1. Heard Shri Ambika Prasad Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri J. P. Maurya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the opposite party No. 1, Shri Anand Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party Nos. 3 & 4 through video conferencing. The opposite party No. 2 is Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, which has passed the order under challenge.
2. For the reasons assigned in the order dated 02.07.2021, issuance of notice to the opposite party No. 5 was dispensed with.
3. The writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:
(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of CERTIORARI, Quashing/Setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 25-03-2021 passed by opposite party No.2 in Regular Appeal No. 14 of 2021 UCO Bank Vs Ram Pal Soni and another which is contained in Annexure No.1 to this writ petition.
(ii) Issue a writ or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties concerned not to disturb peaceful possession of the petitioners regarding property in question during the pendency of the writ petition in the interest of Justice.
(iii) Issue any other writ, order or direction be passed which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case.
(iv) Allow the writ petition with cost in favour of the petitioner.
4. The petitioner No.1 is the borrower from opposite party No.4, United Commercial Bank, Branch Amethi, District Amethi (in short, ''UCO Bank'). The petitioner No. 2 is the guarantor. The loan account of petitioners became non productive asset (NPA) on 31.03.2017.
5. The opposite party No. 3-Zonal Manager/ Authorized Officer, UCO Bank from its Zonal Office at Lucknow, issued notice dated 03.05.2019, Annexure-3, under Rule 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement), Rules, 2002 (in short, ''Rules, 2002'), framed under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securtiy Interest Act, 2002 (in short, ''SARFAESI Act'), to hold public-e-auction of the property, i.e., the secured assets, fixing the date as 10.06.2019. Another notice dated 27.06.2019 was issued from the Branch Office of the UCO Bank-opposite party No. 4, to the petitioners to deposit the amount which had become overdue. The e-auction of the property was held by the Zonal Authority, Lucknow on 28.06.2019 and the petitioners were informed vide letter dated 03.07.2019. The petitioner No. 1 filed Writ Petition No. 19204 (MB) of 2019, Ram Pal Soni Vs. State of U.P. and others, which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 16.07.2019 on the ground of alternative remedy, available under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.
6. The petitioners, thereafter, filed Securitisation Application (SA) No. 541 of 2019, Ram Pal Soni and another Vs. Zonal Manager/ Authorized Officer, UCO Bank and others, before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow (in short, ''DRT, Lucknow'), under Section 17 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, in which the respondent Bank raised a preliminary objection that as the security asset was located at Amethi, the DRT, Lucknow, had no jurisdiction, which was contested by the petitioners. The D.R.T., Lucknow vide order dated 06.08.2019, rejected the preliminary objection about its territorial jurisdiction finding that the demand notice and the sale notice were issued from the Authorized Officer at Zonal Office of the UCO Bank at Lucknow, the cause of action in part had arisen at Lucknow, and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. An interim protection was also granted that till the date fixed, the respondent Bank may proceed with sale, but the sale deed will not be executed in favour of the auction purchaser.
7. The Bank, opposite parties filed Regular Appeal No. 14 of 2020, under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, UCO Bank, Branch Office-Amethi, District Amethi Vs. Ram Pal Soni and another, which, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad (in short, ''Appellate Tribunal'), has allowed and has set aside the judgment of the Tribunal dated 06.08.2019 vide judgment and order dated 25.03.2021, holding that the S.A. No. 541 of 2019 is not maintainable before the DRT, Lucknow, for lack of territorial jurisdiction in as much as according to it the issuance of notices cannot be treated as cause of action.
8. The Appellate Tribunal, by the same order dated 25.03.2021, also transferred the Securitisation Application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad (in short, ''DRT, Allahabad').
9. It is this judgment dated 25.03.2021 passed by the Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, which is under challenge in the writ petition.
10. Shri Ambika Prasad Mishra, submits that an application under Sub section (1) of Section 17(1-A) of SARFAESI Act shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part arises; where the secured asset is located or the branch or any other office of the bank is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being. He submits that the cause of action has arisen partly within the territorial jurisdiction of the DRT, Lucknow, as the demand notice and sale notice were issued by the zonal authority of the Bank at Lucknow, and as the e-auction was also conducted by the officer sitting at Lucknow, and as such the DRT, Lucknow had the territorial jurisdiction.
11. Shri Anand Kumar Singh, submits that the DRT, within whose territorial jurisdiction, the secured asset is located, will have the jurisdiction and as the secured asset is located at Amethi, the DRT, Lucknow, had no territorial jurisdiction. He has placed reliance on Section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code (in short, ''CPC'), that the suits are to be instituted, subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, in court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property situates. The notices in question, according to him, would not furnish any part of cause of action at Lucknow. He placed reliance on the judgments of Amish Jain & Ors. Vs. ICICI Bank Ltd., 2018 LawSuit (Del) 2370, and Ramsay Exim and Technology Private Limited and others Vs. ICICI Bank Limited and another, 2019 LawSuit (Cal) 1238, which have also been referred in the impugned judgment of the Appellate Tribunal.
12. Shri Anand Kumar Singh further submitted that the Chairman of the appellate tribunal has the jurisdiction to transfer the securitisation application from one DRT to another DRT in view of Section 17(A)(2) of the SARFAESI Act. Consequently he submits that the order under challenge passed by the Chairman of Appellate Tribunal is within jurisdiction and calls for no interference.
13. Shri J. P. Maurya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, submits that the petitioners' application was maintainable before the DRT, Lucknow, as the issuance of notice under Section 13(2), (4) of the SARFAESI Act, as also holding of e-auction by the Bank authority from Lucknow, would, form part of the cause of action, and in view of Section 17(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act, the DRT, Lucknow has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application.
14. Shri J. P. Maurya, has placed the judgment of this Court at Allahabad in Writ-C No. 46965 of 2017, Saurabh Gupta Vs. Union of India and others, and submits that in that case it has been held that the DRT, Allahabad has exclusive territorial jurisdiction over all the fifty five districts specified in the notification dated 15.02.2017, under Section 3 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal Act, but he submits that Section 17(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act finds no consideration.
15. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.
16. In view of the submissions advanced, points for determination which arise for consideration are being formulated as under:-
(i) Whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal within whose territorial jurisdiction the secured asset is located, would only have the jurisdiction where the application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act can be filed, or it can also be filed with such Debts Recovery Tribunal where, the secured asset might not be located, but the part of cause of action had arisen?
