JUDGMENT N.K. Mehrotra, J.
1. This is second civil appeal against the judgment and decree dated 15.1.1982, passed by the Civil Judge, Pratapgarh in Appeal No. 11 of 1980 setting aside the judgment and decree dated 27.11.1979, passed by the Additional Munsif Sultanpur in Regular Suit No. 12 of 1978, Ram Kalap v. Chaitoo, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff.
2. I have heard Shri Balram Yadav, the learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Sharad Dwivedi holding brief of Shri D. D. Dwivedi, the learned counsel for the respondent on the substantial questions of law formulated in the memo of the appeal.
3. This appeal was admitted on 24.5.1982, after taking into consideration the substantial questions of law formulated in the memo of appeal.
4. It appears that the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining, the defendant from opening any door towards south of his house and from raising any construction over the land shown by letters. Aa, Ba, Ra, La, Da, Ya in the map prepared by the Advocate Commissioner (Paper No. 15C) and for mandatory injunction for demolition of the wall raised on the disputed land and other constructions including 'Chhappar' etc. over it and for closing the door opening towards south of the house. There is a dispute between the parties with respect to the land shown by letters Aa, Ba, Ra, La, Da, Ya in the map paper No. 15C. This land lies south-west to the house of the plaintiff and south to the house of the defendant. The case of the plaintiff is that this land had been appurtenant to his house and had been in his use and occupation for beneficial enjoyment of the house from since before the abolition of Zamindari and it is alleged that the disputed land has been settled with the plaintiff under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951). It is also alleged that the trees and bamboo clumps standing on the disputed land were planted and maintained by him. The defendant had his sahan towards north of his house and had no concern with the disputed land. There was an agreement between the parties with regard to the disputed land on 23.11.1975 through a panchayat. It is alleged that in December, 1977, the defendant opened the door towards such land and raised certain unauthorized construction thereon. Therefore, the suit was filed.
5. The defendant filed written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiff and asserted that the suit land had been appurtenant to his house and had been in his use and occupation for more beneficial enjoyment of his house and holding since the time of ancestors. It is also alleged that the trees and bamboo clumps had been" planted and maintained by his father. He also claimed the settlement of the land with his house under Sections 9 and 7 (aa) of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951. The defendant denied any agreement with the plaintiff with respect to the disputed land and alleged it to be forged and fictitious. The defendant alleged that the southern door is old one and is in existence since the construction of the building. The defendant further alleged that the plaintiffs' another door and sahan has been towards east and north. The learned Munsif framed six issues and out of these issues the following two issues were material for deciding the suit :
(i) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the land in suit as alleged in the plaint?
(ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of demolition as claimed?
6. On issue No. (i), the learned munsif held that the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed land. On issue No. (ii) the learned munsif held that the plaintiff is entitled to get the relief of demolition as claimed.
7. The defendant preferred the first appeal. After discussing the evidence on record, the learned Civil Judge, Sultanpur, held that the plaintiff has ultimately failed to prove his right and title in the suit land and his user and possession thereon at any span of time much less since before the abolition of the zamindari. It was also held that the conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit land and the suit was within time, is vitiated on account of mis-appreciation of evidence on record.
8. Aggrieved by the Judgment dated 15.1.1982 passed by the Civil Judge, Sultanpur in first appeal, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal.
9. Following substantial questions of law were raised by the plaintiff in the memo of appeal on which this second appeal was admitted:
"(i) Whether the appellant's suit could be dismissed inspite of the admission of the defendant that the temple was constructed by the appellant's ancestors in front of sadar door of the appellant?
(ii) Whether the Commissioner's report could be disbelieved inspite of the facts that the appellant's sadar door is in western side and no other door is existing in the appellant's house?
(iii) Whether the defendant is entitled to claim the sahan in back of his house while he is already having sahan towards north side of his house at the same time and can the defendant claim his sahan on two sides?
(iv) Whether the land in dispute has been settled with the plaintiff-appellant under Section 9 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act?
(v) Whether the learned Civil Judge could disbelieve the evidence and give finding without considering the evidence on record?
(vi) Whether the compromise document duly proved by the appellant could be disbelieved without having the expert opinion by the defendant and the burden to prove lies on him?
