Reserved
Court No. - 17
Case : CRIMINAL REVISION No.672 of 1991
Revisionist :- Ram Prakash
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another
Counsel for Revisionist :- Vinod Kr. Sharma,Prashant Mishra
Counsel for Opposite Party :- A.G.A.,B.N. Upadhyay
Hon'ble Suresh Kumar Gupta,J.
This criminal revision has been filed against the judgment and order dated3.5.1991, passed by IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Agra, confirming the order of conviction in criminal appeal no.120 of 1986, Ram Prakash vs. State, passed by Judicial Magistrate City II (Economic Offences) Agra on 23.8.1986 in case no.2800/86 State vs. Ram Prakash & others sentencing the revisionist for 1-1/2 years R.I. and a fine of Rs.300/-, under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Brief facts of the case is that on 25.02.1982, Food Inspector S.K Saxena after disclosing his identity five grams of Vanaspati Ghee which was displayed by the accused for sale after payment of Rs. 22.50 in accordance with rules. He divided the sample into three equal parts and kept in three bottles as per rules and it was sealed and code slip was also pasted and was signed and after completing the formalities the sample was sent to Public Analyst and it was reported to be adulterated. The copy of the report was sent to the accused and after obtaining prosecution sanction the complaint was filed against both the accused as it was disclosed by Ram Prakash that owner of the shop is Rajeev Prakash while he only sells the articles. The accused was charged. The accused denied the offence. He was not selling anything. He had also no concern with the shop in question. Accused was denied the charge and also denied that at least his signature was obtained forcibly. He was not selling anything. He has no concern with the shop. Learned Trial Court examined P.W-1 Sri S.K Saxena Food Inspector, P.W-3 Uttam Cand Sanitary Supervisor, P.W-4 Suresh Chandra Food Clerk of C.M.O office. In a defense accused examined Sri Girraj Kishore DW-1 and Satish Kumar DW-2. The court also examined Dr. K.G Sharma C.M.O as CW-1 and Dr. R.C Sikroria as court witness. After perusing the record and hearing at length, learned appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding, hence, this revision.
The grounds of the revisionist is that he is not the seller and for a short time he had sold the commodity in the absence of the owner of the shop- who was acquitted by the trial court on the similar evidence. No public witness was examined by the prosecution to establish that the revisionist was selling the vanaspati ghee. The prosecution did not try to find out the name of the licence holder of the shop. The courts below did not disclose in their judgment how the article of ghee is adulterated. According to the P.A. Report the melting point was more that 37. C but he did not mention how much it was more and when the container was opened and in the month of February it was but natural and it cannot be said that it was adulterated. Vanaspati ghee is a product of agriculture in its natural form.
I have heard Sri Prashant Mishra, learned counsel for the revisionist, Sri B.N. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
Learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the revisionist had been falsely implicated. There is also no compliance of under Section 13 (2) of the P.F.A. Act and Section 10 of the Act. Though an attempt was made to argue that the sample was not adulterated but it is difficult to accept the said submission. Definition of adulteration has contained in Section 2(i.a) reads as under:-
(i.a) “adulterated” an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated.”
(m)“if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability but which does not render it injurious to health.”
Clause (M) postulates a situation whereof article falls below the prescribed standard, even if it is not injurious to health nevertheless the quality /purity of article were falls below the prescribed standard, it would be treated as adulterated.
Learned counsel for the revisionist failed to show that prescribed standard of vanaspati ghee falling below due to natural cause which is beyond the control of human agency.
Learned counsel for the revisionist failed to show that prescribed standard of vanaspati ghee falling below due to natural cause which is beyond the control of human agency. Learned counsel for the revisionist argued that he was not the owner of the alleged shop. He sold the vanaspati ghee in the absence of the shop owner who was acquitted by the trial court as well as by the appellate court on the same evidence. Learned trial court as well as appellate court in its clear cut findings that at the time of taking sample revisionist was present on the shop. Sample was taken by the Food Inspector from the revisionist although revisionist alleged that he was doing the coals business but he is unable to prove his case that the trial court as well as appellate court after appreciation of the full facts it is concluded by the trial court as well as by the appellate court that the revisionist was the seller at that time.
There is no other significant argument made by the learned counsel for the revisionist. The other point which could have been raised by him had already been answered by the learned Magistrate Court as well as Appellate Court.
