JUDGMENT
1. The plaintiffs in this a as 9 sue for a declaration that they are in possession of plot No. 351 in Mouza Sukhpura and that they are the Mnafidars of that holding. In the alternative they sue for possession.' At the last Settlement in the year 1883 the plot was entered as the fixed rate tenancy of defendants Nos. 1 to 9 who sold their rights and title in the plot to defendant No. 10, who resisted the suit and is appellant in this Court. The plaintiffs had applied in the Revenue Courts to have the entry altered but were unsuccessful. Both the lower Courts held that as a matter of fast the entry in the year 1383 was due to a mistake and they further held that they were not prevented by Section 9 of the Tenancy Act from going into this matter. They based their decision on the ruling in the case of Jainath Pathoh v. Kalka Upadhya 13 Ind. Cas. 643 : 34 A. 258 : 9 A.L.J. 238. Section 9 lays down that every entry at the last revision of records before the commencement of this Act recording a person as a fixed rate tenant shall be conclusive proof and so on. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs in this Court that that section has only application in suits between Zemindars and tenants and that it has no application to the present case, as the Zamindar is not a party to the suit. The learned Vakil relies in support of his contention on the ruling already referred to as well as on Gajadhar Dasaundhi v. Gokul Dasaundhi Sel. Dec. No. 2 of 1909. In these cases there was no dispute as to the nature of the tenancy whish had been entered at the time of Settlement. The dispute was as between persons who claimed to be entitled to the tenancy as entered in the Record of Rights. We fully agree with the genera' principle laid' down in these cases and even if we did not agree, we would be bound to follow the decision in the case of Jainath Pathak v. Kalka Upadhya 13 Ind. Cas. 643 : 34 A. 258 : 9 A.L.J. 238, but the present case differs from those cases in that in those cases there was no dispute as to the nature of tin tenancy in the village papers, whereas the whole point in the present case is that the plaintiffs claim that the nature of the tenancy as entered in the last Settlement was wrongly entered and that it should be declared that that entry was a mistake. The section may, and undoubtedly on occasions does, lead to hardship when there are cases of admitted mistakes, but when a section dearly lays down that an entry is conclusive proof, we are precluded from going behind it or even deriding whether the original entry is due to a mistake or not. In the view we have taken of the applicability of Section 9 to the facts of the case, it is not necessary to consider the other point which has been argued. Having regard to what has been said above, the appeal is allowed and the plaintiffs' claim is dismissed with costs in all Courts including fees on the higher scale.