Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 13.8.2007 passed by the respondent no.1 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition), whereby the petitioner's application for referring the industrial dispute to the Labour court has been rejected. A writ of mandamus is also sought for directing the respondents no. 2 and 3 to reinstate the petitioner in service as Peon in the institution in question and pay increments & salary for the period of illegal removal from the institution.
3. The brief facts leading to the case are that the petitioner was duly appointed as Peon (Paricharak) in the Allahabad Public School Subedarganj, Chaufatka, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the 'Institution') on 23.1.2001 but the respondents were taking work from him from morning 6.00 a.m. to evening 7.00 p.m. everyday and were compelled the petitioner to do 'Jhadu Pochha' work. It is stated that the respondents were paying salary to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 800/- per month in the year 2002, Rs. 1000/- per month in the year 2003, Rs. 1200/- per month in the year 2004, Rs. 1400/- per month since 2005 and thereafter Rs. 1500/- per month and were not paying salary to the petitioner as per Scheme of minimum wages at all. On 4.3.2006 the respondents have orally terminated the services of the petitioner. Against said oral termination the petitioner filed an application on 12.4.2006 before the respondent no.1 and prayed for constitution of reconciliation Board with regard to the industrial dispute and for grant of relief of continuity in service and for payment of his increased salary of entire period. Copy of the Memo of C.P. No. 49 of 2006 (Ram Shiromani Yadav Vs. Principal, Allahabad Public School & College and others) is on record as Annexure-1 to the writ petition.
4. It is further stated that the petitioner submitted before the respondent no. 1 various documents which are the basis of his claim on 22.1.2007 and 27.1.2007 from which it is fully proved that the petitioner was duly appointed Peon of the institution and he had worked in the institution continuously since date of his appointment i.e. from 23.1.2001 to 4.3.2006. The respondents no.2 and 3 filed their written statements on 4.1.2007 and denied the claim of the petitioner. Against the written statement of the respondents no. 2 and 3 the petitioner/ claimant filed his written statement/ replication on 27.1.2007 and given para wise reply of the same. But without considering the documents and evidence in respect of the petitioner's appointment and working in the Institution as Peon since 23.1.2001 to 04.3.2006 continuously without any break in service the respondent no. 1 rejected the claim petition of the petitioner holding that the petitioner could not prove his employment in the institution. The impugned order was published by the State Government on 13.8.2007. The copy of the impugned order dated 13.8.2007 passed by the opposite party no. 1 is on record as Annexure No. -6 to this writ petition. It is further stated that the petitioner is filing some documents and photographs which prove that the petitioner had worked in the Institution since 23.1.2001 to 4.3.2006. A true photostat copy of the character certificate issued by the respondent no.2 on 9.10.2001 and 22.1.2004 and some photographs of the petitioner which have been taken during service of the petitioner in the Institution as Peon are on record as Annexure No. 7 to the writ petition. The petitioner is ready to file several other documents and photo stat copy of the Attendance Register and Salary Register etc. before this Hon'ble Court which fully prove that the petitioner has worked in the Institution since 23.1.2001 to 4.3.2006 continuously without any break, if this Hon'ble Court requires the same.
5. It is further stated that since the petitioner has worked in the Institution continuously since 23.1.2001 to 4.3.2006 without any break in service and has completed 240 days in three calender years, therefore, his services could not be terminated orally without following the procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act. But illegally and arbitrarily without following the procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act, the respondents no.2 and 3 have orally terminated the petitioner's services on 4.3.2006 and ousted him from the Institution. It is stated that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in continuity of his service and is entitled to get outstanding arrears of salary for the period in which he has been illegally and arbitrarily ousted from the employment of the Institution. The actions of the respondents are wholly arbitrary, illegal and against the provision of the Industrial Dispute Act, hence, the impugned order dated 13.8.2007 is liable to be set aside and the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service in continuity of his old services and entitled to get all consequential benefits.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that impugned order dated 13.8.2007 passed by Dy. Labour Commissioner indicates that the application of petitioner for referring the industrial dispute to the Labour Court has been rejected on the ground that the petitioner could not prove his employment in the institution. Thus, the Dy. Labour Commissioner-respondent no.1 has finally adjudicated the relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and institution on merit which was not within the province of Dy. Labour Commissioner working on behalf of State Government. While deciding the question as to whether reference should be made or not, the respondent no.1 has acted illegally and improperly. The relevant scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act as disclosed by Section 12 is clear. When any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may hold conciliation proceeding in the manner prescribed in Section 12. If the conciliation officer's efforts to bring out a settlement of dispute failed then he makes a report under Section 12(4) and Section 12(5), provides inter alia that if on consideration of report referred to in Sub-section (4) the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is case for reference to the tribunal, it may make such reference. It however adds that where the appropriate government does not make such reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reason there for. But the respondent no.1 refused to make reference without recording any reason instead thereof final conclusion on merits of dispute has been communicated by respondent no.1 through impugned order, thus he has acted beyond his jurisdiction in proceeding to consider the merit of dispute while deciding whether the reference should be made or not.
