[1] The appellant – original complainant has preferred these appeals under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and challenged the common judgment and order of acquittal dated 29.12.2009 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) Court No.8, Ahmedabad in Criminal Case Nos.4682 of 2008, 4683 of 2008 and 4684 of 2008 acquitting the respondent accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “the Act”).
[2] According to the complainant, he is wholesale cloth merchant and accused is also dealing in the cloth business. The accused purchased cloth worth Rs.79,547/- by bill No.29 dated 5.3.2003 and Rs.77,673/- by bill No.33 dated 10.3.2003 on credit. Thereby, the accused purchased cloths worth Rs.1,56,220/- from him. The accused gave cheque No.070922 dated 4.4.2003 for Rs.79,547/- against bill No.29 drawn on Sarangpur Cooperative Bank Limited, Sarangpur branch and cheque No.523109 dated 5.4.2003 for Rs.77,673/- against bill No.33 drawn on the same bank. On presentation of the cheques in the bank, both the cheques returned unpaid with endorsement “referred to drawer”. Therefore, notice through advocate was served to the accused, but despite receipt of the notice, the accused did not pay the outstanding amount. Therefore, complaint under section 138 of the Act was filed in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate at Ahmedabad and it was registered as Criminal Case No.4684 of 2008.
[3] It may be recorded that the accused also gave other cheques against his purchase, but the cheques returned unpaid on account of insufficient funds. Therefore, after service of statutory notice as the accused did not pay the amount of unpaid cheques, the complainant filed Criminal Case No.4682 and 4683 in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate at Ahmedabad for the offence under section 138 of the Act.
[4] As all the alleged offences were committed within one year, learned advocates for the parties by filing application, made a request to the Court to record evidence in one case and deliver common judgment. Therefore, the Court recorded evidence in Criminal Case No.4684 of 2008. After hearing the learned advocates for the parties, the trial Court acquitted the accused in all the three cases. Therefore, the complainant filed these appeals challenging the judgment and order of acquittal recorded in common judgment in Criminal Case No.4684 of 2008. As all the three appeals arise out of common judgment, all the three appeals are heard and decided by this common judgment.
[5] The Trial Court issued summons. Pursuant to the summons, the accused appeared and denied having committed the offence. Therefore, the prosecution adduced evidence. At the end of recording of evidence, trial Court explained to the accused the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The accused explained the incriminating circumstances in his further statement recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. After hearing the learned advocates for the parties, the Trial Court by impugned common judgment acquitted the accused. Being aggrieved by the said decision, the complainant has preferred these appeals.
[6] I have heard learned advocate Mr. Thakkar for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Vyas for the respondent accused. I have also perused the impugned judgment and Record & Proceedings of the trial Court.
[7] Learned advocate Mr. Thakkar mainly submitted that the case were tried as summary cases and successor Magistrate, relying upon the evidence recorded by his predecessor, delivered the judgment. Therefore, the trial is vitiated and hence, the impugned judgment is required to be set aside and the cases are required to be remanded to the trial Court for fresh trial. He relied upon the decision in the case of Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah & another Vs. Manubhai Manjuibhai Panchal and another, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 638.
[8] Learned advocate Mr. Vyas for respondent accused did not dispute the fact that the successor Magistrate relied upon the evidence recorded by his predecessor and delivered the judgment.
[9] It appears from the impugned judgment that the case was tried as a summary case and the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.16 (Shri P.S. Joshi) recorded the evidence. Thereafter, on 11.11.2008, the case was transferred to the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) Court No.8, Ahmedabad and the successor Magistrate (Shri Z.V. Desai) relying upon the evidence recorded by his predecessor (Shri P.S. Joshi), delivered the judgment. In the decision of Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled that in summary trial only substance of evidence instead of entire evidence is recorded which a successor Magistrate is not in a position to appreciate properly. Therefore, decision rendered by successor Magistrate relying upon the evidence recorded by his predecessor was bad in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:
“17. The mandatory language in which Section 326 (3) is couched, leaves no manner of doubt that when a case is tried as a summary case a Magistrate, who succeeds the Magistrate who had recorded the part or whole of the evidence, cannot act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor. In summary proceedings, the successor Judge or Magistrate has no authority to proceed with the trial from a stage at which his predecessor has left it. The reason why the provisions of sub-Section (1) and (2) of Section 326 of the Code have not been made applicable to summary trials is that in summary trials only substance of evidence has to be recorded. The Court does not record the entire statement of witness. Therefore, the Judge or the Magistrate who has recorded such substance of evidence is in a position to appreciate the evidence led before him and the successor Judge or Magistrate cannot appreciate the evidence only on the basis of evidence recorded by his predecessor. Section 326 (3) of the Code does not permit the Magistrate to act upon the substance of the evidence recorded by his predecessor, the obvious reason being that if succeeding Judge is permitted to rely upon the substance of the evidence recorded by his predecessor, there will be a serious prejudice to the accused and indeed, it would be difficult for a succeeding Magistrate himself to decide the matter effectively and to do substantial justice.”
[10] In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the present case as successor Magistrate decided the case on the basis of substance of evidence recorded by his predecessor, he was not in a position to appreciate the evidence properly and decide the case effectively. This caused serious prejudice to the complainant as order of acquittal is passed. Section 143 provides that sections 262 to 265 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall, as far as may be, apply to the trial under the Act. Section 326(3) of the Code does not permit the Magistrate to act upon the substance of evidence recorded by his predecessor. Therefore, in order to do substantial justice, the successor Magistrate was required to record the evidence afresh. Therefore, the impugned judgment is required to be set aside and the cases are required to be remanded to the trial Court for de novo trial.
[11] In view of the above, the present appeals are allowed. The impugned common judgment and order of acquittal dated 29.12.2009 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) Court No.8, Ahmedabad in Criminal Case Nos.4682 of 2008, 4683 of 2008 and 4684 of 2008 is set aside.
Criminal Case Nos.4682 of 2008, 4683 of 2008 and 4684 of 2008 are remanded to the Trial Court for retrial in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 11th June, 2012. If the accused fail to appear before the trial Court on the date fixed, the learned Magistrate trying the case is at liberty to take appropriate action to secure presence of the accused.
[12] Registry is directed to send back the Record & Proceedings to the trial Court, immediately.
shekhar* (BANKIM.N.MEHTA, J.)