JUDGMENT Pankaj Mithal, J.
1. The petitioner was appointed on the post of Lekhpal on 14.5.1970 and was confirmed vide order dated 8.2.1980 w.e.f. 28.11.1976. The petitioner in the year 1985 was charged under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 161 I.P.C. and a criminal case was registered against him as Special Trial No. 1/1986. On account of the above criminal charge, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 19.9.1985. The petitioner was convicted in the Trial vide judgment and order dated 21.1.1989 and was awarded punishment of two years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 161 I.P.C. and imprisonment of one year under Section 162 I.P.C. The petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 1989 in the High Court against his conviction. During the pendency of the Criminal Appeal in the High Court, the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 3.12.1993 solely on the ground of his conviction without holding any disciplinary enquiry regarding his conduct whatsoever. Finally, petitioner's criminal appeal was allowed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 23.4.2003 and his conviction was set aside. On his acquittal from the criminal case, the petitioner vide application dated 19.5.2003 applied for his reinstatement in service. This application was rejected by the Appointing Authority vide order dated 3.6.2003. Thus, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the order dated 3.6.2003 by which his application for his reinstatement has been rejected and also the order of his dismissal from service dated 3.12.2003. The petitioner has further prayed that he may be directed to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits.
2. Shri Vikas Budhwar, learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the petitioner was dismissed from service only on account of his conviction in the criminal case, therefore, he is entitle for reinstatement on his acquittal by the High Court. Therefore, the respondent No. 3 has committed manifest error of law in rejecting his application for reinstatement. The order rejecting his application for reinstatement is unreasoned and is non-speaking in nature and, therefore, also stands vitiated under law. He has further submitted that the dismissal of the petitioner from service vide order dated 3.12.1993 was also illegal as no disciplinary enquiry was conducted against him before passing the same even though the disciplinary enquiry does not stand excluded where the dismissal is based merely on conviction recorded by the Criminal Court. In support of his above arguments, he has placed reliance upon the two decisions of this Court State of U.P. through Director N.C.C. v. Shri Sadanand Mishra and Anr. 1984 (2) LCD 294 and Constable Firoj Khan v. Inspector General of Police, Bareilly and Ors. 2000 (4) ESC 2475 (Alld.) On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel has contended that the petitioner was dismissed from service on 3.12.1993 and, therefore, he cannot challenge the said order by filing writ petition in the year 2003 at such a belated stage. The petitioner cannot get limitation to challenge the said order merely on the basis of the subsequent order dated 3.6.2003 by which his application for reinstatement has been rejected. The petitioner's application for reinstatement has rightly been rejected as the order dismissing him from service was final and has not been set aside or cancelled by any competent Court or authority.
3. As far as the preliminary objection that the petition is barred by laches and the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the order of dismissal dated 3.12.1993 by filing a writ petition in the year 2003. I am of the opinion that the aforesaid preliminary objection is totally devoid of merits and is not tenable under law. The right to claim reinstatement in service had accrued to the petitioner for the first time when his criminal appeal was allowed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 23.4.2003 and the order of his conviction was set aside. The petitioner had immediately applied for his reinstatement vide application dated 19.5.2003 as soon as the cause of his dismissal from service stood vanished. Thus, there is no delay, negligence or laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Hon'ble Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
4. Now the core issue involved herein is as to whether a delinquent employee who has been dismissed from service without facing any disciplinary inquiry only on the ground of conviction recorded against him by the criminal Court is entitled to automatic reinstatement when the conviction is set aside in appeal or otherwise.
5. Article 311 of the Constitution of India provides that no person in civil service of the Union or State shall be dismissed or removed from service by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority and further no such person be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without holding an enquiry and affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard. However, proviso to Article 311(2).provides that no opportunity of hearing as required under Article 311(2) shall be necessary where a person is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge or where the authority is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not practicable to hold an inquiry or where the President or the Governor is satisfied in the interest of security of the State it is not expedient to hold such an inquiry.
6. Article 311 of the Constitution of India reads as under:
Dismissal, removal or deduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.- (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges [* * *] Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply-
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in Clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.
7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Captain P. Paul Anthoney v. Bharat Gold Mines and Anr. has held that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. The basis of this proposition is that the proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. In the departmental proceedings, where the charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent employee. The standard of proof required in departmental proceedings is also different then required in a criminal case. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence and the proceedings are virtually common without there being any variance.
