JUDGMENT Janardan Sahai, J.
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.K. Pandey learned Counsel for the respondent Bank.
2. The petitioner took a loan from the Allahabad Bank for purchase of a tractor. It is stated by the petitioner's counsel that this loan was taken in the year 1999 and was repayable in instalments over a period of nine years. It appears that the petitioner defaulted. The Bank initiated recovery proceedings. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition for quashing the citation issued by the respondent No. 3 Tehsildar and the recovery proceedings and for a mandamus directing the respondents not to arrest and harass the petitioner The petitioner has not disputed having taken the loan. In paragraph 13 of the writ petition he has expressed his grievance that compound interest is being charged, which the Bank could not. The petitioner's contention is that the recovery certificate ought to have been sent to the Up Ziladhikari and not to the Collector and further that the prescribed authority alone could pass an order for recovery under Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the recovery is time barred in view of Section 11-A (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the petitioner has filed objections in this regard before the Tehsildar. A counter affidavit has been filed in which a statement of account has been annexed by the Bank in which the present outstanding dues have been shown to be Rs. 1,87,450/- upto 30th September 2006. It is also alleged that the recovery certificate has been sent to the Collector under the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973.
3. I have considered the submission made by the parties counsel. In my opinion none of the contentions has any merit.
4. A copy of the recovery certificate has been annexed along with counter affidavit. It is headed under Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973 but it was sent to the Collector as is clear from the averments made in paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit. A citation has also been issued by the Tehsildar. It is well settled that the validity of an action cannot be judged merely with reference to the section under which it purports to have been taken if the action can be supported by another provision, which confers validity upon it. In this case the dues are being recovered as arrears of land revenue. In such a case the recovery certificate is to be sent to the Collector under Section 11-A of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973. The said provision contains a non obstante clause. The power under this provision is without prejudice to the power of the Bank to take proceedings under Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973. The Bank could therefore send the recovery certificate to the Collector exercising powers under Section 11-A of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a single judge decision of this Court in Ram Sajivan Shukla v. The Collector, district Faizabd and Ors. AIR 2002 (46) 820. The said case is distinguishable. The provisions of Section 11-A of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973 have not been considered therein. The court was interpreting Section 11 of the Act and took the view that the recovery is to be ordered by the Prescribed Authority/S.D.O. The matter has been considered by the Division Bench in Dr. Aziz Haider v. State 1987 (1) A.W.C. 750. This Court has considered the provisions of Section 11-A of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act and held that recourse can be taken to it without prejudice to other modes of recovery. The Bank was, therefore, justified in sending the recovery certificate to the Collector and its action would fall under Section 11-A of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973.
5. It was then submitted by the petitioner's counsel that the recovery is time barred as the loan was payable in instalments and the amount became due when the petitioner defaulted for the first time. The statement of account filed by the Bank indicates that the last payment was made by the petitioner on 22.8.2003. The limitation was therefore in any case extended. After the default was first committed by the petitioner whether it was open to the Bank to recover the defaulted instalment or the entire amount of the loan or it had also the discretion to recover the loan after any subsequent default or after the last instalment became due would depend upon the terms of the agreement. It is however not necessary to go into this question any further as the last payment was made by the petitioner on 22.8.2003 and the period of limitation was thus extended. The discretion to recall the loan was exercised by the Bank by its letter-dated 5.8.2004. It was then that the amount fell due for the purposes of Section 11-A (2). The limitation of three years under Section 11-A (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Credit Act, 1973 would therefore in this case not run from any date before the issuance of the recall notice. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Apex court in State of Kerala and Ors. v. V.K. Kalliyani Kutty and Anr. A.L.J. 1164. In that case it was held that a time barred debt is not an amount due and therefore cannot be recovered by coercive means. It is not in dispute that the property of the petitioner has been mortgaged. Article 62 of the Limitation Act, which provides for a 12 years period of limitation would be applicable. The decision in Kalliyani Kutti is wholly distinguishable. From the facts discussed above it is clear that the debt in the present case is not time barred.
6. It was then submitted that the petitioner has filed objections and the same have not been disposed of. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon two decisions. One is the decision of the Apex court in Seth Banarsi Dass (dead) by LRS. v. District Magistrate and Collector, Meerut and Ors. . That was a case in which the shares of companies were brought to sale. It was held that by virtue of Sections 341 and 282 of the UP. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the provisions of the civil procedure code are applicable to sale of movable property and hence the petitioner had a right to file objections. This case is distinguishable. In the present case the petitioner has challenged the recovery proceedings themselves. There was no objection relating to the sale of any movable or immovable property. The scheme of U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on the point is clear. In respect of sale of movable property recourse to the provisions of the civil procedure code has been made. In the case of sale of immovable property objections under Rule 285-I of the UP, Zamidnari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is the remedy. That apart the Supreme Court in the case cited had directed the disposal of objections, which go to the root of the validity of the recovery. In the present case the loan is not disputed. The only objection of the petitioner was about the rate of interest. According to the Bank it has charged interest at the rate in the agreement. At best therefore all that can be said is that there is a dispute about the interest due. Section 287-A of UP. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provides that where a defaulter challenges the dues it is open to him to file a suit after depositing the amount under protest. It is not a case where the entire recovery is invalid. One of the objections is that the petitioner had paid Rs. 15,000/- in the Tehsil but a receipt of Rs. 5500/- alone was given. The dispute being raised is a factual one and would require evidence to be led. The petitioner can raise the question in a suit. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon Vidyadhar Bind and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. Writ Petition No. 40952 of 2006 in which a Division Bench of this Court has relied upon the decision of the Apex court in Seth Banarsi Dass and directed the Tehsildar to decide the representation of the petitioner. The objections, which were raised by the petitioner, have already been considered by me. None of the objections goes to the root of validity of the recovery. No ground for quashing the recovery proceedings under Article 226 has been made out. No other contention was advanced. If the petitioner challenges the amount due it is open to him to file a suit. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.