Findings on substantial questions of law :
Questions Nos. 1 and 11:
10. The plaintiff relies on a compromise between the parties, which is alleged to have been entered into a 'panchayat'. It is paper No. 11 Ka on the record of the trial court. It was written by Kailash Nath Dubey. It bears the seal of Gaon Sabha bearing the signature of Jokhu Dubey. There is a thumb impression alleged to be of defendant Chaitoo. The plaintiff has made an attempt to prove this document by his oral statement as well as the statement of Bindeshwari Tiwari in whose presence this compromise is said to have taken place. This compromise is mentioned in the plaint as the basis of the claim of the plaintiff over the disputed land. The trial court relied on this document while the first appellate court disbelieved it on the ground that from the very beginning the execution of this document was denied by Chaitoo, the defendant. Chaito had denied his thumb impression on this compromise-deed and there is no fingerprints expert's evidence to prove that this compromise-deed bears the thumb impression of defendant Chaitoo. The learned first appellate court had disbelieved the statement of Bindeshwari Tiwari, P.W. 3 on the ground that he had enmity with the defendant because of litigation under Section 107/116, Cr. P.C. between him and the defendant. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant had challenged this finding of the learned first appellate court over this compromise-deed that it could not be proved without producing fingerprints expert's evidence. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the suit has not been dismissed merely on this ground alone. I find that the learned first appellate court has disbelieved the execution of this document before the nyaya panchayat on various factors. It has not been disbelieved only on the ground that no fingerprints expert has been examined.
11. Section 67 of the Evidence Act provides that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. Section 67 merely states with reference to deeds what is the universal rule in" all cases that the person who makes an allegation must prove it. There are several modes of proving a signature, which are as follows :
(i) By calling a person who signed or wrote a document.
(ii) By calling a person in whose presence the document was signed or written.
(iii) By calling handwriting expert.
(iv) By calling a person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom the document is supposed to be signed or written.
(v) By comparing in Court the disputed signature or writing with some admitted signature or writing.
(vi) By proof of an admission by the person who is alleged to have signed or written the document that he signed or wrote it.
(vii) By the statement of a deceased professional scribe, made in the ordinary course of business, that the signature on the document is that of a particular person.
(viii) A signature is proved to have been made if it is shown to have been made at the request of a person by some other person, e.g., by the scribe who signed on behalf of the executant.
(ix) By other circumstantial evidence.
12. The ordinary methods of proving handwritings are : (i) by calling as a witness a person who wrote the document or saw it written or who is qualified to express an opinion as to the handwriting by virtue of Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ; (ii) by a comparison of handwriting as provided in Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and (iii) by the admission of the person against whom the document is tendered.
13. The plaintiff-appellants admitted the first modes by producing the witness Bindeshwari Tiwari in whose presence the compromise is said to have taken place.
14. It may refer the statement of Bindeshwari Tiwari. In cross-examination he says that he does not remember the terms of compromise. The compromise-deed was read over before him and after hearing it, he stated that it was not read over to him at the time of preparation and he had signed the document at the advice of Pradhan and he cannot say that it is the same compromise which had taken place between the parties. In view of this statement, it cannot be said that the learned Civil Judge has wrongly refused to rely on this compromise. I make it clear that the suit has not been dismissed merely on this ground therefore, it cannot be a substantial question of law for deciding the second appeal.
Question No. 2.
15. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has pointed out the admission of the defendant that a temple was constructed by the plaintiff's ancestors in front of the southern door of the plaintiff and it has been argued that in view of the admission, a suit could not be dismissed. The learned first appellate court had dismissed the suit after taking into consideration the entire evidence and the circumstance not only on this admission and mere construction of the temple does not confer any right on the plaintiff over the disputed land. Therefore, this issue is also not a substantial question of law.
Question No. 3.
16. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Advocate Commissioner's report could not be disbelieved on the fact that the plaintiff's southern door is in the western side towards land. A perusal of the report of the Commissioner Shri Jagdish Dhar, advocate goes to show that he had noted that there is no wall on the western side of the house of the plaintiff. This report was submitted on 31.1.1978. The. Advocate Commissioner was again sent on the spot and on 2nd March, 1979, he reported that on the spot the house of the plaintiff was being constructed by new bricks and mud and in that construction, he has established a door towards west. It means that the door of the plaintiff in the western side has been established some time after 31.1.1978 and before 2nd March, 1979. The question of believing or disbelieving the Advocate Commissioner's report cannot be said to be a substantial question of law.