(ii) Whether by issuance of notice under Section 13(2), (4) as also holding of e-auction, from Lucknow by the opposite party No. 3 at Lucknow, any part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of DRT, Lucknow?
(iii) If the DRT, Lucknow also had the territorial jurisdiction in view of Section 17(1A)(a) of SARFAESI Act, the order of the Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, setting aside the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow, and transferring the case to DRT, Allahabad, can be sustained in law?
17. To consider the aforesaid points and to appreciate the rival submissions, it is apt to refer the provisions of Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act.
18. Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act reads as under:
13. Enforcement of security interest.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any instalment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under sub-section (4).
[Provided that--
(i) the requirement of classification of secured debt as non-performing asset under this sub-section shall not apply to a borrower who has raised funds through issue of debt securities; and
(ii) in the event of default, the debenture trustee shall be entitled to enforce security interest in the same manner as provided under this section with such modiifications as may be necessary and in accordance with the terms and conditions of security documents executed in favour of the debenture trustee.] (3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of secured debts by the borrower.
(3A) If, on receipt of the notice under sub-section (2), the borrower makes any representation or raises any objection, the secured creditor shall consider such representation or objection and if the secured creditor comes to the conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate within fifteen days of receipt of such representation or objection the reasons for nonacceptance of the representation or objection to the borrower.
Provided that the reasons so communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons shall not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 or the Court of District Judge under section 17A.
(4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely:--
(a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset;
(b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset:
Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt:
Provided further that where the management of whole of the business or part of the business is severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security for the debt;
(c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor;
(d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt.
(5) Any payment made by any person referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (4) to the secured creditor shall give such person a valid discharge as if he has made payment to the borrower.
(5A) Where the sale of an immovable property, for which a reserve price has been specified, has been postponed for want of a bid of an amount not less than such reserve price, it shall be lawful for any officer of the secured creditor, if so authorised by the secured creditor in this behaalf, to bid for the immovable property on behalf of the secured creditor at any subsequent sale.
(5B) Where the secured creditor, referred to in sub-section (5A), is declared to be the purchaser of the immovable property at any subsequent sale, the amount of the purchase price shall be adjusted towards the amount of the claim of the secured creditor for which the auction of enforcement of security interest is taken by the secured creditor, under sub-section (4) of section 13.
(5C) The provisions of section 9 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) shall, as far as may be, apply to the immovable property acquired by secured creditor under sub-section (5A).
(6) Any transfer of secured asset after taking possession thereof or take over of management under sub-section (4), by the secured creditor or by the manager on behalf of the secured creditor shall vest in the transferee all rights in, or in relation to, the secured asset transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of such secured asset.
(7) Where any action has been taken against a borrower under the provisions of sub-section (4), all costs, charges and expenses which, in the opinion of the secured creditor, have been properly incurred by him or any expenses incidental thereto, shall be recoverable from the borrower and the money which is received by the secured creditor shall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, be held by him in trust, to be applied, firstly, in payment of such costs, charges and expenses and secondly, in discharge of the dues of the secured creditor and the residue of the money so received shall be paid to the person entitled thereto in accordance with his rights and interests.
(8) Where the amount of dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him is tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date of publication of notice for public auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets,-
(i) the secured assets shall not be transferred by way of lease assignment or sale by the secured creditor; and
(ii) in case, any step has been taken by the secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of the assets before tendering of such amount under this sub-section, no further step shall be taken by such secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of such secured assets.
(9) Subject to the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in the case of financing of a financial asset by more than one secured creditors or joint financing of a financial asset by secured creditors, no secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise any or all of the rights conferred on him under or pursuant to sub-section (4) unless exercise of such right is agreed upon by the secured creditors representing not less than sixty per cent in value of the amount outstanding as on a record date and such action shall be binding on all the secured creditors:
Provided that in the case of a company in liquidation, the amount realised from the sale of secured assets shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956):
Provided further that in the case of a company being wound up on or after the commencement of this Act, the secured creditor of such company, who opts to realise his security instead of relinquishing his security and proving his debt under proviso to sub-section (1) of section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), may retain the sale proceeds of his secured assets after depositing the workmen's dues with the liquidator in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of that Act:
Provided also that liquidator referred to in the second proviso shall intimate the secured creditor the workmen's dues in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and in case such workmen's dues cannot be ascertained, the liquidator shall intimate the estimated amount of workmen's dues under that section to the secured creditor and in such case the secured creditor may retain the sale proceeds of the secured assets after depositing the amount of such estimate dues with the liquidator:
Provided also that in case the secured creditor deposits the estimated amount of workmen's dues, such creditor shall be liable to pay the balance of the workmen's dues or entitled to receive the excess amount, if any, deposited by the secured creditor with the liquidator:
Provided also that the secured creditor shall furnish an undertaking to the liquidator to pay the balance of the workmen's dues, if any.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section,-
(a) "record date" means the date agreed upon by the secured creditors representing not less than sixty per cent in value of the amount outstanding on such date;
(b) "amount outstanding" shall include principal, interest and any other dues payable by the borrower to the secured creditor in respect of secured asset as per the books of account of the secured creditor.
(10) Where dues of the secured creditor are not fully satisfied with the sale proceeds of the secured assets, the secured creditor may file an application in the form and manner as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction or a competent court, as the case may be, for recovery of the balance amount from the borrower.
(11) Without prejudice to the rights conferred on the secured creditor under or by this section, secured creditor shall be entitled to proceed against the guarantors or sell the pledged assets without first taking any of the measured specifies in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (4) in relation to the secured assets under this Act.
(12) The rights of a secured creditor under this Act may be exercised by one or more of his officers authorised in this behalf in such manner as may be prescribed.
(13) No borrower shall, after receipt of notice referred to in sub-section (2), transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business)any of his secured assets referred to in the notice, without prior written consent of the secured creditor.
19. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act reads as under:-
17. Application against measures to recover secured debts].--(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed, to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty five days from the date on which such measure had been taken:
Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.
Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section.
(1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction--
(a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises;
(b) where the secured asset is located; or
(c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being.
(2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
(3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,--
(a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and
(b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and
(c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13.
(4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt.
(4A) Where--(i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy,--
(a) has expired or stood determined; or
(b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or
(c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or
(d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under subsection (2) of section 13 of the Act; and
(ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application:
Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1).
