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Rajkot Municipal Corporation vs Kishor Construction Company Defendants

High Court Of Gujarat|13 July, 2012
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JUDGMENT / ORDER

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD FIRST APPEAL No. 4504 of 2001 For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI ========================================================= 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
========================================================= RAJKOT MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - Appellant(s) Versus KISHOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY - Defendant(s) ========================================================= Appearance :
MR GOVINDAN FOR MR. AK CLERK for Appellant(s) : 1, NOTICE SERVED for Defendant(s) : 1, MR SANDEEP N BHATT for Defendant(s) : 1, ========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI Date : 13/07/2012 CAV JUDGMENT (Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI)
1) This appeal is filed by the Rajkot Municipal Corporation against the judgment and order dated 9.4.2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rajkot in Special Civil Suit No.122 of 1990, whereby the learned Judge has allowed the suit and directed the parties to refer the matter in issue to the sole Arbitrator as contained in the letters dated 15.12.1988 and 1.9.1988, addressed by the respondent to the appellant-Municipal Corporation as regard the disputes between the parties.
2) The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as under:
2.1) The respondent was given public contract by the appellant-Municipal Corporation for providing and installing M.S. Fabricated community bins. In respect of the said contract, the disputes had arisen between the parties for making payment for the claims made by the respondent under the contract. The respondent had claimed Rs.26,69,117/- under different heads on 15.12.1988 with interest. It appears that the claims of the respondent were not decided and the respondent, therefore, issued notice for the purpose of referring the dispute to the Arbitrator by appointing Arbitrator as provided under the clause for arbitration in the contract. Since the appellant did not appoint the Arbitrator, the respondent had preferred the above referred civil suit under Section 20 read with Section 8 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The suit was resisted by the appellant by filing written statement at Exh.15. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Judge framed issues at Exh.16, which are as under:
“1)Whether there is an arbitrative agreement between the parties?
2) Whether there are disputes and differences arising out of the contract? and whether they relate to the arbitrator?
3) Whether there are reasons to refer the dispute to the arbitrator?
4) Whether the application is maintainable under law?
5) Whether the application is within the limitation?
6) What order and decree?”
The answers to the above stated issues are as under:
1) Yes
2) Yes
3) Yes
4) Yes
5) Yes
6) As per final order
2.2) In the suit, the following documents, which are relevant for our purpose, came to be produced and exhibited. Exh.115, is a copy of tender document issued by the appellant-defendant. Exh.68 and Exh. 69, being extract of the contract agreement/tender regarding settlement of the dispute through arbitration. Exh.67 is the letter dated 15.12.1988 raising claims by the respondent. Exh.66 is the letter dated 23.1.1989 again addressed by the respondent for the claims. Exh.113 is the notice dated 21.3.1989, calling upon the appellant to appoint Arbitrator amongst the persons named in the notice under clause-
23 of the contract. On the basis of the evidence on record, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that there were disputes between the parties in relation to work contract and such differences and disputes were arising out of the contractual obligations between the parties and Clause- GC- 23 & 24 of the contract provides for referring of all the disputes and differences to the Arbitrator. The learned Judge, therefore, allowed the suit and issued directions as stated above including the direction to file the original agreement before the Court.
3) Mr. Govindan, learned advocate for Mr. A.K. Clerk, learned advocate for the appellant has made only two submissions. The first submissions is that there is no separate arbitration agreement between the parties and in absence of the separate agreement for referring the disputes between the parties to the Arbitrator, no direction could have been issued by the learned Judge to refer the disputes contained in letters dated 15.12.1988 and 1.9.1988 addressed by the respondent to the appellant. In this very submission, he stated that Clause- GC- 23 & 24 in the tender document, which is stated to be part of the terms and conditions of the contract, cannot be termed and said as an arbitration agreement between the parties and the said clause could not have been resorted to for referring the so called disputes stated in the letters dated 15.12.1988 and 1.9.1988 to the Arbitrator.
