JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 22.3.2004 (Annexure-4) passed by the Chancellor and the reference dated 11.12.2003, made by the Executive Council (Annexure-3), to refer the matter to the Chancellor, disagreeing with the recommendations of the Selection Committee.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that in various departments of the University of Allahabad, candidature of the teachers, i.e., Lecturers, Readers were considered for grant of promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme/Personal Promotion Scheme who had completed the requisite period of service. In the regular cadre of Professors, Readers, large number of vacancies existed. Advertisement was made to fill up the same. However, the Government of Uttar Pradesh passed an order dated 10.9.2003, staying all selection and appointments through direct recruitment. While passing the order, the promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme were also stopped. On representation of the eligible candidates, State Government issued an order dated 26.9.2003, modifying its earlier order dated 10.9.2003, that the promotion under the Personal Promotion Scheme/Career Advancement Scheme may be considered. For that purpose, Selection Committee were constituted and made recommendations. It could not be implemented, as some enquiries were conducted in the University regarding financial irregularities and State Government passed the order dated 14.11.2003, restraining the University from placing the recommendations made by Selection Committee before the Executive Council till the enquiry in financial embezzlement is completed. Being aggrieved, petitioner, who was also one of the candidates for promotion to the post of Professor, filed Writ Petition No. 51565 of 2003, G.K. Rai and Ors. v. State of U.P., for quashing the said order and directing the respondent University to place the recommendation of the Selection Committee before the Executive Council. The writ petition was allowed vide order dated 3.12.2003, by which the order of the Government dated 14.11.2003 was quashed. In pursuance of the said order, recommendations of the Selection Committee were placed before the Executive Council on 11.12.2003 and when the matter was placed before the Executive Council, it was revealed that certain candidates had been recommended for promotion but some were not recommended for promotion. The Executive Council approved the recommendations vide order dated 11.12.2003, giving promotions to those candidates who had been approved by the Selection Committee. However, the cases of those candidates who were not found suitable, were referred to the Chancellor under Section 31(8)(a) of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, hereinafter called 'the Act'. On receiving the aforesaid reference dated 11.12.2003, the learned Chancellor passed an order dated 12.3.2004, constituting a Committee of Experts to examine the recommendations made by the Selection Committee in respect of those candidates who had not been found suitable. Hence, this petition.
3. Shri R.N. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the Career Advancement Scheme is meant for those teachers who have outstanding career, have made large number of publications and they are being considered for promotion on personal post (supernumerary post) and once the Selection Committee made a recommendation, the Executive Council without recording a finding that the Selection Committee was biased or acted mala fide, without recording appropriate and sufficient reasons having no good ground, could make the reference to the Chancellor under the Act and the Chancellor further was not required to constitute a Committee to reconsider the whole issue or sitting as a Reviewing Authority of the previous Selection Committee. Such a course is not envisaged under the provisions of the Act or the Allahabad University Statute. Thus, petition is liable to be dismissed.
4. On the other hand Shri Sudhir Agarwal, learned Additional Advocate General and Shri M.D. Singh Shekhar, who appear for the State and some of the teachers in the said department, who were impleaded on their application, i.e., Shri R.P. Tripathi and Dr. Jai Narain respectively have submitted that the petitioner himself had been a beneficiary of the same selection process, got promotion in the same Career Advancement Scheme, therefore, he cannot raise any grievance, whatsoever, after being promoted. Not a single person, who may be adversely affected, has been impleaded. Petition is liable to be dismissed for non-impleadment of necessary parties. The learned Chancellor has not yet taken a decision. The Expert Committee constituted by the Chancellor may or may not agree with the recommendations made by the Selection Committee, therefore, the writ petition should not be entertained being premature at this stage. Reference made by the Selection Committee is pending before the Chancellor and law permits the learned Chancellor to appoint Expert Committee for seeking opinion, of experts as no person can be said to be expert of all subjects, therefore, constitution of Expert Committee is permissible. Petitioner has no right to file this petition as Public Interest Litigation, as his grievance has been that in case the respondent Shri R.P. Tripathi is promoted, the seniority of the petitioner may be adversely affected. Petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the petition. Court should be very slow in interfering with the matter which have been dealt with/examined by the special body of experts. University Statute does not provide for having interview of a candidate for Career Advanced Scheme (CAS), thus the Selection Committee had no business to interview the candidates at all. The petition is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed.
Shri P.S. Baghel, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Allahabad University, did not make any submission as the matter is pending consideration before the learned Chancellor, therefore, according to him, it was not desirable for the University to advance any argument on merit. However, he produced the record of Selection Committee as well as of the Executive Council.
