JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The petitioner is a tenant and has filed the writ petition challenging the order dated 11.10.1985, passed by the appellate court recalling its judgment and restoring the appeal to its original number.
2. The facts are that respondent No. 3 is the landlord and had filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for the release of the shop in question on the ground of personal need. The petitioner contested the release application. The prescribed authority by its judgment dated 26.9.1978 allowed the application and released the premises in question.
3. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The appellate court by judgment and order dated 26.11.1984, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the prescribed authority and remanded the matter back to the prescribed authority to redecide the matter after hearing the parties.
4. It transpired that the landlord filed an application under Section 151, C.P.C. for the review of the order dated 26.11.1984. The appellate court vide order dated 11.10.1985, recalled its order and directed the appeal to be heard afresh on merits.
5. The tenant has challenged this order dated 11.10.1985 contending that the application for review was not maintainable against a judgment passed under Section 22 of the Act.
6. Heard Sri N. C. Rajvanshi, the learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Manik Chandra Mishra and Sri Pankaj Mittal, the learned counsel for the landlord/opposite party, assisted by Sri Shubham Agarwal, advocate.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appellate court under the Act had no power to review its earlier judgment and hence the impugned order of the appellate court reviewing its own judgment was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the landlord/opposite party submitted that the appellate court had inherent powers to review its earlier judgment under Clause (b) of Rule 22 of the Rules for the ends of justice to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned.
8. In order to appreciate the submissions made by the rival parties, it is essential to place a few provisions of the Act and the Rules framed therein.
9. Section 22 of the Act reads as under :
"Appeal. --Any person aggrieved by an order under Section 21 or Section 24 may within thirty days from the date of the order prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge, and in other respects, the provisions of Section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such appeal."
10. Section 10 of the Act reads as under :
"10. Appeal against order under Sections (8, 9 and 9A).-- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the District Magistrate under Section 8 or Section 9 or Section 9A may, within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge, and the District Judge may either dispose of it himself or assign it for disposal to any Additional District Judge under his administrative control, and may recall it from any such officer, or transfer it to any other such officer.
(2) The appellate authority may confirm, vary or rescind the order, or remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing, and may also take any additional evidence, and pending its decision, stay the operation of the order under appeal on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit.
(3) No further appeal or revision shall lie against any order passed by the appellate authority under this section, and its order shall be final."
11. From the aforesaid it is clear that the appellate court has power to confirm, vary or rescind the order or remand the matter back to the prescribed authority for rehearing.
12. Section 34 of the Act deals with the powers of various authorities and the procedure to be followed by them. Section 34 of the Act is quoted hereunder :
"34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them.--(1) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely,--
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath ;
(b) receiving evidence on affidavits ;
(c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation ;
(d) requiring the discovery and production of documents ;
(e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any party or requiring security for costs from any party ;
(f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith ;
(g) any other matter which may be prescribed."
13. Sub-section (8) of Section 34 is quoted hereunder :
"8. For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proof, rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed."
14. Section 34 (g) of the Act provides that apart from the powers given to the appellate court under Clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 34, the State Government may provide other powers as may be prescribed. Section 41 of the Act enables the State Government to make Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. In exercise of the powers under Section 41 of the Act, the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, were framed (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules").
15. Rule 22 of the Rules states as under :
"22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Section 34 (1) (g).--The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or the appellate authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under the Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely :
(a) the power to dismiss an application, appeal or revision for default and to restore it for sufficient cause ;
(b) the power to proceed ex parte, and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex parte ;
(c) the power to award costs and special costs to any successful party against the unsuccessful party ;
(d) the power to allow amendment bf an application, memorandum of appeal or revision ;
(e) the power to consolidate two or more cases of eviction by the same landlord against different tenants ;
(f) the power referred to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to make any order for ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the authority concerned."
16. In Shiv Behari Sharma v. Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1977 AWC 679, it was held that there was no remedy for a review under U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972.
17. In Abdul Hameed v. District Judge. Kanpur, 1979 ARC 408, it was held that appellate authority had no power to review its earlier order.
18. In Kishori Lal alias Kashmiri Lal and Ors. v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Rampur and Anr., 1984 (2) ARC 623, it was held that a review application was not maintainable to review an order passed under Section 9A of the Act.
19. In Kailash Singh Rajput v. Ram Prakash, AIR 1979 All 110, it was held that the Court had no power, to review its order in exercise of its inherent power and that the power of review could only be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.
20. The learned counsel for the petitioner also invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of India and Ors., 2000 (3) AWC 2.25 (SC) (NOC) : AIR 2000 SC 1650, in which it was held that the power of review can only be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view and that the power of review could only be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of such power. The review could not be treated as an appeal in question.
