JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 5th November, 2004, passed by the appellate authority under the provisions of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, (in short 'the Act') before whom the appeal under Section 22 of 'the Act' is pending, whereby the amendment application filed on behalf of the petitioner-tenant has been rejected by the appellate authority.
2. The brief facts of the present case are that the respondent-landlady Manju Agrawal filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act for the release of the accommodation in question against the petitioner-tenant as she bona fide requires the aforesaid accommodation in question. The prescribed authority vide its order dated 13th August, 2004, allowed the release application filed by the landlady and released the aforesaid accommodation in favour of the landlady-respondent.
3. Aggrieved by the order of the prescribed authority, the petitioner-tenant preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, which is pending, as stated above. During the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner-tenant filed an application, paper No. 17 Ka seeking amendment in the written statement. This application is opposed by the respondent-landlady on the ground, firstly that the aforesaid application has been filed just to delay the disposal of the appeal and secondly, at the appellate stage the petitioner-tenant wants to carve out a new case, which is not taken up before the prescribed authority and thirdly it has not been stated as to why the amendment which is now sought, could not be incorporated at the time when the written statement was filed, as these facts were very well in existence when the application was opposed by the tenant. The appellate authority considered the aforesaid application and the objection filed by the respondent-landlady and recorded a finding that all the amendments, which are sought to be brought on record by means of amendment application were either in the knowledge of the tenant when the written statement was filed, or are already on records in form of affidavit as the evidence and thus the appellate authority found that the application has been filed only to delay of the disposal of the appeal, therefore the amendment prayed, cannot be granted by means of the amendment in written statement. The application therefore was rejected by the appellate authority. Thus, this writ petition.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner-tenant submitted before me that the appellate authority has committed error in denying the amendment sought by the tenant-petitioner and for that he relied upon the decision in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.. 2002 All CJ 168 (SC), wherein the Apex Court relying upon an earlier Apex Court's decision in B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameshwaran Pillai, . has ruled out, which is quoted below :
"3. The purpose and object of Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and this Court. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the Courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled-for multiplicity of litigation.
4. The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred : Weldon v. Neal, (1887) 19 QBD 394 : 59 LJ QB 621. But it is also well recognized that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation : See Charan Das v. Amir Khan, AIR 1921 PC 50 : ILR 48 Cal 110 and L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., "
5. So far as the law laid down by the Apex Court, referred to above, I am in full agreement by the law laid down by the Apex Court but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that any case is made out as laid down by the Apex Court for permitting the petitioner to amend its written statement and the view taken by the appellate authority is contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court. To me it appears that petitioner-tenant cannot get any assistance from the decision aforesaid.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-landlady relied upon a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Devendra Mohan and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2004 (3) AWC 2162, wherein the Division Bench after considering the law laid down by the Apex Court has ruled :
"...The amendment is not permissible if the very basic structure of the plaint is changed or the amendment itself is not bona fide. In case the facts were in the knowledge of the party at the time of presenting the pleadings, unless satisfactory explanation is furnished for not introducing those pleading at the initial stage, the amendment should not be allowed. Amendment should also not be permitted where it withdraws the admission of the party or the amendment sought is not necessary to determine the real controversy involved in the case."
7. In the present case, the. order passed by the appellate authority demonstrates that all the materials, which are sought to be introduced by way of amendment, were already on record and for which materials which were not on record, no explanation, much less satisfactory explanation was furnished by the petitioner-tenant as to why these facts, though were in existence and in his knowedge, were not brought at the initial stage. In this view of the matter, in view of the Division Bench decision in the case of Devendra Mohan (supra), I do not think that the appellate authority has committed any error, much less error apparent on the face of record, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This writ petition, therefore, has no force and is accordingly dismissed.
The interim order, if any, stands vacated. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.