We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The concept of personal promotion was introduced by the University Grants Commission in order to remove stagnation and consequent frustration amongst the teachers in the various Universities and therefore, the object of the Scheme had been to provide reasonable opportunity to teachers for carrier advance and recognition of their merit and to provide reasonable opportunity for promotion, who merit academic recognition, on a competitive basis. In order to give effect to the said objective, the Act, 1973 was amended by the State of U.P. Inserting the provisions of Section 31(A) to the Act, 1973 which provides for a different channel of appointment/promotion, but for a joint seniority list of appointees from both the channels. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. Bal Krishna Agarwal v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 614, held that a person under the Personal Promotion Scheme shall be entitled for all privileges and get benefit of seniority, further promotion and shall be entitled to be appointed as Dean or Head of the Department. However, as no such amendment was made in other State, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. Rashmi Srivastava v. Vikram University and Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1694, held that as there was no provision in Madhya Pradesh analogous to Section 31-A of the U.P. Act of 1973, such promotee shall not be entitled for seniority promotion etc.
5. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in Prof. S.A. Siddiqui v. Prof. M. Wazid Khan and Ors., (1999) 2 SCC 1, wherein it was held that a person either appointed in regular cadre or under Personal Promotion Scheme would stand on a equal footing and would belong to the same cadre.
6. In view of the above, it is to be noted that a promotion under Personal Promotion Scheme or Career Advance Scheme is to recognize the merit of a person who merits promotion by competing with others. Here the question does arise as to whether University is competent to make promotion under PPS/CAS system even when the vacancies in the regular cadre of the Department are available. We asked the Counsel to address the Court on this issue, they avoided submitting that once the legislature in its wisdom created a separate independent promotional channel for appointment under PPS/CAS Scheme and had been given due consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the issue does not require to be considered. The Hon'ble Apex Court is in Balkrishna Agarwal's (supra), has taken note of the fact that the scheme was introduced to remove stagnation and frustration amongst the teachers, it may mean that promotion in the said Scheme is permissible provided there is no vacancy available in the regular cadre. The purpose of floating the Scheme by U.G.C. was to give recognition to a person having outstanding merit and who deserves to be appointed on competitive basis. It may impliedly mean that the Schemes are meant for those, who are fit to be promoted, but could not be considered for want of vacancy in the regular cadre. However, issue not raised in the case cannot be decided by this Court, though the Court is competent enough to raise the issue, we leave the issue open to be considered by the learned Chancellor and other Statutory Authority, as it is admitted fact that vacancies in the regular cadre are still remained unfilled.
7. Undoubtedly, a Public Interest Litigation cannot be filed by a person having personal interest in the matter. Pro bono publico is meant to raise the voice of those who are downtrodden and persons belonging to the lower/weaker sections of the society who cannot approach the Court. However, in a particular case, where larger public interest is involved, the petition can be entertained in public interest by the Court.
8. It is settled law that a person who suffers from legal injury only can challenge the act/action/order etc. Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is a breach of the statutory duty on the part of the respondents. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforcement on which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of the said right is the condition precedent to invoke the writ jurisdiction. [Vide Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1044; Mani Subrat Jain etc. etc. v. State of Haryana and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 276; State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutty and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 331; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors., (1988) 7 SCC 469; State of Kerala and Ors. v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and Ors., AIR 1989 SC 49; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2736; Utkal University etc. v. Dr. Nursingha Charan sarangi and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 943 and Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2003) 5 SCC 413].
9. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Hazi Bashir Ahmed and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 578, the Apex Court has held that only a person who is aggrieved by an order, can maintain a writ petition. The expression "aggrieved person" has been explained by the Apex Court observing that such a person must show that he has more particular or peculiar interest on his own beyond that of general public in seeing that the law is properly administered. In the said case, a cinema hall owner had challenged the sanction of setting up of a rival cinema hall in the town contesting that it would adversely affect monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :
"Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria. The term injuria being here used in its true sense of an Act contrary to law. The reason why law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstratively clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to legal wrong. He has suffered no grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiceable claim to hang on. Therefore, he is not a "person aggrieved" and has no locus standi to challenge the ground of the no objection of certificate."
10. Similarly, in K. Ramadas Shenoy v. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 2177, the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined a case of a resident in a locality where a cinema building was to be constructed contrary to the Building Town Planning Scheme. He was held to be entitled to maintain writ on the ground that the residential area would stand spoiled by unauthorized construction in violation of the statutory provisions and the municipal authorities owed a public duty and an obligation under the Statute not to allow the construction of a cinema hall in a residential area.
