JUDGMENT Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. Heard Sri A. K. Mishra, counsel for the petitioner, Sri Anurag Khanna, appearing for respondent No. 3 and learned standing counsel. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to arrest the petitioner in pursuance of the recovery proceedings initiated against him by Citation No. 072219 dated 30th October, 2002.
2. The facts giving rise to this writ petition briefly stated are :
"Petitioner is one of the Directors of a Private Limited Company, namely, Allahabad Fertiliser Sales Private Limited. A loan of Rs. 73,00,000 was taken from the respondent No. 3 by the aforesaid company. The company failed to repay the loan as a consequence of which proceedings for recovery was initiated against the Directors. A citation dated 14th October, 1997 for an amount of Rs. 1,46,40,165.98 was issued against which Writ Petition No. 42659 of 1997, was filed. The writ petition was finally decided on 24th April, 1998, by which Directors were permitted to sell of its company and its assets. However, the Directors were unable to sell the company and repay the loan. Another citation dated 19.7.1999, for an amount of Rs. 1,87,32,191.30 was issued in pursuance of which petitioner was arrested by the revenue authority on 10th August, 1999 and was detained in custody till 25th October, 1999. Another citation dated 13.6.2001 was issued for an amount of Rs. 4,29,09,935.31. Petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 22948 of 2001 against the citation dated 13.6,2001 in which an interim order was passed by this Court on 20th June, 2001, staying the arrest of the petitioner till 10th September, 2001. It has been stated in paragraph 12 of the writ petition that although the aforesaid writ petition is still pending but the same has become infructuous as a fresh citation has been issued by the respondent on 30th October, 2002 being citation No. 072219 for an amount of Rs. 4,29,09,935.31. The said citation dated 30th October, 2002, has been challenged by the petitioner by means of this writ petition."
3. Sri A. K. Mishra, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner having been already detained in civil prison from 10.8.1999 to 25.10.1999, he cannot be again arrested on the basis of citation dated 30.10.2002. The counsel for the petitioner contended that maximum period prescribed under Section 281 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, is fifteen days, hence detention beyond the aforesaid 15 days is not permissible. In support of his submission, Mishra placed reliance on Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sangam Lal Gupta v. Sales Tax Officer and Ors., 1969 ALJ 257 and Rasul Bux v. State of U, P. and Ors., 1977 AWC 711, Sri Mishra has also placed reliance on Apex Court judgment in Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union, AIR 1953 SC 95. Sri Anurag Khanna appearing for the respondent No. 3 refuting the submission of counsel for the petitioner, contended that the maximum period of detention prescribed under Section 281 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is not applicable when the arrest is for different arrears. The contention is that if the arrears sought to be recovered are different, there is no prohibition in again detaining the petitioner for realisation of different arrears. He submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in Sangam Lal Gupta's case (supra) has laid down the aforesaid proposition when the recovery is for the same arrears. Sri Khanna submitted that the petitioner was arrested on 10th August, 1999 and detained till 25th October, 1999, in pursuance of the citation dated 19.7.1999 for an amount of Rs. 1,87,32,191.30 whereas the citation which has been challenged in the present writ petition is dated 30th October. 2002 and is for an amount of Rs. 4,29,09,935.31 plus collection charges. The submission is that since the citation now challenged in the present writ petition is for different amount, there is no prohibition in detaining the petitioner under Section 281.
4. We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. From the facts brought on the record, it is clear that the petitioner was earlier detained in civil prison from 10.8.1999 to 25.10.1999, for recovery of an amount of Rs. 1,87,32,191,00 in pursuance of the citation dated 19.7.3999. By the present writ petition, petitioner is challenging the recovery proceedings for realisation of an amount of Rs. 4,29,09,935.00 plus collection charges for which citation has been issued on 30th October. 2002. Thus, it is clear that the earlier citation dated 19th July, 1999, was for different arrears and the citation which has now been issued is for a very huge amount of Rs. 4,29,09.935.00. The Division Bench's judgment cited by the counsel for the petitioner in Sangam Lal Gupta v. Sales Tax Officer and Ors.' case (supra) was pertaining to realisation of arrears of sales tax. The Division Bench in the aforesaid case had laid down that if a person has been detained in custody for maximum period of fifteen days, he cannot be arrested and detained again in recovery proceedings relating to the same arrears of land revenue. Following was held in the aforesaid case :
"But, in our opinion, the total period for which he may be detained in custody in respect of the same arrear cannot exceed fifteen days. Section 148 declares that a defaulter may be detained in custody for fifteen days unless the arrear and the costs of arrest and detention, are paid before the expiry of that period. There is nothing in the provision from which we can infer that the defaulter may be detained in custody for repeated periods of fifteen days until the arrear is paid up. If that inference was possible, we would have to hold that the detaining authority is entitled, so long as it believes that the process of detention would result in the payment of the arrear, to detain the defaulter in custody almost indefinitely provided the successive periods of detention did not exceed fifteen days at a time. A construction such as this would result in serious encroachment upon the liberty of the citizen and we are not prepared to accept that so unlimited an arbitrary power was intended to be conferred upon the detaining authority, specially when the power to detain has been conferred under Rule 47, even upon a Tahsildar and when the only reason for detention is the possibility of the payment of an arrear of land revenue. In our judgment, the period of fifteen days prescribed by Section 148 is the maximum period for which a defaulter may be detained in custody in respect of any arrear. If he has been detained in custody for that period he cannot be arrested and detained again in a recovery proceeding relating to the same arrear of land revenue."