(6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any part to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder.
20. Sub section (1-A) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act was inserted by the Act No. 44 of of 2016 w.e.f. 01.09.2016, which clearly provides that an application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-
(a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises;
(b) where the secured asset is located; or
(c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being.
21. Section 17(1A) of SARFAESI Act is very specific and unambiguous. Therefore, an application under Section 17(1) of the Act is maintainable before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly; or in part arises, even if the secured asset is not located within the territorial limits of such Debts Recovery Tribunal. This is not to say that an application under Section 17(1) cannot be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the secured assets is located, but, this is to say that if the jurisdiction falls within the two or more Debts Recovery Tribunal, in view of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 17(1A), the application under Section 17(1) can be filed before any of those Debts Recovery Tribunals by any person, including the borrower aggrieved by any of measures referred to in Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.
22. Now, the Court proceeds to consider the judgment delivered by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Amish Jain (supra), on which the learned counsel for the opposite parties has placed much reliance and which has also been relied upon by the Appellate Tribunal.
23. In Amish Jain (supra), the question before the Full Bench was, if an application under Section 17(1) SARFAESI Act can be filed, not only in the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction where the mortgaged property is situated, but also in DRT having jurisdiction where the branch of the Bank / Financial Institution, which has disbursed the loan is situated, as well as in all DRTs, which would have jurisdiction in terms of Section 19(1) of The Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act) read with Rule 6 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (DRT Rules).
24. In Amish Jain (supra), it was held as under in paragraph Nos. 16 to 24:
16. We are therefore of the view that the question of territorial jurisdiction for the remedy of appeal provided in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act has to be construed in the said light and not in the light of the DRT Act making a departure from the principle enshrined in Section 16 of the CPC.
17. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act provides for filing of the appeal / application thereunder not to any DRT but only to the "DRT having jurisdiction in the matter". However, such jurisdiction is not specified. To determine which DRT will have jurisdiction in the matter, we have to find as to what is to be the matter for adjudication in a proceeding under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act and what relief the DRT is empowered to grant in the said proceeding. The scope of a proceeding under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act is described in Section 17(2) of the SARFAESI Act as of "whether any of the measures referred to in Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the Rules made thereunder". The measures which the Bank / Financial Institution is empowered to take under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act are of taking over possession or management as aforesaid of the secured asset. Of course, the action of so taking over possession or management is to be preceded by (a) the borrower under a liability under a secured agreement making any default in repayment of the secured debt or any installment thereof; (b) the borrowers account in respect of such debt being classified as non-performing asset; (c) the Bank / Financial Institution requiring the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities within sixty days and giving details of the amount payable and the secured asset intended to be enforced in the event of non-payment; d) consideration of representation if any made by the borrower thereagainst and communication to the borrower of the reasons for non-acceptance of such representation. Though, it could well be argued that the DRT within whose jurisdiction Bank / Financial Institution to whom the borrower is indebted is situated, would also have jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the action under Section 13(4) of taking over possession / management is in accordance with the aforesaid procedure but the explanation to Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act clarifies that the communication of the reasons to the borrower for not accepting the representation or the likely action of the Bank / Financial Institution shall not entitle the borrower to make an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. Thus the cause of action for the appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act is the taking over of the possession / management of the secured asset and which cause of action can be said to have accrued only within the jurisdiction of the DRT where the secured asset is so situated and the possession thereof is taken over. We are thus of the view that it is the said DRT only which can be said to be having "jurisdiction in the matter" within the meaning of Section 17(1) of the Act.
18. Further, the relief to be granted by the DRT in an appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, if successful, is (under Section 17(3)) of restoration of possession / management of the secured asset to the borrower and to pass such order as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to the recourse taken by the Banks / Financial Institution under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. This relief also, we find, the DRT within whose jurisdiction the secured asset to be so restored to the borrower is situated, to be the most competent to grant and implement. The orders which the DRT under Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act may be required to pass may also entail exercising jurisdiction over the CMM / DM which is approached by the Bank / Financial Institution for assistance for taking over possession / management. Notice in this regard may be taken of Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev Vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 2 SCC 782 and of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon (2010) 8 SCC 110 suggesting that appeal under Section 17(1) can be filed after the Bank has filed application under Section 14, even if possession / management has not been taken. In such a situation, DRT may be required to issue direction to the CMM / DM approached by the Bank / Financial Institution. As already noticed in the referral order dated 26.07.2012, Section 3(2) of the DRT Act requires the notification constituting the DRT to specify the area within which the said DRT shall exercise jurisdiction. A DRT at Delhi, as in the facts of the present case, would have no jurisdiction over the DM at Meerut or for that matter over the property at Meerut. We are of the view that exercise of jurisdiction under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act by DRTs of a place other than where the secured asset is situated is likely to lead to complexities and difficulties and which are best avoided. It may also be mentioned that the remedy under Section 17(1) is available not only to the borrower or mortgagor, but also to any other person aggrieved from the measures under Section 13(4). In Satyawati Tandon supra it was invoked by the guarantor. If it were to be held that more than one DRT will have jurisdiction, it may also lead to remedy under Section 17(1) against same action under Section 13(4) being invoked by different persons before different DRTs.
There is no provision in the DRT Act for transfer of proceedings from one DRT to another. The Supreme Court, in Authorized Officer, Indian Overseas Bank Vs. Ashok Saw Mill (2009) 8 SCC 366 has held the scope of a proceeding under Section 17(1) to be extending to scrutinizing even the steps taken by the Bank / Financial Institution subsequent to measures under Section 13(4). Such scrutiny by the DRT may entail adjudication of disputes as to preservation and protection of the secured asset (see Rule 4 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002), valuation of the secured asset (Rule 5), sale thereof (Rules 6 to 8) and in the case of the borrower being a company in liquidation, distribution of sale proceeds thereof or between more than one secured creditor of the secured asset (see Section 13(9) of the SARFAESI Act). Such scrutiny by DRT of post Section 13(4) measures may yet further enlarge the number of persons interested in invoking the remedy under Section 17(1). Also, all these disputes bear closest proximity to the place where the secured asset is situated and the DRT having jurisdiction over that place would be the most suitable DRT to entertain such disputes.