11. In The Nagar Rice and Floour Mills and Ors. v. N. Teekappa Gowda and Bros, and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 246, the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the claim of an existing Mill owner that in case any other Mill is shifted to the locality wherein his Mill stood situated, he would be adversely affected, therefore, has a locus standi to maintain the suit/writ. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the right to carry on business being fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, its exercise is subject to only to the restrictions imposed by the law in the interest of general public under Article 19(6)(i) of the Constitution.
12. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmad and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 728; Bans Raj Kehar and Ors. v. The State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 389 and Mithilesh Garg etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1992 SC 443, while examining the locus of the existing operators to have objection for grant of permits under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.
13. In Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Col. Ltd. and Ors., 1997 (4) SCC 452, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again considered the meaning of "person aggrieved" and "locus of a rival Government Undertaking" and held that a rival businessman cannot maintain a writ petition on the ground that its business prospects would be adversely affected. However, in the said case, the Union of India's writ petition was held to be maintainable in a larger public interest.
14. In Thammanna v. K. Veera Reedy, (1980) 4 SCC 62, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that although the meaning of expression "person aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the Statute and facts of the case, nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance; a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of something or wrongfully refused something, or wrongfully affected his title to someone. However, in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors., (1998) 7 SCC 273, the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the claim of a stranger to maintain a writ petition even in Public Interest Litigation before the Hon'ble Administrative Tribunal. It was further held that the Administrators Tribunal constituted under the Act is meant for resolving the personal dispute of an employee, does not have a right to entertain Public Interest Litigation at the instance of a total stranger.
15. In M.S. Jayaraj v. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 552, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the matter at length and placed reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including the Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. v. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) and Ors., 2000 (2) SCC 465; and held that the Court must examine the issue of locus standi from all angles and the petitioner should be asked to disclose as what is the legal injury suffered by him.
16. The "person aggrieved" means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to received and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. "Person aggrieved" means a person who is injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense. [Vide K.N. Lakshminarasimaiah v. Secretary, Mysore S.T.A.T., (1966) 2 Mys. LJ 199].
17. Whether a person is injured in strict legal sense, must be determined by the nature of the injury considering the facts and circumstances involving in each case. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance, as the law can appreciate and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons.
18. In Thiruvengadam v. Muthu Chettiar and Anr., AIR 1970 Mad 34, it has been held that a person can be said to be aggrieved if apart from the general interest, such a person, as a member of the public, has particular or special interest in the subject matter supposed to be wrongly decided.
19. In Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd. v. Roman and Roman (Private) Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1961 Mad 180, the Full Bench of Madras High Court, while considering the provisions of Madras Motor Vehicles Act, considered the issue and approved the law laid down in The King v. Richmond Confirming Authority, (1921) 1 KB 248; and The King v. Groom and Ors., (1901) 2 KB 157, and laid down the principles as under :--
"The true principle is to determine whether the applicant has an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered."
20. In Ram Singh and Anr. v. Director of Consolidation and Ors., 1968 All WR 844, this Court held that the expression "person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from psychological or imaginary injury; the person aggrieved must necessarily be one whose right or interest is adversely affected or jeopardised."
21. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid that "person aggrieved" is to be considered in context of the Act involved and is to be restricted to the person, which has wrongfully been deprived of something or wrongfully refused something or his interest/title is adversely affected, but the same does not require a very liberal and wide interpretation.
22. In Ashok Auto Service of Betim v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1968 Goa 67, while considering the issue of locus standi of a person to file a writ petition in the High Court in respect of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The State of Orissa v. Madhari Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12, the Court held that the existence of a right in favour of the writ petitioners is the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kalyan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1183, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court enunciated the proposition that the right to maintain a writ postulates a subsisting personal right in the claim which the petitioner makes and in the protection of which he is personally interested. The existence of a legal right is a condition precedent to approach the Court/Tribunal.
23. The term "person aggrieved" was also considered and defined in Re-Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458, wherein it has been observed as under :--
"The words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something."
24. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the similar issue and observed as under :--
"There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case, where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filling of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid article. The Orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in our country and the Constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hyper-technical grounds............. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi."
25. The party has to satisfy as what is the legal injury caused by that violation of law for the redressal of which the party has approached the Court. Mere violation of law or making out a legal issue is not enough to maintain the writ petition.
