JUDGMENT Bhanwar Singh, J.
1. By virtue of this petition, the petitioner Shri Ram Naresh and two others have prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders dated 17.8.1981 (Annexure-10), 7.1.1981 (Annexure-8) and 17.5.1980 (Annexure-7), passed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Deoria, Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Lucknow, Camp Padrauna and the Consolidation Officer-II, Deoria respectively.
2. According to the petitioners, Plots No. 1306, 1307/1, 1309, 1311, 1313 and 1319, area 5.5 acres belonged to Dil Mohammad. Umat Yakub, Nasrullah and Mastedeen before the abolition of zamanindari. All of them surrendered their tenancy rights in the aforesaid land and ceased to have any concern with all the plots. The petitioners 1 and 2 and Lal Babu, husband of the petitioner No. 3 entered into the possession over the entire land and in this way, they acquired khudkast right and eventually became bhumidhar on the date of vesting. However, due to the inadvertence on the part of the revenue authorities, the names of Dil Mohammad and other erstwhile tenure holders continued to be recorded in the revenue records. The petitioners moved for correction of the records by filing a case before the Tehsildar, Padrauna which was later transferred to Panchayat Adalat, Dadopur for decision. During pendency of the case relating to correction of papers, an objection was filed by Nasrullah and others but they subsequently executed registered sale-deed in favour of the petitioners 1 and 2 and Lal Babu on 8.8.1952. Mastedeen died before execution of the sale-deed. The panchayat Adalat directed by its order of August 10, 1952 that the petitioners 1 and 2 and Lal Babu be recorded khudkast holders of the land in dispute. As a matter of fact, Nasrullah and others admitted in the sale-deed executed by them that the petitioners 1 and 2 and Lal Babu had khudkast rights in the land in question. In this way, the petitioners were recorded under Section 9 (1) of Zamindari Abolition Act as bhumidhars of the land in dispute but the respondent No. 4 Smt. Roshan Bibi filed an objection under Section 9 (2) claiming her to be the co-tenure holder of the land in question. The petitioners resisted her claim and alleged that Mastedeen died heirless and the petitioners became owners of the land in question on the basis of their long continuous possession. However, the Consolidation Officer during the proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act rejected their claim and allowed the objection of Roshan Bibi and recorded a finding that she was the rightful claimant of her one fourth share in the land in dispute. Being aggrieved of the said order of the Consolidation Officer, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 11 (1) of the Act but the Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation dismissed the appeal vide his order dated 7.1.1981 (Annexure-8). The petitioners then preferred a revision under Section 48 (1) of the Act on various grounds but the Assistant Director of Consolidation dismissed the revision vide his order dated 17.8.1981 (Annexure-10).
3. Feeling aggrieved of the order of the revisions, the petitioners filed this writ petition with the allegation that Roshan Bibi, respondent No. 4 was not the widow of Mastedeen and whatever the right Mastedeen had in the plots in question, was surrendered by him at the time of handing over possession over the entire land to the petitioners 1 and 2 and their brother Lal Babu. The petitioners 1 and 2 and Lal Babu were the bona fide purchasers of the land from Nasrullah and others and as Nasrullah was sole heir of Mastedeen, the latter's tenancy rights were also duly transferred by him. In the alternative, it was pleaded by the petitioners that they had acquired ownership over the land in dispute by adverse possession, a fact of which Roshan Bibi was aware of throughout. None of the authorities has appreciated the petitioners' case and the evidence adduced in support thereof. The Assistant Director of Consolidation observed that the petitioners failed to prove their possession and the alleged possession was illegal and the same did not confer any right. As a matter of fact, the Assistant Director of Consolidation failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence of the petitioners.
4. Roshan Bibi appeared in response to the notice issued to her and on her behalf, Shri Sheikh Abulkalam filed his counter-affidavit. Shri Abulkalam controverted all the averments of the petitioners and asserted that there was no surrender by Mastedeen of his rights in favour of the petitioners and as his name continued to be the tenure holder in the revenue records, Roshan Bibi's name was rightly mutated as his widow. The admission made by Nasrullah will not have any binding effect upon either Mastedeen or his heir Smt. Roshan Bibi nor Nasrullah was legal heir of Mastedeen who was, in fact, succeeded by his widow Roshan Bibi. Nasrullah and others had no business to execute sale-deed in the land of Mastedeen. Smt. Roshan Bibi filed a suit under Section 229B of the U.P. Z.A.L.R. Act in the year 1967 which had abated on account of the consolidation proceedings being operational. Roshan Bibi was always in continuous possession of the land of her share after her husband's death. Thus, the consolidation authorities have rightly recorded their findings in her favour.
5. During the pendency of this petition. Ram Naresh died and his son Vishwanath Pandey along with other partners have entered into a compromise with the respondent No. 4 Smt. Roshan Bibi. Their counsel have jointly signed compromise application No. 168547 of 2003 filed under Order XXIII. Rule 3, C.P.C. The sworn affidavits of Vishwa Nath Pandey and Smt. Roshan Bibi have been enclosed with the said application. The details of the compromise lie in the affidavits of Vishwa Nath Pandey and Smt. Roshan Bibi.
6. A very pertinent question would arise for determination by this Court and it is as to whether a writ petition can be decided on the basis of a compromise?
7. There is no doubt that if two parties, in a Writ Petition filed before this Court, bona fide enter into a compromise, with a view to arrive to a finality to their litigation, the compromise should be accepted for being acted upon. As such, the compromise will not only decide the dispute forever leaving no room for another round of litigation but it will also give the families and their members a peace of mind. The only safeguard the Court has to vouchsafe is that the possibility of their being any mischief or fraud should be ruled out so that a party may not subsequently complain of resulting injustice. In order to protect that interest of a party, it seems to be necessary that all the parties concerned should agree to the compromise and the Court of competent jurisdiction should be fully convinced about the genuineness of the compromise and settlement of the dispute.
8. This Court has already held in Surendra Nath Rai v. Prahlad Singh and Ors., 2002 (3) AWC 2301 : 2002 (93) RD 468, that unless there is something contrary to public interest or there are specific reasons, a petition can and should be decided on the basis of compromise, although under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not bound to accept a compromise and decide the petition.
9. However, as decided by this Court in Laljee v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2001 (4) AWC 2743 : 2002 (93) RD 430, if an application for compromise is filed, it should be decided expeditiously by the appropriate authority, namely, the Deputy Director of Consolidation.
10. It is also well within the competence of this Court, as ruled in Dhaneshwar v. Deputy Director (Consolidation), Deoria and Ors., 2003 (95) RD 372, to refer the compromise to the appellate authority and then pass orders on the basis of the clarification and report of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. No doubt, possibility of mischief and fraud may be ruled out by taking recourse to that procedure but in my opinion it would amount to a lengthy procedure and the parties would be put to lot of inconvenience by going to the appellate court and then coming back again to this Court. It will also entail huge expenditures to be incurred by them.
11. Moreover, in this case, the petitioners and the respondent No. 4 by virtue of their mutual settlement decided to recognise each other's rights and the compromise will certainly confer a finality to the two and a half decades old litigation subsisting between them.
12. Having regard to the interest of the parties and keeping in view that there is no likelihood of any malpractice, mischief or fraud being played by any one of the parties, this petition is finally disposed of with a direction to the Deputy Director (Consolidation) to examine the contents of the compromise and unless there is something contrary to the public policy, as envisaged in the Consolidation Act, decide the dispute by affording an opportunity of hearing to all the parties and then pass final orders. Accordingly, the judgment dated 17.8.1981 passed in revision (Annexure-10) is hereby quashed.