ORDER Virendra Saran, J.
1. Radhey Sham S/o Gangadhar has filed this revision against the order dated 25-3-1994 of the Sessions Judge, Allahabad refusing bail to the applicant in Crime No. 506 of 1993 of P.S. Sarai Inayat, district Allahabad under Sections 302, 307, 504, 506 I.P.C.
2. The prosecution case is that on 1-10-1993 informant Rajendra Pratap Singh, his elder brother Mahendra Pratap Singh, P.W. Radhey Shyam and Dev Narain Singh were having a chat at their Petrol Pump located in village Anduva on the G.T. Road. At about 7 p.m. Radhey Shyam (applicant) Chandra Prakash Alias Panda and Lalji arrived there in an Ambassador Car bearing No. UVA 5511. They had guns with them. The occupants of the car asked Umesh, the Salesman at the pump to be quick and top up diesel in a jerrycan. When Umesh refused to supply diesel out of turn, he was greated with abuses and was also threatened to be shot dead. Mahendra Pratap Singh (deceased) intervened and asked the occupants of the car (accused) to desist from abusing. Soon applicant Radhey Shyam shot at Mahendra Pratap Singh injuring him seriously. When P.W. Radhey Shyam tried to save Mahendra Pratap Singh he too was paid in the same coins and accused Gangadhar got down from the car with a rifle. Chandra Prakash Alias Panda and Lalji Alias Chandra bail Singh also resorted to firing. Radhey Shyam was seriously injured by the shots fired by Chandra Prakash Alias Panda and he fell down. The incident created commotion and the shopowners and the public started running helter skelter in panic. The accused boarded their car and left the scene. A report of the ghastly crime was lodged at police station Sarai Inayat by Rajendra Pratap Singh.
3. The applicant applied for bail in the court of Sessions but his application was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge, Allahabad. Sri V.C. Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant, informs that notice of bail application of the applicant has been given on 14-2-1994 (Vide Notice No. 1579 of 1994) and the bail application was filed but has been taken back. Thereafter a second bail application was filed before the learned Sessions Judge, Allahabad, being Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 695 of 1994. The Second bail application has been rejected by the learned Sessions Judge, Allahabad on 25-3-1994. The ground taken in the second bail application before the learned Sessions Judge, Allahabad was that the C.J.M. Allahabad has not granted proper remand committing the applicant to custody and as such the applicant is in illegal detention, he is entitled to be released on bail. The learned Sessions Judge, Allahabad once again rejected the bail application on the ground that he was informed that bail application has already been moved in the High Court and was actually argued by Sri Dilip Gupta, Advocate before Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S.N. Tripathi and this fact was not denied and hence it would not be proper to exercise parallel jurisdiction.
4. I have narrated the prosecution case in the earlier part of this judgment. The crime was committed in a diabolical manner. There is no dearth of direct evidence against the applicant and there is an injured witness too. Sri Dilip Kumar learned Counsel for the applicant has not pleaded that the applicant be released on bail on merits. He has pressed the revision on the technical ground that the learned C.J.M. Allahabad has not committed the accused to custody as required by Section 209, Cr. P.C. and due to lack of a remand order the detention of the applicant is without the authority of law. Sri Dilip Kumar has relied on a recent decision of this Court dated 20-1-1994, in Criminal Revision No. 1891 of 1993, Rajesh Mishra v. State of U.P. In Rajesh Mishra's case (Supra) Mr. Justice A.S. Tripathi has granted bail to Rajesh Mishra in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction on the ground that there was no proper order of remand.
5. At the very outset I may observe that bail orders are orders purely of interlocutory nature and are not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court. There is no dearth of judicial authority on the point. The two leading cases of the Supreme Court i.e., Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185:(1977 Cri LJ 1891), as also Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47: (1978 Cri LJ 165), lend enough countenance to the view I am expressing. In the case of Amar Nath (Supra) while giving illustration of what is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of Code, the Supreme Court described "passing order for bail" as one of the specific illustrations. In Bhola v. State, 1979 UP CLR 218, a Division Bench of this Court held that the words "passing orders for bail" would also include orders rejecting bail. The cases of Amarnath (supra) and the case of Bhola (supra) were followed in the case of State of U.P. v. Karan Singh, 1988 UP CR 138: (1988) Cri LJ 1434). Needless to say that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding. Thus orders rejecting bail are purely of interlocutory nature and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against such orders.
6. Countenanced with the above hurdle the learned Counsel for applicant submitted that this Court may exercise its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and direct the release of the applicant on bail on the ground that his detention is illegal. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant. The legislature has taken care by enacting Sections 436 to 439, Cr. P.C. and has codified Specific provisions regarding bail. These provisions cannot be given ago by by short circuiting the procedure and taking recourse to Section 482, Cr. P.C. or to revisional jurisdiction. It is well settled that when there are specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure touching with regard to a particular subject, the provision of Section 482, cannot be resorted to for the same purpose.
7. Learned Counsel for the applicant has urged that in the case of Rajesh Misra (Supra) a revision had been filed challenging the remand orders passed by the C.J.M. Allahabad and A.S. Tripathi, J. granted bail in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. In my opinion orders granting remand do not stand at any higher footing than the orders refusing bail and are interlocutory in nature and Section 397(2) specifically bars the exercise of revisional jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Section 397(2) states:--
397(2) The powers of revision conferred by Sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order....
