JUDGMENT J.C. Gupta, J.
1. Heard Sri Ravi Kant for the petitioner and Sri A. N. Sinha assisted by Sri Ved Byas Mishra for landlady, respondent No. 3.
2. This is tenant's writ petition.
3. The dispute relates to a portion in the ground floor of the building known as 'Conniston', situated at Tallital. Nainltal. Petitioner is undisputedly a tenant in the same. Respondent No. 3, the landlady, in the year 1984 moved applications for the release of that portion as well as of another portion in the ground floor which was in occupation of another tenant. Smt. Kushum Lata Kukreti alleging that she bona fide required the entire ground floor accommodation for her personal use as well as of her family members. It was her case that her husband is a retired Naval Officer and he and the family were used to a decent and comfortable living. Before the retirement of her husband, she with a view to settle down at Nainital, along with her sister Smt. Anil Bisht and brother Sardar Amarjeet Singh respondent Nos. 4 and 5 respectively purchased the aforesaid building in the year 1980. It was further alleged that in a family settlement between her and her sister and brother, the entire ground floor fell into the share of the landlady and one portion of the first floor fell into the share of her sister while other portion in the share of his brother. She gave notice as per the requirement of proviso to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act Intimating the petitioner that she has purchased the property and she was in dire need of the same and after the expiry of notice period, she filed the release application before the Prescribed Authority in the year 1984. It was also stated before the Court below by the landlady that the tenant-petitioner was comfortably settled at his farm situated in Kichha far away from Nainltal, yet the tenant was keeping the accommodation in question with him for no plausible reason. The landlady pointed out that her family consisted of herself, her husband, her mother-in-law and three daughters and looking to their status and standard of living, she was in need of the entire ground floor accommodation for personal use by herself and her family members. The application was contested by the petitioner on a number of grounds, the foremost being that the respondent No. 3 is not the owner and landlady of the accommodation in question and as a matter of fact, the erstwhile owner had executed an agreement of sale in favour of the petitioner and he was in occupation of the accommodation in question in part performance of that agreement. The bona fide need of the landlady was also disputed by the petitioner-tenant. On consideration of material produced by the parties, the Prescribed Authority by the order dated 2.7.87 allowed the application of the landlady and the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 22 of the Act has also been dismissed by respondent No. 1 by the impugned order dated 25.5.99, Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority as well as of the appellate authority.
4. In the present case, the requirement of the landlady of the entire ground floor accommodation has been concurrently found by the two courts below to be bona fide and reasonable and this finding is based on appreciation of evidence. On examination of the reasonings advanced by the authorities below, this Court finds no fault therein.
5. It was vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the absence of any partition deed or registered document, the theory of partition as set up by the landlady in the Courts below should not have been accepted. Both the authorities below have concurrently arrived at the conclusion that there had taken place an oral partition amongst the co-sharers. It could not be disputed that family partition could also be oral. It is significant to note that the building was purchased by the landlady, her sister and her brother. Her sister Smt. Anil Bisht herself came forward and filed her own affidavit admitting therein that there has been a family partition and the ground floor accommodation has fallen into the share of the landlady, respondent No. 3 with which she has no concern nor she possesses any rights therein. Normally no person makes an admission against his or her own interest. If there had been no such partition, it is Inconceivable that Smt. Anil Bisht would have foregone her claim or rights in the ground floor accommodation. Sardar Amarjeet Singh, the brother of landlady was duly served with the notice in the proceeding before the Prescribed Authority, yet the did not come forward to raise any objection regarding exclusive claim of the landlady in the ground floor accommodation. Both the courts below have believed the evidence adduced on behalf of the landlady on the question of partition and have concurrently found that the ground floor accommodation fell into exclusive share of the landlady and she alone was the landlady of the tenant-petitioner.
