JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.
1. Heard counsel for the parties.
By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order of the labour court dated 22.1.1980 in Misc. Case No. 141 of 1979 filed under Section 32C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947.
2. The root of the dispute lies in a consolidated award of the labour court, Gorakhpur dated 23.4.1979 in Adjudication Case Nos. 88/77, 91/77, 92/77, 93/77, 95/77, 103/77, 104/77, 107/77, 109/77, 111/77, 114/77, 152/77 and 135/78. Adjudication Case No. 135/78 was made the leading case.
3. The aforesaid cases pertain to adjudication of dispute on reference made by the State Government with regard to illegal termination of services of the workmen, The labour court by the aforesaid consolidated award in Adjudication Case No. 135/78 held that the termination of services of the workmen was illegal and unjustified. It further held that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, termination of the services of the workmen amounted to victimization of innocent and helpless workmen. By the aforesaid award, the labour court granted relief of reinstatement to the workers without back wages. It was further directed that the employers shall call upon the workmen within one month of the award becoming enforceable in law by sending them a written notice for reinstatement on their old posts on which they were working prior to their termination.
4. The award was published on 29.5.1979 on the notice Board and the same became enforceable in law on 29.6.1979 i.e., after 30 days from the date of its publication on the notice board in terms of Section 6 read with Section 6A (1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The operative portion of the award is as under :
^^ftu ifjfLFkfr;ksa eas bu lEcfU/kr Jfedksa dh lsok;sa lekIr dh xbZ gS og lrkus foDVhekbts'ku ds leku gS A ;g lHkh Jfed ,slh ifjfLFkfr esa vlgk; ,oa funksZ"k gS vkSj esjs fopkj ls pwfd bl caSad dh izcU/k lfefr fu;qDr djus ds fy;s gj izdkj ls l{ke gS vkSj bu lc Jfedksa dh fu;qfDr;k v/;{k ds vkns'kkuqlkj gqbZ gSa A blfy;s ;g U;k;r% mfpr gksxk fd mUgsa iqu% muds dk;Z ij iquZLFkkfir fd;k tk; A ;gk ;g dguk iz'kkafxd gksxk fd bl fLFkfr ds vfrfjDr lsok;kstdksa dh vksj ls bu Jgedksa ds ekeys esa dksbz vU; dkj.k ugha crk;s x;s gSaa vkSj u rks fdlh Lrj LVst ij bl fookn dh lquokbZ ds nkSjku ;g ugha dgk x;k gS A fd bu yksxksa dk dk;Z vlUrks"ktud jgk gS A ;k os fdlh nqjkpj.k ds nks"kh ik;s x;s gSaa A mfYyf[kr vkSj Hkh Li"V gS fd bu yksxksa ds ij u rks dksbZ vkjksi&i= fn;k x;k gS vkSj u rks fdlh izdkj dh ?kjsyw tkp djkbZ xbz gS A vUr esa eSa bl urhts ij igqpk gw fd bu yksxksa dh fu;qfDr;k mfpr ,oa oS/kkfud gSaa vkSj tc mudh txg tgk og fu;qDr fd;s x;s gSa vc Hkh fu;fer ,oa yxkrkj py jgh gS A rc mUgsa dk;Z ls foeqDr djuk U;k; ds gj n`f"Vdks.k ls vuqfpr ,oa voS/kkfud gS tgk rd budh csdkjh dh vof/k ds osru dk lEcU/k gS] lwpukFkZ dh frfFk fnukd 20-2-1979 dks Jfed i{k ds izfrfuf/k us bl U;k;ky; ds le{k ;g izkFkZuk&i= dh fd ;fn ;g lHkh Jfed viuh iqjkuh txg ij cgky fd;s tkrs gaSa rks os bu Jfedksa dh vksj ls mudh csdkjh dh vof/k ds iSls ij tksj ugha nsaxs A bu lHkh ifjfLFkfr;ksa ij iw.kZ:i ls fopkj djus ds mijkUr esa bu fooknksa esa ;gh fu.kZ; nsrk gw fd loZJh fnfXot; flag iq= Jh fugky flag fookn la- [email protected] Jh jktsUnz izlkn fookn la- [email protected] vatuh dqekj flag iq= Jh txnh'k izlkn flag fookn] la- [email protected] Jh v'kksd dqekj flag iq= Jh xaxk flag fookn la- [email protected] Jh vej ukFk flag iq= Jh jke lwjr flag fookn la- [email protected] Jh jfoUnz izrki ukjk;.k iq= Jh cgy ukjk;.k fookn la- [email protected] Jh 'kSysUnz flag iq= Jh HkxoUr flag fookn la- [email protected] Jh /keZlsu flag iq= Jh ljlsu fookn la- [email protected] rFkk Jh izHkw xksfoUn jko iq= Jh jke nkl jko fookn la- [email protected] dks bl ,okMZ ds ykxw gksus ds ,d ekg ds vUnj fyf[kr lwpuk Hkst dj cqyk;k tk;
vkSj mUgsa mudh iqjkuh txg ij iquZLFkkfir fcf'k"V fd;k tk; rFkk muds izfrfuf/k ds vk'oklu ij vkSj bl fookn dh iw.kZ fLFkfr dks /;ku esa j[krs gq;s eSa ;g Hkh fu.kZ; nsrk gw fd ;g lHkh lEcfU/kr Jfed csdkjh dk iSlk ugha ik;saxs A 8 bl fookn esa esjk mijksDr izdkj dk vokMZ gS A g- vLi"V MkW- t- u- flag ihBklhu vf/kdkjh A**
