JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. A large number of vacancies existed in the post of lecturers in different Government Institutions for which a Circular in the form of the Government Order dated July 16, 1989 was Issued by the Government facilitating ad hoc appointment in the post of lecturer until a regularly selected candidate by the Commission is available on the terms and conditions contained in the said Government Order. Pursuant to the advertisement published in terms of the Government Order, the petitioner having applied, was selected by the Selection Committee constituted in terms of the Government Order following the procedure laid down therein. In the appointment letter, the appointment was limited for a particular time and contemplated that the petitioner would continue till a regularly selected candidate by the Commission is available or till the time stipulated in the appointment letter, whichever is earlier. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the imposition of the condition limiting the appointment by a particular time stipulated. An interim order was issued on May 6, 1992 by this Court. By virtue of such interim order, Mr V. C. Dixit holding brief of Mr. D. S. M. Tripathi contends that, the petitioner is continuing in the post of lecturer even till today. He relies on a decision of this Court in the case of Manju Vati v. State of U. P. and others, 1991 ACJ 1009. In the said case, identical question was involved and the stipulation of the time was struck off while maintaining the condition that the appointment would continue till a regularly selected candidate is available. On these grounds, Mr. Dixit contends that this writ petition should be disposed of on similar terms as in the case of Manju Vati (supra).
2. Mr. K. R. Singh, learned standing counsel on the other hand contends that the said decision appears to have followed the principle of ad hoc appointment as provided in Section 18 of the U. P. Intermediate Education Selection Board and Service Commission Act. 1982, where ad hoc appointment was permitted for a limited period since been held by this Court to be unreasonable in various decisions. But the said judgment has overlooked that the 1982 Act has no manner of application in the case of a teacher/ lecturer in Government Institutions. The recruitment of a lecturer in a Government Institution is governed by the Uttar Pradesh Special Subordinate Educational (Lecturer's Grade) Service Rules. 1992, promulgated under Article 348(3) of the Constitution in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. According to him, these rules do not provide for any ad hoc appointment. An ad hoc appointment is made only pursuant to Government Order dated July 16. 1989. Therefore, the right that is being claimed in this writ petition flows from the said Government Order and as such the petitioner is bound by all the conditions provided in the said Government Order. At the same time, the petitioner has not challenged the conditions contained in the Government Order particularly clause (6), which provided that such appointment could be made for a limited period of one year or till a regularly selected candidate by the Commission is available, whichever is earlier. In the writ petition, the petitioner has not challenged the said condition. At the same time in the decision in the case of Manju Vati (supra), the said question had never been gone into since Court's attention was neither drawn to the said provision nor there is anything to show that clause (6) of the said Government Order was ever challenged in the case of Manju Vati (supra). Therefore, the decision in the case of Manju. Vati is distinguishable by reason in fact that it has not considered this aspect. The said decision cannot be said to be a decision declaring clause (6) of the Government Order to be ultra vires. When the petitioner seeks benefit of this Government Order, he has to accept all the conditions whether it is for or against the interest of the petitioner. Having accepted the appointment in terms of said Government Order, it is no more open to him to turn round and question the conditions stipulated in the Government Order. This point having been raised for the first time, this Court should decide the same and the decision in the case of Manju Vati (supra) should be distinguished by reason of the contention as raised by him. On these grounds, he prays that this writ petition should be dismissed.
3. I have heard both the learned counsel at length.
4. It appears that Mr. K. R. Singh had rightly pointed out that this question has not been dealt with specifically in the case of Manju Vati (supra). At the same time, the question of recruitment of lecturer in the Government Institution is governed by the 1992 Rules. Whereas the petitioner was selected and appointed on September 24, 1991 before the 1992 Rules were published on February 18, 1992. Mr. Singh has not pointed out to any other rules relating to recruitment of lecturers in Government Institutions, which is an admitted position. According to Mr. Singh, even in the earlier rules since superseded by 1992 Rules, there was no provision for ad hoc appointment. If such a situation is accepted, in that event in the absence of any such provision the appointment given to the petitioner cannot be said to be an appointment within the said rules or any other rules.
5. Thus, it is apparent that the appointment was made pursuant to the Government Order dated July 16, 1989 permitting ad hoc appointment in view of the prevailing situation. Admittedly a large number of vacancies were existing for the post of lecturer in different Government Institutions. But no candidate selected by the Commission being U. P. Subordinate Service Selection Commission was available. In such situation, the Government Order dated July 16, 1989 was issued facilitating appointment of ad hoc teachers on the terms and conditions stipulated therein. Admittedly, clause (6) of the said Government order provided that such selection should be valid for one year or till a regularly selected candidate by the Commissioner is available, whichever is earlier.
6. In fact, the said clause has not been consciously dealt with in the case of Manju Vali (supra). But the fact remains that in principle the clause was the main contention that was under consideration in the said decision even if no reference is made to clause (6). But by drawing analogy of Section 18 of the 1982 Act, the question was gone into. A plain reading of the said decision shows that the Court did not decide the question relying on Section 18 of the 1982 Act. It had only attempted to draw an analogy from the provisions contained therein and had deliberated on the matter. Despite statutory condition contained in Section 18 of the 1982 Act limiting the period of appointment, the Courts had declared the said limitation as unreasonable in various decisions referred to in the case of Manju Vati (supra). It was so held in the cases of Shiv Chandra Mishra and others v. District Inspector of Schools and others. 1986 UPLBEC 248, Subhash Chandra Gupta v. Committee of Management, 1988 UPLBEC 492. as well as Rattan Lal and others v. State of Haryana and others. AIR 1987 SC 478, and Ravi Narain Mohapatra v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1991 SC 1286. Thus, though no conscious reference was made to clause (6) of the said Order but yet the identical stipulation limiting the appointment by time was the contention which was deliberated and was held to be unreasonable. Simply on the technical ground that this stipulation was not considered in the said decision, the same cannot be distinguished as contended by Mr. Singh. In principle, the stipulation of the time has been declared unreasonable in the said decision After having gone through the reasoning propounded in the said decision. I have not been able to find out anything of disagreement in the reasoning given in the said decision. on which I could distinguish the same or could afford to differ with the decision arrived at. But. however, it may be noted that the said stipulation has been modified to the extent of the limitation of time stipulated, but not with regard to the limitation on account of availability of a candidate selected by the Commission, which has been kept intact.
7. At the same time, it may be useful to refer to the penultimate paragraph of the said decision, which reads as follows :
"There is yet another important aspect of the matter which needs consideration. Under the Government Orders dated 22.7.1986 and 16.7.1989. admittedly a large number of teachers have been appointed in schools and colleges all over the State particularly In hill areas. There may be cases where teachers serving in remote areas. may not have been able to approach this Court, for some reasons like financial etc. However, if such identically situated teachers are not given similar benefits which shall now be available under this order to the petitioner and to other teachers who have approached this Court, by filing separate petitions, a great injustice shall be worked to them. Teaching in Government colleges and schools has recently started. In these facts and circumstances and in the interest of Justice, the respondents are directed to permit all these teachers also to continue who approach the authorities and are willing to continue on their post, on which they were appointed on ad hoc basis, and to extend to them also all the benefits like present petitioners."
8. The existence of the above observation and the direction clearly indicates that the Court while deciding the question of Manju Vati (supra) was conscious of the situation and, therefore, had made the application of the said decision universal viz.. to all such similarly situated candidates even if they had not approached the Court but might approach the appointing authority or such other authority as the case may be. There is nothing to show that this decision has since been overruled or that the observation made in the penultimate paragraph has since been struck off. If it is still not overruled or struck off, in that event the Judgment will be operative in full force. Since I have not been able to find out any reason to disagree with the decision, I am bound to follow the same. In the circumstance in case a regularly selected candidate has not been available in the meantime, the petitioner's continuance by virtue of the interim order shall be treated in continuance and he shall be permitted to continue till a regularly selected candidate is available, provided he is still continuing and is otherwise eligible. It is made clear that as soon a regularly selected candidate is available, the petitioner shall not be entitled to claim any right to continue in the said post nor he will be deemed to have acquired any right or interest to the post by virtue of his continuance either in terms of the appointment or in terms of the interim order passed in this case or in terms of this order in respect of the post held by him in any manner whatsoever at any situation or circumstance.
9. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed accordingly. No cost.
Let a writ of certiorari do issue accordingly striking off the condition stipulated in the appointment letter to the extent that the appointment is limited by time. However, the condition that the appointment is valid till a regularly selected candidate is available is, hereby, confirmed.