JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J.
1. Petitioner herein is aggrieved by orders dated 25.4.1996 and 22.10.1996 passed by the District Inspector of Schools.
"The contention raised by the learned counsel is based on averments of fact which require verification, I, therefore, consider it appropriate to direct the petitioner to approach the Regional Deputy Director of Education. Gorakhpur, before whom the petitioner may file an application along with a certified copy of this order within a period of one week. On such an application being filed the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Gorakhpur, will look into the facts and examine the matter and if he finds the statement of fact made by petitioner which has been referred to above to be correct he shall pass appropriate orders in respect of the approval for the appointment of the petitioner. In case approval is granted, payment of salary of the petitioner with effect from the date of appointment shall be ensured. In case, however, petitioner's case is found not acceptable the Regional Deputy Director of Education shall give reasons for rejecting the claim.
With these directions, the writ petition is finally disposer of.
Sd./A. P. Singh, J.
15.5.1996."
3. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction of this Court, the matter was considered by the Regional Deputy Director of Education who by his order dated 22.10.1996 (Annexure No. 13) rejected the petitioner's representation on the grounds firstly, that there was a ban on appointment in view of the provisions contained in Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations and secondly, that the procedure for appointment was not followed.
4. I have heard Sri A.N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, standing counsel representing opposite parties 1 and 2 and Shri K. Sahi representing the respondents 3 and 4. Learned counsel representing the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 supported the case of the petitioner. Shri Sabhajeet Yadav learned standing counsel opposed the writ petition and tried to support the impugned orders.
5. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders impugned herein. I am of the view that the petition deserves to be allowed. Regulations 101 to 107 were inserted in Chapter III of the Regulations made under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 vide Board's notification No. 9/592 dated 28.8.1992 issued pursuant to the Government Notification No. 400/15-7-2(11-19 dated 30.7.1992. Regulation 101 and Regulations 103 to 107 were subsequently substituted by notification No. 300/15-7-2(1)/l9 dated 2.2.1995. The language in which Regulation 101 is couched does not suggest that it was intended to impose a ban on appointment of the non-teaching staff in recognised and aided institutions. All that it provides is that appointing authority would not fill in any vacancy of non-teaching staff in recognised and aided institutions except with the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. Prior approval is necessary for filling the vacancies but in the fact situation of a given case, as the instant one, the approval may be deemed if no communication is received by appointing authority within a reasonable time. There are provisions in the Act, prohibiting 'appointment' of any person as a teacher except with the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. Regulation 101 prohibits filling of vacancies of non-teaching staff. The respondent authorities have fallen into error in holding that there was ban on appointment in view of Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations. The view taken by the respondent authorities is based on misconstruction of the provisions contained in Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act which in my opinion requires prior approval for filling in vacancies of non-teaching staff. As stated earlier in this judgment, permission was sought for appointment vide letter dated 28.2.1995 followed by subsequent letters but the District Inspector of Schools did not care to respond to the request of the Principal seeking per mission/approval for making appointment in the vacant post. Ultimately the vacancy was advertised on 17.10.1995 and upon consideration of the inter se suitability of candidates who had applied for the post, the petitioner was selected on 25.10.1995. Since the District Inspector of Schools failed to communicate his decision with reference to letter dated 28.2.1995, he would be deemed to have given his approval to fill in the vacancy.
6. Even if it be held that prior approval is necessary as a condition precedent to issuing order of appointment, the District Inspector of Schools would in the fact situation of the case, be deemed to have accorded approval on expiry of a period of two weeks after the receipt of the letter dated 13.1.1996 and appointment would become effective from the date of deemed approval. The District Inspector of Schools and the Regional Deputy Director of Education have rejected the petitioner's representation on misconstruction of the provisions of the Regulation 101 of the Chapter III of the Regulations made under the provisions of U. P.
Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and on a manifestly erroneous conclusion that the procedure for appointment was not followed.
7. It may be pertinent to observe that by means of the notification dated 30.7.1992, provision has been made in Chapter III for making compassionate appointment of the dependents of teachers and other employees dying-in-harness. The requirement as to prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools is, in my opinion, intended to safeguard the interest of the dependents of teachers and other employees dying-in-harness for whom the provision has been made in Regulations 103 to 106 for compassionate appointment. The finding recorded in the instant case is that no candidate was available for appointment on compassionate ground and, therefore, there was no question of the object sought to be achieved by Regulation 101 being frustrated in the instant case. The orders impugned herein are, therefore, liable to be quashed.
8. The only question that remains to be considered is whether the District Inspector of Schools in the circumstances of the case would be deemed to have accorded approval to the appointment of the petitioner. As stated (supra), the approval of the District Inspector of Schools was sought vide letter dated 13.1.1995 but the District Inspector of Schools failed to communicate his decision thereon within a reasonable time. True, Regulation 101 does not prescribe a time limit within which the District Inspector of Schools is to accord approval. The District Inspector of Schools, in my opinion, must exercise his powers within a reasonable time. The principle has been stated by the Supreme Court in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. M/s, K.T. Rolling Mills Put. Ltd., JT 1995 (1)SC 138, asunder :
"There can be no dispute in law that when a power is conferred by statute without mentioning the period within which it could be invoked, the same has to be done within reasonable period, as all powers must be exercised reasonably, and exercise of the same within reasonable period would be a fact of reasonableness."
9. The question is as to what should the "reasonable period' within which the District Inspector of Schools should either accord, or refuse to accord, approval under Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations. In Regulation 6 of Chapter II, provision has been made that if the District Inspector of Schools fails to communicate his decision on the proposal submitted by the Committee of Management for appointment of a teacher by promotion within three weeks from the date of receipt of the proposal, he shall be deemed to have given concurrence to the proposal of the management. There are other provisions, for example Section 16F (2) as it originally stood, where the Legislature has provided for 'deemed approval' in the event of failure on the part of the competent authority to communicate his decision within two weeks. Similarly para 2 (3) (iii) of U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981 also enjoins a duty upon the District Inspector of Schools to communicate its decision on the proposal for ad hoc appointment in short term vacancy within seven days from the date of receipt of the relevant papers failing which it shall be deemed that the District Inspector of Schools has given his approval. The District Inspector of School, as stated earlier in this judgment, did not communicate his decision in response to the letters dated 28.2.1995 and 13.1.1996 within reasonable time and it was by means of the letter dated 25.4.1996 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) that he purports to have declined financial approval to the appointment of the petitioner. Applying the test of reasonableness as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above. I am of the considered view that two weeks from the date of receipt of the letter seeking approval would be 'reasonable period' within which the District Inspector of Schools must communicate his decision to the appointing authority failing which he shall be deemed to have accorded approval. In the circumstances of the case, therefore,, the District Inspector of Schools would be deemed to have accorded approval way back on or before February 1, 1996 and the petitioner is, therefore, entitled to his salary w.e.f. 1.2.1996.
10. In view of the above discussion, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders are quashed. The respondents are directed to ensure payment of salary to the petitioner w.e.f. 1.2.1996. Arrears of salary upto date shall be paid within three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order and thereafter the salary shall be paid month to month as and when if falls due. There shall be no orders as to costs.