21. Thus, from a perusal of Sections 10, 22 and 34 of the Act, read with Rule 22 of the Rules, coupled with the decisions cited aforesaid it is clear that no specific provision has been provided under the Act to review a judgment given by the appellate court.
22. Even though there is no specific provision for review, but could the appellate court exercise such powers by necessary implication under Section 151, C.P.C.? Section 34 (8) of the Act read with Rule 22 (f) of the Rules gives powers to the appellate court to exercise the powers of Section 151, C.P.C. to pass such orders for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned. In fact, the powers of Section 151, C.P.C. is clearly and expressly engrafted in Rule 22 (f) of the Rules.
23. Section 151. C.P.C. does not confer any powers but only indicates that there is a power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. If the circumstances require the Court to act "ex debito justiciae" and to do that real and substantial justice, the Court has the inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. to make such orders.
24. In Sri Sheo Kishan Das v. Prescribed Authority, Pilibhit and Ors., 1980 ARC 369, a Division Bench of this Court held that although no specific powers are conferred but restitution can be granted under Section 151, C.P.C. in exercise of powers under Rule 22 (g) and Section 34 of the Act and refusal to grant restitution would amount to non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in such authorities by law.
25. In S.G. Estates and Properties Ltd. v. Tehri Steels Ltd., 1997 (2) AWC 2.220 (NOC) : 1997 (1) ARC 614, it was held :
"..........Section 151 is the Jurisdiction inherent in a Court which can be exercised where there is no remedy available or where though such remedy is available it is just and expedient in the interest of justice that such jurisdiction is to be exercised............"
26. In Sheo Nath Gupta v. Pramod Kumar Misra and Ors., 2000 (1) ARC 270, it was held :
"........if the orders do not serve the ends of justice and do not prevent the abuse of the process of the Court then the powers should not be exercised under Section 151 of the Code........"
27. From the aforesaid, it is clear that when there is no remedy available or where though such remedy is available, it is just and expedient in the interest of justice that such power is exercised under Section 151 of the C.P.C. The Courts have power in the absence of any express or implied prohibition to pass an order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.
28. Applying the aforesaid principles, it has to be seen as to whether the landlord's application for recall comes within the parameters of the power conferred under Section 151, C.P.C.
29. Admittedly, an application under Section 151, C.P.C. was filed for recall of the judgment of the appellate court. The ground for recall was that the appellate court had allowed the appeal on such grounds which were neither raised nor argued by any party and, therefore, the landlord had no opportunity to rebut those grounds. The ground for recall of the judgment has not been disputed by the petitioner. The appellate court after hearing the review application passed an order dated 31.5.1985, which is quoted hereunder :
"The main grievance of the applicant in this review petition is that a point not argued in appeal was considered by me at the time of the writing of the judgment and the petitioner claims that he has been prejudiced by this reason."
"In this premises and context I place this on record that the points whether the disputed accommodation was an independent structure or was a part of a larger building or structure was never argued in Court and it occurred to me for the first time at the time of writing of judgment when I came across the site plan of the accommodation in question and that changed entire thinking about the appeal. Since I came to hold an opinion that remand was the only answer. I did not consider it necessary to rehear the matter as no decision on merits, in my opinion was being passed.
"..........I, however be the last person to let a litigant suffer for any fault or error committed by me even unknowingly. I can only say that Judges like the rest of them are all human and the concept of error is an integral concomitant of us all mortals."
30. Based on this order, the appellate court subsequently passed the impugned order and recalled its judgment and posted the appeal for rehearing.
31. In my view, the order passed by the appellate court recalling its earlier judgment has been validly passed in the exercise of its powers conferred under Section 151, C.P.C. to meet the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. The appellate court clearly held that the judgment was passed on certain grounds which occurred to the Judge which dictating the judgment and which points were neither raised nor argued by the parties and therefore, the litigant should not suffer for any fault or error committed by the appellate court. On this basis, the appellate court recalled its judgment.
32. The inherent powers have not been conferred on the Court. It is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties. One of the first and main duties of the Court is to ensure that the act of the Court does not cause injustice to any of the suitors. Accordingly, if injustice has been done by the Court, the aggrieved party can invoke the provisions of Section 151, C.P.C.
33. The maxim of law expressed in the Latin phrase "actus curiae neminem gravabit", namely that the error of the Court will cause no harm to a litigant, fully applies in the instant case.
34. Thus, in my view, in the present facts and circumstances of the case, the application for recall of the judgment passed by the appellate court could be made under Section 151, C.P.C. and the same was maintainable. In exceptional circumstances and to advance the cause of justice, the appellate court had the inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. to recall its judgment.
35. In the result, the writ petition is devoid of any merit and is dismissed with costs, which is assessed at Rs. 10,000. The petitioner is directed to deposit the cost before the appellate court within four weeks from today, which the landlord can withdraw. The appellate court is further directed to decide the appeal within three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him.