26. However, need was felt to relax the rule of locus standi wherever person aggrieved could not have the resources to approach the Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court entertained the petition even of unregistered Association espousing the cause of over down-trodden or its members observing that the cause of "little Indians" can be espoused by any person having no interest in the matter. However, the said person should be bona fide, not a intermeddler or busy-body. (Vide Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 802).
27. In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) etc. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1981 SC 298, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of locus standi observed as under :--
"Our current processual jurisprudence is not an individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad based and people-oriented and envisions access to justice through 'class actions', 'Public Interest Litigation', and representative proceedings'. Indeed, little Indians in larger numbers seeking remedies in Courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions."
28. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1981 SC 344, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :--
"Public Interest Litigation is part of the process of participate justice and 'standing' in civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial doorsteps."
29. Public Interest Litigation is riot in the nature of adversary litigation. The purpose of P.I.L. is to promote the public interest which mandates that violation of legal or constitutional rights of a large number of persons, poor, down-trodden, ignorant, socially or economically disadvantaged should not go un-redressed. The Court can take cognizance in P.I.L. when there are complaints which shocks the judicial conscience. P.I.L. is pro bono publico and should not smack of any ulterior motive and no person has a right to achieve any ulterior purpose through such litigations.
30. In S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors., AIR 1982 SC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has warned by saying that the Court must be careful that the members of the public who approach the Court are acting bona fide and not in personal garb of private profit or political motivation or other oblique considerations. "The Court must not allow its process to be abused". Similar view has been taken in Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors., 1994 (Supp) 2 SCC 116.
31. In Miss Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1983 SC 339, the Apex Court has observed that the role of law requires to be played for the poor and ignorant who constitute a large bulk of humanity in this country and the Court must uphold the basic human rights of weaker sections of the society.
32. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Shimla and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 910, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :
"Where the Court finds, on being moved by an aggrieved party or by any public spirited individual or social action group, that the executive is remiss in discharging its obligation under the Constitution or the law, so that the poor and the under-privileged continued to be subjected to exploitation and injustice or are deprived of their social and economic entitlements or that social and economic entitlements or that social legislation enacted for their benefit is not being implemented thus depriving of their rights and benefits conferred upon them, the Courts certainly can be must intervene and compel the executive to carry out its constitutional and legal obligations and ensure that the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community are no longer subjected to exploitation or injustice and they are able to realise their social and economical rights."
33. In Sachidanand Pandey (supra), the Apex Court observed that the Court should not take cognizance in such matters merely because of its attractive name. The petitioner must inspire the confidence of the Court and must be above suspicion.
34. In Ram Saran Ayotan Parasi v. Union of India, JT (1988) 4 SC 577, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the P.I.L. is for making basic human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and to assure them social, economic and political justice.
35. In Giani Devender Singh Sant Sepoy Sikh v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1995 SC 1847, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court, while entertaining a P.I.L. must indicate how the public interest was involved in the case.
36. In R.K. Jain v. Union of India and ors., AIR 1993 SC 1769, the Apex Court observed that it was for the aggrieved person to assail the illegality of the offending action and no third party has a locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Similarly, in Mohammad Anis v. Union of India and Ors., 1994 (Supp) 1 SCC 145, the Apex Court has held that a case should not be entertained unless the petitioner points out that his legal rights have been infringed.
37. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :
"If a person wants a relief in a Court independent of a statutory remedy, he must show that he is injured or subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. The Courts can interfere only where legal rights are involved. In fact legal wrong requires judicially enforceable right and 'the touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right'. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse effect on the interest of a person or right of a person is sufficient to give him the 'standing to sue'. Again, the 'adverse effect' and the requisite for 'standing to sue' must be an illegal effect........
Such persons are merely busy body of middlesome interloper....They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the ........judicial process....... from improper motives.........The High Court should do well to reject the application of all such busybodies at the threshold."
38. In S.P. Anand, Indore v. H.D. Deve Gowda and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 734, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that, "no person has a right to waiver of the locus standi rule and Court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is in the competent hands of a person, who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations, so also the Court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused........"
39. P.I.L. can also be filed by any person challenging the misuse or improper use of any public property, including the political party in power for the reason that interest of individuals cannot be placed above or preferred to a larger public interest. But such a petition can be entertained for the protection of the society. [Vide J. Jayalalitha v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 53; L. Muthukumar and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 618; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1544; Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. CK. Rajan and Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 546 and 5 M&T Consultants Secunderabad v. S.Y. Nawab and Anr., (2003) 8 SCC 100).
