JUDGMENT D.S. Sinha, J.
1. Heard Sri B.P. Singh, learned Counsel representing the appellant-applicants and Sri P.R. Pal, learned Counsel representing the claimant-respondent.
2. By means of this application dated 16th April, 1991, under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, hereinafter called the Code, the applicants pray for modification of the orders dated 7th January, 1992 and 14th February, 1992 passed by this Court and grant of extension of time for making certain deposit directed by this Court.
3. In claim petition No. III of 1988, decided by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Dehat by means of its order and judgment dated 28th February, 1991, impugned in the Appeal, the appellant-applicants figured as opposite parties. The judgment and order dated 28th February, 1991 directs the appellant-applicants to pay to the claimant-respondent an amount of Rs. 25.000/- along with interest at die rate of 10 percent per annum. The appellant-applicants have challenged the order of the Tribunal before this Court by means of the First Appeal from Order No. 454 of 1991. The appeal, which was filed by the appellants through Sri A.K. Sachan, Advocate, was admitted by this Court on 17th May, 1991. While admitting the appeal, this Court stayed the operation of the impugned judgment and order dated 28th February, 1991 provided the appellant-applicants deposited a sum of Rs. 20.000/- with the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by 25th of July, 1991. The Court also clarified that in case the amount was not deposited as stipulated by the order, the interim order would stand vacated automatically. This order was passed in presence of Sri PJR. Pal, Advocate, who had filed caveat on behalf of the claimant-respondent. The claimant-respondent was granted three weeks' time for filing counter affidavit and the appellant-applicants were granted a week thereafter for filing rejoinder affidavit. The application for interim order was directed by to listed thereafter for further orders.
4. Indisputably, the appellant-applicants did not comply with the condition imposed by the order dated 17th May, 1991 with regard to the deposit of Rs. 20,000/- by 25th of July, 1991. Thus the interim order dated 17th May, 1991 stood vacated automatically as stipulated by the order itself.
5. It appears that on account of lapse of the interim order, the impugned award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was put into execution and a citation dated 25th October, 1991 was issued to the appellant-applicants for realisation by the amount payable by them. This led the appellant-applicants to rush to this Court and pray by means of the application dated 29th October, 1991 for stay of the operation of the citation dated 25th October, 1991, although the citation was not the subject matter of the appeal. It will be pertinent to notice that by this time the appellant-applicants had changed their Counsel and had chosen to move this application by another Counsel, namely, Sri K.K. Tripathi. It is also relevant to notice that copy of this application was not served on Sri P.R. Pal, who was continuing to represent the claimant-respondent. Instead, the copy of the application was sent to Sri Pal by registered post. Sri Pal states that he is not sure about the receipt of the aforesaid copy sent to him through registered post. The application dated 29th October, 1991 came up for consideration before the Court on 2nd January, 1992 but it was dismissed for want of prosecution. However, on 7th January, 1992, the Court recalled the order dated 2nd January, 1992 and, while recalling the order dated 2nd January, 1992, passed the following interim order:
Hon'ble B. Dikshit J.
The order dated 2.1.1992 is recalled.
The sale of the property of petitioner in pursuance of the recovery proceedings shall remain stayed till 10th February, 1992 provided the appellant makes the deposit of amount demanded under citation within one mc/nth from today. In case of default this order shall stand vacated automatically.
Dt 7.1.92 Sd/-B.Dikshit.
6. Under the above interim order dated 7th January, 1992 the sale of the property of the appellant-applicants in pursuance of the recovery proceedings was directed to remain stayed till 10th February, 1992 provided they made the deposit of the amount under demand within one month from the date of the order. Thus the Court had again put the condition that in case of default the above interim order would stand vacated automatically. Undeniably, the appellant-applicants again failed to comply with the condition of making the deposit in pursuance of the said order dated 7th January, 1992 within the time stipulated therein and the interim order again stood vacated automatically.
7. It appears that Change of the Counsel suited to the appellant-applicants for getting interim orders and once again they decided for change of the Counsel. This time they engaged Sri B.P. Singh as their Counsel and through him got an application prepared, probably on 10th February, 1992, praying for modification of the order dated 7th January, 1992. A copy of the application along with the affidavit was served of Sri P.R. Pal, the learned Counsel for the claimant-respondent, on 10th February, 1992, as is evident from endorsement of the application. This application was not moved before the Court on 10th February, 1992. It was moved before the Court on 14thFebruary, 1992. Sri P.R. Pal, learned Counsel representing the claimant-respondent, states that he was not informed about the moving of the application before the Court on 14th February, 1992. Sri B.P. Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant-applicants, admits that he did not inform Shri Pal that he would be moving that application before the Court on 14th February, 1992. The application was considered by the Court on 14th February, 1992 itself, admittedly, in the absence of Sri P.R. Pal, who was representing the claimant-respondents, and the following order was passed:
Hon'ble M. Katju J.
The interim order dated 7.1.92 is modified to the extent that the time for depositing the amount as directed by the order dated 7.1.92 is extended by another two months for today. However, it is made clear that no further extension shall be granted. In case of default the interim order shall stand vacated automatically.
Dt 14.2.92 Sd/-M. Katju.
8. There is no material on record to show that the record of the case was before the Court when the application of the appellant-applicants for modification of the interim order dated 7th January, 1992 was considered and the interim order dated 14th February, 1992, quoted above, was passed. Sri B.P. Singh, concedes that the record was not before the Court.
9. The order dated 14th February, 1992 purported to modify the order dated 7th January, 1992 to the extent that time for depositing the amount, as directed by the said order, was extended by another two months, subject to the condition that no further extension would be granted and also that in case of default the interim order would stand vacated automatically.
10. Two months granted for making the requisite deposit by the order dated 14th February, 1992 have expired resulting the automatic vacation of the interim order. The appellant-applicants have not bothered to comply with the requirement of making the requisite deposit as stipulated in the order dated 14th February, 1992. Presumably, they felt assured that extension of time for making the requisite deposit would be granted to them by the Court as a matter of course and in routine.
11. No party can claim extension of the time as a matter of right. The party cannot be allowed to invoke inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of getting an order which would have the effect of defeating the order passed by the Court itself. It may be noticed that the appellants-applicants succeeded in getting successive orders from this Court nullifying the earlier orders passed by itself. As a matter of fact, the Court feels that the appellant-applicants have been playing chicanery and succeeding in getting the extension orders even after violating the stipulation of the previous orders of the Court with impunity. The appellant-applicants cannot be allowed to succeed again. By their most reprehensible conduct, as is evident from the events noticed above, they have forfeited any claim. What soever, for modification of the interim orders in the manner prayed for. It would be travesty of justice to grant any further indulgence to the appellant-applicants who have repeatedly failed to comply with the orders of this Court. Section 151 of the Code is not meant to help a quibbler.
12. For the reasons stated above, the Court is of the opinion that it would be clearly wrong to accede to the request of the appellant-applicants for modification of the interim order dated 7th January, 1992 and 14th February, 1992 and grant extension of time prayed for. The application dated 16th April, 1992 is therefore, rejected.