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Praveshbhai Rasiklal Shahs vs State Of Gujarat Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & 1

High Court Of Gujarat|01 August, 2012
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JUDGMENT / ORDER

Heard Ms. Ajmera, learned advocate for the petitioner, and Mr. Shah, learned AGP, for the respondent authority. Rule.
Mr. Shah, learned AGP, waives service of notice of rule for the respondent – State.
2. The petitioner has taken out present petition seeking below mentioned relief:-
“7(a) Direct the respondent authorities to comply with the directions issued by this Hon'ble Court and thereby decide the said application on merits without rejecting the same on technical ground of delay.
(b) issue writ of certiorari and / or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the order dated 10/09/2007 passed by the Respondent No.2 in respect of instrument registration No.3787 dated 16/11/1998.”
2.1 During hearing on 23.7.2012, at the request of learned advocate for the petitioner, permission to amend the petition was granted. Accordingly, the petition has been amended and para-7(aa) and (ab) have been added in the prayer clause, which read thus:-
“(aa) Your lordships be pleased to issue writ or direction to quash and set aside order dtd 31/3/2011 and condone the delay and remand the matter to be decided on merits.
(ab) Your lordships be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction to quash and set aside order dtd 31/3/2011 passed by Respondent No.1.”
3. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 31.3.2011 passed by the competent authority under Section 53 of the Bombay Stamp Act whereby the authority has declined to entertain the appeal on the ground that the appeal has been filed after expiry of prescribed period of limitation.
4. The facts involved in and leading to submission of present petition are as follows:-
4.1 The petitioner purchased certain property for which a sale deed came to be executed. The said deed was subsequently presented for registration on 16.11.1998. The said sale deed came to be registered vide Registration No.3787 on 16.11.1998. At the relevant time, the petitioner paid stamp duty on the basis of the valuation mentioned in the document. Subsequently, the said document was taken under scrutiny. Upon proper scrutiny and valuation, the competent authority came to the conclusion that the market value of the property would be to the tune of Rs.5,48,400/-.
In that view of the matter, the petitioner was directed to pay deficient stamp duty of Rs.59,990/-. The petitioner was also directed to pay fine/penalty in the sum of Rs.250/-. The order to the said effect came to be passed by the competent authority on 10.9.2007.
The petitioner did not take any action pursuant to or in compliance of the order dated 10.9.2007 for long time.
Subsequently, present petitioner preferred writ petition being Special Civil Application No.6272 of 2010.
The said petition was also preferred after delay of almost 3 years.
The said petition came to be disposed of by the Court by relegating the petitioner to the revisional / appellate authority under Section 53 of the Act with clarification that the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act may consider petitioner's application in accordance with law.
Thereafter, present petitioner filed application/appeal under Section 53 before the competent authority. The appellate authority considered the said application/appeal and found that the appeal was filed after expiry of prescribed period of limitation. Therefore, vide impugned order dated 31.3.2011, the competent authority refused to entertain the said application/appeal on the ground that it is time barred. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has preferred present petition.
5. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is contrary to provisions contained under Section 53 of the Act, beside being in violation of principle of natural justice. He submitted that the competent authority passed impugned order dated 10.9.2007 without any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Learned advocate for the petitioner also submitted that the said order dated 10.9.2007 was challenged by the petitioner by way of Special Civil Application No.6272 of 2010 wherein by order dated 14.6.2010 this Court disposed of the petition with liberty to the petitioner to file application before the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act, however, the said application/appeal is not entertained on the ground of delay i.e. it was preferred after expiry of period of limitation. The decision does not take into account that the first adjudicating authority's order was neither known to nor served to the petitioner.
5.1 Per contra, learned AGP for the respondent authority submitted that the order made by the respondent is in accordance with the provision contained under the Act.
5.2 He also submitted that the order was passed on 14.6.2010 and therefore, the petitioner ought to prefer application/appeal under Section 53 of the Act within the prescribed time limit (i.e. 90 days) and that therefore, the competent authority under Section Section 53 of the Act, in absence of any power to condone delay, could not accept and entertain the application.
5.3 He also submitted that despite the fact that the order dated 14.6.2010 was passed, the petitioner did not pay the amount of deficient stamp duty and therefore, the authority has been compelled to initiate recovery proceedings by issuing Notice.
5.4 Learned AGP in light of the facts of the case and the provision under Section 53 of the Act submitted that the petition may not be entertained as there is not illegality or any error in the order dated 10.9.2010.
6. So as to consider the rival submissions, it is necessary to take into account the provision contained under Section 53 which reads thus:
“53. Control of and statement of case to Chief Controlling Revenue Authority:
(1) The powers exercisable by a Collector under Chapter III except sub section (3) of section 32A Chapter IV and Chapter V and under clause (a) of the first proviso to section 27 shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority.