19. As far as Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act requiring disposal of appeals under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, "as far as may be" in accordance with the provisions of the DRT Act and the Rules framed thereunder is concerned, though the learned Single Judge of this Court in Upendra Kumar Vs. Harpriya Kumar MANU/DE/0136/1978 had held that Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 providing for the proceedings thereunder to be regulated as far as may be by the CPC, could not be read as incorporating every provision of CPC or making applicable the provisions of CPC to substantive aspects like jurisdiction but the Supreme Court in Guda Vijayalakshmi Vs. Guda Ramachandra Sekhara Sastry AIR 1981 SC 1143 took a contrary view and held that Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not make a distinction between procedural and substantive provisions of CPC and thus the provisions of CPC as partake of the character of substantive law are also by implication to apply to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act and the use of the expression "as far as may be" is intended to exclude only such provisions of CPC as may be inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. Applying the said law, Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act is to be read as providing for disposal of appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act in accordance with the provisions of the DRT Act and the Rules made thereunder save as otherwise provided in the SARFAESI Act.
20. The expression "as far as may be" still means "to the extent necessary and practical". Supreme Court in Dr. Pratap Singh Vs. Director of Enforcement (1985) 3 SCC 72 held that the expression so far as may be has always been construed to mean that those provisions may be generally followed to the extent possible but if a deviation becomes necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act in which reference to another legislation is made, it would be permissible. Similarly, in Ujagar Prints Vs. Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 488 a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the Legislature sometimes takes a shortcut and tries to reduce the length of a statute by omitting elaborate provisions where such provisions have already been enacted earlier and can be adopted for the purpose in hand. The expression "so far as may be" was held to be meaning "to the extent necessary and practical".
21. What we however find is that the DRT Act is not containing any provision for territorial jurisdiction of an appeal as under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, even if it were to be construed not as an appeal and as an original application. The jurisdictional provision under Section 19(1) of the DRT Act is only for applications by the Bank / Financial Institution for recovery of debt from any person. An application by a Bank / Financial Institution for recovery of debt can by no stretch of imagination be equated with an appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. We are therefore of the view that there is no provision in the DRT Act providing for territorial jurisdiction of an appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act and the question of application thereof under Section 17(7) does not arise. Under Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act only that much of the DRT Act can be said to be incorporated therein as is contained in the DRT Act and not more. Whether a particular provision of DRT Act would apply or not, would depend upon the nature and scope of proceeding under the SARFAESI Act.
22. Once it is held that an appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act cannot be equated with an application by the Bank / Financial Institution for recovery of debt under Section 19 of the DRT Act, the limits of territorial jurisdiction described under Section 19(1) of the DRT Act cannot be made applicable to Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act.
23. It would thus be seen that the provision for territorial jurisdiction under Section 19 (1) of the DRT Act is only qua the applications to be made by the Bank or Financial Institution for recovery of its debt. However, a proceeding under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act is initiated not by the Bank or the Financial Institution but by a person including the borrower aggrieved from the measures taken by the Bank or Financial Institution under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act. We are thus of the view that notwithstanding Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act providing for the disposal of the proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act in accordance with the provisions of the DRT Act and the Rules made thereunder, the same cannot make the provisions of Section 19(1) of the DRT Act applicable to proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. As aforesaid, Section 19(1) of the DRT Act is not an omnibus provision qua territorial jurisdiction. It is concerned only with providing for territorial jurisdiction for applications for recovery of debts by the Banks / Financial Institutions. The same can have no application to the appeals under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act which are to be preferred, not by the Banks / Financial Institutions, but against the Banks / Financial Institutions.
24. We are further of the view that the use, in Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act, of the words "as far as may be" and "save as otherwise provided in this Act" also exclude applicability even of the principles contained in Section 19(1) of the DRT Act to determine the territorial jurisdiction of an appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. Our reasons therefor are stated herein below.
25. A careful reading of Amish Jain (supra) shows that it was held therein that an appeal/ application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act can be filed only before the DRT within whose jurisdiction the property/ secured asset against which action is taken is situated and in no other DRT, considering that Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act provides for filing of the appeal/ application thereunder not to any DRT but only to the "DRT having jurisdiction" in the matter, but such jurisdiction was not specified and the DRT Act was not containing any provision for territorial jurisdiction of an appeal as under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. The jurisdictional provision under Section 19(1) of the DRT Act was held to be only for applications by the Bank / Financial Institution for recovery of debt from any person. An application by a Bank / Financial Institution for recovery of debt, it was held, could by no stretch of imagination be equated with an appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, and, therefore, it concluded that the limits of territorial jurisdiction described under Section 19(1) of the DRT Act could not be made applicable to Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. As the proceeding under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act is initiated, not by the Bank or the Financial Institution, but by a person including the borrower aggrieved from the measures taken by the Bank or Financial Institution under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act, the Full Bench, was of the view that notwithstanding Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act providing for the disposal of the proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act in accordance with the provisions of the DRT Act and the Rules made thereunder, Section 19(1) of the DRT Act could not be made applicable to proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act.
26. The case of Amish Jain (supra) was decided on 13.09.2012 whereas, in SARFAESI Act, Sub section (1-A) was inserted in Section 17, by the Act 44 of 2016 with effect from 01.09.2016, therefore, in Amish Jain (supra), Sub section (1-A) of Section 17, was not under consideration, which specifically provides for filing of an application under Section 17(1) to the DRT, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, (a) the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. So, even if, in view of the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Amish Jain (supra), Section 19 of the DRT Act is not applicable to determine the jurisdiction with respect to an application/ appeal under Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act, the jurisdiction of the DRT concerned will have to be determined as per Section 17(1-A) of SARFAESI Act, under which, if the applicant can show that his case falls within any of the clauses (a), (b) or (c), the DRT, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, (a) the cause of action, wholly or in part arises; (b) where the secured asset is located; or (c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being, shall have jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 17(1), subject of course, at the option of the applicant to choose any one of those DRTs.
27. This Court is of the considered view that the amendment in Section 17 SARFAESI Act, by insertion of Sub section (1-A), w.e.f. 01.09.2016, has taken away the very basis of the judgment in Amish Jain (supra).