40. In Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 492, the Apex Court observed as under :--
"The Public Interest Litigation should not be merely a cloak for attaining private ends of a third party or of the party bringing the petition. The Court can examine the previous record of public service rendered by the organization bringing the Public Interest Litigation. Even when a Public Interest Litigation is entertained, the Court must be careful to weigh conflicting public interests before intervening."
41. In Dr. Meera Massey (Mrs.) and Ors. v. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra and Ors., (1998) 3 SCC 88, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered large number of its earlier judgments and held that if a person working in the institution is genuinely concerned to rectify the wrongs without any personal animosity against anyone, his feelings are bona fide, being a teacher in the University and he has all informations and details of facts and law pertaining to the institution, he is neither politically motivated nor he comes forward for publicity, petition at his behest may be entertained even as a Public Interest Litigation and locus to approach the Court for such genuine person should not be challenged.
42. In Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. C.K. Rajan and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court held that where an issue of public importance, enforcement of fundamental right of large number of people vis-a-vis the constitutional duties and functions of the State, if raised, the Court may consider the case as a common rule of locus standi and may relax so as to enable the Court to look into the grievances complained on behalf of the poor, the deprived, the illiterate and the disabled who cannot vindicate the legal wrong or legal injury caused to them for any violation of any constitutional or legal right. The Court further held that in appropriate case, although petitioner might have moved the Court in his private interest and for redressal of his personal grievance, the Court in furtherance of public interest may treat it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice.
43. On the contrary, in the case of Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 363, the Hon'ble Apex Court defined the public interest as a matter of public or general interest or a matter relating to community at large and held that Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which should be used with great care and circumspection and the Court should be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It should not be a means to abuse the process of the Court for oblique considerations by masked phantom nor a PIL can be filed for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration.
44. Thus, in view of the above, the ratio of all these judgments is that there must be a public injury and public wrong caused by wrongful or ultra vires acts or omission of the State or a public authority. It is for the enforcement of basic human rights of weaker sections of the community who are poor, down-trodden, ignorant, illiterates and whose fundamental rights and statutory rights have been violated. In fact, it is for compelling the executive to carry out its constitutional and legal obligations. It must not be frivolous litigation by persons having vested interests.
45. In the instant case, the petitioner has taken a specific plea in the writ petition particularly in Paragraph 31 that Dr. R.P. Tripathi, respondent No. 5 had also applied for being considered for promotion to the post of Professor in the department of Ancient History, Culture and Archeology and in case he is promoted, in spite of the fact that he has not been found suitable by the Selection Committee, it might affect the seniority of the petitioner as the said respondent was senior to the petitioner in the Readers grade, therefore, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that as he himself has shown to be the aggrieved person and apprehends to be adversely affected in case Dr. Tripathi is found suitable and promoted. The petition even it cannot be termed as a PIL but a petition claiming the relief for himself and in such an eventuality, it cannot be held that petitioner is, by no means, concerned with the case, and has no locus to approach the Court raising the issue involved herein. Moreso, we are of the view that issues raised by the petitioner are of paramount importance for the public at large, and in such a case, issue of locus standi may not be examined in its rigor.
46. So far as the issue of impleadment of necessary party is concerned, needless to say that a petition must fail for non-impleadment of necessary parties, i.e., persons who may be adversely affected, as it is settled law that any order passed behind the back of a party is not binding upon him. (Vide Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar and Anr., AIR 1963 SC 786).
47. In Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 167, the Apex Court held that where a large number of persons are likely to be affected, some of them may be impleaded in a representative capacity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2002) 4 AWC 2756.
48. In V.P. Shrivastava and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 759, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the issue of necessary party and held that non-inclusion of affected parties is not always fatal for the reason where the very principle on the basis of which the authorities are acting upon is under challenge, in such a case, the necessary party may not be impleaded. While deciding the said case, a very heavy reliance has been pleased by Hon'ble Supreme Court upon its earlier judgment in The General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad and Anr. v. A.V.R. Siddhanti and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 1755.
49. In the instant case, at the initial stage, petitioner did not implead any persona but as Shri M.D. Singh Shekhar, learned Counsel filed an application and got two such persons impleaded. Thus, it cannot be held that petition is not maintainable for want of necessary parties as persons who may be adversely affected are now being represented in the representative capacity. The case does not require any further consideration on this issue.