Provided that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority shall not entertain an application made by a person under sub-section (1) unless
(a) such application is presented within a period of ninety days from the date of order of the Collector.
(b) such person deposits twenty-five per cent of the amount of duty or as the case may be, amount of difference of duty payable by him in respect of subject matter of the instrument for which application has been made.”
6.1 A glance at the said provision would show that power to condone delay in preferring the application/appeal under the said provision is not conferred on the concerned authority.
7. Consequently, the authority, according to Section 53, does not have any power to condone delay and that, therefore, if the application is preferred after expiry of 90 days, then such application cannot be accepted and entertained by the concerned authority.
8. Under the circumstances, any fault cannot be found with the decision of the concerned authority whereby, the authority has declined to entertain the application sought to be tendered by present petitioner.
However, such restriction or inability cannot hold back the Court from exercising discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8.1 In this background, the question, which arises, is as to whether the party aggrieved by the first authority's order should be deprived of the remedy available under Section 53 and the opportunity of hearing on the ground that he could not file the application within the prescribed period of limitation, i.e. within 90 days.
9. A 'Court' can pass necessary and appropriate order for ensuring that complete justice is done and/or to ensure that a person is not deprived of right of hearing, if it is established that:-
(a) the delay is not caused on account of sheer negligence on part of the applicant-petitioner or plaintiff; (b) conjointly it is also established that the applicant or petitioner or plaintiff has shown due diligence to prosecute available remedy without being indolent or negligent; (c) if the applicant or petitioner or plaintiff can establish and satisfy the Court that he could not prosecute the remedy within the prescribed time limit due to circumstances beyond his control and there is satisfactory explanation and sufficient cause to condone delay; (d) it is also shown to the prima- facie satisfaction of the Court that the applicant or petitioner or plaintiff has reasonably good case and possibility of success, (e) the length of delay or conduct of the applicant do not amount to waiver of the right; (f) the applicant can establish substantial compliance of pre-condition and thereby the applicant could establish that he has not been negligent or indolent, then a “Court”, in exercise of power under Section 5 of Limitation Act and in accordance with said provision or in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court can condone the delay and direct the authority to consider the application under Section 53 on merits.
9.1 The above mentioned instances are illustrative and not exhaustive. There could be other germane, compelling, just and equitable reasons and justification to condone delay, for which any straight jacket formula cannot be laid down and it will mostly depend on length of delay and the steps taken by the applicant in the meanwhile i.e. applicant's conduct in the interregnum, the bonafides of the applicant i.e. the intention is not to frustrate the opponent or to merely delay the proceedings in given set of facts and circumstances.
10. Now, therefore, the question which arises in present petition is as to whether the petitioner should be deprived of opportunity of hearing before the Competent Authority.
11. However, before touching the said issue in present case it is also necessary to note that the learned advocate for the petitioner has claimed that the application under Section 53 of the Act cannot be said to be delayed since the petitioner had challenged the order dated 10.9.2007 before this Hon'ble Court in Special Civil Application No. 6272 of 2010 and the said writ petition was decided on 14.6.2010 and thereafter the application/appeal was preferred under Section 53 of the Act and therefore, there is no delay and if there is any delay, the same ought to have been condoned since the delay was caused mainly because of the fact that the petition was pending before this Hon'ble Court. It is urged that while considering the relief prayed for by the petitioner in present case the above mentioned details is also required to be kept in focus.
11.1 However, it is also necessary to recall that the petition was filed after about 3 years. The said delay is relevant.
11.2 On this count, the petitioner would claim that the delay occurred since the order was not served.
12. In this background, the issue as to whether the petitioner should be deprived of the opportunity of hearing has to be considered. It is appropriate to note that if the petitioner's request is granted then any right of the opponent will not be irreversibly and adversely affected.
12.1 Ordinarily, it is considered preferable to decide an application or case on merits rather than rejecting it on ground of delay unless it is shown that the delay was intentional and/or the delay occurred on account of negligence on part of the applicant/plaintiff/appellant or in the interregnum any other or further equities (including third party rights) are created and/or any right accrued in favour of the opponent would be adversely affected if delay is condoned.
13. The petitioner has claimed that it has reasonably good case on merits and has also good chance for succeeding before the Competent Authority.
14. It is true that the right of appeal is not an absolute right nor essential part or component or ingredient of natural justice, compliance of which must be ensured even by quasi judicial authority. However, as mentioned above, there may be cases and circumstances in which the aggrieved party may not be in position to challenge the order of adjudicating authority within the prescribed period of limitation due to compelling reasons or circumstances beyond control of the aggrieved party.