5. Before enforcement of the award, the employers vide letters dated 23.6.1979, 26.6.1979, 27.6.1979 and 28.6.1979 directed the petitioners to join on the old posts on which they were working prior to their termination, on certain new terms and condition. The workmen by means of letters dated 25.6.1979, 26.6.1979, 27.6.1979, 29.6.1979 and 2.7.1979 (Annexures-2 to 10 to the writ petition) informed the Secretary of respondent bank that the new conditions laid down in the letters of the bank dated 23.6.1979, 26.6.1979, 27.6.1979 and 28.6.1979 for their reinstatement were not acceptable to them and they requested that they may be reinstated on their old posts on old terms and conditions in terms of the award. It was also stated by the workmen in the aforesaid letters that they were presenting themselves for joining their duties, but they were neither being allowed to join their duties nor were permitted to sign the attendance register by the employers. Two of the aforesaid letters by the workmen dated 25/26.6.1979 and 27.6.1979 Annexures-2 and 4 respectively to the writ petition is reproduced below :
(l) "The Sachiv Distt. Co-operative Bank Ltd.
College Road, Gorakhpur.
Sir, In terms of the award in Adjudication Case No. 109/77, I hereby submit my joining report to you, condition laid down in your letter dated 23.6.1979 are not acceptable. I have been ordered to be reinstated by a competent court and contrary to the terms of the award nothing shall be legal and justifiable which may kindly be noted.
You are requested to kindly arrange my duties with effect from today in the light of the submission made above.
Yours obediently, Sd/-
Please refer to your letter No. 7363 dated 27.6.1979. In terms of the award, I had presented myself for duties after submitting joining report, but 1 was not allowed to duties.
Again I give this intimation to you that I have been always present for duties in the premises of the Bank with effect from 25.6.1979.
Kindly allow me to resume in terms of the award.
Yours obediently, Sd/-
6. From perusal of the aforesaid letters it appears, that the employers in the letters dated 23.6.1979, 25.6.1979 and 27.6.1979 laid down certain new terms and conditions, which were not "acceptable to the workers and they wanted to be reinstated on the same terms and conditions by which their services were governed at the time of their illegal termination as was directed in the award.
7. The employers refused to reinstate the petitioners and sent letters to them stating that the workmen had been reinstated on their old post but since they had not accepted the conditions of reinstatement hence, they have lost their lien on the posts. These letters have been appended as Annexures-14, 15 and 16 to the writ petition and are in the same language. One of such letter dated 28.6.1979 in respect of petitioner Shailendra Singh is being quoted below :
^^dk;kZy; ftyk lgdkjh cSad fyfeVsM] xksj[kiqj A i=kad 7569 fnukd % 28-6-1979 Jh 'kSysUnz flag xzke dqleksy] iks- dqleksy] ftyk&xksj[kiqj A vkids izkFkZuk&i= fnukd 27-6-1979 ds lEcU/k esa lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vius fu;qfDr&i= la[;k 7148&53 fnukd [email protected]@79 ftlds vuqlkj ,okMZ dh n'kk ds vuq:i vki vius iqjkuh fLFkfr ij fu;qfDr fd;s x;s Fks 'krksZ dks Lohdkj ugha fd;k A blfy, vki us viuk vf/kdkj Lor% [kks fn;k A ml lEcU/k esa iqu% lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vc iqu% dksbZ i= O;ogkj ugha fd;k tk;sxk A g- lfpo**
8. A perusal of the aforesaid letter dated 28.6.1979 would show that this letter was sent to the workers one day prior to the enforcement of the award i.e., before expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication on the notice board in terms of Section 6A of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. From perusal of the operative portion of the award, it is also clear that the workers were to be reinstated on their old posts and it did not provide fresh appointment on the old posts on new terms and conditions.
