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P.Subramani vs Government Of India

Madras High Court|26 July, 2017

JUDGMENT / ORDER

in W.A.(MD) No.1561 of 2011
1.Union of India, Represented by Under Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Shasthri Bhavan, New Delhi - 110 001.
2.Re-logistics Infrastructure Limited, 9-D/6D, Ramakrishnapuram, Opp. to Pillaiyar Kovil, Karur, Tamilnadu.
3.Competent Authority, Re-logistics Infrastructure Limited, 9-D/6D, Ramakrishnapuram, Opp. to Pillaiyar Kovil, Karur, Tamilnadu.
4.Mr.S.Rajamanickam, Competent Authority, Re-logistics Infrastructure Limited, 9-D/6D, Ramakrishnapuram, Opp. to Pillaiyar Kovil, Karur, Tamilnadu. ... Respondents/Respondents in W.A.(MD) Nos.1562 to 1565 of 2011 Writ Appeals filed under Clause 15 of Letter Patent against the order passed by this Court in W.P.(MD)Nos.8556, 8871 to 8874 of 2011 dated 20.09.2011.
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.M.SUNDRESH, J) These writ appeals are preferred against the common order of the learned Single Judge dated 20.09.2011, passed in W.P.(MD)Nos.8556, 8871 to 8874 of 2011.
2.The appellants herein are the land owners. They have challenged the notice issued under Section 3(1) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipe Lines (Acquisition of Right of User in land) Act, 1962 by which objections have been called for by respondent No.3 for the proposed acquisition. Before the learned Single Judge it was contented that under Section 3(2) of the said Act the notice issued is vague. It suffers from bias and there involves non- application of mind. The learned Single Judge on the point held that in as much as a map has already been furnished the question of vague would not arise. Incidentally, it was held that the writ petitions are premature and it is open to the appellant to give their objections. Challenging the same, the present appeals have been filed.
3.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would make only one submission. It is submitted that there is likelihood of bias as the third respondent is a paid officer of the second respondent and the second respondent is a private entity. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.8629 and 8631 of 2011 dated 13.10.2011 in the matter of Trilok Sudhirbhai Pandya v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. would apply in all fours.
4.The learned Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the first respondent would submit that the above said decision apply to the case depending on the facts and circumstances involved in the case therein and the same cannot be made applicable to the present case.
5.The Hon'ble Apex Court in Trilok Sudhirbhai Pandya v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (cited supra) was pleased to hold as follows:
"10. This Court as early as in 1957 held in Manak Lal, Advocate v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi and Others [AIR 1957 SC 425] that every member of a Tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In the aforesaid decision, this Court also held:
"But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. It would always be a question of fact to be decided in each case." In the aforesaid decision, the observations of Viscount Cave L.C. in Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Jusstiees (1926 Appeal Cases 586 at p.590) that the rule that every member of a Tribunal must be able to act judicially and without bias applies not only to judicial Tribunals but also in the case of authorities which have to act as Judges of the rights of others. In aforesaid decision, this Court also held that it would always be a question of fact to be decided in each case whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigants or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice.
11. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Others (supra), M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. writing the judgment for the Court held in Paras 16 and 17 of the judgment:
"16. It is the essence of a judgment that it is made after due observance of the judicial process; that the court or tribunal passing it observes, at least the minimal requirements of natural justice; is composed of impartial persons acting fairly and without bias and in good faith. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is a nullity and the trial `coram non-judice'.
17. As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party. The proper approach for the judge is not to look at his own mind and ask himself, however, honestly, "Am I biased?" but to look at the mind of the party before him."
12. Thus, as per the judgment of this Court the test of likelihood of bias is whether there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party before the Court or the Tribunal that the Court or the Tribunal will not act with fairness and without bias on account of certain objective circumstances. There is no dispute in the present case that the salary, allowances, accommodation and transport were being borne by the respondent-company directly. Thus, the Competent Authority was virtually an employee of the respondent no.4-company and there were grounds for the appellants to entertain a reasonable apprehension in their mind that the Competent Authority will not act fairly and is likely to act with bias. In the judgment of this Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Others (supra) it has been held that a judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is a nullity and the trial coram non-judice.Thus, the entire proceedings for determination of compensation before Shri V.I. Gohil would be a nullity.
13. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Yashwant Gajanan Joshi and Others (supra), relied on by the High Court as well as learned counsel for the respondent no.4, this Court has clearly made a distinction between a public corporation and private employer. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has held:
".... It would be to broad a proposition to extend the theory of bias to exclude persons only because such person draws the salary from the bodies like public corporation, State Government. It would altogether be a different case if it was a case of a private employer and his employee. We cannot equate the case of a person in private employment with that of a person in public employment. ..."
14. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court as well as the proceedings for determination of compensation in the case of the appellants only. We, however, make it clear that this judgment will not affect any of the orders passed by Shri V.I. Gohil with regard to acquisition of the right of user as the appellants challenged the appointment of Shri Gohil in the Writ Petitions before the High Court in the present case only after he started the proceedings for determination of compensation. We direct that the Union of India will appoint another unbiased person in place of Shri Gohil for determination of compensation payable to the appellants. No costs."
6.Now what is issued is a notice calling for a response from the land owners by way of representations/objections. These notices have been issued statutorily. The respondent No.3 issued these notices in pursuant to a decision taken already to acquire the lands. The question of bias would actually come while considering the objections/representations given or to be given by the interested person and that stage has not come. We do find considerable force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants insofar as likelihood of bias is concerned. Admittedly, the third respondent is the paid officer of the second respondent. There is an element of apprehension of mind involved while considering the issue. While holding that the issuance of notice under Section 3(1) of the Act has been issued as per the procedure and there is no element of bias, we have to hold that the respondent No.3 cannot act as competent authority after receiving the representations/objections as he is a paid officer of the 2nd respondent.
7.In such view of the matter, we dispose of these Writ Appeals by directing the first respondent to appoint any one other than than the paid officer of the second respondent to perform the role as per Section 3(2) of the Act. We make it clear that the remuneration for the person to be appointed as competent authority shall be paid only by the respondent No.1. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
To
1.The Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, Shasthri Bhavan, New Delhi - 110 001..
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Title

P.Subramani vs Government Of India

Court

Madras High Court

JudgmentDate
26 July, 2017