7. It is further contended that although from the material placed before the respondent no.1, the petitioner has proved relation of master and servant, employer and employee between him and the institution and also proved the existence of industrial dispute between him and employer but respondent no.1 has failed to consider the same and without recording any reason as to why the petitioner could not establish the relationship of employer and employee between him and the institution and existence of dispute, has communicated merely his decision through the impugned order that petitioner did not prove his employment in the institution. Such finding arrived at by the respondent no.1 on disputed question of fact, was not within the province of respondent no.1/State Government, wherein the government is not supposed to reach final conclusion on merits of the case on disputed question of fact which is within provisions of industrial tribunal or Labour court. While elaborating his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that while exercising the power under Section 10(1) of Industrial Disputes Act, the function of appropriate government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi judicial function, and that in performing this administrative function the government can not delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by Section 10 of the said Act.
8. Contrary to it, the submission of learned counsel appearing for respondents is that Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act confers discretion on the appropriate Government either to refer the dispute or not to refer it for industrial adjudication wherein it has to form opinion on factual basis as to whether an industrial dispute exists or apprehended and in its opinion, it is expedient to refer the industrial dispute or not and while doing so the appropriate government is not precluded from considering the prima facie merit of the dispute and refuse to refer the dispute to the Labour court or Industrial Tribunal when it is found that the claim made by the party is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, and likewise if the impact of claim on general relations between the employer and employees in the region is likely to be adverse, the appropriate Government may take into account in deciding whether a reference should be made or not, therefore, it cannot be said that examination of prima facie merits of dispute is foreign to the inquiry which the appropriate Government is entitled to make in dealing with a dispute under Section 10(1).
9. Having considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, the question which arises for consideration of this court is that as to whether the government is precluded from considering the prima facie merit of the dispute and is precluded from refusing to refer the dispute under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act?
10. This question has been considered by Apex Court earlier at several occasions. In Bombay Union of Journalists and others Vs. The State of Bombay and another, AIR 1964 S.C. 1617. While dealing with the issue in para 6 of the decision the Apex Court observed that when the appropriate government considers the question as to whether a reference should be made under Section 12(5) it has to act under Section 10(1) of the Act which confers discretion on the appropriate government either to refer the dispute, or not to refer it, for industrial adjudication. In para-13 of the aforesaid decision, it was also observed that a writ of mandamus can be validly issued in such a case if it is established that it was the duty and obligation of the respondent no.1 to refer for adjudication an industrial dispute. For ready reference the pertinent observations made by Apex Court in aforesaid case in para 6 and 13 are extracted as under:
"6. When the appropriate Government considers the question as to whether a reference should be made under Section 12(5), it has to act under Section 10(1) of the Act, and Section 10(1) confers discretion on the appropriate Government either to refer the dispute, or not to refer it, for industrial adjudication according as it is of the opinion that it is expedient to do so or not. In other words, in dealing with an industrial dispute in respect of which a failure report has been submitted under Section 12(4) the appropriate Government ultimately exercises its power under Section 10(1), subject to this that Section 12(5) imposes an obligation on it to record reasons for not making the reference when the dispute has gone through conciliation and a failure report has been made under Section 12(4). This question has been considered by this Court in the case of the State of Bombay V. K.P. Krishnan, (1961) 1 SCR 227:(AIR 1960 SC 1223). The decision in that case clearly shows that when the appropriate Government considers the question as to whether any industrial dispute should be referred for adjudication or not, it may consider, prima facie the merits of the dispute and take into account other relevant considerations which would help it to decide whether making a reference would be expedient or not. It is true that if the dispute in question raises questions of law, the appropriate Government should not purport to reach a final decision on the said questions of law, because that would normally lie within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, on disputed questions of fact, the appropriate Government cannot purport to reach final conclusions, for that again would be the province of the Industrial Tribunal. But it would not be possible to accept the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded from considering even prima facie the merits of the dispute when it decides the question as to whether its power to make a reference should be exercised under Section 10(1) read with Section 12(5), or not. If the claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference. Likewise, if the impact of the claim on the general relations between the employer and the employees in the region is likely to be adverse, the appropriate Government may take that into account in deciding whether a reference should be made or not. It must, therefore be held that a prima facie examination of the merits cannot be said to be foreign to the enquiry which the appropriate Government is entitled to make in dealing with a dispute under Section 10(1)".
