1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 27.05.2010 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, Unnao rejecting petitioner's revision against the trial court's order rejecting amendment sought in written statement.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that at revisional stage also amendment can be allowed and since petitioner came to know subsequently that no firm or company in the name as described by plaintiff in the array of parties existed, hence he moved amendment bringing this fact on record.
3. However, a perusal of impugned amendment shows that petitioner intends to introduce contradictory plea inasmuch as in para 1 of written statement filed by petitioner he has not disputed the very authority or status of plaintiff to file suit or his ownership on the property in question but what he has said is that he is not the sole owner and, therefore, not entitled to file suit in his individual capacity. However by means of amendment sought to be introduced he has sought to plead that plaintiff has no right to file suit at all.
4. So far as the amendment in pleadings are concerned, it is no doubt true that judicial precedents are in favour of a liberal approach for allowing amendment. An amendment is normally allowed unless the principle negativing such amendment are attracted. The law in respect to amendment of pleadings is a bit liberal. The mere fact that application for amendment has been filed after a prolong delay would not justify its rejection where neither it changes the nature of the suit nor intends to add a claim which is barred by limitation nor takes away the claim of other party nor amounts to a fresh cause of action nor otherwise prejudice the other side. Instead of adding several authorities on this aspect, I intend to refer to a decision of Apex Court in North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur Vs. Bhagwan Das (D) by Lrs. AIR 2008 SC 2139 where the Court said:
"Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and Ors. 1957 (1) SCR 595 which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. [Also see: Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar (1990)1 SCC 166]"
5. This has been followed in Peethani Suryanarayana and Anr. v. Repaka Venkata Ramana Kishore and Ors. 2009 (11) SCC 308. To the same effect is the view taken in Sushil Kumar Jain v. Manoj Kumar and Anr. 2009 (10) SCC 434.
6. A self contradictory plea if results due to amendment sought, if allowed, it must be avoided. This is what has been observed by the court below also particularly when amendment would have the result of taking away admission of a fact and would place other party to a disadvantageous position after withdrawal of admission. Such amendment is likely to cause great injustice to another party and, therefore, would not be justified to be allowed at this stage. In my view the courts below have not erred in rejecting petitioner's application for amendment in written statement. There is no error apparent on the face of record in the impugned order order warranting interference.
7. Moreover, in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution it is well established that scope of judicial review is extremely limited. The scope of judicial review in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very narrow. It is not to correct the errors in the orders of the court below but to remove manifest and patent errors of law and jurisdiction without acting as an appellate authority.
8. This power involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. But this power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.
9. In D. N. Banerji Vs. P. R. Mukherjee 1953 SC 58 the Court said:
"Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere."
10. A Constitution Bench of Apex Court examined the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution in Waryam Singh and another Vs. Amarnath and another AIR 1954 SC 215 and made following observations at p. 571 :
"This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. 193, to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors".
11. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 38 the Apex Court held that this Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal, etc. has resulted in grave injustice.
12. For interference under Article 227, the finding of facts recorded by the Authority should be found to be perverse or patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. (See: Nibaran Chandra Bag Vs. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895; Rukmanand Bairoliya Vs. the State of Bihar & ors., AIR 1971 SC 746; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1896; Laxmikant R. Bhojwani Vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Singh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576; Reliance Industries Ltd. Vs. Pravinbhai Jasbhai Patel & ors., (1997) 7 SCC 300; M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sub-Judicial Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749; and Virendra Kashinath Ravat & ors. Vs. Vinayak N. Joshi & ors. (1999) 1 SCC 47).
13. It is well settled that power under Article 227 is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. (See: Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni & ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341; Chandra Bhushan Vs. Beni Prasad & ors., (1999) 1 SCC 70; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate & ors. Vs. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. Vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr.,(1999) 2 SCC 143).
14. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (See: Union of India & ors. Vs. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521).
15. In Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-opeative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that there is no justification for the High Court to substitute its view for the opinion of the Authorities/ Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
16. In Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri Vs. Bhaskar Balwant Aheer, AIR 2000 SC 931, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not appealable but supervisory. Therefore, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by Courts below unless there is no evidence to support findings or the findings are totally perverse.
17. In Indian Overseas Bank Vs. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers' Union (2000) 4 SCC 245, the Court observed that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to reappreciate evidence liberally and drawing conclusions on its own on pure questions of fact for the reason that it is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by Tribunal. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere.
18. In Union of India Vs. Rajendra Prabhu, (2001) 4 SCC 472, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot re-appreciate the evidence nor it can substitute its subjective opinion in place of the findings of Authorities below.
19. Similar view has been reiterated in State of Maharashtra Vs. Milind & ors., (2001) 1 SCC 4; Extrella Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97; and Omeph Mathai & ors. Vs. M. Abdul Khader, (2002) 1 SCC 319.
20. The order impugned in this writ petition, if considered in the light of exposition as above, cannot be said to be faulty or erroneous in the manner as may warrant interference of this Court.
21. The writ petition is devoid of merit.
22. Dismissed.
23. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Order Date :- 19.7.2012 AK