9, Aggrieved by the aforesaid letter and the deliberate attempt of the employers to keep the workmen out of employment by imposing new conditions of service and non-implementation of the award of the labour court in letter and spirit the workmen filed an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) before the Labour Court, Gorakhpur praying that the benefits of reinstatement arising out of the award of the labour court dated 23.4.1979 may be computed in terms of money as they were deliberately kept away from duty. This application under Section 33C(2) of the Act by the workmen was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 141 of 1979. The application was contested by the respondent-bank and the labour court passed the impugned order dated 22.1.1980 by which the labour court held that the application under Section 33C(2) of the Act was not maintainable.
10. It has been contended by Sri K. P. Agarwal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that according to the terms of the award of labour court, the workmen were to be reinstated on their old posts and no new conditions could be imposed vide letter dated 23.6.1979 for their reinstatement as referred in letter dated 28.6.1979 as this would amount to fresh appointment. He further submits that for this purpose, the respondent bank was to inform them within one month of the award becoming enforceable in law but the respondent-bank neither gave them any notice nor reinstated them after enforcement of the award notwithstanding the fact that the workmen themselves have persistently approached the respondent bank for being reinstated. He submits that the petitioners had an existing right arising out of the award and were entitled to computation of the benefit of reinstatement after the enforcement of the award ; which was not implemented by the employers.
11. The counsel for the respondents states that the bank had implemented the award inasmuch as it had asked the workmen to join duties on old posts on the basis of conditions of service re-clarified/re-defined in letter dated 23.6.1979 written to the workmen but since the workmen had refused to accept the conditions of service for reporting on duty in pursuance of the letter written by the bank, they are not entitled to any benefit as claimed by them. It was submitted that the labour court had not Imposed any condition in the award that the workmen could not be reinstated on old posts on new terms and conditions of service offered by the employers.
12. It was further submitted that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act were beyond the scope of the said section. It was also submitted that the award under Section 10 of the Act can be declared as a nullity in proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act and if any difficulty arises to the interpretation of the award the same can be removed under Section 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
13. The relevant paragraphs of the written statement submitted on behalf of the bank are as under :
^^1 d ekuuh; U;k;ky; ,okMZ ds ckgj bl tkZ ds vUrxZr vo/kkj.kk ugh dj ldrk A fdUrq ,okMZ dh uSfyVh vo'; ?kksf"kr dj ldrk gS A [k ,okMZ dk ikyu izfroknhx.k us dj fn;k A oLrqr% oknhx.k gh fu;qfDr&i= dh 'krksZ dks ekuus ls vLohdkj dj fn, A blfy, izfroknh ij dksbZ nkf;Ro ugha jg tkrk A x oknhx.k us ,okMZ ifjikyu lEcfU/k dkuwuh dk;Zokgh Hkh dh Fkh A tgk ;g Li"V gks x;k fd izfroknh dh vksj ls ,okMZ dk ifjikyu dj fn;k x;k A ?k ,okMZ ds fdlh 'kCn vFkok va'k dh O;k[;k dk ;fn dksbZ iz'u gks rks ml ij i{kksa esa dksbZ erHksn gks A ftlds dkj.k dksbZ fnDdr mRiUu gksrh gks] rks mldk lek/kku dsUnzh;
dkuwu dh /kkjk 36, rFkk jkT; ds dkuwu dh /kkjk 11ch ls gh lEHko gS A /kkjk 33lh 2 mijksDr /kkjkvksa dk vfre.k ugha djrh A p izfroknh us fnukd 23 twu 1979 ds i= }kjk ,okMZ dk gokyk nsrs gq, izfroknhx.k dks fM;wVh ij vkus ds fy, muds iwoZ fu;qfDr dh 'krksZ dks iquZLi"V djrs gq, lwfpr fd;k A bl izdkj dk ifjikyu dj fn;k A N oknhx.k us izfroknh dk i= izkIr fd;k A rr~i'pkr 'krksZ dks u ekuus dh lwpuk nh rFkk ;g fy[kk fd 'krsZ mUgsa Lohdkj ugha gSa A ,oe~ l{ke U;k;ky; }kjk iqUkZLFkkfir fd, tkus ds izfrdwy dqN Hkh oS| ugha gksxk A ml i= ds dkj.k ,okMZ dh laKk vkSj 'kCnksa dh O;k[;k dk fu%lUnsg fookn mRiUu gks x;k A ftls gy djkus ds fy, lUnHkZ dk vf/kdkj ek= mi;qDr ljdkj dks gS u fd /kkjk 33lh 2 dh tkZ A 2- oknhx.k us izfooknh ds i= fy[kus ds okotwn O;k[;k lEcU/kh fookn mRiUu djds viuk ;ksxnku dk;Zgsrq ugha fn;k A blfy;s mUgsa fdlh ykHk ;k vuqrks"k dk vf/kdkj ugha gS A**
14. In the impugned order in Misc. Case No. 141 of 1979. the labour court came to the conclusion that from the pleadings of the parties, it was apparent that the workmen were being offered new terms and conditions of service, i.e., stand of the bank that it has implemented the operative portion of the award and had only re-clarified/redefined the terms of employment was not accepted by the labour court. It was, however, held by labour court that since there was dispute between the parties regarding implementation of the award it cannot be resolved in proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
15. Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides that where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government (within a period not exceeding three months).
