JUDGMENT Dalal, J.
1. The view of law taken by the lower appellate Court is not correct. The final decree was passed on 29th June 1922. It was revived on 5th March 1925 under Section 20, Lim. Act. On 5th March 1925, the judgment-debtor sent a certain sum in payment of the debt, and the money order coupon which requested credit of this sum towards the debt was in the handwriting of the judgment-debtor. This writing amounts to the fact of the payment appearing in the handwriting of the person making the same. Where a part of the principal of a debt is before the expiration of the prescribed period paid by the debtor a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made. Such a writing was considered to be a writing as required by Section 20, Lim. Act in Ram kumar Sewchand Roy v. Nanuram Poddar A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 510. A fresh period of limitation, therefore, would be computed from 5th March 1925. Subsequently a similar payment was made by the judgment-debtor on 30th October 1925 and a fresh period of limitation would run from that date. The application for execution having been made on 3rd May 1927, was within time.
2. The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court was of opinion that these payments cannot be recognized by the civil Court, and therefore, the writing cannot be used to start a fresh period of limitation, because they were not certified to the executing Court. There is, however, such a certificate in the application for execution, dated 3rd May 1927 in Col. 5 of the application. It has been held by the Privy Council in Raja Shri Prokash Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 19 that a certification by a decree-holder under Order 21, Rule 2(1) of a payment made to him out of Court is not an application and can be made at any time. A mention in Col. 5 of the application for execution is sufficient certification under the law.
3. I set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore the decree of the first Court with costs of this Court and of the lower appellate Court.