13 . . . . . .A writ of mandamus could be validly issued in such a case if it was established that it was the duty and the obligation of respondent no.1 to refer for adjudication an industrial dispute where the employee contends that the retrenchment effected by the employer contravenes the provisions of Section 25-F (c). Can it be said that the appropriate Government is bound to refer an industrial dispute even though one of the points raised in the dispute is in regard to the contravention of a mandatory provision of the Act? In our opinion, the answer to this question cannot be in the affirmative. Even if the employer retrenches the workman contrary to the provisions of Section 25-F (c), it does not follow that a dispute resulting from such retrenchment must necessarily be referred for industrial adjudication. The breach of Section 25-F is no doubt a serious matter and normally the appropriate Government would refer a dispute of this kind for industrial adjudication; but the provisions contained in Section 10(1) read with Section 12 (5) clearly show that even where a breach of Section 25-F is alleged, the appropriate Government may have to consider the expediency of making a reference and if after considering all the relevant facts, the appropriate Government comes to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient to make the reference, it would be competent to it to refuse to make such a reference. We ought to add that when we are discussing this legal position, we are necessarily assuming that the appropriate Government acts honestly and bona fide. If the appropriate Government refuses to make a reference for irrelevant considerations, or on extraneous grounds, or acts mala fide, that, of course, would be another matter; in such a case a party would be entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus."
11. In M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh Vs. State of M.P. and another, (1985) 2 SCC 103, while dealing with the content and scope of Government's powers to examine frivolousness and perversity of workman's demand and to reach to a prima facie conclusion against making a reference in para 5 of the decision the Apex Court observed as under:
"5. . . . . . . Therefore, while conceding a very limited jurisdiction to the State Government to examine patent frivolousness of the demands, it is to be understood as a rule, that adjudication of demands made by workmen should be left to the Tribunal to decide. Section 10 permits appropriate Government to determine whether dispute 'exists or is apprehended' and then refer it for adjudication on merits. The demarcated functions are (1) reference, (2) adjudication. When a reference is rejected on the specious plea that the Government cannot bear the additional burden, it constitutes adjudication and thereby usurpation of the power of a quasi-judicial Tribunal by an administrative authority namely the appropriate Government.. . . .".
12. In Ram Avtar Sharma and others Vs. State of Haryana and another, (1985) 3 SCC 189, while considering the government powers to make or refuse the reference, the Apex Court observed that though the government can examine the frivolousness of the demand in order to reach to a prima facie conclusion, it is not competent to assume quasi judicial function of the tribunal by going into merits of the demand to decide whether or not to make reference. In para 5 and 7 of the decision the Apex Court observed as under:
"5. The first question to be posed is whether while exercising the power conferred by Section 10 to refer an industrial dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication, the appropriate Government is discharging an administrative function or a quasi-judicial function. This is no more res integra. In State of Madras V. C.P. Sarathy, 1953 SCR 334, 346: AIR 1953 SC 53: (1953) 1 LLJ 174: 4 FJR 431, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed as under :
But, it must be remembered that in making a reference under Section 10(1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination.
Explaining the ratio of the decision in Sarathy case, in Western India Match Co. Ltd. V. Western India Match Co. Workers Union, (1970) 3 SCR 370:(1970) 1 SCC 225:(1970) 2 LLJ 256, it was observed as under :
In the State of Madras V. C.P. Sarathy this Court held on construction of Section 10(1) of the Central Act that the function of the appropriate Government thereunder is an administrative function. It was so held presumably because the Government cannot go into the merits of the dispute, its function being only to refer such a disute for adjudication so that the industrial relations between the employer and his employees may not continue to remain disturbed and the dispute may be resolved through a judicial process as speedily as possible.
After referring to the earlier decisions on the subject in Shambhu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda, Jullunder, (1978) 2 SCR 793: (1978) 2 SCC 353: 1978 SCC (L&S) 357, it was held that "in making a reference under Section 10(1), the appropriate Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dipuste as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character". Thus, there is a considerable body of judicial opinion that while exercising power of making a reference under Section 10(1), the appropriate Government performs an administrative act and not a judicial or quasi-judicial act.
