Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra,J.
1. Heard Sri Nand Kishore learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Shatrughan Chandhary, Addl. Chief Standing Counsel for the State.
This is an appeal, filed under Chapter-VIII Rule-5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules against the judgment and order dated 25.1.2012 passed by the learned Singh Judge in Writ Petition No. 5744 (S/S) of 2004.
2. Petitioners-appellants namely Ram Saran, Ram Tej and Chaitu are daily wage employees, engaged as Mali since the years 1985,1979 and 1981 respectively in Department of Forest, Government of U.P.. While preferring the aforesaid writ petition, the petitioners submitted before the writ Court that they are entitled for regularization under U.P. Regularization of Daily Wages Appointments on Group-D Post, Rules, 2001. The representation of the petitioners, to this effect, has been rejected by the Divisional Forest Officer respondent no. 4, which, according to the counsel, suffers from substantial illegality. Writ Petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the petitioners are not qualified for regularization in accordance with the Regularization Rules. However, a perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that the learned Single Judge has not considered the earlier judgment of this Court in its true spirit whereby this Court had directed to consider the petitioners-appellants case for regularization.
3. Petitioners, earlier to this, have approached this Court by preferring Writ Petition No. 5348 of 1990 (S/S) ( Van Vibhag Shramik Sangh Vs. State of U.P. and others) alongwith other connected writ petitions. The writ petition was decided finally by judgment and order dated 13.7.2003, directing the Respondent-State to consider the petitioners case for regularization under Regularization Rules of 2001 as well as in view of the Apex Court judgment reported in (2002) 2 UPLBEC ,1959 State of U.P. Vs. Putti Lal. Relevant portion of the judgment dated 13.7.2013 is reproduced below:-
"In all these writ petitions, the petitioners have claimed regularisation on Class-D posts. There case is that they are work charge/ daily wage employees of the Forest Department and have been working for the last several years and are entitled to be regularised under the rules but still their services have not been regularised. During the course of arguments, the parties counsel submitted that during the pendency of these petitions, the State of U.P. has framed the U.P. Regularisation of Daily Wages Appointment on Group-D Post Rules, 2001 for regularisation of the daily wagers working in various departments of the Government fixing the cut off date as as 29th June,1991 and the case of the petitioners is fully covered by these rules. They have thus urged that the Opposite Parties be directed to consider the individual cases of the petitioners for regularisation in the light of the said rules.
In view of the above, these writ petitions are finally disposed of with the direction to the opposite parties that they shall consider the claim of the petitioners for regularisation in the light of the U.P. Regularisation of Daily Wages Appointment on Group-D Post Rules,2001 and the judgment of the Apex Court in 'State of U.P. And others Vs. Putti Lal (2002) 2 UPLBC, 1959'at the earliest, preferably within six months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced by the petitioners before them. Till the case of the petitioners for regularisation is considered and decided, they shall be paid salary at the minimum of the scale admissible to their counterparts in the department.
No costs."
4. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgment of this Court reveals that the petitioners have been found to be working upto date when the judgment was delivered by this Court i.e. on 13.7.2003. Meaning thereby, while considering the claim of the petitioners, the respondent-State should have considered the services rendered by the petitioners in the Forest Department, taking the letter and spirit of the judgment dated 13.7.2003. As is evident from the judgment and order dated 13.7.2003, it was pressed before the Court that the petitioners are working in the department right from the date of their initial appointment as such, they are entitled for regularization under the Rules of 2001 being appointed prior to cut of date i.e. 29.6.1991. We have been informed that the petitioners-appellants are thus working inthe department and they have been paid meager salary, which is payable to a daily wager.
