JUDGMENT M. Katju, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner is challenging the impugned order dated 4.6.2002, Annexure-4 to the writ petition, order dated 25.8.2001, Annexure 4-A to the writ petition and order dated 3.2.2003 Anncxure-5 to the writ petition. The petitioner has also prayed for a declaration that Section 13 of U.P. Act No. 22 of 1998, in so far as it seeks to amend Clause (b-1) of Article 5 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, be declared unconstitutional.
3. The petitioner is a Co-operative Society registered under the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act. It is alleged in Paragraph 3 of the writ petition that it entered into an agreement dated 16.7.1999 to purchase a bhumidhari Plot No. 395 measuring 1.345 acres belonging to one Matru alias Matrumal situate at village Asadpur, Pargana and Tahsil Koil, District Aligarh. True copy of the registered agreement to sell dated 16.7.1999 is Annexure 1 to the writ petition. A sum of Rs. 100/- was paid as stamp duty on the aforesaid agreement but the possession was not delivered at the time of the agreement.
4. In Paragraph 6 of the writ petition it is alleged that subsequently by a cancellation deed dated 27.1.2002, registered on 28.1.2002, the agreement dated 16.7.1999 was cancelled vide Annexure 2 to the writ petition. It transpired that in the deed of cancellation there was some mistake in the description of the agreement to sell and that was rectified by a rectification deed dated 21.6.2002, vide Anncxure-3 to the writ petition.
5. In Paragraph 8 of the writ petition it is alleged that a reference under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act was made by the Sub-Registrar, Koil, Aligarh to respondent No. 2, the A.D.M. (Finance and Revenue), Aligarh for determination of the Stamp Duty payable on the registered agreement to sell dated 16.7.1999. It is alleged in Paragraph 9 of the writ petition that the petitioner pointed out that the alleged agreement to sell stood cancelled by the cancellation deed and the petitioner Society was never in possession of the land which was subject matter of the agreement to sell. Hence, it was urged that there was no deficiency in the stamp duty.
6. It appears that on 25.8.2001, the A.D.M., (?Finance) determined the deficiency in the stamp of Rs. 1,26,775/- and directed the petitioner to pay the same, It is alleged that since this order was ex-parte it was set-aside and again after hearing the petitioner the same order was reiterated by the order dated 4.6.2002, vide Annexure 4 to the writ petition and again the petitioner was directed to pay deficiency of Stamp Duty of Rs. 226,775/-.
7. The petitioner filed a revision against that order which has been dismissed by the order dated 3.2.2003, vide Annexure-5 to the writ petition. Aggrieved this petition has been filed in this Court.
8. In the impugned order dated 3.2.2003, the Commissioner, Agra Division, held that no doubt the possession was delivered to the petitioner but once a deed is registered stamp duty became payable even if subsequently it is cancelled. The question is whether this view of the learned Commissioner is correct.
9. It may be mentioned that stamp duty is a tax as held by the Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Navin Gun House v. Union of India, 2003 (2) AWC 894. The power to levy stamp duty is in the Concurrent List of the Constitution viz., Entry 44 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. Hence, the State Legislature has power to pass laws, including amendments relating to stamp duty.
10. Article 5(b-l) Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as substituted by U.P. Act 22 of 1998 states :
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13. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the Statute vide Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Keshav Chand, AIR 1950 SC 265, (vide Para 20). If the language is plain and admits of one meaning it has to be given effect to even if it leads to hardship or possible injustice vide D.D. Joshi v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 420.
14. In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 (685), it was observed by the Supreme Court that if there is any hardship it is for the Parliament to amend the law, but the Court cannot be called upon to discard the cardinal Rule of interpretation for mitigating a hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear the Court has to give effect to it however inequitable or unjust the result may be. As is said, 'dura lex sed lex' which means 'the law is hard but it is the law'. In our opinion, even if the impugned amendment is causing hardship to some people it is not for this Court to amend the law. A legal enactment must be interpreted in its plain and literal sense as that is the first principle of interpretation. In our opinion, the impugned amendment to the Stamp Act is clear and unambiguous.
15. In Abel v. Lee, 1871 LR 6 CP 365, Willes, J., observed :
"I utterly repudiate a notion that it is competent to a Judge to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his views as to what is right and reasonable."
16. In Miller v. Salomons, 7 Ex. 475, Polak, J., observed :
"If the meaning of the language be plain and clear we have nothing to do but to obey it to administer it as we find it and to take a different course is to abandon the office of a Judge and to assume the province of legislation."
17. The same view has been taken by our Supreme Court in Suddappa v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2002 (I) SCC 142.
18. A Taxing Statute cannot be struck down merely on the ground that the imposition is heavy vide Jagannath v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 148. There are several Taxing Statutes which may be harsh, but they cannot be held to be unconstitutional for that reason. Thus, when a Sales Tax law is made under which the dealer cannot pass on the incidence of the tax to the purchaser, this will not make the law unconstitutional vide S. Dodar v. State of Kerala, AIR 1974 SC 2272 and (Paras 12 to 14) and M/s, Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1019. A Stamp Act, as already observed above, is a Taxing Statute and as regards a Taxing Statute it is well-settled that equity has no place in it. As observed by Rowlatt, J., in his classis statement in Cape Brady Syndicate v. IRC, (1921) 1 KB 64. "There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read. In nothing is to be implied" and this view has been approved by our Supreme Court in CIT v. Ajax Products Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1358 and Banarsi Debi v. ITO, AIR 1964 SC 1742.