The second submission advanced by the learned advocate for the appellant is that no disputes or differences were specified by the respondent and a reference to Arbitrator could not have been made on the basis of the letters dated 15.12.1988 and 1.9.1988 to the arbitrator. In this very submission, he further pointed out that these two letters could not be taken in general for making reference to the arbitrator. Since there were no specific disputes or differences pointed out for reference to the Arbitrator by the respondent, the directions issued by the learned Judge by exercising powers under Section 20 read with Section 8 for reference to the arbitrator, relying on the letters dated 15.12.1988 and 1.9.1988 could not stand scrutiny of law as there were no specific arbitrable disputes and differences between the parties which could have been referred by resorting to the arbitration clause.
4) As against the above arguments made by the learned advocate for the appellant, Mr. Sandeep N. Bhatt, learned advocate for the respondent has submitted that the disputes and differences under the contract and in relation to the contract awarded to the respondent by the appellant had arisen which could be seen from the claims raised by the respondent in its two letters dated 15.12.1988 and 1.9.1988. Therefore, there were clear differences and disputes between the parties and, therefore, such disputes contained in the above said two letters were clearly referable to the Arbitrator under the contract. Mr. Bhatt, learned advocate for the respondent would further contend that the terms and conditions of the contract were provided by the appellant and under the same terms and conditions of tender document, the respondent fulfilled and completed its part of the obligations and the appellant itself has placed on record the tender document, containing terms and conditions of the contract between the parties at Exh.115. There is a clear and specific clause for referring all the disputes and differences between the parties in relation to the work contract to the Arbitrator and, therefore, this clause in respect of the arbitration, contained in the very contract between the parties, is itself an arbitration agreement and there is no need for a separate arbitration agreement and the learned Judge has directed to refer the disputes between the parties on the basis of this arbitration agreement between the parties by exercising powers under Section 20 read with Section 8 of the Act and, therefore, the learned Judge has not committed any error whatsoever in allowing the suit and issuing necessary directions for referring the disputes between the parties on the basis of the two letters addressed by the respondent. He has further submitted that before issuing notice for appointment of the arbitrator, the respondent had acted under the contract by, first, approaching the appellant for finalizing its claims as contained in the above said two letters. However, since the appellant did not decide the claims of the respondent, the disputes between the parties had arisen and the respondent was within its right to get resolution of the disputes contained in the above said two letters by approaching the Civil Court under Section 20 read with Section 8 of the Act. He, thus, urged that the learned Judge, having committed no error in allowing the suit, this Court may not interfere with the judgment and order passed by the learned Judge.
5) Before we deal with the rival contentions of the parties, we may reproduce the arbitration clause, contained in the contract documents produced by the appellant at exh.115, the extract of which has been produced by the respondent at Exh.68 and 69. Clause GC-23 & 24 are reproduced as under:
“GC-23:
If the seller considers any work demanded of him to be outside the requirement of the contract or considers any drawings, record or ruling of the Buyer or his representative on any matter in connection with or arising out of the contact or the carrying out of work to be unacceptable, he shall promptly ask the Buyer or his representative in writing for written instructions or decision. Thereupon, the Buyer or his representative shall give his written instructions or decision within a period of thirty (30) days of such request from the seller.
Upon receipt of the written instruction or decision, the Seller shall promptly proceed without delay to comply with such instructions or decisions.
If the Buyer or his representative fails to give his instructions or decisions in writing within a period of thirty (30) days after being requested, or if the Seller is dissatisfied with the instructions or decision of the Buyer, the Seller may within thirty (30) days after receiving the instructions or decisions, appeal to Municipal Commissioner, Rajkot Municipal Corporation, Rajkot, who shall afford an opportunity to the Seller to be hard and to offer offer evidence in support to his appeal. This official shall give a decision within a period of thirty (30) days after the Seller has given the said evidence in support of his appeal.
If the Seller is dissatisfied with this decision, the Seller within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision shall indicate his intention to refer the dispute to Arbitration, failing which, the said decision shall be final and conclusive.