5. In pursuance to the aforesaid judgment and order dated 13.7.2003, the case of the petitioners and others was considered by the department and the claim of regularization of the petitioners have been rejected. The operative portion of the impugned order, by which the petitioners' representation was rejected, is reproduced below:-
"fdlh O;fDr dks tks jkT;k/khu lsok esa 29 twu 1991 ds iwoZ lewg ?k ds in ij nSfud osru ds vk/kkj ij lh/ks fu;qDr fd;k x;k gks vxj bl fu;ekoyh ds izkjEHk ds fnukad dks ml :i esa fujUrj lsok gks vkSj [k- tks ,sls nSfud osru ds vk/kkj ij fu;qfDr ds le; ml in ij fu;fer fu;qfDr ds fy;s laxr lsok fu;ekoyh esa fofgr visf{kr vgZrk;sa j[krk gks ?k ds inksa ij dsoy Lfkk;h ;k vLFkkbZ fjfDr esa tks bl fu;ekoyh ds izkjEHk ds fnukad dks miyC/k gks fu;fer fu;qfDr ds fy;s ,sls fjDr esa laxr lsok fu;eksa ;k vkns'kksa ds vuqlkj dksbZ fu;fer fu;qfDr djus ls iwoZ mls vfHkys[k vkSj mi;qDrrk ds vk/kkj ij fopkj fd;k tk;sxk A x- ,sls O;fDr dh lsok tks nSfud osru vk/kkj ij fu;qDr fd;k x;k gks vkSj tks bl fu;ekoyh ds v/khu fopkj fd;s tkus ds i'pkr mi;qDr u ik;k tk;, rRdky lekIr dj nh tk;sxh vkSj ,slh lekfIr ij og ,d ekl dk osru ikus dk gdnkj gksxk A mijksDrkuqlkj ;kfp;ksa ds uo fu;ferhdj.k ij ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; y[kum csap y[kum dk vkns'k dk vuqikyu djrs gq;s fopkj fd;k x;k fdUrq 22 O;fDr;ksa dks mi;qDr ugha ik;k x;k A g0-viBuh;
v'kksd nhf{kr izzHkkxh; oukf/kdkjh ou izHkkx. QStkckn"
6. A plain reading of the impugned order passed by the competent authority with regard to the regularization at the face of record, shows that instead of considering the mandate and condition of regularization of services of the petitioner, the competent authority has rejected the petitioners' case. No finding has been recorded by the authority as to why petitioners are not entitled for regularization of their services. Once the petitioners have been found continuously working in the department since the years 1985,1979 and 1981 by this Court while deciding the writ petition, why the regularization of the petitioners has not been made, although the cut of date is 29.6.1991, as referred in the impugned order. The order impugned, on the face of record itself, seems to be cryptic in nature and has been passed without assigning any reason with regard to the regularization of services of the petitioner. It may be noted that the authorities while considering the petitioner's case, had not taken note of the fact that this Court while finally deciding the controversy, by judgment dated 13.7.2003, considered the petitioners' continuation in service upto the date of delivery of judgment. No objection was raised nor it was pleaded by the State before this Court nor a finding has been recorded that the petitioners are not continuing in service right from the date of their initial appointment as daily wagers i.e. from 1985,1979 and 1981 respectively. Once the State has not raised this plea before this Court when the judgment was delivered on 13.7.2003 and also not challenged the same before the higher forum, it attained finality. There shall be presumption that the petitioners are continuously in service from the date of their initial engagement (supra). It has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of cases that correctness of a judicial order, which has attained finality, cannot be examined in a writ jurisdiction. It finds support in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirjakar Vs. State of Maharastra, AIR 1967, SC 1. The findings recorded in the aforesaid judgment of this Court, attained finality and cannot be subject matter of re-appreciation and has to be followed in letter and spirit. Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed with the same facts, as such, the judgment passed in the writ petition shall be binding on the authority.
7. Feeling aggrieved by the order impugned dated 20.8.2003, petitioners preferred instant Writ Petition No. 5744(S/S) of 2004. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, interim order was passed on 30.6.2008 directing the respondents to permit the petitioners to continue in service with same status, which they were enjoying before dispensation of their services. Thus, while passing the interim order, this Court has relied upon the earlier judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 5348 (S/S) of 1990. The finding recorded in the said judgment, as observed here in above, attained finality. However, after exchange of the affidavits, by the impugned order dated 25.1.2012, the writ petition has been dismissed.