15. In facts and circumstances of present case, it cannot be said that any loss or damage will be caused to the respondent State if the competent authority is directed to hear and decide the application under Section 53 of the Act on its own merits and in accordance with relevant and applicable provisions as well as settled legal position more particularly when the petitioner has, in response to the Court's query, declared his readiness to deposit 100% amount (as determined vide order dated 10.9.2007). In such circumstances, there is no strong and justifiable reason to deny opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
16. It is equitable to decide the matter on merits instead of defeating a meritorious mater on ground of delay, unless any accrued right of the respondent is likely to be defeated by condonation of delay or unless any circumstances, few are mentioned above, which would persuade and convince the Court to not to condone delay emerge from the record or are shown to the Court. That is not the position in present case.
17. However, such order ought not be passed without imposing appropriate condition on the petitioner and/or without compensating, wherever required or justified, the other side.
18. Therefore, it was inquired from the petitioner as to whether the petitioner would deposit further amount of deficient stamp duty determined by the competent authority, as condition for condoning delay and for opportunity of hearing under Section 53 of the Act on merits.
18.1 In response, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner would deposit 100% amount as determined by order dated 10.9.2007.
Obligation on the part of the Court is to balance equity and that therefore appropriate directions have to be passed so as to secure payment of deficient stamp duty in the event petitioner fails in application under Section 53 of the Act before the competent authority.
19. In facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that the petitioner has agreed to deposit 100% amount as determined by the order dated 10.9.2007, the Court is inclined to accept the said request of the petitioner in exercise of equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that therefore below mentioned order is passed:
(a) the delay caused in filing the application under Section 53 of the Act is condoned on the condition that the petitioner shall, on or before 24.8.2012, deposit before the authority specified under Section 53 of the Act i.e. 100% amount (as determined by order dated 10.9.2007) in cash or by demand draft by Nationalized Bank.
(b) such deposit shall be without prejudice to the contentions of both sides.
(c) if the requisite amount, as aforesaid, is deposited by the petitioner within above-mentioned time limit, then the delay shall be deemed to have been condoned and the authority will, thereafter, accept, entertain and decide the application under Section 53 of the Act on merits.
(d) the application under Section 53 of the Act shall be considered and decided on its own merits by the competent authority, after hearing the petitioner. Thus, on such deposit, the concerned authority shall independently consider the application on its own merits and on the basis of material available on record before it and shall come to its own independent conclusion on merits of the case in light of the relevant and applicable provisions and pass appropriate order, as may be required by law, on merits.
(e) in view of the foregoing discussion and reason, the impugned orders dated 31.3.2011 passed by respondent No.2 is, only for the limited purpose i.e. for remanding the case to the competent authority, set aside and the matter is remitted to the competent authority for decision on merits, provided the condition of pre- deposit is complied. The case is returned to the authority under Section 53 of the Act. The said authority shall, after hearing the petitioner, pass appropriate order on merits.
(f) for the said purpose, the competent authority shall inform the petitioner the date and time of hearing.
(g) the petitioner shall accordingly remain present and shall not make request for adjournment.
(h) if the petitioner remains absent, then it will be open to the authority to proceed ex-parte and decide the application under Section 53 of the Act on merits on the basis of material available on record and to pass appropriate reasoned and speaking order.
(i) the amount deposited by the petitioner shall be subject to the order that may be passed by the competent authority.
(j) the competent authority will accept/receive and entertain the application under Section 53 of the Act if the requisite amount, as aforesaid, is deposited within the time limit mentioned above. If the amount is not so deposited, then application under Section 53 of the Act will not be entertained.
(k) all contentions available to the petitioner and the Department are kept open.
(l) the competent authority shall decide the application under Section 53 of the Act independently and on its own merits without being influenced by any order or observations.
(m) the petitioner shall place on record the receipt acknowledging the payment/deposit of the amount in question.
20. It is, again, clarified that the delay caused in preferring the application under Section 53 of the Act shall stand condoned if and after the amount, as aforesaid, is deposited.
21. The Competent Authority will pass appropriate order on merits and strictly in accordance with law and in light of the provisions under the Act and the Rules as expeditiously as possible and preferably within 12 weeks from the date on which the amount is deposited.
22. If the petitioner fails to deposit the amount within the time limit prescribed above, present order will not take effect.
With the aforesaid clarifications and directions, present petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. The petition accordingly stands disposed of.
kdc (K.M.Thaker, J.)
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Title

Praveshbhai Rasiklal Shahs vs State Of Gujarat Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & 1

Court

High Court Of Gujarat

JudgmentDate
01 August, 2012
Judges
  • K M Thaker
Advocates
  • Ms Amrita Ajmera