50. It has vehemently been contended on behalf of respondents that petition is pre-emptive and therefore, cannot be entertained. The submissions made by them seem to be very attractive but has no force for the reason that if an order in its inception is bad, the subsequent circumstances cannot santify the same. Thus, we find no force in the submissions made on behalf of the respondents that as the learned Chancellor has yet to take a decision in exercise of its power under Section 38(1)(a) of the Act, or other provision, particularly the provisions of the Universities Act which empowers the Executive Council to appoint particularly Clause (7) thereof provides the power of Executive Council which included power to appoint officers and teachers and other employees of the University, and it is not necessary that the Chancellor may agree with recommendations made by the Expert Committee constituted by him.
51. In Upen Chandra Gogoi v. State of Assam and Ors., (1998) 3 SCC 381, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no authority or Court can validate an action which was not lawful in its inception. If an order suffers from illegality or bad at initial stage, it cannot be good by efflux of time or by any subsequent development. If in case the order of reference is bad and requires to be quashed, then it cannot be held that Court should wait till the final result of the reference comes out. If the reference itself is held to be bad, or subsequent proceedings would render a futile exercise. More so, when the issues of competence to make reference and non-existence of the conditions required for making such reference are raised, such a plea become untenable.
52. We find no force in the submission made on behalf of the private respondents that the Selection Committee could not have called the candidates for interview as it is not envisaged in the provisions of the University Statute. Our attention had been drawn to Clause 11.12-B of the First Statute of the Allahabad University, which provides for personal promotion/CAS, and it provides to examine by the Selection Committee the self assessment made by the candidate himself. The provision cannot be construed in such a narrow way as there is no prohibition also for holding the interviews. Even if interview was not permissible, the plea is not with consideration. None of the candidates ever raised any objection to the Selection Committee on this issue. Nor it has been in issue before the Executive Council. Nor reference is based on this plea. It cannot be permitted to be agitated at this time after being found non-suitable, If a candidate takes a chance to have a favourable report before a Committee and gets confronted with an unfavourable report, he cannot adopt the device of raising any technical ground, as in such a case doctrine of estoppel applies. [Vide Manak Lal, Advocate v. Prem Chand Singhvi and Ors., AIR 1957 SC 425; Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 2428; U.D. Lama and Ors. v. State of Sikkim and Ors., (1997) 1 SCC 111 and Utkal University (supra)]. More so, interview may be necessary to find out as to whether self assessment made by the candidate is correct.
53. Undoubtedly, the Court does not have expertise in all subjects, therefore, it has to be slow in disturbing the decision taken by the Committee of Experts, working in the field, have day to day experience and which has acquired special skill in the subject.
54. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in The University of Mysore and Anr. v. C.D. Govindarao and Anr., AIR 1965 SC 491, held that in academic matters where the decision under challenge has been taken by the Committee of Experts, "normally the Court should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by the experts" unless there are allegations of mala fide against any of the members of the Expert Committee.
55. A similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The State of Bihar and Anr. v. Dr. A.K. Mukherjee and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 192; Dr. M.C. Gupta and Ors. v. Dr. Arun Kumar Gupta and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 339; Dr. J.P. Kulshreshtha and Ors. v. Chancellor, Allahabad University and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 2141; Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University and Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1448; Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and Ors. v. Dr. B.S. Mahajan and Ors., AIR 1990 SC 434; Dr. Uma Kant v. Dr. Bhika Lal Jain and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2272; Bhushan Uttam Khare v. The Dean, B.J. Medical College and Ors., AIR 1992 SC 917; The Chancellor and Anr. v. Dr. Bijaynanda Kar and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 579; Central Areca Nut and Cocoa Marketing and Processing Co-operative Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 31; Chairman, J&K State Board of Education v. Feyaz Ahmed Malik and Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 59 and Dental Council of India v. Subharti K.K.B. Charitable Trust and Anr., (2001) 5 SCC 486, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the matter of academic courses, the Court should not disturb the decision taken by the educational institution unless there are compelling circumstances and sufficient material warranting the interference. 56. In view of the above, the Court should not interfere with the decision taken by the body of the experts unless there are compelling circumstances i.e., unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the expert body has acted arbitrarily or in contravention of the statutory provisions, to do so. But this argument is of no use or either side as the Court is not examining the decision of the Selection Committee, rather dealing with the locus standi of the petitioner and the validity of the reference made by the Executive Council. The issue whether the Executive Council could interfere with the decision of the Selection Committee would be dealt with later.