28. In Ramsay Exim (supra), upon which also reliance has been placed by Shri Anand Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the Bank-opposite parties, the Calcutta High Court, while considering the provisions of Section 17(1A) of the SARFAESI Act, clearly held that the primary consideration for ascertaining the jurisdiction of the tribunal is not restricted to the situs of the secured asset, but, is primarily based on the debt itself, be it with regard to the place where the cause of action, wholly or in part arises, or the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution where it is maintaining an account in which the debt claimed is outstanding for the time being, or the defendant resides or works. It further held that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1A) are disjunctive and it is the option for the applicant in an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act to choose any of the forums. The location of the asset cannot be the sole determinant of the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Paragraphs-25 to 29 of Ramsay Exim (supra) read as under:
25. Section 17(1) of the DRT Act provides that a tribunal shall exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. Section 19(1) of the DRT Act, on the other hand, provides as follows:
"19. Application to the Tribunal. - (1) Where a bank or a financial institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,-
(a) the branch or any other office of the bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding, for the time being; or (aa) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises:
Provided that the bank or financial institution may, with the permission of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, on an application made by it, withdraw the application, whether made before or after the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 for the purpose of taking action under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), if no such action had been taken earlier under that Act:
Provided further that any application made under the first proviso for seeking permission from the Debts Recovery Tribunal to withdraw the application made under subsection (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within thirty days from the date of such application:
Provided also that in case of Debts Recovery Tribunal refuses to grant permission for withdrawal of the application filed under this subsection, it shall pass such orders after recording the reasons therefor."
26. A perusal of Section 19(1) of the DRT Act, in conjunction with Section 17(1A) of the SARFAESI Act, indicates that the primary consideration for ascertaining the jurisdiction of the tribunal is not restricted to the situs of the secured asset but is primarily based on the debt itself, be it with regard to the place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises or the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution where it is maintaining an account in which the debt claimed is outstanding for the time being or (in the DRT Act) the defendant resides or works.
27. The only additional feature in subsection (1A) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is clause (b) thereof, which confers jurisdiction additionally on the Debts Recovery Tribunal where the secured asset is located.
28. However, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1A) are disjunctive and it is the option of the applicant in an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to choose any of the forums.
29. In such view of the matter, the location of the asset cannot be the sole determinant of the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
29. In view of the aforesaid, on point No. 1, I am of the view that the location of the secured asset is not the only criterion to determine the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal(s) under Section 17(1A). If a part of cause of action arises within the limits of jurisdiction of a Debts Recovery Tribunal, an application under Section 17(1) shall lie there also, even if, the secured asset is not located within the limits of its jurisdiction. It is, in such a case, for the applicant, to frame the case appropriately to adopt the jurisdiction of either of the Debts Recovery Tribunals.
30. Now, I proceed to consider the second point, for which it is required to consider the meaning of ''cause of action'.
31. In Y. Abraham Ajith and others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another, (2004) 8 SCC 100, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph Nos. 14 to 17, has held as under:
14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.
15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in "cause of action".
16. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts.
17. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In "Words and Phrases" (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.
32. In Swamy Atmananda and others Vs. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and others, (2005) 10 SCC 51, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 23 and 24 has held as under:
23. Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary defines 'cause of action' as the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right or action. In Black's Law Dictionary it has been stated that the expression cause of action is the fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial relief. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a cause of action is stated to be the entire set of facts that give rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment.
24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded.
33. In Alchemist Ltd. and another Vs. State Bank of Sikkim and others, (2007) 11 SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph Nos. 20 to 28 and 37, has held as under:
20. It may be stated that the expression 'cause of action' has neither been defined in the Constitution nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It may, however, be described as a bundle of essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed. Failure to prove such facts would give the defendant a right to judgment in his favour. Cause of action thus gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit.
21. The classic definition of the expression "cause of action" is found in Cooke v Gill. Wherein Lord Brett observed:
" "Cause of action' means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court".
22. For every action, there has to be a cause of action. If there is no cause of action, the plaint or petition has to be dismissed.
23. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, Senior Advocate appearing for the Appellant-Company placed strong reliance on A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. A.P. Agencies, [(1989) 2 SCC 163] and submitted that the High Court had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction in holding that no part of cause of action could be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. He particularly referred to the following observations: (SCC p. 170, para12) "12. A cause of action means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff".
24. In our opinion, the High Court was wholly justified in upholding the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and in dismissing the petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.
25. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to several decisions of this Court and submitted that whether a particular fact constitutes a cause of action or not must be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. In our judgment, the test is whether a particular fact(s) is (are) of substance and can be said to be material, integral or essential part of the lis between the parties. If it is, it forms a part of cause of action. If it is not, it does not form a part of cause of action. It is also well settled that in determining the question, the substance of the matter and not the form thereof has to be considered.
26. In Union of India & Ors. v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. & Ors., [(1984) 3 SCR 342], the registered office of the Company was situated at Ludhiana, but a petition was field in the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that the Company had its branch office there. The order was challenged by the Union of India. And this Court held that since the registered office of the Company was at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom primary relief was sought were at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petitioner to approach either the High Court of Punjab & Haryana or the High Court of Delhi. The forum chosen by the writ petitioners could not be said to be in accordance with law and the High Court of Calcutta could not have entertained the writ petition.
27. In State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. M/s Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 : AIR 1985 SC 1289, the Company whose registered office was at Calcutta filed a petition in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the notice issued by the Special Town Planning Officer, Jaipur for acquisition of immovable property situated in Jaipur. Observing that the entire cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, the Supreme Court held that the High Court of Calcutta had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
28. This Court held that mere service of notice on the petitioner at Calcutta under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 could not give rise to a cause of action unless such notice was 'an integral part of the cause of action'.
37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellant-petitioner, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than that.
34. In Alchemist (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to its previous judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217, in which it was held that mere service of notice on the petitioner at Calcutta under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 could not give rise to a cause of action, unless such notice was 'an integral part of the cause of action'. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on, but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. The test is whether a particular fact is of substance and can be said to be material, integral or essential part of the lis between the parties, if it is, it forms a part of cause of action.
35. Thus, the ''cause of action' consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. It is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter, since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would arise. In the restricted sense, cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. In the wider sense it has been used to denote all the material facts on which the right to sue is founded. It is not dependent merely upon the character of the relief prayed for. A notice may also be an integral part of the cause of action.
36. The demand notice and the sale notice under the SARFAESI Act read with Rules, 2002, were issued by the Zonal Manager/ Authorized Officer, UCO Bank at Lucknow. The e-auction was conducted on 28.06.2019 from Zonal Officer/ opposite party No. 3, UCO Bank at Lucknow. These are the facts noticed by the Tribunals as undisputed.
