JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The petitioner filed a writ petition alleging that pursuant to an advertisement, the petitioner applied and appeared for being considered on the post of assistant teacher. Since the petitioner was found suitable and eligible for the said post, the committee of management resolved to appoint the petitioner as an assistant teacher on a substantive vacancy. The papers with regard to the petitioner's appointment was forwarded to the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, who by its order dated 10.10.1994 accorded the approval. The petitioner alleged that inspite of the approval having been granted by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, the petitioner was not paid the salary. Accordingly, a writ petition was filed seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay the salary. This Court, at the time when the writ petition was entertained, passed an order dated 11.10.1996. which is quoted hereunder :
"Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents.
List this petition for admission on 30.10.96. On that date the learned standing counsel may obtain instructions for filing counter-affidavit as to why the petitioner's salary has not been paid."
2. From the order sheet it transpires that subsequently the petitioner filed an application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India praying that the respondents be punished for contempt of court for not complying with the interim order of the Court dated 11.10.1996, This application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India was eventually rejected by an order dated 27.5.1997. Thereafter, the writ petition was listed on 31.8.1999 and the following order was passed :
"The petitioner shall take steps to serve the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 by registered post within two weeks. The office shall send notices, returnable at an early date."
3. Thereafter, the order sheet indicates that the office made a report on 8.10.1999 stating therein that the petitioner had not complied with the order dated 31.8.1999 and had not taken any steps to serve the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The case was subsequently listed on 5.11.1999, on which date the Court allowed the writ petition. The order of the Court dated 5.11.1999 is quoted hereunder :
"Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the writ petition. Supplementary-affidavit filed today, be kept on the record of the writ petition.
The petitioner seeks issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the opposite parties to pay salary to the petitioner on month to month basis including arrears. The learned counsel has placed reliance on an order passed by Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Ballia, vide order dated 24.8.96 a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-7 in which the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari directed for payment of salary to the petitioner. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that notwithstanding the orders passed by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, the Accounts Officer working in the office of the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Ballia, is sitting tight over the salary bills of the petitioner. The Committee of Management, it is submitted by the learned counsel, has no objection and has in fact, submitted the salary bills of the petitioner. Despite stop order no counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents.
In the above context, the petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to pay salary including arrears of the petitioner. The arrears of salary upto date may be paid within three months and thereafter, salary shall be paid regularly on month to month basis as and when it falls due and bill is submitted by the Committee of Management."
4. This Court while allowing the writ petition directed the respondents to pay the salary including the arrears within three months and also continue to pay the salary month by month.
5. Subsequently, a Recall Application No. 81523 of 2000, dated 11.10.2000 was filed on behalf of Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Ballia, the respondent No. 2, for recalling the order dated 5.11.99 on the ground that no selection or appointment of the petitioner was ever made nor did the manager ever send the papers of his appointment for approval, nor did the Basic Shiksha Adhikari ever granted any approval on 10.10.1994. In the recall application it was also stated that a number of assistant teachers and non-teaching staff were working beyond the sanctioned post and therefore, there was no question of appointing the petitioner, as there was no vacancy. The respondent further stated that no copy of the writ petition was made available and that the respondent had no knowledge about the pendency of the writ petition and, therefore, no counter-affidavit could be filed. The respondents therefore prayed that the order dated 5.11.1999, be recalled and the matter be heard on merits.
6. This application was rejected for want of prosecution by an order dated 19.7.2002, which is quoted hereunder :
"None appears to press the application. The application for recall/review is accordingly dismissed for want of prosecution."
7. The respondents, subsequently, filed Civil Misc. Recall Application No. 144060 of 2002 for recall of the order dated 19.7.2002, stating therein that the file of the standing counsel was not available at the time when the case was called out and therefore, the standing counsel was not aware as to whether the recall application was filed on behalf of the State or was filed on behalf of the petitioner and therefore allowed the recall application to be dismissed for want of prosecution. This recall application was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that the same had been filed beyond 30 days and the recall application was not accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Upon this objection being taken the respondents filed Civil Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. 97618 of 2004 dated 25.6.2004, for condoning the delay in moving the application.