GC-24:
All the dispute or difference in respect of which the decision is not final and conclusive shall be referred for arbitration to arbitrator/arbitrators appointed as follows:
i) One Arbitrator to be appointed with the consent of both the Buyer and Seller: Or
ii) In case of disagreement between the two parties, two arbitrators one to be appointed by the Buyer and one by the Seller: Or
iii) In case of dispute between the two arbitrators, an umpire appointed by the two arbitrators in writing before proceeding with the arbitration.
The decision of such arbitrators or umpire shall be final and binding on both the parties.
The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, or any statutory modification thereof. The Arbitrator or umpire shall determine the amount of costs of arbitration to be awarded to either parties.
Performance under the contract shall continue
All awards shall be in writing and in case of awards amounting to thirty thousand rupees (Rs.30,000/-) and above, such awards shall state the reasons for the amount awarded. Neither party is entitled to bring a claim to arbitration if the Arbitrator has not been appointed before the expiration of thirty (30) days after guarantee period.
6) We may also prefer the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab State & Ors. Vs. Dina Nath, (2007) 5 SCC 28. From the said decision, paragraph-14, 19 and 20 are required to be reproduced:
14. The words "any dispute" appears in Clause 4 of the Work Order. Therefore only on the basis of the materials produced by the parties in support of their respective claims a decision can be arrived at in resolving the dispute between the parties. The use of the words 'any dispute' in Clause 4 of the Work Order is wide enough to include all disputes relating to the said Work Order. Therefore, when a party raises a dispute for non-payment of money after completion of the work, which is denied by the other party, such a dispute would come within the meaning of 'arbitration agreement' between the parties. Clause 4 of the Work Order also clearly provides that any dispute between the department and the contractor shall be referred to the Superintending Engineer, Hydel Circle No. 1, Chandigarh for orders. The word 'orders' would indicate some expression of opinion, which is to be carried out, or enforced and which is a conclusion of a body (in this case Superintending Engineer, Hydel Circle No. 1, Chandigarh). Then again the conclusion and decision of the Superintending Engineer will be final and binding on both the parties. This being the position in the present case and in view of the fact that Clause 4 of the Work Order is not under challenge before us, the decision that would be arrived at by Superintending Engineer, Hydel Circle No. 1, Chandigarh must also be binding on the parties as a result whereof Clause 4 must be held to be a binding arbitration agreement.
19. At the risk of repetition we may also say before parting with this judgment that Clause 4 of the Work Order speaks for a dispute between the parties. It also speaks of a dispute and all such disputes between the parties to the Work Order shall be decided by the Superintending Engineer, Anandpur Sahib Hydel Circle No. 1. Obviously, such decision can be reached by the Superintending Engineer, Anandpur Sahib Hydel Circle No. 1 only when it is referred to him by either party for decision. The reference is also implied. As the Superintending Engineer will decide the matter on reference, there cannot be any doubt that he has to act judicially and decide the dispute after hearing both the parties and permitting them to state their claim by adducing materials in support. In Clause 4 of the Work Order it is also provided as noted herein earlier that the decision of the Superintending Engineer shall be final and such agreement was binding between the parties and decision shall also bind both the parties. Therefore, the result would be that the decision of the Superintending Engineer would be finally binding on the parties. Accordingly, in our view, as discussed herein above that although the expression "award" or "arbitration" does not appear in Clause 4 of the Work Order even then such expression as it stands in Clause 4 of the Work Order embodies an arbitration clause which can be enforced.
20. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that Clause 4 of the Work Order can safely be interpreted to be an arbitration agreement even though the term 'arbitration' is not expressly mentioned in the agreement. In view of our discussions made herein earlier, we therefore conclude that Clause 4 of the Work Order constitutes an arbitration agreement and if any dispute arises, such dispute shall be referred to Superintendent Engineer for decision which shall be binding on the parties.