6. Both the courts below have also disbelieved the petitioner's case that the erstwhile owner had executed an agreement of sale in his favour and the finding so recorded is based on cogent and valid reasons. The agreement was said to have been executed in April, 1978 whereas evidence adduced before the authorities below established that the alleged executor of the agreement had died on 8th March, 1978, i.e., much earlier than the date the so called agreement was executed. The agreement of sale was, therefore a manipulated and forged document. The petitioner as per his statement is a practising lawyer, yet against all professional ethics he could manipulate a forged document simply in order to defend himself in the eviction proceedings. This conduct of the petitioner is most condemnable and Js sufficient to oust him from claiming discretionary relief of this Court in writ jurisdiction.
7. In any view of the matter, concurrent findings which have been recorded by the courts below on both the relevant issues of bona fide need and comparative hardship are pure and simple findings of fact which have been arrived at by the authorities below on examination of material objectively and in a proper and legal manner and since the matter of appreciation of evidence is the domain of the fact finding authorities, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India would not be justified in upsetting those findings by converting itself into a court of appeal. No manifest error of law in the concurrent findings recorded by the authorities below could be pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
8. It was next contended by Sri Ravi Kant learned counsel for the petitioner that during the pendency of proceedings admittedly the landlady has come in occupation of the portion vacated by the other tenant Smt. Kukreti and, therefore, her need stood exhausted. It may be relevant to mention here that as per the case of the landlady, her need was for the entire ground floor accommodation which Included the portion in the tenancy of the petitioner as well as the portion occupied by another tenant Smt. Kukreti. Therefore. It cannot be said that her need stood exhausted on account of her getting possession of the portion vacated by Smt. Kukretl. The landlady belong to a respectable family of a retired Naval Officer of high rank and the family members of the landlady were used to a high standard of living. The object of the Act is not to deprive an honest landlord of having sufficient accommodation which he needs genuinely. While judging the question of bona fide need, the social status and social obligations are relevant considerations. The bona fide need of the landlord should be tested on a number of factors such as his status, the number of his family members, their ages, their standard of living etc. The question whether the need is bona fide or not is to be answered on the facts of each case and no strait-jacket formula for distribution of accommodation on the basis of number of family members alone can be laid down. Every landlord is entitled to a reasonably decent and comfortable living. Therefore, the need of accommodation may vary from person to person. There may be a landlord with a low social strata who may manage to live in a small accommodation without having separate drawing room, dining room, guest room, toilets, etc. Whereas persons of high social status and specially those who have served on high positions may find it not only difficult but impossible to cramp themselves in such an accommodation and they may require a bigger accommodation to suit their requirement. In the case of Kamla Ahuja v. VIth Additional District Judge and others. (1981) 1 UPRCC 199. It was held that the Act regulates letting in the interest of general public and places restrictions on the right of the landlord to evict tenant but does not lay down that the landlord should take only that much of accommodation as the Court may consider sufficient. This aspect has to be considered broadly and reasonably keeping in view the social status and other social requirements of the landlord in the light of the prevailing social conditions. A reference may also be made to the case of Jiya Lal Jain v. XIVth A.D.J., Meerut, 1999 (1) ARC 213, wherein it was held that where the need of the landlord has been examined keeping in view his social status, his standard of living etc. the finding of bona fide need cannot be said to be based on irrelevant consideration and the need is to be judged from the point of the view of the landlord by taking into consideration his status, his style of living, etc. and no hard and fast rule can be prescribed for limiting the extent of accommodation merely on the basis of number of family members of the landlord and though the number of family members is also a relevant factor which may be taken into account while examining the requirement of the landlord but that could not be the sole criterian for deciding the question of bona fide need of the landlord.
9. In the present case, both the authorities below examined the question of requirement of the landlady objectively and the factors which have weighed with them for arriving at the conclusion that the need of the landlady is bona fide can by no stretch of Imagination said to be extraneous and irrelevant. The proceedings for release remained pending in the Courts below for the last 15 years, yet no serious and sincere effort was made by the petitioner to find out any other alternative accommodation. It is also note-worthy that as per the finding of the Courts below, the accommodation in question was not in serious use of the petitioner as he normally lives at Kichha. In view of all this, the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below on the question of comparative hardship is perfectly valid and justified.
10. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no sufficient ground for making interference in the concurrent judgment of the Courts below. Accordingly writ petition is dismissed in limine.