expected to pursue his remedies of appeal and revision and could not have come to the High Court in the ordinary way until he had exhausted them."
17. In N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar AIR 1959 SC 422, the honourable apex Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against the orders of the Tribunal is undoubted; but then, it is well-settled that where there is another remedy provided, the court may properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under article 226 of the Constitution.
18. Another Constitution Bench of the honourable Supreme Court, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai [1964] 15 STC 450 ; AIR 1964 SC 1006, held that the remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. The power to give relief under article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power. Similar view has been reiterated in Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar AIR 1965 SC 1321.
19. In Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das AIR 1984 SC 653, the apex Court held that the High Court must exercise its power under article 226 with circumspection and while considering the matter of recovery of tax etc., it should not interfere save under very exceptional circumstances.
20. In S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan AIR 1988 SC 616, the honourable Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot be justified to exercise the power in writ jurisdiction if an effective alternative remedy is available to the party.
21. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil (2000) 6 SCC 293, while dealing with a similar issue, the apex Court held that the writ petition should not be entertained unless the party exhausted the alternative/statutory efficacious remedy.
22. In A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan (2000) 7 SCC 695, the honourable Supreme Court deprecated the practice of exercising the writ jurisdiction when efficacious alternative remedy is available. The court observed as under :-
"Though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the Constitutional powers of the High Court it is a well recognised principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies, one or the other before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy."
23. Similar view has been reiterated in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant (1995) 5 SCC 75, L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2001) 6 SCC 634, Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 8 SCC 509, GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer [2003] 259 ITR 19 (SC) ; (2003) 1 SCC 72 and Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 7 SCC 484.
24. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raja Mahendra Pal AIR 1999 SC 1786 while dealing with a similar issue the honourable apex Court has held as under :-
"It is true that the powers conferred upon the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature which can be invoked for the enforcement of any fundamental right or legal right.......... The Constitutional Court should insist upon the party to avail of the same instead of invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court. This does not however debar the Court from granting the appropriate relief to a citizen under peculiar and special facts notwithstanding the existence of alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of the special circumstances are required to be noticed before issuance of the direction by the High Court while invoking the jurisdiction under the said article."
25. In Government of A.P. v. J. Sridevi (2002) 5 SCC 37 the apex Court held that where a authority is competent to determine the issue, "the High Court in a writ jurisdiction should have directed the authority only to take an appropriate decision. When the statutory authority is vested with the power to determine the question as to the applicability of the provisions of the Act, it is ordinarily desirable to leave the question to be decided by such authority. The aggrieved party can file appeal against the decision within the framework provided under the statute and the ultimate decision also could be challenged under judicial review, if permitted in law."
26. In the State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 216 the apex Court held that existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the writ court but it could be a good ground for not entertaining the petition.
27. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107, the honourable Supreme Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and the court must consider the pros and cons of the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the writ seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights ; where there is a failure of principle of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the virus of an Act is challenged. While deciding the said case, the apex Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai AIR 1999 SC 22.
28. Thus, the law can be summarised that rule of exclusion of the writ jurisdiction is not a law but discretion to be exercised by the court considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and if the case requires any kind of evidence etc., the writ court may not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction at all.
29. Thus, in view of the above, as the statutory remedy was available to the petitioner in Muzaffarnagar itself, we fail to understand why the petitioner has taken the trouble to come to this Court. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel has merit and therefore the petition is liable to be dismissed only on this ground.
30. Petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy provided under section 13-A(6) of the Act.