8. As we have observed, no reason has been recorded while passing the impugned order, which has been subject matter of dispute before the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court. As observed in Writ Petition No. 5348 (S/S) of 1990 (Supra), as well as the interim order dated 30.6.2008, the petitioners shall be deemed to be continuing in service on the date when their representation has been considered. The judgment delivered by this Court (Supra) contains conclusive finding in favour of the petitioners, with regard to continuity of service, hence, it was incumbent on the State while deciding the representation in pursuance of the earlier judgment, pass a reasoned and speaking order, as to why the petitioners are not entitled for regularization in service.
9. Recently Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri and others Vs. Union of India and others, reported in 2013 (11) ADJ, 22 (FB) elaborately considered the necessity of reasons in an order passed by the Government. Now it is a well settled position of law that whether it is administrative, judicial or quasi judicial, the order must be reasoned one, so that the people may know where they stand in a controversy, which has been adjudicated by the authority in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. In the case of Ranjana Agnihorti (Supra), the Full Bench with regard to reasons, has made observations as Under:-
"196. The Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785 Seimens Engineering and Manufacturing Company of India Limited versus Union of India and another, held as under :
"6..............If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of administrative law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law."
197. In one another case reported in (2004)5 SCC 568 State of Orissa versus Dhaniram Lunar, their Lordships of Supreme Court held as under :-
"8......... Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made..........".
198. In Mc Dermott International Inco. Versus Buru Standard Co. Limited and others (2006) SLT 345, their Lordships observed as under :
"...Reason' is a ground or motive for a belief or a course of action, a statement in justification or explanation of belief or action. It is in this sense that the award must state reasons for the amount awarded. The rationale of the requirement of reasons is that reasons assure that the arbitrator has not acted capriciously. Reasons reveal the grounds on which the arbitrator reached the conclusion which adversely affects the interests of a party. The contractual stipulation of reasons means, as held in Poyser and Mills' Arbitration In Re, "proper, adequate reasons". Such reasons shall not only be intelligible but shall be a reason connected with the case which the court can see is proper. Contradictory reasons are equal to lack of reasons................"
199. A Division Bench of this Court in a case reported in 2007 LCD 1266 Vijai Shanker Tripathi versus Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has considered the concept of exercise of discretionary power by the State or its authorities including the High Court held that every administrative order passed by authorities must fulfil the requirement of Art. 14 of the constitution.
200. Supreme Court in a case in M/s Kranti Associates Private Limited and another V. Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, JT 2010(9) SC 590 held that a cryptic order shall deem to suffer from vice of arbitrariness. An order passed by quasi judicial authority or even administrative authority must speak on its face.
In a case CCT versus Shukla and Brothers, 2010(4) SCC 785 their Lordships held that the reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. To quote relevant portion from the judgment (supra), to quote :
"Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice. These principle are not only applicable to administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial pronouncements."
201. The aforesaid view with regard to reasoned order by authorities which include judicial and quasi judicial authorities has been consistently reiterated by the Supreme Court in earlier judgments. Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the authorities have to record reasons, otherwise it may become a tool for harassment vide K.R. Deb versus The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447; State of Assam and another versus J.N. Roy Biswas, AIR 1975 SC 2277; State of Punjab versus Kashmir Singh, 1997 SCC (L&S) 88; Union of India and others versus P. Thayagarajan, AIR 1999 SC 449; and Union of India versus K.D. Pandey and another, (2002)10 SCC 471.
In a recent judgment in Union of India versus Ibrahimuddin (para 33), AIR 2013 SCW 2752 , their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that every order passed by the administrative authority, judicial or quasi judicial must be a reasoned order.
202. From the foregoing discussion with regard to passing of a reasoned order by administrative, quasi judicial or judicial authorities, it appears that the law on the question has travelled a long way".