37. Looking to the scheme of the SARFAESI Act, without there being any notice under Section 13(2), there could be no cause of action at all. In the absence of any such notice the Bank authorities could not legally proceed any further under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. The notice, therefore, is an integral part of the cause of action. Though the application under Section 17(1) lies, against the measures taken under Section 13(4), but any measure under Section 13(4) cannot be taken without first complying with Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. The cause of action as it consists of bundle of facts which give cause to enforce the legal enquiry/ redress in a court of law, it must be some act done by the other side, since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would arise and, therefore, every act which is necessary to be taken and is taken by the other side, i.e., the Bank here, would form part of cause of action, as in a wider sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts.
38. The Appellate Tribunal has taken the view that the issuance of the notice could not be treated as cause of action as according to it a part of cause of action implies when the branch of the Bank is under jurisdiction of DRT-''A' and the secured asset is situated under the jurisdiction of DRT-''B', then only it can be treated that a part of cause of action has arisen under the jurisdiction of both DRT(s) ''A' and ''B'. In the considered view of this Court, the Appellate Tribunal legally erred in holding so. All the clauses (a), (b) & (c) are disjunctive.
39. It is true that if the secured asset is located within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one Tribunal, and the Branch or any other office of the Bank or Financial Institution maintaining an account in which debt claim is outstanding for the time being, is situated under the jurisdiction of other Tribunal, then both the Tribunals shall have jurisdiction and it will be for the applicant to file the application before any of such Tribunals, but the expression ''part of cause of action' cannot be restricted to clauses (b) or/ and (c), otherwise, clause (a) would be rendered nugatory. If, that had been the intention of the legislature, that only the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the secured asset is located or the Branch of the Bank concerned is located, then the legislature would not have framed clause (a), because in that case there was no need to frame clause (a), everything being clear from clause (b) and (c). This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the ''cause of action, wholly or in part, arises' is not to be restricted to clauses (b) or/ and (c). But is to be considered also independently from clause (b), or/ and (c) of Sub section (1-A) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and if in view of any other fact, amounting to part of cause of action the jurisdiction lies with a Tribunal, such fact will have to be considered giving rise to part of cause of action under clause (a). By giving the interpretation as given by the Appellate Tribunal, clause (a) cannot be rendered nugatory. Even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, that court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, petition application. The notices under Section 13(2), under Section 13(4) and holding of e-auction are integral part of the cause of action.
40. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the view that a part of cause of action had arises within the local limits of the debts recovery tribunal at Lucknow, which had the jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, in the present case.
41. Now, I proceed to consider the judgment of the coordinate Bench in the case of Saurabh Gupta (supra).
42. In Saurabh Gupta (supra), this Court held that the Tribunal established under Section 3 of the Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, can entertain and decide the applications of such areas which have been specified by notification, therefore, the DRT, Allahabad shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide the applications arisen from 55 districts specified in the notification dated 15.02.2017 and in view of Section 3 read with Section 17(1) of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow completely lacks jurisdiction to entertain and decide all those applications which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad.
43. In holding that, reliance was placed on Sections 3 & 17 of the Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the notification issued under Section 3 of the Act, 1993.
44. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs-10, 11, 12, 13, 28 and 32 of Saurabh Gupta(supra) as under:
10. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record before me.
11. There is no dispute that in view of Notification No. SO 454(E)[F.NO.1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15-2-2017 issued under Section 3 of the Act, district Shahjahanpur falls within the territorial jurisdiction of D.R.T., Allahabad. For ready reference, the aforesaid Notification No.454(E)[F.NO.1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15-2-2017 is reproduced below:
SECTION 3 OF THE RECOVERY OF DEBTS DUE TO BANKS AND FINACIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT, 1993 - TRIBUNAL - ESTABLISHMENT OF - NOTIFIED DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL - SUPERSESSION OF NOTIFICATIONS NO.GSR 274(E), DATED 31-3-2000 AND GSR 71(E), DATED 31-1-2002 NOTIFICATION NO. SO 454(E)[F.NO.1/3/2016-DRT], DATED 15-2-2017 In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and in supersession of the notifications of the Government of India, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, Section 3, Sub-section (i) vide number G.S.R. 274 (E), dated the 31st March 2000 and G.S.R. 71 (E), dated the 31st January, 2002, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Central Government hereby establish the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Dehradun with effect from the 16th day of February, 2017 and hereby specifies the area of jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunals at Allahabad, Lucknow and Dehradun in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, as mentioned in column (4) of the Table below, namely:--
TABLE S. No. Name of Debts Recovery Tribunal Location Area of Jurisdiction (1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad 9/2A, Panna Lal Road, Allahabad.
Agra, Aligarh, Allahabad, Ambedkar Nagar, Amethi (CSM Nagar), Auariya, Azamgarh, Bahraich, Ballia, Balrampur, Banda, Barabanki, Bareilly, Basti, Bhadohi (Sant Ravidas Nagar), Budaun, Chandauli, Chitrakoot, Deoria, Etah, Etawah, Faizabad, Farrukhabad, Fatehpur, Firozabad, Ghazipur, Gonda, Gorakhpur, Hamipur, Hathras (Mahamaya Nagar), Jalaun, Jaunpur, Jhansi, Kannauj, Kanpur Dehat, Kanpur Nagar, Kasganj, Kaushambi, Kushinagar, Lalitpur, Maharajganj, Mahoba, Mainpuri, Mathura, Mau, Mirzapur, Pilibhit, Pratapgarh, Sant Kabir Nagar, Shahjahanpur, Shrawasti, Siddharth Nagar, Sonebhadra, Sultanpur and Varanasi districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
2. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow 600/1, University Road, Near Hanuman Setu Mandir, Lucknow-226007 (UP).
Baghpat, Bulandsahar, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Ghaziabad, Hapur, Meerut, Hardoi, Lakhimpur Kheri, Lucknow, Raebareli, Sitapur and Unnao districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
3. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Dehradun Paras Tower, 2nd Floor, Majra Niranjanpur, Saharanpur Road, Dehradun.
State of Uttarakhand and Amroha, Bijnor, Moradabad, Rampur, Sambhal, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur and Shamli districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
12. Before I proceed to examine the effect of the afore-quoted notification, it would be useful to refer the provisions of Sections 3 and 17 of the Act, as under:
"3. Establishment of Tribunal.--(1) The Central Government shall by notification, establish one or more Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act.