19. The Supreme Court in CIT v. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216, observed that equity is out of place in tax laws. In CIT v. Madhav Prasad Jatia, 1976 (4) SCC 92, the Supreme Court held that there could be no consideration of equity if the language of the provision was plain and clear. In CIT v. Shahzada Nand, AIR 1966 SC 1342, the Supreme Court observed that while interpretating a Taxing Statute one cannot go by the notion as to what is just and expedient.
20. We are of the opinion that no doubt the impugned provision is harsh as it does not provide for non-realization of stamp duty if the agreement is subsequently cancelled, but it is not for this Court to cure this defect vide Smt. Tarun Lata Sham v. CIT, 108 ITR 345 SC, as it would then be taking on the role of the legislature. If there is a casus omissus the defect can only be remedied by legislation, vide S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (Paras 251 to 257). The Supreme Court held in these cases, that where there was a lacuna in the Act, that could not be filled up by the Court, but only by the legislature.
21. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21344 of 2003, Syed Mahfooz Hussain v. State of U.P. and Ors., decided on 19.5.2003, a Division Bench of this Court upheld the first proviso to Section 56(1-A) of the Indian Stamp Act even though it was a harsh provision, Against this decusuib S.L.P. was filed but the same has been dismissed by the Supreme Court.
22. It is first principle of interpretation that a statute should be read in its ordinary, natural and grammatical sense. As observed by the Supreme Court of India :
"In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost Rule of construction is the literary construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what docs the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other Rules of construction of statutes. The other Rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear vide M/.s. Hiralal Ratanlal v. STO, AIR 1973 SC 1034."
23. This principle is applied with particular emphasis while interpreting Taxing Statutes vide ITO v. Nadar, AIR 1968 SC 623 and the fundamental principle of interpreting Taxing Statutes is the principle of strict construction. In this respect Taxing Statutes are to be interpreted differently from beneficial legislation (e.g., labour laws) vide S.K. Verma v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 422 or the Constitution vide State Trading Corporation v. CTO, AIR 1963 SC 1811, where the principle of liberal interpretation applies.
24. It is well-settled that there is no equity in tax. If one comes within the four corners of the Statute, one has to pay the tax, however, great the harshness.
25. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. G. Hyatt, Vide AIR 1971 SC 725, the question was whether under Section 17(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the interest on the assessee's own contribution to an unrecognized provident fund could be treated as salary. The Supreme Court of India held that the language of Section 17(3) was plain and unambiguous and hence, the said amount was not salary but income from other sources and taxable under Section 56.
26. In Plester and Co. Ltd. v. Addl. Commissioner of Sales Tax, vide AIR 1978 SC 897, the question was whether sales outside Delhi would also be included in taxable income. The Supreme Court has held that the section used the word 'resale' simpliciter and hence it referred to all resales and could not be limited to resales within Delhi alone. Thus, the Supreme Court went by the plain language of the statute and did not speculate on the intention of the legislature.
27. In AV Fernandez v. State of Kerala, AIR 1957 SC 657, the Supreme Court of India, stated the principle as follows :
"If the Revenue satisfies the Court that the case falls strictly within; the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand, the case is not covered within the four corners of the Taxing Statute no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter."
28. It is said that tax and equity are strangers vide Partington v. Attorney-General, (1869) LR 4 HL 100. this view was best expressed by Lord Cairns as follows :-
"If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however, great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind. On the other hand if the Court seeking to recover the tax cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however, apparently within the spirit of the law, the case might otherwise appear to be."
29. In a Taxing Statute, if a dealer or assessee falls within the four corners of the statute then the statutory provision will apply, but if he docs not it will not apply. There is no scope for arguments of hardship, equity etc., in interpretation of a taxing law.
30. In Bindal Batteries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2003 UPTC 462, this Court held that if an eligibility certificate either in full or in part has been availed by the petitioner he cannot claim moratorium as the language of Rule 43(8) of U.P. Trade Tax Rules was very clear. Against this decision also S.L.P. has been dismissed by the Supreme Court, as we are informed.
31. In our opinion, sympathy and sentiments can have no place when the legal position is clear. As held by this Court in Smt. Rampatti Jaiswal v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1996 AWC 1373, equity can supplement the law but not supplant. In M. Ramappa and Anr. v. M. Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633, the Supreme Court has held :
"What is administered in Courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law."
32. In our opinion, when there is a conflict between the law and equity it is the law, which is to prevail in accordance with the Latin maxim "Dura Lex Sed Lex", which means "the law is hard but it is law." In this connection reference can also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gauri Shanker v. State of U.P., AIR 1994 SC 169.
33. Since the impugned provision is very clear we find no illegality in the impugned order. The stamp duty was clearly payable as per Clause (b-1) of Article 5 of Schedule 1-B, even though the agreement was subsequently cancelled.
34. In view of the above this petition is dismissed.