8. It appears that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case Amar Nath (Supra) and followed by this Court in the Division Bench case of Bhola (Supra) and the case of State v. Karan Singh (Supra), was not brought to the notice of A.S. Tripathi, J. Thus a revision is not maintainable either against remand orders passed by the courts below or orders refusing bail to the accused and if there is lack of a valid remand order the appropriate remedy is to move this Court in Habeas Corpus jurisdiction.
9. In the case of Rajesh Misra (Supra) A.S. Tripathi, J. has held that even if the magistrate committing the case to the court of Sessions remands the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of trial the remand order remains in force only till the cognizance is taken by the Sessions Judge. Tripathi, J. observed:--
In my opinion, the amended provision of Section 209, Cr.P.C. will remain in force only till the provision of Section 309(1) of the Cr.P.C. are applicable but once the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 309 Cr.P.C. begins to apply on adjournment or postponment of that trial then a fresh remand is required if the accused is in custody.".
Section 209, Cr.P.C. was amended in this state by Section 6 of U.P. Act No. 16 of 1976. The extract of Section 209, Cr.P.C. as it stands in U.P. reads thus:
209. When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the court of Sessions, he shall--
(a) as soon as may be after complying with the provisions of Section 207, commit the case to the court of Sessions.
(b) Subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody until commitment of the case under Clause (a) and thereafter during and until the conclusion of the trial.
10. A plain reading of Clause (b) quoted above shows that subject to the provisions of bail the learned Magistrate is duty bound to remand the accused until commitment and similarly after commitment to the court of Sessions the accused are remanded to custody during and until the conclusion of trial. I am of the view that once the Magistrate grants a remand the accused during and until the conclusion of trial it is not necessary for the Sessions Judge to pass fresh orders of remands under Section 309(2), Cr.P.C. My view is fortified by the case of Pushpendra Singh v. Superintendent District Jail, 1984 ACC 245: (1984 Cri LJ 838), in which a Division Bench consisting of H.N. Seth and R.A. Mishra, JJ. held that provision contained in Section 209(b) of the Code is mandatory and shall be followed by a Magistrate while committing the case to the court of Sessions. It is a special provision not only empowering the Magistrate to remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial but commanding him to do so. The Division Bench further held that if the Magistrate has passed an order under Section 209(b) of the Code remanding the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of trial, it is not necessary for the Sessions Court to remand them again. In the case of Pushpendra (Supra) the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was that since an order had been passed under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C. it would render the proviso under Section 209(b) of the Code illegal. A Division Bench held that even though the Sessions Court had jurisdiction to pass an order of remand under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C. but since there was already an order of remand passed under Section 209(b) the order of Sessions Court was not necessary.
11. Similarly in yet another Division Bench case of Abdul Jabbar v. Superintendent District Jail, Meerut, 1984 Cri LJ 847, H.N. Seth, J. speaking for the Bench observed that Section 209 clearly enables the Magistrate, while committing the case, of a person accused of an offence trial by a Court of Session, to that court authorising his detention for the duration of the Sessions trial and oncean accused has been remanded to jail custody for the duration of the Sessions trial under Section 209(b) of the Code the Jail Superintendent becomes entitled to keep him in custody during that period and no further authorisation for the purpose is required from the court of Session. Section 309, Cr.P.C. was held to be a general provision governing various inquiries and trials.
12. Adverting to Section 309(2), Cr.P.C. the Court observed:--
This provision enables the court before which an inquiry or trial is pending to, while adjourning the hearing of the same, remand the accused who is already in custody for such term as it thinks fit. Section 209, Cr.P.C. however, is a specific provision pertaining to cases which in the opinion of the Magistrate are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, and it enables the Magistrate to pass an order remanding an accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the Sessions trial. It is well settled that a special provision in a statute governing a specific situation excludes the applicability of any general provision contained therein to that situation. Accordingly, nothing contained in Section 309, Cr.P.C. which limits the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to remand an accused to custody for a period of fifteen days only will apply to a case where a Magistrate makes an order remanding the accused to custody while committing his case to Court of Sessions. As already stated, Section 209 in very clear words authorises the Magistrate to pass an order directing the jail authorities to keep an accused in custody during and until the conclusion of the sessions trial and this is what has precisely been done in the instant case.
13. I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down in the two Division Bench cases of Pushpendra Singh (supra) and Abdul Jabbar (Supra) and I also feel bound by the view of the Division Bench. In my opinion the law laid down to the contrary in the single Judge decision in Rajesh Misra's case is not binding.
14. Before parting with I may also observe that in the case of Rajesh Misra (supra) note has been taken of the submission that if necessary papers have not been supplied to the accused under Section 207, Cr.P.C. Section 209, Cr.P.C. is not attracted. The controversy has already been set at rest in the case of Mustaque Ahmad v. State of U.P., 1984 ACC 73: (1984) Cri LJ NOC 37. In the above case this Court has held that non supply of copies is a mere irregularity. I respectfully agree with the view expressed in Mushtaque Ahmad's case.
15. In the premise I hold that the revision is not maintainable and it is accordingly dismissed.