7. Now if the Government performs an administrative act while either making or refusing to make a reference under Section 10(1), it cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of lis. That would certainly be in excess of the power conferred by Section 10. Section 10 requires the appropriate Government to be satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This may permit the appropriate Government to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons not for justice or industrial peace and harmony. Every administrative determination must be based on grounds relevant and germane to the exercise of power. If the administrative determination is based on the irrelevant, extraneous or grounds not germane to the exercise of power it is liable to be questioned in exercise of the power of judicial review. In State of Bombay V. K.P. Krishnan, (1961) 1 SCR 227, 243 : AIR 1960 SC 1223 : (1960) 2 LLJ 592 : 19 FJR 61, it was held that a writ of mandamus would lie against the Government if the order passed by it under Section 10(1) is based or induced by reasons as given by the Government are extraneous, irrelevant and not germane to the determination. In such a situation the Court would be justified in issuing a writ of mandamus even in respect of an administrative order. May be, the Court may not issue writ of mandamus, directing the Government to make a reference but the Court can after examining the reasons given by the appropriate Government for refusing to make a reference come to a conclusion that they are irrelevant, extraneous or not germane to the determination and then can direct the Government to reconsider the matter. This legal position appears to be beyond the pale of controversy."
13. Again in Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and another Vs. State of Bihar and others, (1989) 3 S.C.C. 271, the Apex Court observed that while considering the question of making a reference under Section 10(1) the government is entitled to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended" but it is not entitled to adjudicate the dispute itself on merit. The formation of opinion as to whether industrial dispute exists or apprehended is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on its merits. It was further observed that when government refusal to make reference is to be found unjustified, court can direct the government to make a reference to appropriate tribunal. The pertinent observation made by the Apex Court in this regard contained in para 11,15 and 16 of the decision are extracted as under:
"11. It is true that in considering the question of making a reference under Section 10(1), the government is entitled to from an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended", as urged by Mr. Shanti Bhushan. The formation of opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended" is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on its merits. In the instant case, as already stated, the dispute is as to whether the convoy drivers are employees or workmen of TELCO, that is to say, whether there is relationship of employer and employees between TELCO and the convoy drivers. In considering the question whether a reference should be made or not, the Deputy Labour Commissioner and/ or the government have held that the convoy drivers are not workmen and, accordingly, no reference can be made. Thus, the dispute has been decided by the government which is, undoubtedly, not permissible.
15. We are, therefore, of the view that the State government, which is the appropriate government, was not justified in adjudicating the dispute, namely, whether the convoy drivers are workmen or employees of TELCO or not and, accordingly, the impugned orders of the Deputy Labour Commissioner acting on behalf of the government and that of the government itself cannot be sustained.
16............In several instances this Court had to direct the government to make a reference under Section10 (1) when the government had declined to make such a reference and this Court was of the view that such a reference should have been made. See Sankari Cement Alai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 1 SCC 304:1983 SCC (L&S) 139:(1983) a Lab LJ 460; Ram Avtar Sharma V. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 189:1958 SCC (L&S) 623:(1985) 3 SCR 686; M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh V. State of M.P., (1985) 2 SCC 103: 1985 SCC (L&S) 409 :(1985) 2 SCR 1019; Nirmal Singh V. State of Punjab, 1984 Supp SCC 407 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 38 : (1984) 2 Lab LJ 396".
14. Similar view has also been taken by Apex Court in Dhanbad Colliery Karamchari Sangh Vs. Union of India and others, 1991 Supp (2) S.C.C. 10. The pertinent observations made by the Apex Court contained in para 2 and 3 of the decision are extracted as under:
"2. The appellant Union raised a dispute that the workmen employed in the mines run and maintained by M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., Lodhra Area, Dhanbad were engaged by a contractor without obtaining a licence and in fact the workmen were under the direct employment of the management of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. They claimed relief for a declaration to that effect. The workmen approached the Central Government for referring the dispute to Industrial Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Central Government by its order dated May 5, 1989 refused to refer the dispute on the ground that Union had failed to establish that the disputed workmen were engaged in prohibited categories of work under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and further that they were engaged by contractor and not by the management of the respondent Company. The government further held that there appeared to be no employer-employee relationship between the management of the respondent-company and the workmen involved in the dispute. The appellant challenged the government's order before the High Court by means of writ petition but the same was dismissed in limine. Hence this appeal.