Lastly, it is contended by learned counsel for the revisionist that the revisionist has suffered the pain and agony of trial for more than 37 years because the alleged occurrence is of date 25.2.1982. It was prayed that the sentence of imprisonment of the revisionist be commuted to fine. Reliance was placed on the following decisions of the Apex Court:-
Haripada Das Versus State of West Bengal, 1998 (2) FAC 187 : (1998 AIR SCW 4040) the Apex Court has held:-
“Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also considering that the revisionist was released on bail by this Court long back and because of the protracted litigation up to this Court he has also suffered a lot of mental agony and financial hardship and also considering the fact that he had already undergone imprisonment for more than three weeks, we feel that in the facts of the case the ends of justice will be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone. We, however, direct the besides the fine imposed by the Courts below, the appellant will have to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- within four weeks from today, in default he will have to undergo imprisonment for three months. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. The bail bonds stand discharged”.
(ii)N Sukumaran Nair V. Food Inspector Navelikara, 1996 (2) PFA Cases
21: (1995 Cri LJ 3651) wherein it was held (at page 3652 of Cri LJ):
“The offence took place in the year 1984. The appellant has been awarded six months simple imprisonment and has also been ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. Under clause (d) of Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appropriate government is empowered to commute the sentence of simple imprisonment for fine. We think that this would be an appropriate case for commutation of sentence where almost a decade has gone by. We, therefore, direct the appellant to deposit in the trial the appellant to deposit in the trial Court a sum of Rs. 6000/- as fine in commutation of the sentence of six months simple imprisonment within a period of six weeks from today and intimate to the appropriate government that such fine has been deposited. On deposit of such fine, the State Government may formalise the matter by passing appropriate Code of Criminal Procedure.”
Santosh Kumar V. Municipal Corporation, 2000 (2) FAC 76 : (2000 Cri LJ 2777) wherein it was held:-
“4. This case seems to be almost on a parallel with the facts enumerated in the decision cited above. We are also persuaded to extend the same benefit which the appellant in the aforesaid decision was granted by this Court, as this would be an appropriate case for commutation of sentence under Clause (d) of Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
5. We therefore, direct the appellant to deposit in the trial Court a sum of Rupees 10,000/- as fine in commutation of the sentence of 6 months imprisonment within a period of 6 weeks from today and intimate to the appropriate Government that such fine has been deposited. On deposit of the fine the State Government may formalize the matter by passing appropriate order under clause (d) of Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the meanwhile the appellant will remain on bail.”
Learned A.G.A. opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist and submitted that there is complete compliance of the provisions of the P.F.A. Act.
Now the moot question arises in this case whether this Court can commute the sentence below the minimum prescribed period under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In this regard, the position of law is being considered in several ruling of Hon'ble Supreme Court which is as follows:-
Delhi Administration (Now NCT of Delhi) Versus Manohar Lal (2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 222:-
“3. Aggrieved, the respondent pursued the matter on revision before the High Court in Crl. Revision Petition No.188 of 2001. The conviction of the respondent was not challenged by the respondent before the High Court. So far as the sentence is concerned, adverting to the certificate of the Director, Central Food Laboratory, wherein it was found stated that the colouring matter was not injurious to health and placing reliance upon the decision of this Court reported in 2000 Crl. L. J. 2777, wherein a direction was issued by this Court to the Government under Section 433 Cr.P.C., benefit of Section 433 (d) Cr.P.C., was claimed for the respondent. Taking into account the same and the concession said to have been made by the counsel for the State, the learned Judge in the High Court felt persuaded to extend the benefit of commutation of sentence, as envisaged under Section 433 (d) Cr.P.C.,. and directed the respondent to deposit in the trial court Rs.20,000/- as fine, in commutation of the sentence of imprisonment and inform the Government of such deposit, for formalising the matter by passing appropriate orders under Section 433 (d) Cr.P.C., It was also ordered that on deposit of the fine amount, the sentence of imprisonment imposed shall stand suspended. Aggrieved against this order of the High Court dated 24.4.2001, this appeal has been filed by the Delhi Administration.
5. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. Apparently, the learned Judge in the High Court was merely swayed by considerations of judicial comity and propriety and failed to see that merely because this Court has issued directions in some other cases, to deal with the fact situation in those other cases, in the purported exercise of its undoubted inherent and plenary powers to do complete justice, keeping aside even technicalities, the High Court, exercising statutory powers under the Criminal Laws of the land, could not afford to assume to itself the powers or jurisdiction to do the same or similar things. The High Court and all other courts in the country were no doubt ordained to follow and apply the law declared by this Court, but that does not absolve them of the obligation and responsibility to find out the ratio of the decision and ascertain the law, if any, so declared from a careful reading of the decision concerned and only thereafter proceed to apply it appropriately, to the cases before them. Considered in that context, we could not find from the decisions reported in 1997 (9) SCC 101 (supra) and 2000 (9) SCC 151 (supra) any law having been declared or any principle or question of law having been decided or laid down therein and that in those cases this Court merely proceeded to give certain directions to dispose of the matter in the special circumstances noticed by it and the need felt, in those cases, by this Court to give such a disposal. The same could not have been mechanically adopted as a general formula to dispose of, as a matter of routine, all cases coming before any or all the courts as an universal and invariable solution in all such future cases also. The High Court had no justifying reason to disturb the conclusion of the first Appellate Court, in this regard”.
