JUDGMENT
1. By this writ petition, the petitioner, M/s Raj Metal Industries, has sought for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents, Union of India, the Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad and the Director, Anti-Evasion (Central Excise) Wing, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, New Delhi to release the detained goods and the seized records.
2. We had directed that this petition be listed for admission on the 15th October, 1985 and the Standing Counsel was granted two weeks time to obtain instruction and file counter-affidavit. When the case was listed yesterday, Mr. Shishir Kumar, Additional Standing Counsel prayed that the case be put up today and he would file a counter-affidavit mean-while. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been filed today. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and we dispose of the petition finally under Chapter 22 of the Rules of the Court.
3. The petitioner is a registered partnership firm dealing in copper billets. The copper alloy circles are used for manufacturing utensils. Duty is payable on the copper alloy circles sold. The copper and copper alloy circles are liable to Central excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
4. The officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, New Delhi raided the premises of the petitioner in Mirazpur on 13th March, 1985 and 15th March, 1985 and detained 54 circles weighing 59 Kgs., 363 trimmed circles weighing 295 Kgs., 651 trimmed circles weighing 521 Kgs., bottom of utensils weighing 726 Kgs. and 10 brass blocks weighing 253 Kgs. A detention memo was prepared on the occasion and copies thereof have been attached to the petition. The petitioner has further alleged that apart from detaining the goods the officers have also seized all records available in the premises. The petitioner's case was that the seized goods were all duty-paid. The petitioner had made a representation to the Senior Intelligence Officer, Anti-Evasion, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, New Delhi vide letter dated 23rd March, 1985 and had prayed for the release of the detained goods and the seized records.
5. The petitioner received three summonses dated 15th March, 1985 to appear before the Senior Intelligence Officer, Anti Evasion, New Delhi on 25th and 27th March, 1985 requiring the petitioner to appear in connection with the detained goods. The petitioner in his reply indicated that he is unable to attend on the appointed date and prayed for 16 days' time. The petitioner was not informed of any other date in response to the above letter. The petitioner thereafter received five show cause notices dated 29th August, 1985 on the 3rd September, 1985. It required the petitioner to show cause within 7 days of the receipt of the notice as to why the statutory period of six months for issue of show cause in terms of Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 be not extended for a further period of six months. The petitioner alleged that he had replied to the show cause notices on the 9th September, 1985, and these were received by the respondents on the 9th September, 1985.
6. In the rejoinder affidavit it has been stated that thereafter the petitioner received registered notice from the Superintendent, Central Excise, Allahabad requiring him to appear for personal hearing before the Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad on the 4th of October, 1985. The petitioner alleged that he received the notice of the 1st of October, 1985.
7. The petitioner's contention is that under the provision of Section 110 of the Customs Act the detention of the goods cannot exceed the period of six months unless the period is extended by a further period of six months. It was further contended that the extension has to be granted within the existing period of six months from the date of seizure. Learned Standing Counsel has referred to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in which it has been stated that whatever delay has been caused in the giving of the notice of proceeding has all been occasioned at the instance of the petitioner who acted in such a manner so that the period of six months expired, and he could not take the benefit of the provisions of Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. Learned counsel argued that the petitioner is himself responsible for the delay in this case and when a notice was issued to him within time, there was sufficient jurisdiction in the detaining authority to continue the detention.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the material on the record, we are of the opinion that the detention of goods is not at all justified. From the dates as mentioned above, it is clear that there is no order passed by the detaining authority extending the period of six months so far. The raid took place on the 13th and 15th of March, 1985. The extension of six months should have been ordered before the expiry of six months, i.e., by 13th and 15th September, 1985. Notice to extend the time was issued for the first time on 30th August, 1985. Although this notice was served on the 3rd September, 1985 and the petitioner replied by 9th September, 1985, the respondents did not take any action until the end of September fixing 4th of October, 1985 for personal hearing before the Collector. The notice fixing date of hearing before the Collector bears the date 24th September, 1985 vide annexure RA-6. It is, therefore, apparent that even the notice fixing the date for, hearing was issued after expiry of six months from the date of seizure. Learned Standing Counsel was not able to satisfy that there is any order by the detaining authority for extending the period beyond six months in the present case. Since the period of detention has not been extended and the original period of six months from the date of seizure has already expired, we do hot see any justification for the authority to detain the seized goods beyond the period of six months. Sub-section (2), Section 110 also makes it clear that in such an event the goods, which were seized, shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized.
9. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that continued detention of the seized goods is wholly uncalled for and this is a fit case in which suitable directions should be issued for the release of the seized goods and the records forthwith.
10. No other point was argued.
11. For the reasons indicated above, the writ petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus is issued directing the respondents to release the seized goods and the records forthwith. Looking to the facts and the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.