8. Admittedly, in the present case the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner is not based on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. The order of dismissal has been passed against him on the sole ground that he has been convicted in special trial under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with 161/162 I.P.C. The Allahabad High Court in the case of State of U.P., through Director, N.C.C. v. Shri Sadanand Mishra and Anr. 1984 (2) LCD 294 has held that inquiry under proviso (a) of Article 311(2) may not be held when the order of removal from service is passed on the ground which has led to the conviction of an employee on a criminal charge but it does not provide for dispensing with an inquiry where the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is based on the conviction recorded by the criminal Court. Thus, there was no bar under the law in the present set of circumstances to hold a disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner. However, no disciplinary inquiry was held against the petitioner before dismissing him from service, even though it has not been provided to be dispensed with.
9. In the similar facts and circumstances when in the case of Constable Firoj Khan v. Inspector General of Police, Barreilly and Ors. 2000 (4) ESC 2475 (Alld.) the Hon'ble High Court placing reliance upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dost Mohammad v. Union of India 1980 ACJ 270 set a side the order of dismissal of a constable of U.P. Police, who was dismissed from service without holding any disciplinary inquiry on a solitary ground of being convicted in a criminal case. The High Court had set aside the order of dismissal as it was passed without holding any disciplinary inquiry and without application of mind objectively in as much as under proviso (a) to Article 311(2) disciplinary inquiry was not required to be dispensed with where the order of dismissal was based on conviction recorded by the criminal Court.
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (P.J.) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. relying upon its earlier decision in the case of Hari Pada Khan v. Union of India observed that where the prosecution has resulted in the acquittal of the employee who was dismissed from service subject to the result of the criminal case, was entitled to be reinstated.
11. The facts of the present case are still better as here the petitioner was dismissed from service without any disciplinary inquiry on the ground of his conviction in a criminal case, which judgment and order on appeal has admittedly been set aside and the petitioner has been exonerated from all the criminal charges. Therefore, as the order of conviction passed against the petitioner in a criminal case has disappeared altogether, the entire basis of dismissing the petitioner from service also stood vanished. Thus, logically the petitioner has become entitle to be reinstated.
12. However, the reinstatement of the petitioner on acquittal in criminal case is not automatic. It is open for the competent authority to direct an inquiry or to hold a disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner before his reinstatement as has been observed in the case of Dhananjay v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad Jalna . The Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision in Union of India v. Bhihari Lal wherein it was held as under:
5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.... Mere acquittal of government employee does not automatically entitle the government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available....
13. A similar view has also been expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajit Kumar Nag (Supra) and it has been held that acquittal in criminal case does not preclude the employer from taking action if it is otherwise permissible. The observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the above effect is quoted below:
As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of a criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. Therefore the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside, cannot be upheld.
14. Therefore, in view of the above discussion petitioner has made out a case for reinstatement as his services were terminated without holding any disciplinary inquiry against him solely on the ground of his conviction in a criminal case which has ultimately resulted in the acquittal of the petitioner in appeal. However, the reinstatement of the petitioner is not automatic and can only be made subject to the relevant Rules and Regulations applicable at the judicial discretion of the appointing authority. The appointing authority in considering reinstatement has to consider many relevant factors and may or may not consider it proper to reinstate such an employee to maintain the discipline of the department considering his level of misconduct and integrity or may even pass an order of reinstatement, if any, without extending the benefit of back wages etc. depending on various other factors.
15. In view of the above there is no doubt that once the delinquent employee is acquitted in the criminal case and his conviction has been set aside which has led to his dismissal from service, he is entitled for reinstatement but the reinstatement is not ipso facto or automatic. It would depend upon a large number of factors and would be subject to the discretion of the appointing/disciplinary authority.
16. The appointing authority has rejected the petitioner's application for reinstatement vide order dated 3.6.2003 without recording any reasons whatsoever which shows total non-application of mind with regard, to the relevant factors necessary for reinstatement such as the level of integrity of the petitioner and the requirement of enforcement of discipline in the department etc. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Mukharjee v. Union of India has held that administrative authorities must record reasons unless specifically dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, in support of its decision in as much as recording of reasons in support of the decision is one of the limbs of the principles of natural justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court therein observed as under:
35. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the order considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisions-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.
38. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action." As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view that expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement....
39. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.
17. The impugned order dated 3.6.2003 is totally uninformed of reasons and is a non-speaking nature. It is therefore, unsustainable under law and is liable to be quashed.
18. In view of the above discussion, the impugned order dated 3.6.2003 passed by Additional District Magistrate (Administration) Firozabad rejecting petitioner's application for reinstatement is hereby quashed and the matter is relegated to him for decision afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above.
19. The writ petition is accordingly, allowed in part with no order as to costs.