ORDER B.L. Yadav, J.
1. The applicants being accused in Sessions Trial No. 131 of 1982 State v. Swami Rangacharya and Ors. (for short the Trial) under Sections 307/337, I.P.C. pending in the Court of Sri Nepal Singh, Special Judge Saharanpur, have filed present application for transfer of aforesaid trial to some other Court of competent jurisdiction, u/s. 407, Cr. P.C. (for short the Code).
2. Factual metrics can be stated succinctly. The trial was pending since 1982. The prosecution evidence was concluded on 8-6-88 on 14-6-88 was the date fixed for recording statements of the accused u/s. 313 of the Code. The case was adjourned on several dates on the applications of the accused. The statement of the accused could be recorded on 6-9-88. Thereafter on several dates adjournments were taken for furnishing defence evidence which could be furnished on 14-10-1988. The arguments appear to have been heard in part on 2-1-1989. Thereafter 30-1-89 was the date fixed for arguments. On that date learned counsel for the accused could not appear on account of illness hence the adjournment was granted for the next date i.e. 31-1-89 and it, was made clear in the order allowing adjournment that no further adjournment would be granted but on that date i.e. 31-1-89 an adjournment application was filed on the ground of illeness of the learned counsel for the applicants and the same was rejected and 6-2-89 was fixed for arguments. Before that date a transfer application was moved before the learned Sessions Judge and the same was rejected by an order dt. 29-3-1989, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure 1 to the affidavit filed in support of the present transfer application. Against that order instant transfer application has been filed.
3. Learned counsel for the applicants urged that as the case was fixed on 30-1-89 but learned counsel for the applicants before trial court could not appear and just the next day i.e. on 31-1-89, subsequent date was fixed for arguments and on that date learned counsel for the applicants was ill hence adjournment application was made. Instead of allowing the same, learned Special Judge fixed 6-2-89 for judgment without hearing learned counsel for the applicants. This indicates that Sri Nepal Singh learned Special Judge was baised against the applicants who genuinely apprehended that a fair and impartial trial would not be possible in his Court. The adjournment application has incorrectly been rejected by the learned Sessions Judge. A number of cases were cited on behalf of applicants but it is not necessary to refer all of them. The relevant and important cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants are these. Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425, G. X. Francis v. Banke Bihari Singh, AIR 1958 SC 309 and Mansoor Madaru v. The State, AIR 1963 All 477.
4. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand urged that no case for transfer has been made out. The applicants appear to be over sensitive and over apprehensive which was not the object behind enactment of Section 407 of the Code.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, principal question that falls for determination is as to whether under the circumstances of the case, accused applicants could get fair and impartial trial in the Court of Sri Nepal Singh, Special Judge Saharanpur.
6. The relevant statutory provisions bearing in the subject are set out below:
"407. Power of High Court to transfer cases and appeals:- (1) Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court -
(a) that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any Criminal Court subordinate thereto, it may order,
(ii) that any particular case or appeal, or class of cases or appeals, be transferred from a Criminal court subordinate to its authority to any other such Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction."
A bare reading indicates that Section 407 enacted with a view to enable the parties to criminal cases to make an application for transfer in case that party apprehends that he cannot get fair and impartial enquiry or trial. The elementary rule of interpretation is that 'Animus Imponentis' i.e. intention of law givers has to be ascertained. At the same time there is another maxim 'Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat" which connotes that a statute or any enacting provision must be construed to make it more effective. (See AIR 1959 SC 356). The Parliament has employed the word fair and impartial trial with obvious object that accused should not be prejudiced. In common parlance trial can be said to be fair if only when it is conducted with honesty, in other words where it is free from injustice, prejudice and of favouritism. According to Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (Collins London and Glasgow 1987 Edition page 509) word "fair", means reasonable according to generally accepted standard about what is right and just. Next meaning given to word "fair" is that it gives the same or equal treatment to every one concerned. The law requires that an application for transfer can be moved when the applicant apprehends that he would not get equal treatment with the opposite party or that the personal feelings of the Court would influence his judgment. The aforesaid provision emanates from a Latin maxim 'Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit' which means that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. It is better, to make a reference of American Jurisprudence (Volume 21, 2nd Edition para 415) which deals with change of venue or scope of transfer application in criminal matters. "The Courts are deemed to have inherent power to direct the change of venue in order that an accused may have fair and impartial trial. Change of venue can be had only upon some ground specified in the Statute. The right of the accused to a change of venue upon the ground of inability to obtain a fair trial in the country where the indictment is found or because of local prejudice and excitement is universally recognised. It is a fundamental principle of our law that every person charged with crime shall have a right to fair and impartial trial.'