3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that this appeal must succeed. The Central Government instead of referring the dispute for adjudication to the appropriate Industrial Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it itself decided the dispute which is not permissible under the law. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and of the Central Government and direct the Central Government to refer the dispute for adjudication to the appropriate Industrial Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We further direct the Central Government to make the reference within three months."
15. Again in Sharad Kumar Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and others, (2002) 4 S.C.C. 490, after considering the entire case law on the point in para 31 of the decision the Apex Court observed as under:
"31. Testing the case in hand on the touchstone of the principles laid down in the decided cases, we have no hesitation to hold that the High Court was clearly in error in confirming the order of rejection of reference passed by the State Government merely taking note of the designation of the post held by the respondent i.e. Area Sales Executive. As noted earlier determination of this question depends on the types of duties assigned to or discharged by the employee and not merely on the designation of the post held by him. We do not find that the State Government or even the High Court has made any attempt to go into the different types of duties discharged by the appellant with a view to ascertain whether he came within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The State Government, as noted earlier, merely considered the designation of the post held by him, which is extraneous to the matters relevant for the purpose. From the appointment order dated 21.4.1983/22.4.1983 in which are enumerated certain duties which the appellant may be required to discharge it cannot be held therefrom that he did not come within the first portion of Section 2(s) of the Act. We are of the view that determination of the question requires examination of factual matters for which materials including oral evidence will have to be considered. In such a matter the State Government could not arrogate on to itself the power to adjudicate on the question and hold that the respondent was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, thereby terminating the proceedings prematurely. Such a matter should be decided by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court on the basis of the materials to be placed before it by the parties. Thus the rejection order passed by the State Government is clearly erroneous and the order passed by the High Court maintaining the same is unsustainable."
16. Thus, from the legal position stated by Apex Court from time to time, it is clear that when the appropriate government considers the question as to whether a reference should be made for industrial adjudication or not, it has to exercise its discretion conferred by Section 10 of the Act and while doing so it may consider prima facie merit of the dispute and take into account other relevant factors which would help it to decide whether making a reference would be expedient or not. If the dispute in question raises questions of law, the appropriate government should not purport to reach a final decision on the said questions of law, because that would normally lie within the jurisdiction of industrial tribunal. Similarly on disputed questions of fact, the appropriate government cannot purport to reach final conclusions, for that again would be the province of the Industrial Tribunal. But it would not be possible to accept the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded from considering even prima facie merits of the dispute when it decides the question as to whether its power to make reference should be exercised under Section 10(1) read with Section 12(5), or not. If the claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference. Likewise, if the impact of claim on the general relations between employer and employees in the region is likely to be adverse, the appropriate Government may take into account in deciding whether a reference should be made or not. It must, therefore be held that an examination of a prima facie merits cannot be said to be foreign to the inquiry which the appropriate Government is entitled to make in dealing with dispute under Section 10(1). However, when the Government decides not to make reference for industrial adjudication, it is under an obligation to record its reason for not making such reference.
17. While exercising the power conferred by Section 10 of the Act to refer an industrial dispute to a tribunal for adjudication, the appropriate Government is discharging an administrative function wherein it has to form an opinion as to factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function. If the Government performs an administrative function while either making or refusing to make a reference under Section 10(1), it cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of lis. Section 10 requires the appropriate Government to be satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. Such exercise permits the appropriate Government to examine prima facie merit of the dispute as whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons not for justice or industrial peace or harmony. The formation of opinion as to whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on its merit. The adjudication of dispute on its merit requires examination of factual matters on the basis of documentary and oral evidence, as such appropriate Government cannot finally decide the dispute which is within a province of Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court.
18. Testing the case in hand on the touchstone of the principles laid down in the decided cases referred herein before, I have no hesitation to hold that the Government/respondent no.1 was clearly in error in rejecting the application of petitioner for reference of dispute to the industrial adjudication. As noted earlier the State Government instead of referring the dispute for adjudication to the appropriate industrial tribunal or Labour court under relevant provisions of Industrial Dispute Act, it itself decided the dispute holding that there appeared to be no employer-employee relationship between the management of respondents' institution and the petitioner-workman and while doing so, in my opinion, the State Government itself decided the dispute finally which is not permissible under law. The determination of such dispute finally depends upon examination and assessment of various oral and documentary evidence to be adduced by the parties before the Labour court or Industrial Tribunal, therefore, it could not have been decided by the appropriate government while forming opinion about the existence of industrial dispute between the employer and employee. If facts stated in the application moved by the petitioner before the appropriate government is taken to be correct, in my considered opinion, in that eventuality there exists prima facie merit in respect of rel