16. The scope of the jurisdiction of the labour court under Section 33C(2) was considered by the Supreme Court in three leading cases :
(1) Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbandu, 1962 (1) LLJ 234.
(2) Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan etc., 1964 SC 734.
(3) Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Ganesh Razak, 1995 (1) LLJ 395.
In these cases the Court interpreted and construed the words "any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money" as the benefit to which a workman may be entitled which has not already been calculated.
17. In Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Ganesh Razak, 1995 (1) LLJ 395, the Apex Court held that :
"It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer or thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation, that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the labour court's power under Section 33C(2) like that of the executing court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution."
18. In Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan's case (supra), the Apex Court explained the scope of Section 33C(2) of the Act. In that case, claim of four clerks was resisted by the bank on the ground that the labour court had no jurisdiction to determine the question whether the clerks came within the category of workmen or not under the Shastri Award. It was held that the enquiry as to whether the four clerks came within the category of workman was purely 'incidental' and necessary for the purpose of giving relief asked for and, therefore, the labour court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the clerks answered the description of the category mentioned in the Shastri Award.
19. Sri K. P. Agarwal, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on paragraph 16 of the judgment in Central Bank: of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan, etc., 1964 SC 734, in which scope of Section 33C(2) has been interpreted by the Apex Court which reads as under :
"16. Let us then revert to the words used in Section 33C(2) in order to decide what would be its true scope and effect on a fair and reasonable construction. When Sub-section (2) refers to any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified, does it mean that he must be a workman whose right to receive the said benefit is not disputed by the employer. According to the appellant, the scope of Sub-section (2) is similar to that of Sub-section (1) and it is pointed out that just as under Sub-section (1) any disputed question about the workman's right to receive the money due under an award cannot be adjudicated upon by the appropriate Government, so under Sub-section (2) if a dispute is raised about the workman's right to receive the benefit in question, that cannot be determined by the labour court. The only point which the labour court can determine is one in relation to the computation of the benefit in terms of money, We are not impressed by this argument. In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of Sub-section (2) it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the labour court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the labour court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the labour court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money, but if the said right is disputed, the labour court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the labour court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of Sub-section (2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The clause "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit" does not mean "Where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit." The appellant's construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words "admittedly, or admitted to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by Sub-section (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman ts not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the labour court to entertain the workman's application. The claim under Section 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the labour court by Sub-section (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution." We must accordingly hold that Section 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employer .............."
20. Sri Agarwal submits on the basis of the aforesaid judgment given in Central Bank of India's case (supra) that under Section 33C(2) of the Act, the labour court had power to decide the incidental question of the nature involved in the writ petition and holding that due to some difference or dispute between the parties regarding implementation of the operative portion of the award, the award is not maintainable under Section 33C(2) of the Act is Illegal and amounts to refusal of exercise of its jurisdiction.
21. This, in other words, means that under Section 33C(2) the labour court has a wide scope and the labour court under this section is competent to entertain claims of workmen, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers and it is open to the labour court to interpret an award or settlement on which the workman's right rests.
22. It is true that the labour court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) cannot arrogate itself upon the power of adjudication under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is equally settled in law that the labour court or Industrial Tribunal can decide the Incidental question in exercise of its power under Section 33C(2) of the Act. In the present case, the award has already been given by the labour court in the adjudication cases filed by the workmen and they had an existing right to claim benefit of reinstatement and money in terms of the award as their rights stood adjudicated.