5. In the above, case, it has been clearly laid down that a person cannot be arrested and detained again in recovery proceedings relating to same arrear. The observation of the Division Bench, underlined by us, clearly shows that aforesaid proposition was laid down when the subsequent recovery is for the same arrear. The natural corollary of the provision would be that if the arrears are different, the prohibition from detention will not apply. Thus, the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench is clearly distinguishable and not applicable in the facts of the present case since in the present case the subsequent recovery which is impugned in the present writ petition, is for different arrears.
6. The next Division Bench's judgment in Rasul Blue's case (supra) relied by the counsel for the petitioner follows the Division Bench's judgment of this Court in Sangam Lal Gupta v. Sales Tax Officer and Ors.' case (supra). However, paragraph 2 of the aforesaid judgment also lays down the same proposition. The prohibition is of arrest for recovery of same amount. Paragraph 2 of the Division Bench lays down :
"...................... The only bar is that if the petitioner has already been under arrest for 15 days, he cannot be arrested again for the recovery of the same amount."
7. In view of the aforesaid, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Sangam Lal Gupta v. Sales Tax Officer and Ors.' case (supra) and Rasul BUX'S case (supra) are not applicable in the facts of the present case.
8. The view which we are taking in the present case is further reinforced from provisions of Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904. Section 14 provides that where by any U. P. Act any power is conferred, then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Section 14-of the U. P. General Clauses Act is quoted below :
"14. Powers conferred on the State Government to be exercisable from time to time.--Where, by any (Uttar Pradesh) Act, any power is conferred (xxx), then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires."
9. The power given under Section 281 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, can be exercised from time to time. Sections 279, 280 and 281 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, use the word "an arrears of land revenue". The words "an arrears of land revenue" refer to a particular arrears. The words "an arrears of land revenue" thus, has to be confined to a particular arrears, if different arrears of land revenue are all treated "an arrears of land revenue", it will lead to unworkable and inequitable result, for example if a person takes two loans from two different agencies for which he gives different securities and commits default in payment of Both the arrears and if he is detained for recovery in recovery proceedings with regard to one loan, there cannot be any prohibition for his detention with regard to recovery proceedings of another loan. Thus, the words "an arrears of land revenue" have to be read as a particular amount of arrears of land revenue. Sri Mishra relied on the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union (supra) for the submission that Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, are not attracted in the present case. In the above case, the Apex Court was considering the power of the State Government given under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. It was contended that Section 6 (1), as it stood then, provides that the adjudicator was, within such time, as may be specified submit its award to the State Government. It was contended that the State Government had power of extension of time under Section 6 of the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, read with Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904. The Apex Court held in paragraph 5 of the aforesaid case :
"5. Learned counsel for the respondents refers us to the provisions of Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, which provides that where by any Uttar Pradesh Act any power is conferred on the State Government then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Sections 3 and 4 of the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, certainly confer power on the State Government to refer disputes to an adjudicator for decision and Section 6 (1) may be read as empowering the State Government to specify the time within which the adjudicator to whom an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication is to submit this award. The combined effect of Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act and Section 6 (1) of the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, it is contended, that the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his report "within such time as may from time to time be specified" and that this being the position, the principles laid down in the English decisions referred to above must be held to be applicable to the present case.
We are unable to accept this line of reasoning. Under Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act the State Government may exercise the power conferred on it by Sub-sections 3, 4 and 6, that is to say, it can from time to time make orders referring disputes to an adjudicator and, whenever such an order of reference is made, to specify the time within which the award is to be made. This power to specify the time does not and indeed cannot include a power to extend the time already specified in an earlier order. The legislative practice, as evidenced by the provisions of the different statutes referred to above, is to expressly confer the power of extension of time, if and when the Legislature thinks fit to do so. There is no question of any inherent power of the Court and much less of the Executive Government in this behalf. Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act does not in terms, or by necessary implication, give any such power of extension of time to the State Government and, therefore, the respondents can derive no support from that section."
10. From aforesaid, it is clear that the Apex Court in the aforesaid case was considering the question as to whether the State Government will have power to extend the time for an award. The aforesaid judgment has no application In the facts of the present case. In the present case, there is no question regarding any extension of time of detention. The question in the present case is the exercise of power of detention under Section 281 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner on the aforesaid case is clearly misplaced.
11. In view of what has been said above, we are of the view that there is no prohibition in resorting the power of detention under Section 281 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in the present case since it is for different arrears and for different citation. The petitioner has not made out any case for issue of writ of mandamus.
12. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed summarily.