(2) The Central Government shall also specify, in the notification referred to in sub-section (1), the areas within which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the applications filed before it.
17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals.--(1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions.
(2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act."
13. Section 3(1) of the Act confers legislative power upon the Central Government to establish one or more Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred by or under the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 further confers legislative powers upon the Central Government to specify, in the notification referred to in sub-section (1), the areas within which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the applications filed before it. Thus, a Tribunal established under Section 3 of the Act can entertain and decide applications of such areas only which have been specified by notification. Therefore, the D.R.T. Allahabad shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide applications arising from fifty five districts specified in the afore-quoted notification dated 15.02.2017. Thus, in view of the provisions of Section 3 read with Section 17(1) of the Act, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as 'D.R.T. Lucknow') completely lacks jurisdiction to entertain and decide all those applications which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as 'D.R.T. Allahabad').
28. Thus, the Tribunal created under the Act is bound to act and discharge its duties only with respect to the areas falling within its territorial jurisdiction conferred by the Notification under Section 3 of the Act.
32. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. It is held that the D.R.T. Allahabad has exclusive territorial jurisdiction over all the fifty five districts specified in the notification dated 15.02.2017 under Section 3 of the Act to entertain, hear and decide fresh and pending securitisation applications under the Act, which has also been admitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India on behalf of the Union of India. Accordingly, the respondent No.2 is directed to remit immediately the record of S.A. No.559 of 2013 (Saurbah Gupta vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce) to the D.R.T. Allahabad which shall hear and decide the aforesaid application expeditiously.
45. Section 3 of the Act, 1993 provides for establishment of the Tribunal, according to which, the Central Government shall, by notification, establish one or more Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act. Sub-Section (2) provides that the Central Government shall also specify, in the notification referred to in sub-section (1), the areas within which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the applications filed before it.
46. In exercise of power under Section 3 of the Act, 1993, the Central Government issued Notification No. SO 454 (E) [F.NO.1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15.2.2017 which is quoted in Saurabh Gupta(supra) and need not be reproduced again.
47. A careful reading of the judgment in Saurabh Gupta (supra) would show the following:
(i) that Section 17 (1-A) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcment of Security Interest Act, 2002, which specifically provides that an application under Section 17 (1) of the Act, 2002, shall be filed before the D.R.T. within local limits of whose jurisdiction, inter alia, (a) the cause of action wholly or in part arises, escaped consideration,
(ii) Section 19(1) of the Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which also provides that, where a bank or a financial institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction:- (a) the branch or any other office of the bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding, for the time being; or (aa) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises:, also escaped consideration.
(iii) The law as laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1975) 2 SCC 671, also escaped consideration.
48. In Sri Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1975) 2 SCC 671, where the question was with respect to the jurisdiction of this High Court, sitting at Lucknow and at Allahabad, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the cause of action in part arises in the specified areas of Oudh it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to adopt the jurisdiction at Lucknow or at Allahabad.
49. Section 3 of the Act, 1993 does not provide that the Tribunal, either at Allahabad or at Lucknow, shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the respective areas specified in the notification issued under Section 3 of the Act, 1993. Section 3 of the Act, 1993, only provides for establishment of Debts Recovery Tribunal, which has to exercise the jurisdiction, power and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under the Act, 1993, and in considering this jurisdiction, power and authority of Tribunal, Section 19 of the Act, 1993, as also Section 17(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act, are required to be considered and cannot be ignored. The fact that a part of cause of action arises within the limit of the jurisdiction of more than one tribunal; in view of Section 19 of the Act, 1993 and Section 17(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act, would confer jurisdiction on all such Tribunals and in such a case the jurisdiction of any of such Tribunals can not be held to be exclusive based on the notification issued under Section 3 of the Act, 1993.
50. In Jagannath Temple Managing Committee Vs. Siddha Math & Ors., (2015) 16 SCC 542 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that While the doctrine of stare decisis is crucial to maintain judicial discipline, what cannot be lost sight of the fact, is, that decisions which are rendered in ignorance of existing statutes and law laid down by this Court cannot bind subsequent Benches of this Court.
51. In K. P. Manu Vs. Chairman Scrutiny Committee for Verification of Community Certificate, (2015) 4 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when a binding precedent is not taken note of and the judgment is rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of the binding authority, the concept of per incuria comes into play. Referring to A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak it was observed that, ''Per incuriam' are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong and also that it is a settled rule that if a decision has been given per incuriam the court can ignore it.
52. In Jayant Verma Vs. Union of India (2018) 4 SCC 743 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under in para nos. 55 to 58:
"55. In Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab (1979) 3 SCR 1059 at 1073-1074, a dissenting judgment of A.P. Sen, J. sets out what is the ratio decidendi of a judgment:
According to the well-settled theory of precedents every decision contains three basic ingredients:
(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts;
(ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
(iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above.
For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies, ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision for it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This indeed is the ratio decidendi. [R.J. Walker & M.G. Walker: The English Legal System. Butterworths, 1972, 3rd Edn., pp. 123-24] It is not everything said by a judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. In the leading case of Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes [LR 1959 AC 7 43 : (1959) 2 All ER 38] it was laid down that the ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problems raised by the facts as found, upon which the decision is based. The other two elements in the decision are not precedents. The judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties themselves), nor are the findings of facts. This means that even where the direct facts of an earlier case appear to be identical to those of the case before the court, the judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier case."
56. Similarly, this Court in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCR 111 at 139 referred to the "laconic discussion and limited ratio" in Subhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975) 3 SCR 616, a judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court, and was not bound by it. Krishna Iyer, J. put it thus: "We may first deal with Subhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975) 3 SCR 616, where the question mooted was as to whether the C.S.I.R. (Council of Scientific and Industrial Research) was ''State' under Art. 12. The C.S.I.R. is a registered society with official and non-official members appointed by Government and subject to some measure of control by Government in the Ministry of Science and Technology. The court held it was not ''State' as defined in Art. 12. It is significant that the court implicitly assented to the proposition that if the society were really an agency of the Government it would be ''State'. But on the facts and features present there the character of agency of Government was negatived. The rulings relied on are, unfortunately, in the province of Art. 311 and it is clear that a body may be ''State' under Part III but not under Part XIV. Ray, C.J., rejected the argument that merely because the Prime Minister was the President or that the other members were appointed and removed by Government did not make the Society a ''State'. With great respect, we agree that in the absence of the other features elaborated in Airport Authority case (1979) 3 SCC 489, the composition of the Governing Body alone may not be decisive. The laconic discussion and the limited ratio in Tewary (supra) hardly help either side here."
