1. Writ petition is directed against the order dated 7.11.2002 passed by Rent Control And Eviction Officer, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as "RCEO") under Section 12 (1) (b) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") in respect to premises in dispute.
2. It is not disputed that accommodation in question was under the tenancy of Bhaggu Kahar, grand maternal uncle (Nana) of petitioner who is said to have died in 1970 and tenancy was succeeded by the widow of Bhaggu Kahar, Smt. Ratna Devi. At that time petitioner's mother, Smt. Kamla, was unmarried and it is said that she married in 1972 to Sri Gaya Prasad, petitioner's father. The widow of Bhaggu Kahar, namely Smt. Ratna Devi continued to enjoy tenancy till 13.12.1993 when she also died. It is contended that petitioner's mother was continuously residing with petitioner's grand maternal aunt (Nani) and, therefore, petitioner continued to be the tenant of premises in question. However, there is nothing on record and no evidence has been placed to show that even after marriage of petitioner's mother Kamla in 1972, she along with her husband was residing regularly in the premises in question. The tenancy after the death of initial tenant Sri Bhaggu Kahar was succeeded by his widow Smt Ratna Devi who also died on 13.12.1993 leaving no family member as defined in Section 3 (g) of the Act, 1972 so as to succeed the tenancy rights of accommodation in question. Petitioner's contention that despite marriage, petitioner's mother was continuously residing along with family with her own mother has not been supported by any material on record in absence whereof the bare assertion of petitioner to this effect does not generate any confidence.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner placed reliance on Ganesh Trivedi Vs. Sundar Devi AIR 2002 SC 676 wherein the Apex Court found as a matter of fact that brother was residing in the tenanted premises and therefore tenancy rights will devolve upon him on the death of original tenant within the meaning of Section 3 (a) (g) read with Section 12 (1) (b) of Act, 1972. This is evident from the following observation made in para 9 and 10 of judgment which are reproduced as under:
"9. The brother of a tenant is not included in the definition of 'family'. However, the present one is not a case where the tenant Suraj Prasad had during his lifetime taken up residence elsewhere and/or allowed the suit premises to be occupied by his brother. Deo Narain, being the real brother of late Suraj Prasad, the tenant, had come to stay with his brother and was residing along with him as such, even at the time of death of Suraj Prasad. It will not therefore be correct to say that applicability of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act was attracted to the suit premises during the lifetime of Suraj Prasad and a deemed vacancy had occurred. On the death of Suraj Prasad tenancy rights devolved on Deo Narain, he being the only heir. He too became 'tenant' within the meaning of Clause (a) of Section 3. The decision of the High Court cannot, therefore, be faulted.
10. There is yet another reason why no interference with the impugned order of the High Court is called for. Shri Upadhyay, the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 invited our attention to the pleadings and pointed out that admittedly the sale deed executed by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi in favour of Ganesh Trivedi, the appellant, contains recitals to the effect that the former landlord-owner was well aware of Deo Narain occupying the suit premises after the death of Suraj Prasad, that he was acknowledged by the landlord as tenant in the premises, and that rent was also paid by Deo Narain to the landlord under receipts issued by landlord though Deo Narain had fallen into some arrears of rent at the time of sale of the suit premises in favour of the appellant. Such admissions made by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi are binding on Ganesh Trivedi, the appellant, inasmuch as the same are contained in the sale deed by which title has been derived by the appellant and thereunder the appellant has stepped into shoes of the previous owner-landlord. Deo Narain's status as tenant in occupation of the suit premises, cannot, therefore, be doubted or disputed by the appellant."
4. The aforesaid decision has been rendered in view of proven facts in the said case and, therefore, have no application to the facts of this case.
5. Learned counsel for petitioner also placed reliance on another decision of this Court in Munni Lal Vs. Smt. Shiv Dei and others 1981 ARC Short Notes of Cases 13 at page 6 wherein also this Court has held that if a married daughter is residing with her parents and it is founded on the basis of matériel on record, she would become tenant after the death of tenants. This case has also been decided on the evidence in that case. In the present case, I have already said that there is no evidence to show that after the marriage of Smt. Kamla, the mother of petitioner, along with her husband, stayed with the parents in the tenanted accommodation.
6. In view of above, I find no error apparent on face of record in the order impugned in this writ petition warranting interference in exercise of power under Article 226/227 of Constitution. Findings of fact have been recorded which have not been shown perverse or contrary to material on record. The scope of judicial review under Article 226/227 is very limited and narrow as discussed in detail by this Court in Writ Petition No. 11365 of 1998 (Jalil Ahmad Vs. 16th Addl. Distt. Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others) decided on 30.7.2012. There is nothing which may justify judicial review of order impugned in this writ petition in the light of exposition of law, as discussed in the above judgment.
7. In view of above, I do not find any reason to interfere.
8. Dismissed.
9. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Dt. 27.8.2012 PS