57. The question as to whether the reference made by the Executive Council to the learned Chancellor is valid? A Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Devendra Dutta Tewari v. The Chancellor, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi and Ors., 1978 All LJ 844, after considering all the statutory provisions, came to the conclusion that in view of the provisions of Section 31 of the Act, 1973, if the Executive Council accepts the recommendation of the Selection Committee, the question of making reference does not arise. However, it is only when the Executive Council does not agree with the recommendations of the Selection Committee, it may refer the matter to the Chancellor. Therefore, condition precedent for making a reference is disagreement by the Executive Council with the recommendations of the Selection Committee and for that purpose there must be reasons given for disagreement. In absence of either of these two conditions, the reference becomes bad and the Chancellor is not competent to entertain the reference. While deciding a Writ Petition No. 1101 (SB) of 1993, Dr. B.R.K. Shukla v. Chancellor, University of Lucknow, vide judgment and order dated 16.9.1996, the Division Bench of this Court (Lucknow) after considering a large number of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and interpreting the provisions of the Statute held as under :
"If the procedure has been scrupulously followed, then no interference can be made by any authority of the University, including the Chancellor and even the High Court power to issue a writ shall be circumscribed to the well established principle of judicial scrutiny, meaning thereby; as to whether the procedure has been followed or not and whether in the process of making appointment, irrelevant factors and extraneous matters have influenced the authority or the order suffers from bias. While doing so, neither Chancellor nor the Court will re-appraise the over all merits of the candidate and substitute another judgment for that of Selection Committee constituted under the provisions of the Act. The Chancellor by exercising, power under Section 31(8)(a), or Section 68 of the Act, cannot re-appraise or re-evaluate the merit of the candidates or substitute his own views in the matter of selection of a Teacher or Professor of the University particularly when the Selection Committee has arrived at the subjective satisfaction and graded one Teacher to the post of Professor; a better one in comparison of others."
58. In the aforesaid case, the issue was slightly different as it was a case of appointment in a regular cadre, and the question was of re-appreciation/re-evaluation of the inter se merit of the candidates. While in the instant case, Selection Committee did not require to consider and assess the inter se merit of the candidates, but, to find out as to whether the candidate is suitable for promotion in view of the provisions of Section 31-A of the Act, 1973, fulfilling the requirement and following the procedure prescribed under Statute 11.12-B of the First Statute, 1976 of the University.
59. Be that as it may, the Court has to examine as to whether there was a disagreement on the part of the Executive Council on the recommendations made by the Selection Committee, and whether for that purpose, reasons have been recorded? There have been claims and counterclaims regarding the existence of the reasons. We considered it proper to summon the record and examine the same ourselves. Wherever the recommendations have been made for promoting a candidate by the Selection Committee, the same have been accepted by the Executive Council, but in some cases, the Executive Council has disagreed by majority with the finding of the Selection Committee holding the candidates unsuitable for promotion and the reasons have also been recorded.
60. In one case, i.e., of Dr. Shukla, majority of the members of the Executive Council while disagreeing with the Selection Committee have observed that the Selection Committee itself had not been constituted in accordance with the law, as the said candidate belonged to the "Puratatva Rasayan", and no expert in that discipline had been invited. The Selection Committee has in some cases submitted that the candidates have not been recommended due to poor performance in interview. In such matters, undoubtedly, the Executive Council could not record reasons for disagreement on such grounds, for disagreement. But the question does arise as to whether the Selection Committee could reject the candidate only giving this much reason as it may be a conclusion but certainly not the reason. In such a case instead of the Court, the learned Chancellor should consider the issue. Once the reasons have been recorded and disagreement of the Executive Council is there, we are not in a position to hold that the Reference is bad where the Selection Committee has held that the performance was very poor, and thus, candidate is not found suitable or proforma for self assessment was not complete, whether Executive Council can disagree, is to be examined by the learned Chancellor after examining the entire record assessing the merit of each candidate separately.
61. We also find no force in the submission made by Shri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the case of each individual candidate for promotion has not been considered by the Executive Council, as required mandatorily and held by this Court in Sri Niwas and Anr. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors., 1983 RD 45, as we have seen the record and found that case of each individual candidate had been examined and then the reasons for disagreement had been recorded, the issue is preposterous and not tenable in law.
62. It was vehemently been submitted by Shri R.N. Singh, that constitution of an Expert Committee by the learned Chancellor is not permissible in law, and for that purpose, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal, (1990) 2 SCC 746, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court after considering the scope of provisions of Section 31 (8)(a) of the Act, 1973, held as under :--
"We are concerned with the scope of Section 3 1(8)(a) of the Act, which was not considered in that case. Apart from that, Section 31 confers no such right to make representation to the Executive Council or to the Chancellor against the recommendation of the Selection Committee. There is no provision in the section for hearing any candidate or (sic by) the Executive Council. There is also no provision for receiving evidence. The material in respect of every candidate has already been collected and collated by the Selection Committee. Every material is on the record and the Chancellor has no power to take further evidence. The Chancellor is authorised to take a decision and he must take it on the available records."
63. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it is not open for the Chancellor to take into account the additional evidence or material; obviously, it is for the reason that the issue to be examined before the learned Chancellor is as to whether the recommendations made by the Selection Committee finding a candidate suitable or unsuitable is appropriate and in accordance with law? The Selection Committee had made the recommendations on the basis of the material which has been placed before it. Taking into account the additional evidence would definitely not serve the purpose and it would not be possible to see as to whether the assessment made by the Selection Committee has been in a correct perspective, particularly, in a case like instant, where no allegation of mala fide and bias against any member of the Selection Committee had been made. The" purpose of constituting the Expert Committee is only for seeking advice by the learned Chancellor from the Committee of Experts as to whether the recommendations made by the Selection Committee are correct or not. There is a difference in advice and evidence. Both cannot be put on the same footing. This Court has consistently held that "the opinion so obtained by the Chancellor was not an advice, evidential material...... rather tantamount to his counselling some textual authorities on the subjects". Therefore, it is merely a consultation that cannot be termed as additional evidence, and this as technical plea, being a pure academic question, cannot be entertained. The learned Chancellor cannot be supposed to be an expert of every subject. Therefore, it is merely a consultation with the competent personalities on the subject so that he may arrive at a just and proper decision. The duty cast upon the Chancellor cannot be said to be an empty formality, as he has to scrutinise the recommendations made by the Selection Committee on objective considerations, bearing in mind the larger interest of the society. [Vide Shyam Narain v. Chancellor, Sampurnan and Saskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi and Ors., 1983 UPLBEC 107; Ram Yatra Shukla v. Chancellor, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyala, Varanasi and Anr., 1982 UPLBEC 599; Dr. Abdul Quayum Khan v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1994) 1 UPLBEC 402; Ram Niranjan Maurya v. Governor of U.P. (Chancellor, Gorakhpur University), Lucknow and Ors., (1989) 1 UPLBEC 513 and Dr. (Mrs.) Chitra Dar v. Allahabad University, Allahabad and Ors., (2004) 1 ESC 398].
64. It is apparent from the aforesaid judgments that this Court has consistently approved the consultation by the learned Chancellor in such matters. It is not proper to hold such a consultation as an additional evidence. Therefore, the case does not fall within the ambit of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neelima Misra (supra), and we see no cogent ground to disturb the law laid down by this Court since long; nor it is desirable to un-settle the law settled by the various judgments of this Court.
65. The Court would seldom depart from decisions of old standing. A judgment followed for a long period, by Courts, given effect by the administration, should not be departed lightly. Thus, law laid down by catena of decisions of the High Court and prevailing there for long should not be upset by the Court. Where a law laid down by the High Court prevails in the area for long and transactions are completed in accordance with the law so laid down, the Court should not normally interfere with it, unless the decision is manifestly wrong or unfair. Such a decision should not be upset merely because a different view is also possible. [Vide Attorney General of Ontario and Ors. v. Canada Temperance Federation and Ors., AIR 1946 PC 88; Thamma Venkata Subbamma v. Thamma Rattamma and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1775; Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, AIR 1987 SC 1986; Assistant District Registrar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Vikrambhai Retilal Dalai and Ors., 1987 Supp SCC 27; Ajitsinh C. Gaekwad and Ors. v. Dileepsinh D. Gaekwad and Ors., 1987 Supp SCC 439; Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Standard Motor Products and Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 303; Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. M. Gurivi Reddy and Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 72 and Kattite Valappil Pathumma and Ors. v. Taluk Land Board and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1115.
66. In view of the above, we see no ground to hold that the learned Chancellor does not have competence to constitute the Expert Committee for consultation.
67. In sum and substance, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the Executive Council once disagrees with the recommendations made by the Selection Committee and record reasons for the same, the reference to the Chancellor is valid. The candidates once chosen to submit to the Selection Committee and faced interview, by application to the doctrine of acquiescence, it is not permissible for them to contend that in view of the provisions of the Statute of the University, interview was not permissible. Nor it is a case, where it can be held that petitioner is a totally stranger having no locus standi to approach the Court. The learned Chancellor is competent to constitute an Expert Committee and seek its advice, and thus, the process can be termed only as consultation not collecting additional evidence.
68. The petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly, dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. No cost.