“In Mithilesh vs State (NCT of Delhi) (2014) 13 Supreme Court Cases 423, appellant, who was running a small Kirana shop was held guilty for violation of section 2 (i-a) (a) (m) and punished under section 7 read with section 16 (1) of P.F.A. Act for adulteration in red chilli powder with imprisonment for one year, fine of Rs. 3000 and in default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for 3 months by the Magistrate's Court and the said sentence was upheld by the Appellate Court. In revision, the High Court upheld that conviction but the quantum of sentence was reduced to 3 months' RI which is the minimum sentence, giving reasons in para -25 of the judgment that offence related to the year 1993; 12 days incarceration had already been undergone by the petitioner who was 47 years of age; he having rooted himself in society, the ends of justice would be met with if the sentence was reduced to three months. On request for showing further leniency it was held by the Supreme Court that no further benevolence could be shown to the appellant, more so, when it was a case of food adulteration. There were no special circumstances which could warrant reducing the sentence below the minimum and accordingly dismissed the appeal”.
In the State of Rajasthan vs. Jagdish Prasad, (2009) 12 Supreme Court Cases 646, the Supreme Court did not approbate the commutation of sentence of 6 months' RI to fine. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are as follows:
“2. By the impugned judgment the High Court while upholding the conviction for offences punishable under sections 7 and 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (in short “the act”) imposed a fine of Rs. 6000 and directed that the same is in commutation of the sentence of 6 months' RI as awarded by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar. It was directed that the appropriate Government shall formalise the matter by passing an appropriate order under clause (d) of section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) if the amount is deposited within a particular period. For the aforesaid purpose the High Court relied on a decision of this Court in N. Sukumaran Nair vs. Food Inspector.
Learned counsel for the appellant State admitted that High Court's order is clearly unsustainable. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the judgment.
In Dayal Singh vs. State of Rajasthan it was interalia observed as follows (SCC pp. 728-29, para-15) “15. In the instant case it was not disputed that for the offence charged a minimum sentence of 6 months rigorous imprisonment is prescribed by law. The appellant has been sentenced to undergo 6 months rigorous imprisonment which is the minimum sentence. We are not inclined to modify the sentence by passing an order of the nature passed in N. Sukumaran Nair (supra) where this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction imposed only a sentence of fine and directed the State to exercise its powers under Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to commute the sentence of simple imprisonment for fine. In the instant case the appellant has been sentenced to undergo 6 months rigorous imprisonment. Moreover we are firmly of the view that strict adherence to Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules framed thereunder is essential for safeguarding the interest of consumers of articles of food. Stringent laws will have no meaning if offenders could go away with mere fine. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the sentence imposed against the appellant.”
5. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The sentence, as imposed by the trial Court is restored. However, since the occurrence took place nearly three decades back if the respondent-accused moves the appropriate Government to commute the sentence of imprisonment, the same shall be considered in the proper perspective. For a period of three months the accused need not surrender to undergo sentence during which period it shall be open to him to move the appropriate Government for commutation. If no order in the matter of commutation is passed by appropriate Government the accused shall surrender to custody to serve the remainder of sentence.”
So on perusing the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is settled principle that the power to commute the sentence solely vests in appropriate Government under Section 433 Cr.P.C. This Court have no jurisdiction to commute the sentence below minimum prescribed under the P.F.A. Act.
In this case, it appears that the occurrence taken place on 25.2.1982 i.e. more than three decades back. He has already spent few days in jail after having been convicted by Appellate Court out of the awarded sentence of 1- 1/2 years. The offence discloses that he was found selling adulterated vanaspati ghee. This is an offence of very petty nature. Therefore, looking to the fact that during the period, the accused/revisionist remained on bail. He did not commit any offence and he seems to have rooted well in society approximately 37 years down the line since commission of the offence, the ends of justice would be made if his sentence is reduced to three months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 3000/- only. The period served by revisionist will be set off in this sentence.
The revision is partly allowed. Conviction of the revisionist is maintained. His punishment is reduced to three months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.3000/- with default clause is maintained.
However, if the revisionist moved the appropriate Government to commute the sentence of imprisonment, the same shall be considered in the proper perspective within three months. For a period of three months, the accused need not surrender to undergo sentence during which period it shall be opened to him to move the State Government for commutation. If no order in the matter of commutation is passed by appropriate Government within three months, the accused shall surrender to custody to serve the remainder of sentence.
The office is directed to transmit back the record of the Lower Court with a copy of judgment and order of this Court for immediate compliance.
Order Date:31.01.2019 m.a.