From the decision in the case of Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas Vs. Mrs. Goolbai Hormusji, AIR 1955 S.C 812, paragraph-7 is reproduced herein below:
(7) It may be argued that if the contract note isonly intimation of a sale or purchase on behalf of the constituent, then it is not a contract of employment, and that in consequence, there is no agreement in writing for arbitration as required by the Arbitration Act. But it is settled law that to constitute an arbitration agreement in writing it is not necessary that it should be signed by the parties, and that it is sufficient if the terms are reduced to writing and the agreement of the parties thereto is established. Though the respondent alleged in her petition that she had not accepted the contract notes, Exhibit A, she raised no contention based thereon either before the City Civil Judge or before the High Court, and even in this Court the position taken up by her counsel was that Exhibit A constituted the sole repository of the contracts, and as they were void, there was no arbitration clause in force between the parties. We accordingly hold that the contract notes contained an agreement in writing to refer disputes arising out of the employment of the appellant as broker to arbitration, and that they fell outside the scope of section 6 of Act VIII of 1925, that the arbitration proceedings are accordingly competent, and that the award made therein is not open to objection on the ground that Exhibit A is void.
Sub-section (a) of Section 2 of the Act defines the arbitration agreement as under:
“Arbitration agreement means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to Arbitration, whether an Arbitrator is named therein or not”
7) As laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab State & Ors.(Supra) and Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas (Supra) even a contract between the parties including the work contract can contain a mechanism for referring the disputes to the Arbitrator by having arbitration clause therein. What is required by Sub-section (a) of Section 2 of the Act is that there has to be a written agreement between the parties to submit present or future differences to the arbitration. It is not necessary to have separate written agreement for referring the disputes to the Arbitration. The law does not provide for such separate arbitration agreement. If there is a clause for arbitration in the original contract itself, then such clause for arbitration in the contract itself is an arbitration agreement between the parties because the parties have already entered into the contract and clause therein for referring the disputes to the arbitration is an agreement between the parties. Therefore, the contention advanced by the learned advocate for the appellant that since there was no separate arbitration agreement, the learned Judge could not have issued directions for referring the differences and disputes between the parties to the arbitrator, cannot be accepted.
8) So far as the next contention of the learned advocate for the appellant that there were no clear disputes or differences spelt out for making reference to the Arbitrator and the directions issued by the learned Judge on the basis of the claims made in two letters dated 15.12.1988 and 1.9.1988, were dehorse the provisions of the Act, cannot be accepted. It is required to be noted that under the mechanism provided in clause GC-23 & 24 of the contract, the respondent was, first, required to put forth its claims before the Commissioner of the Corporation and on such claims, the Commissioner was required to take decision and, thereafter, if there was a dispute, it was required to be referred to the arbitrator. The letters dated 15.12.1988 and 1.9.1988 raising claims remained unattended by the commissioner of the corporation and no decision was taken by the Corporation on the claims made by the respondent in the said two letters. Therefore, the disputes and differences had already arisen between the parties and the respondent, therefore, rightly issued final notice under the above said two clauses of the contract for appointment of Arbitrator on the basis of the above said two letters. The above said two letters, therefore, clearly contained the disputes between the parties in the form of claims made by the respondent and such claims under the contract were required to be decided by a method of arbitration, as agreed between the parties in the contract itself. Therefore, the second contention advanced by the learned advocate for the appellant is also not required to be accepted and the same is rejected.
9) We agree with the submissions made by the learned advocate for the respondent to the effect that there was a clear agreement between the parties for referring the disputes to the Arbitrator under the contract itself and since the appellant did not take any decision on the claims put forth by the respondent, the clear disputes and differences had arisen between the parties and, therefore, the disputes contained in the letters were required to be referred to the Arbitrator under the arbitration agreement between the parties as per clause GC-23 & 24 of the Contract.
10) In view of the above, we are of the opinion that learned Judge by referring the disputes to the Arbitrator by exercising powers under section 20 read with section 8 of the Act, has not committed any error.
11) In view of the above, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.
(JAYANT PATEL,J.) (C.L.SONI,J.) Vahid
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Title

Rajkot Municipal Corporation vs Kishor Construction Company Defendants

Court

High Court Of Gujarat

JudgmentDate
13 July, 2012
Judges
  • Jayant Patel
  • C L Soni
Advocates
  • Mr Govindan
  • Mr Ak Clerk