8. While hearing the Recall Application No. 81523 of 2000, the Court found that the affidavit accompanying the said application was defective and therefore, by an order dated 19.7.2004, directed the respondents to file a fresh affidavit. The respondents thereafter, filed a fresh recall application, which was numbered as Recall Application No. 121856 of 2004 dated 21.7.2004.
9. Heard Sri V.K. Rai, the learned standing counsel and Sri S.K. Garg, the additional chief standing counsel appearing for the respondents and Sri Sudhakar Pandey, the learned counsel for the petitioner.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly opposed the recall application and submitted that the same was not maintainable. He further submitted that the recall application had been filed under Section 151, C.P.C. which cannot be done and that a review application could only be filed under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further submitted that in the event the application is treated to be one under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C., the said application having been dismissed for want of prosecution, the subsequent application for recall was not maintainable in view of Order XLVll, Rule 9, C.P.C. and, therefore, submitted that the recall applications are not maintainable and therefore all the applications should be rejected in limine. The learned counsel further submitted that the recall application was filed after a considerable period and the delay in filing the application has not been explained nor an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been filed to condone the delay.
11. Admittedly, the application for recall of the judgment dated 5.11.1999, has been filed under Section 151, C.P.C. and has not been filed under Order XLVll, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of Section 141, C.P.C, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to the proceedings in a writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is therefore, immaterial as to whether the application is one under Section 151 or under Order XLVII, C.P.C. It is settled law that even though the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to writ proceedings, the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure applies in a writ jurisdiction. Under the Rules of the Court, 1952, an application for review can be filed under Chapter V, Rule XII. Therefore, the contents of the application and its prayer is to be seen rather than seeing its format.
12. In Shivdeo Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1909, the Supreme Court held :
"It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Here the previous order of Khosla, J., affected the interests of persons who were not made parties to the proceeding before him. It was at their instance and for giving them a hearing that Khosla, J., enterained the second petition. In doing so, he merely did what the principles of natural justice required him to do. It is said that the respondents before us had no right to apply for review because they were not parties to the previous proceedings. As we have already pointed out, it is precisely because they were not made parties to the previous proceedings, though their interests were sought to be affected by the decision of the High Court, that the second application was entertained by Khosla, J."
13. The aforesaid view of the Supreme Court was again reiterated in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma and Ors., 1979 SC 1047, in which it was held :
"There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary Jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made ; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found ; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
14. In Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India and Ors.. AIR 1992 SC 248, the Supreme Court held as follows :
"The scope of the review in the present case is to ensure that no miscarriage of justice occurs in a matter of such great moment. This is, perhaps, the last opportunity to verify our doubts and to undo injustice, if any, which may have occurred. The fate and fortunes of tens of thousands of persons depend on the effectiveness and fairness of these proceedings. The legal and procedural technicalities should yield to the paramount considerations of justice and fairness. The considerations go beyond legalism and are largely humanitarian. It is of utmost importance that great issues of human suffering are not subordinated to legal technicalities."
15. From the aforesaid, it is clear that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has the inherent powers to review its orders in order to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. The power of review could also be exercised where some mistake or an error apparent on the face of record was found.
16. Even though, the Civil Procedure Code envisages a provision for a review under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. the Court can exercise such powers by necessary implication, even under Section 151, C.P.C. in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned. Section 151, C.P.C. does not confer any powers but only indicates that there is a power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. Sometimes, the facts and circumstances of the case requires the Court to act "exdebito justitios" and to do that real and substantial justice, and pass such orders under the inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C.