57. Also, in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101 at 110, this Court stated:
"11. Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das case [Writ Petitions Nos. 981-82 of 1984] and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. So far as the order shows, no argument was addressed to the court on the question whether or not any direction could properly be made compelling the Municipal Corporation to construct a stall at the pitching site of a pavement squatter." (Emphasis Supplied)
58. Further, in State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 at 679-680, it was stated:
"65. "Incuria" literally means "carelessness". In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. The courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. Thus, the "quotable in law" is avoided and ignored if it is rendered in ignorance of a statute or other binding authority.
67. Thus, "per incuriam" are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory provision or authority binding on the court concerned, or a statement of law caused by inadvertence or conclusion that has been arrived at without application of mind or proceeded without any reason so that in such a case some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong."
53. For the reasons as in paras-47 to 49, with respect, I am not in agreement with the judgment in the case of Saurabh Gupta (supra), which holds that the D.R.T. Allahabad has exclusive territorial jurisdiction over all the fifty five districts specified in the Notification dated 15.2.2017 under Section 3 of the Act, 1993, to entertain, hear and decide afresh and pending securitisation applications under the Act.
54. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view on point Nos. (i) and (ii) framed in para-16 as follows:
(i) That the location of the secured asset is not the sole criterion to determine the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal(s) under Section 17(1A). If a part of cause of action arises within the limits of jurisdiction of a Debts Recovery Tribunal, an application under Section 17(1) shall lie there also, even if, the secured asset is not located within the limits of its jurisdiction. It is, in such a case, for the applicant, who is dominus litis to frame the case appropriately to choose the jurisdiction either of the Debts Recovery Tribunals to have forum conveniences.
(ii) That the issuance of notice under Section 13(2), (4) of the SARFAESI Act, as also holding of e-auction from Lucknow by the opposite party No. 3 at Lucknow, form part of cause of action, which having arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the DRT, Lucknow, it had the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, filed by the petitioners.
55. Further, I find myself unable to be in agreement with the judgment in the case of Saurabh Gupta (supra), which holds that the D.R.T. Allahabad has exclusive territorial jurisdiction over all the fifty five districts specified in the Notification dated 15.2.2017 under Section 3 of the Act, 1993, to entertain, hear and decide afresh and pending securitisation applications under the Act, for the reasons that:
(a) Section 19 of the Act, 1993, and Section 17(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act escaped kind consideration of the coordinate Bench;
(b) Section 3 of the Act only provides for establishment of Debts Recovery Tribunals, but their jurisdictions, powers and authority shall be determined as per Section 19 of the Act, 1993, with respect to the applications/ appeals filed under the Act, 1993 and as per Section 17(1-A) of the SARFAESI Act with respect to the applications/ appeals filed under the SARFAESI Act;
(c) Section 3 does not provide for the jurisdiction of tribunals for the area for which they have been established, to exercise the jurisdiction exclusively with respect to that area barring the jurisdiction of other tribunals, if part of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of that other tribunal as well. If Section 3 of the Act, 1993 is read as conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a tribunal, that would render Section 19 of the Act, 1993 and Section 17(1A) of the SARFAESI Act as nugatory, giving overriding effect to Section 3, whereas the statute does not make these Sections 19 and 17(1A) of the respective statutes subject to Section 3 or any notification issued under Section 3;
(d) The law laid down in Sri Nasiruddin (supra) by Hon'ble Apex Court to the effect that if the cause of action in part arises in the specified areas of Oudh, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to adopt the jurisdiction at Lucknow or Allahabad, also escaped consideration.
(e) Applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sri Nasiruddin (supra), I am of the view that if part of cause of action arises within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal at Lucknow and part of cause of action arises within the limits of territorial jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal at Allahabad, then both the tribunals will have jurisdiction and none of the tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
(f) In such a case, it would be for the litigant/ applicant to choose either of the Tribunals, he being the dominus litis entitled to choose his convenience by framing the application appropriately.
(g) The judgment in Saurabh Gupta (supra) appears to be per incuriam in view of the law as laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Jagannath Temple (supra), K. P. Manu (supra) and Jayant Verma (supra).
56. The answer to point No. 3 for determination as framed in para-16 of this judgment cannot be answered, inspite of the answer on the points for determination Nos. (i) and (ii) in para-16, in view of the judgment in the case of Saurabh Gupta (supra), with which this Court is not in agreement, therefore, I proceed to refer the questions formulated hereinafter to the Larger Bench for consideration and for there being an authoritative pronouncement on the issue under Chapter V Rule 2 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952.
58. Accordingly, the following questions are being referred to the Larger Bench for consideration and for authoritative pronouncement:
(A) Whether in a case where part of cause of action to maintain an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, arises within the limits of territorial jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow will have the jurisdiction, power and authority to entertain and decide such application in view of Sub section (1-A) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act or not ?
(B) Whether Section 3 of the Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, confers exclusive jurisdiction on Debts Recovery Tribunals established thereunder vide notifications of the Central Government ?
(C) Whether Section 3 of the Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, can be read as conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunals established thereunder, irrespetive of Section 19 of the Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and Section 17(1A) of the SARFAESI Act, rendering Sections 19 and 17(1A) of the respective Acts as redundant or nugatory ?
(D) Whether the judgment in Saurabh Gupta (supra), which lays down that the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide the applications arisen from 55 districts specified in the notification dated 05.12.2017, without noticing Section 19 of the Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and Section 17(1A) of the SARFAESI Act, as also the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sri Nasiruddin (supra) lays down the law correctly ?
(E) Whether the judgment in Saurabh Gupta (supra) is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin (supra) and is liable to be declared as not good law ?
59. Let necessary papers be placed before Hon'ble The Chief Justice for necessary orders.
60. List this case before appropriate Bench after the reference is answered by the Larger Bench.
61. The interim order dated 02.07.2021 is extended till the next date of listing.
(Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.) Order Date :- 29.09.2021 Mustaqeem