10. Since the impugned order seems to be cryptic in nature and does not specify the ground as to why the petitioners are not entitled for regularization, it further suffers from vice of arbitrariness and shall be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
11. The reason is also necessary for the maintenance of Rule of law in democratic polity. It is the right of citizen and employees to know as to why and under what ground, State authorities have passed an order which affects their civil rights. Attention of the court has been invited to a case reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2260: Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain. Relevant portion (para 205), for convenience, is reproduced as under :-
"205. Rule of Law postulates that the decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and in general such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is not predictable and such decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law."
12. Accordingly on the face of record, the impugned order being cryptic in nature suffers from vice of arbitrariness and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Hon'ble Single Judge has not considered this aspect of the matter, though the earlier judgment passed by this Court is on record.
13. Learned Single Judge has relied upon Regularization Rules, 2001. Rule-2 provides that it shall be applicable not with standing anything to the contrary contained in any other Rule or orders. Rule-4 deals with regularisation. For convenience, Rule-4 is reproduced as Under:-
"4.Regularization of daily wages appointments on Group 'D' Posts.-(1) Any person who-
(a)was directly appointed on daily wage basis on a Group 'D' post in the Government service before June 29, 1991 and is continuing in service as such on the date of commencement of these rules; and
(b)possessed requisite qualification prescribed for regular appointment for that post at the time of such appointment on daily wage basis under the relevant service rules, shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy, as may be available in Group 'D' post, on the date of commencement of these rules on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant service rules or orders."
(2) In making regular appointments under these rules, reservations for the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, other backward Classes of citizen and other categories shall be made in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Public Services ( Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994 and the Uttar Pradesh Public Services ( Reservation for Physically handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act,1993 as amended from time to time and the orders of the Government in force at the time of regularization under these rules.
(3) For the purpose of sub-rule(1) the appointing authority shall constitute a Selection Committee in accordance with the relevant provisions of the service rules.
(4) The appointing authority shall, having regard to the provisions of sub-rule(1), prepare an eligibility list of the candidates arranged in order of seniority as determined from the date of order of appointment on daily wage basis and if two or more persons were appointed together, from the order in which their names are arranged in the said appointment order. The list shall be placed before the Selection Committee alongwith such relevant records pertaining to the candidates, as may be considered necessary, to assess their suitability.
(5) The Selection Committee shall consider the cases of the candidates on the basis of their records referred to in sub-rule(4), and if it considers necessary, it may interview the candidates also.
(6) The Selection Committee shall prepare a list of selected candidates in order of seniority, and forward the same to the appointing authority".
14. A plain reading of the rule reveals that the pre condition required for the purposes of regularization is continuity of service with satisfactory service record upto 29.6.1991. The rule itself relates to the regularization of service of person engaged on daily wage basis.
15. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioners are daily wagers, who were engaged in service in the respective years i.e. in the years 1985,1979 and 1981. They were in continuity of service till the impugned order has been passed. The impugned order does not reveal that the petitioners have possessed unsatisfactory service and they were not in continuity of service. Moreover, no finding has been recorded in this regard. Petitioners seems to entitled for regularisationi.
16. Much emphasis has been drawn by the learned Single Judge on the Constitution Bench Judgment reported in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi (2006)4 SCC 1.
17. The Judgment rendered in the case of Uma Devi(supra) has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Vs. Sunil Kumar Srivastava and another,(2013)1 UPLBEC 8161. The Divisioin Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment has observed as Under:-
"55. Much emphasis has been given by the appellants' counsel on certain judgments which deals with regularisation. In (2006)4 SCC 1 Secretary, State of Karnataka and others versus Umadevi and others, a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in absence of rules or regulations, the services of employees cannot be regularised. Those who are appointed dehors the rules or without advertisement have to leave the post in the same way. Mere continuance for sufficiently long period or beyond the term of appointment ordinarily shall not create any right and the courts ordinarily should not interfere with regular recruitment.
However, in Umadevi (supra) itself, their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the doctrine of legitimate expectation ruled and laid down the condition under which it can be invoked. For convenience, relevant portion is reproduced as under :
"46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad , Piara Singh , Jacob, and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn {See Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1985 Appeal Cases 374, National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan and Dr. Chanchal Goyal v State of Rajasthan) . There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected."