17. The respondents in their recall application have stated that a number of assistant teachers were working beyond the sanctioned strength and, therefore, no occasion arose for appointing the petitioner on the post of an assistant teacher. The fact of having a number of teachers beyond the sanctioned post has not been seriously disputed by the petitioner. Further, this fact can only be clarified by the committee of management. The respondents have further stated that no order of approval was ever granted on 10.10.94. This requires investigation and therefore, an opportunity is required to be given to the respondents to file their counter-affidavit.
18. The order dated 5.11.99 states that inspite of a stop order no counter-affidavit has been filed. The said order further indicates that the committee of management has no objection to the payment of salary and in fact has submitted the salary bills of the petitioner. This fact has been recorded on the basis of the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Further, from a perusal of the order sheet it is clear that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were only granted time on one occasion to file a counter-affidavit by an order dated 11.10.1996 and thereafter, no further time was granted. The opposite parties in their application for recall have clearly stated that they were not aware of the filing of the writ petition. The order sheet does not record any order stating that a stop order was being passed allowing the respondents to file a counter-affidavit. In fact, the order sheet states that on 31.8.1999, the petitioner was directed to take fresh steps to serve respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The report of the registry dated 8.10.99 on the order sheet indicates that the petitioner did not take any steps to serve respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The petitioner filed a supplementary-affidavit dated 5.11.99 indicating that he had taken steps to serve respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The supplementary-affidavit dated 15.9.99, indicates that the petitioner in compliance of the order dated 31.8.1999, had taken steps to serve the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 by registered post on 10.9.99. In my view, the supplementary-affidavit does not indicate that the service had been made upon respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Further, the petitioner was directed to serve respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 by registered post through the office of the High Court, which had not been done. The petitioner on its own has tried to serve the respondents by registered post outside the Court. In my view, the petitioner had not complied with the orders of the Court dated 31.8.99.
19. Further. I find that the learned counsel for the petitioner could not make a statement to the effect that the committee of management had no objection to the payment of salary to the petitioner, especially in the absence of any service being made upon the committee of management and in the absence of any counter-affidavit being filed on their behalf. Consequently, the order of this Court dated 5.11.99, proceeded on the erroneous assumption, namely, that in terms of the order of the Court dated 31.8.99, the respondents had been served and that inspite of a stop order no counter-affidavit had been filed by the respondents when in fact, there was no such stop order.
20. In my view, this order proceeded on the erroneous assumption, which led to the passing of the order dated 5.11.99. This Court has been conferred with the inherent powers by virtue of its duty to do Justice between the parties. One of the first and main duties of the Court is to ensure that the act of the Court does not cause injustice to any of the parties. If an injustice has been caused by the Court, the aggrieved party can invoke the plenary powers of the Court and can also invoke the provisions of Section 151, C.P.C. The Latin maxim "actius curiae nemint gravabit" namely, that the error of the Court will cause no harm to a litigant fully applies in the instant case.
21. In my view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the application for recall of the order is maintainable and is liable to be allowed. Accordingly, the delay in filing the application for recall of the order dated 19.7.2002, has been explained. The Application No. 97618 of 2004 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed and the Recall Application No. 144060 of 2002 is treated within time. Since, the order dated 19.7.2002 was passed dismissing the application for want of prosecution and the respondents have shown sufficient cause, the Recall Application No. 144060 of 2002 is allowed and the order dated 19.7.2002 is recalled.
22. In view of the aforesaid, sufficient cause has been shown and, in my view, the respondents have made out a case for recall of the order dated 5.11.1999. Accordingly, the Recall Application No. 81523 of 2000 alongwith the Application No. 121856 of 2004 are allowed and the order dated 5.11.99 is recalled. The writ petition is restored to its original number. From the record, I find that the respondent No. 2 had filed the counter-affidavit on 6.12.2001. The petitioner may file a rejoinder-affidavit within three weeks. The petitioner is also directed to take fresh steps to serve the respondent No. 3 by registered post within ten days. The office will fix 29.10.2004 for admission.