7. In the present case what was urged on behalf of applicants was that on 30th Jan., 1989, learned counsel conducting the trial was not feeling well hence he moved an adjournment application on 30-1-89 the date fixed, but the court adjourned the hearing to next date i.e. 31-1-89 indicating that no further adjournment would be granted. On 31-1-89 an application for adjournment was moved on account of the illness of the learned counsel. The Presiding Officer rejected this application on 31-1-89 and fixed 6-2-89 for arguments. Learned counsel for the applicants urged that 6-2-89 was fixed for judgment and not for arguments. To ascertain correct position as to whether 6-2-89 was fixed for arguments or for judgment, certified copy of the judgment (Annexure) was demanded learned counsel for the applicants furnished the same. A perusal of the same indicates that 6-2-89 was the date fixed for arguments and not for judgments. Facts stated in judgment are accepted to be correct and not what a party states is accepted to be correct. On this point State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak, AIR 1982 SC 1249, may be relied upon wherein it has been stated that a statement of fact regarding proceedings in a Court or admission or confession made by a party, recorded in a judgment of the Court is held as conclusive and not open to be contradicted. In this view of the matter I am of the considered opinion that when the certified copy of the order itself indicates in para 5 on page 18 of the paperbook that on 31-1-89 no trial was adjourned to 6-2-89 for arguments it cannot be assumed that 6-2-89 was fixed for judgment. As such when on 2-1-89 arguments were partly heard and 30-1-89 was the next date fixed and on 30-1-89 an application for adjournment was moved by the learned counsel for the applicants which was allowed and it was made clear that the case was being adjourned for 31-1-89 but. no further adjournment shall be granted but even then on that date also adjournment application was moved consequently 6-2-89 was fixed for arguments, there was no question of any apprehension in the mind of a reasonable person to suspect that he would not get a fair and impartial trial from the Court of Sri Nepal Singh, Special Judge Saharanpur.
8. Reverting to the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants, G. X. Francis v. Banke Bihari Singh, AIR 1958 SC 309 was a case where the Magistrate, who was trying a defamation case against certain Christians, had, in a criminal case filed earlier, against the complainant by certain Christians, acquitted the complainant in appeal disbelieving the prosecution evidence and relying upon the defence evidence, it is not sufficient to create reasonable bias in the minds of the accused in the defamation case and the Supreme Court would be extremely slow to allow a transfer on such a ground. However, on another ground namely that the atmosphere was surcharged with communal tension in that area, it was considered that local atmosphere was not conducive to a fair and impartial trial hence application for transfer was allowed. As such this case is of no assistance to the applicants.
9. Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425 was a case where their Lordships of Supreme Court were considering the scope of Sections 11 and 12 of Bar Councils Act and Sections 526 and 556 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (old) and it was held that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. This case also does not help the applicant in as much as in the instant case at least 4 dates were given for arguments as indicated above but the applicants on one pretext or the other got the case adjourned. Under these circumstances no reasonable or prudent person could apprehend that he would not get fair arid impartial trial from the Court.
10. Mansoor Madaru v. State, AIR 1963 All 477 was a case where it was held that there is also good ground for transfer of a case where the High Court is satisfied that even though the Judge is free from any bias and his impartiality is above question, there exist circumstances which may cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a party that justice will not be done to his case. In the latter contingency the case has to be transferred to uphold the settled principle that not only justice should be done by the Courts, but it should also be shown to be done. In that case it was held under para 17 at. page 480 as follows:
"No party or a counsel is entitled to an adjournment of his case as of right in the absence of any provision to the contrary in law or any rules. It is in the discretion of the Court to adjourn or not to adjourn a case as he thinks proper, having regard to a large number of circumstances, particularly the position of his cause list. An adjournment cannot be granted at the bidding of the lawyer for a party."
This case is also of no assistance to the applicants.
11. In view of the discussions made above I am of the considered opinion that by granting different dates for adjournment as indicated above, it cannot be assumed by a reasonable and prudent man that the applicant would not get fair and impartial trial from the Court of Sri Nepal Singh Special Judge, Saharanpur. Apprehension in the mind of an accused has to be seen as that of a reasonable and prudent man. No reasonable or prudent man can apprehend that, when 4 adjournments were granted to the applicants and dates were fixed for arguments and the case was an old one. On 2-1-89 arguments were heard partly on 30-1-89 an adjournment application was moved on behalf of the applicants which was allowed but it was made clear that no further adjournment shall be granted, again on 31-1-89 adjournment application was moved which was rejected and 6-2-89 was the date fixed for arguments, Under these facts it is baseless to assume that the applicants cannot get fair and impartial trial from the Court of Sri Nepal Singh.
12. I am of the opinion that present applicants were not entitled to adjournment as a matter of right. There does not appear to be specific provision under the Code to meet the exigency of the present situation. It was in the judicial discretion of the Court to adjourn or not to adjourn the case as it thinks proper. However, in case the trial has not been concluded as yet, even though there was no interim stay order granted by this Court, learned Special Judge would be justified in fixing a date for hearing learned counsel for the parties and thereafter dispose of the trial on merits.
13. In view of the premises aforesaid, applying Draconian and Aristotetian methods of reasoning, I am of the opinion that present transfer application is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. Present application fails and is accordingly dismissed.