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post."
56. From a plain reading of the aforesaid portion of judgment of Uma Devi (supra), it appears that the principle of legitimate expectation may be applied in case some assurance is given to daily wagers by the competent authority. In the present case, engagement was done in pursuance to resolution of the Board of Directors (supra) and the Board itself on the basis of the report submitted by various authorities took a decision to regularise services and referred its decision to the State Government for approval. Whether regularisation is to be done or not and the proposed rules or regulations are to be framed or not is a matter which should be considered by the Board and not by the government keeping in view the provisions contained in Sect. 23 of the Act, more so when no general guideline or policy decision is in existence. It is for the Board to exercise power conferred by Section 42 of the Act to frame new regulation or amend the existing one or chalk out a Scheme for regularisation.
57. In Umadevi (supra), their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court further permitted the Union of India and the State Government to take one time decision for regularisation of services against sanctioned posts in case certain irregular appointment has been done of duly qualified persons. For convenience, para 53 of the judgment is reproduced as under :
"One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Nanjundappa and B.N. Nagarajan and referred to in para 15 above, of 39 duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme."
58. Appointments of the respondent petitioners cannot be held to be illegal or beyond the power conferred by the Act. The appointments were done in pursuance to the resolution of the Board of Directors (supra). Why the Board of Directors took a decision to meet out the requirement by the respondent daily 40 wager and others is a matter on which no finding may be recorded by this Court but the fact remains that the Board of Directors is the highest authority and it could have taken a decision under Section 23 of the Act (supra) to appoint officers and other employees of the corporation to secure its business interest. Being appointed in pursuance to the resolution of the Board, the respondent petitioners may not be held to be per sons appointed on unfounded grounds and substantially illegal.
59. While differentiating between illegality and irregularity, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appointment which is made throwing all constitutional obligations and statutory rules to the winds would render the same illegal whereas irregularities, pre-supposes substantial compliance of the rules vide 2007(1) SCC 257 State of U.P. versus Desh Raj, AIR 1967 SC 1071 State of Mysore versus S.V. Narayanappa, 1972(1) SCC 409 R.N. Najundappa versus T. Thimmiah, 1979(4) SCC 507 B.N. Nagarjan versus State of Karnataka".
The Judgment rendered in the case of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation (Supra) has been affirmed by Hon. Apex Court and the Special Leave Petition, challenging the aforesaid judgment, has been dismissed.
18. Accordingly, it is not a case of the Respondent-State that it was not proper for the Forest Department to engage a person on daily wage basis, rather engagement seems to have been admitted on daily wage basis and affirmed by earlier judgment of this Court. Accordingly, the appointment and engagement of the petitioners and alike persons to meet out the exigency of service, does not seems to be disputed by the respondent-State during the earlier proceedings in this Court. Since the original engagement of the petitioners as daily wager was not in dispute and continuity of service even after the year 2003, seems to have been considered in its right perspective and affirmed by this Court, there appears no justification on the part of the respondent to reject the petitioners' claim for regularization. The constitution Bench judgment in the case of Uma Devi (Supra), affirmed by the Hon. Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation ( Supra), it has been held that the employees have a right to avail the benefit of their statutory right with regard to regularization.
19. Admittedly, regularization Rule-2001 is applicable in the present case, hence, it was incumbent upon the respondent-State to consider petitioner-appellants case for regularization, keeping in view the provisions of the regularization rules as well as the continuity of service of the petitioners from the date of their initial appointments/ engagements. The learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, has failed to appreciate the aforesaid legal position as well as factual matrix of the case.
Accordingly, appeal is allowed. Writ Petition also stands allowed. The impugned order dated 20.8.2003 is set aside and a writ in the nature of mandamus is issued directing the respondent-State to reconsider the case of the petitioners for regularization, taking into account the observations made herein above, expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this judgment and other.
No order as to cost.
Order Date :- 9.4.2014 n.u.