23. It is admitted to the parties that the employers had written letter(s) before enforcement of the award calling upon the workmen to report for duty and that the workmen had also approached the Management and the Deputy Labour Commissioner for implementation of the award. The only short question that was to be decided by the labour court was whether any new conditions have been imposed or not by the employers on the workers while calling upon them to report for duty in terms of the award. This could have been decided by the labour court as incidental question under Section 33C(2) of the Act for execution of the award on the basis of letter issued by the management calling upon the workers to report for duty and did not require any adjudication under Section 10 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. It could easily have been gathered from the record whether any new conditions have been imposed upon the workmen de hors the operative portion of the award. It was only an incidental question, as such the labour court had jurisdiction to determine by an incidental enquiry under Section 33C(2) of the Act as to whether any new conditions have been Imposed upon the workmen or not. The labour court was, therefore, competent to determine the benefit, as it only required reading of the letters of the employers calling upon the workmen to report for duty and compute the amount.
24. The labour court was under bounden duty to have decided the dispute as well as the incidental questions of law and facts expeditlously whether in favour or against the workmen. However, it emerges from the record that it has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in It and has travelled beyond the scope of Section 33C(2) by holding that it had no jurisdiction in the matter.
25. The word 'reinstatement' has been defined in Concise Oxford dictionary as (i) replace in formal position (it) restore a person(s) to former privileges. According to the meaning of the word 'reinstatement', the workmen were to be taken in service on the same terms and conditions and privileges, which they were enjoying before their illegal termination. The contention of the employer that the service conditions of the workmen were only re-defined or re-clarified while reinstating them Is fallacious. No order of reinstatement after enforcement of the award was issued by the employer and as such the award of the labour court was also not complied with in letter and spirit.
26. The other contention of the employer that the award given by the labour court under Section 10 of the Act adjudicating the dispute finally can be declared as nullity in the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act, is wholly misconceived. The scope of Section 10 and Section 33C(2) of the Act is different. Under Section 10 of the Act, the rights of the parties are determined by adjudication whereas proceedings under Section 33C(2) are only in the nature of execution proceedings. Subsection (2) of Section 33C of the Act is reproduced below :
"33C (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government (within a period of not exceeding three months)."
27. A reading of the aforesaid section shows that the matter has to be first adjudicated by the labour court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereafter recourse can be taken by the workman under Section 33C(2) of the Act. In the instant case, the matter has already been decided under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and thus the workman has a right which is sought to be executed under Section 33C(2) of the Act, The execution proceedings are, therefore, always subject to the final decision of the matter i.e., to say, proceedings under Section 33C(2) which are in the nature of execution proceedings and are subject to adjudication proceedings under Section 10 of the Act and not vice-versa as contended by the counsel for the petitioners.
28. The last contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that if there is any difficulty in interpreting the award, recourse can be had to Section 36A of the Act. Section 36A of the Act provides that if in the opinion of the appropriate Government, any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement, it may refer the question to such labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it may think fit.
29. In this case, there is no material on record to show that the appropriate Government had any difficulty. There has even been no application to the State Government by either of the parties that there was any doubt to the interpretation of any provision of the award nor it is a case of the parties that any such matter was referred by the State Government to the labour court. The instant case arises out of an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act for the execution of the award and computation of the benefit to which the workmen became entitled to due to alleged non-implementation of its operative portion by the employers. Thus, the other two contentions of the employers that the adjudication proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which finally decide the industrial dispute or adjudicate are subject to execution proceedings are fallacious, misconceived and cannot be sustained. In so far as the last contention of the employers that if there was any difficulty in interpreting the award, recourse could be had to Section 36A of the Act also suffers from the same vice as no difficulty is felt by the State Government or by any of the parties in implementation of the award nor any of the parties had moved any application for reference to the labour court.
30. The implementation of the award cannot be delayed due to any technical objections not furthering the cause of justice. The Apex Court has time and again held that it is the duty of the courts to see that justice not only be done but also to prevent injustice from being done. The services of the petitioners had been illegally terminated in 1977-78. Award had also been published in 1979, as such the employers cannot be permitted to thrive upon technical pleas and the workmen cannot be made to suffer for no fault of theirs inspite of the award being in their favour.
31. In view of the discussion made above, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The matter is remanded back to the labour court for deciding the application of the workmen under Section 33C(2) of the Act afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in the body of this judgment. Since the matter is very old, the petition having been filed in the year 1980, it is directed that the labour court shall decide Misc. Case No. 141 of 1979 within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order and if it is found that the workmen are entitled to receive from the employers any amount or benefit which can be computed in terms of money, the labour court shall direct that the employers deposit the aforesaid amount before it along with 12% interest and the same shall be paid to the concerned workers.
32. No order as to costs.