Question No. 4.
17. The defendant relied on an admission of the plaintiff in the plaintiff of Suit No. 37 of 1961, which was filed by the plaintiff against some third person Ram Dutt and others. In this plaint, the sahan of the house of the plaintiff was shown towards north of his house. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is that the defendant cannot take any advantage of the admission of the plaintiff in the plaint of Suit No. 37 of 1961 because the defendant was not a party to that proceedings and the learned Civil Judge had relied on this admission of the plaintiff in the paint of Suit No. 37 of 1961. I find that the learned munsif has not committed any illegality in relying on the statement of the plaintiff in the pleading of Suit No. 37 of 1961 about the existence of the sahan and door of the house of the plaintiff on the spot in the year 1961. The statement of the plaintiff in the pleading in the earlier suit is covered in the definition of admission as provided under Section 17 of the Evidence Act. In Basant Singh v. Janki Singh and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 341, it has been held by the Apex Court that an admission by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a prior suit is an admission within the meaning of Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and may be proved against him in other litigation.
Question No. 5.
18. The case of the plaintiff-appellants is that the sahan of the defendant is in the north of his house and therefore, he cannot claim two sahan on both the sides of the house in north and south. No doubt the Advocate Commissioner has shown that the door of the house of the defendant is in the north and there is a well towards the main door of the house of the defendant and the Advocate Commissioner has shown the sahan of the defendant in the north of the house also. There is no legal restriction that one cannot have two sahans on two sides of the house. I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that it is not substantial question of law.
Question No. 6.
19. The learned first appellate court has recorded a finding after taking into consideration the spot Situation and other circumstances on the spot that the land in dispute is not appurtenant to the house of the plaintiff. This is the finding of fact which cannot be disturbed here in the second appeal. The mere fact that a person has a residential house near the land in suit would not make it appurtenant to that house. Before a person is entitled to claim settlement of the land under Section 9 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951, it must be found that the land was necessary for enjoyment of the appellants of which it was claimed to be appurtenant. So this question depends upon the evidence and the learned first appellate court after taking into consideration the entire admission and the spot situation has held against the plaintiff and that finding being finding of fact cannot be disturbed in second appeal.
20. These issues are not substantial questions of law. The plaintiff has not been able to prove that the disputed land is appurtenant to his house. The findings of the learned first appellate court being finding of facts on these issues cannot be interfered in second appeal.
21. It has been next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned - Civil Judge has disbelieved the evidence of the plaintiff without considering the entire evidence on record. I have gone through the entire evidence on record and the judgment of the Civil Judge. I do not find that there is any evidence which has not been considered by the learned Civil Judge. Therefore, this question is decided against the plaintiff-appellants.
22. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred two decisions in Bandar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors., 2003 (5) AWC 4366 (SC) : 2003 (3) SCCD 1277 : 2003 (4) SCC 161 and Kulwant Kaur and Ors. v. Gurdayal Singh and Ors., 2001 (4) SCC 262, to argue that perversity in findings itself is substantial question of law. I do not dispute with this proposition of law but in the instant appeal I do not find any such perversity.
23. The learned counsel for the appellants has further referred a decision in Hira Lal and Anr. v. Gajjan and Ors., 1990 (1) AWC 286 (SC) : 1991 LCD 43, to argue that there can be interference in findings in the second appeal if admissible evidence has been discarded. At the time of discussion on Question Nos. 1 and 11, I have already held that the compromise on paper No. 11Ka has been discarded for the valid reasons given in the judgment of the first appellate court, therefore, there can be no interference in the findings of the first appellate court. The learned counsel for the appellant has also referred certain decisions to strengthen his argument that a document can be proved in any mode permissible under the law. It is not compulsorily required that in every case the opinion of the fingerprint expert should be produced. As discussed above. I have already discussed the position of the law in what method a document can be proved by a party in a suit. Therefore, these cases are not to be discussed here to avoid repetition.
24. In view of the discussions made above, the instant second appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent.