ORDER Rajeshwar Singh, J.
1. The Magistrate awarded maintenance to the wife Under Section 125 of the Criminal P.C. to be paid by the husband at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month. The husband did not make payment and the court committed the husband to jail for 14 months as maintenance for 14 months was due. Against that order the husband filed a revision, that was dismissed. But that did not satisfy the husband and instead of paying maintenance to the wife he again spent in litigation and filed this application Under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for review or recall of the order dismissing the revision alleging that "a very obnoxious interpretation has been made" by this Court and the order dismissing the revision was "utterly smarting under the abuse of judicial process".
2. In the case of State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, AIR 1979 SC 87 : 1979 Cri LJ 33 the Supreme Court said that once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained. In the application for review some rulings are cited, but they have not been referred at the time of argument. However, I proceed to consider this review application on merits assuming only for the purpose of this case that review is maintainable.
3. The first argument is that imprisonment for more than one month cannot be awarded even if maintenance may have been due for more than one month. For this purpose the language of Section 125(3), Cr. P.C. is to be seen and the principle of interpretation is that so far as possible every word used by the legislature has to be given meaning and not to be treated surplus without clear justification.
4. The aforesaid provision says that the Magistrate "may sentence such person, for...... each month's maintenance......... to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or until payment if sooner made," The use of word "each" is significant. It has to be given full meaning. The provision says that for each month's allowance the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month. In other words it would mean that if there is a failure to pay several months' maintenance then imprisonment will be up to one month for each month's allowance and thus in whole it may be for more than one month. In the above provision quoted in inverted commas after the word 'for' there are words "the whole or any part of". These words do not alter the meaning. They merely provide that one month's imprisonment may be ordered for one month's maintenance or even for a part of one Month's maintenance. So the provision is clear that more than one month's imprisonment can be awarded and argument of the applicant has no force.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant has cited the case of Mohd. Ahmad v. State, 1988 LLJ 250 (Sic) decided by a Division Bench of this Court. It was decided by two Judges. It does support the applicant's argument when it says that "the maximum period has to be one month for any one default. Here the order of Magistrate awarding more than one month's imprisonment was held invalid. It appears that in that case during the course of arguments at the bar the provisions of Section 125(3) Cr. P.C. were not analysed and it was not pointed out that the word 'default' was nowhere used in the Section. It was because of this that another view appears to have been taken. No doubt it would have been binding on this Court, but for the decision of five Judges of this Court in the case of Emperor v. Beni, AIR 1938 All 386: 39 Cri LJ 720. In this case of Beni, this Court was considering provisions of Section 488 of the Code of 1898. There the words used were similar. In that provision it was said that the Magistrate may sentence such person for each month's allowance to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month. The Court held that the intention of the Legislature was to empower the Magistrate to award imprisonment for a period of one month in respect of each Month's default. The Section does not enjoin that there should be a separate warrant in respect of each term of imprisonment for one month. In other words, where arrears have been allowed to accumulate, the Court can issue one warrant and impose a cumulative sentence of imprisonment.
6. In view of the aforesaid Full Bench decision of five Judges this Court will not be justified in reviewing its earlier order dismissing the revision petition on the ground that more than one month's imprisonment was ordered.
7. The learned counsel for the applicant cited another case Smt. Kuldip Kaur v. Surinder Singh, 1989 Cri LJ 794 : AIR 1989 SC 232. It is entirely on a different point. This decision merely says that the husband would not be absolved for his liability merely because he preferred to go to jail and with the consent of the parties it was ordered that the husband shall not be released till he makes payment. So the imprisonment was almost for indefinite period.
8. Another argument is that even if the husband pays the amount, he would not be released and this is bad. Section 125(3), Cr. P.C. itself says that "or until payment if sooner made". So on payment the husband may be released and if he is not released then he can come to this Court against that order refusing release; but this is no ground for reviewing the order dismissing the revision.
9. Another argument is that husband should be given time for payment. More than two years have passed after the order of the Magistrate, so there is no justification for giving further time when it was not asked at the time when revision was heard or it was not allowed at that time, there is no justification to grant time through an application for review.
10. It was also pressed as to how the maintenance can be paid to the wife if husband is sent to jail. Sending of husband to jail is a mode to induce him to make payment. If he does not make payment and prefers to go to jail, his liability will not cease and even then it will be open to Court to take steps for recovery of maintenance.
11. It was argued that at the time of admission stay order was granted on deposit of 1/3rd amount. The learned counsel proceeds to say that no further order has been made for deposit of remaining 2/3rd amount; so the revision cannot be dismissed. This argument has no merit even on the face of it. There is no necessity to grant him further time to deposit 2/3rd amount before dismissing the revision.
Hence, this application for review is dismissed.