JUDGMENT Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. Heard Sri Anil Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Neeraj Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1.
2. Counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged. Both the parties have prayed that writ petition itself be finally disposed of.
3. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 24th September, 2002 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) by which the University communicated the college that since aggregate marks of the petitioner in physics, chemistry and maths of intermediate examinations are less than 50%, hence it is not possible to grant permission for his admission in B.Tech. 1st year.
4. The facts of the case as emerge from pleadings of the parties, briefly stated, are ; petitioner passed Senior School Certificate Examination, 2002 with 49.66% aggregate marks in physics, chemistry and maths. The petitioner applied for admission in B.Tech. course. University sent a communication dated 24th September, 2002, informing that petitioner having not secured 50% marks in physics, chemistry and maths, he is not eligible for admission. Respondent No. 3 also informed the petitioner that in view of the Government order dated 18th October, 2001, that only those candidates be called for admission in B.Tech. who have secured 50% or more marks in physics, chemistry and maths in intermediate or equivalent examination. The petitioner represented the matter to the University praying that his marks be rounded of to 50% and permission be granted for his admission.
5. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the University in which it has been stated that petitioner having obtained less than 50% marks, i.e., 49.66%, he is not eligible for admission. In the counter-affidavit, reliance has been placed on various orders passed by this Court in different writ petitions in which the writ petition of candidates having less than prescribed marks for eligibility were dismissed. The Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 3947 of 2001, Dr. Arvind Kumar Mishra v. State of U. P. and Ors., dated 5th February, 2001, has been relied. Copy of the said judgment has been annexed as Annexure-C.A.2 to the counter-affidavit. It has also been stated in the counter-affidavit that the Government order dated 18.10.2001 filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition clearly prescribes that only those candidates shall be called for admission who have obtained total 50% or more marks in physics, chemistry and maths.
6. The counsel for the petitioner, Sri Anil Sharma, submitted that although the petitioner's marks are not 50%, being only 49.66%, it was liable to be rounded of to 50%. His submission is that fraction of marks being more than 0.5% the same should have been rounded of to 50%. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that although Division Bench judgment of this Court in Vani Pati Tripathi v. Director General, Medical Education and Training and Ors., 2003 (1) UPLBEC 427, has taken the view that fraction of marks even if more than 0.5% cannot be rounded of but his submission is that the recent Apex Court judgment Rameshwar Dass Mehta v. Om Prakash Saini and Ors. 2002 (6) Supreme 545, has accepted the principle of rounding of, hence the writ petition of the petitioner is liable to be allowed.
7. Sri Neeraj Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the University, has refuted the submissions and has placed reliance on one single Judge judgment in Writ Petition No. 5974 of 2002, Arpan Agrawal v. Uttar Pradesh Technical University and Anr., dated 22nd February, 2002 and Division Bench judgment in Arvind Kumar Mishra's case (supra) filed as Annexures-C.A. 1 and C.A.2 to the counter-affidavit. The counsel for the University submitted that University has not accepted the principle of rounding of marks for the purposes of eligibility and a person not having 50% aggregate marks in physics, chemistry and maths is ineligible for admission.
8. I have considered the submissions and perused the record.
9. There is no dispute between the parties that condition of eligibility as prescribed is aggregate 50% marks in physics, chemistry and maths for admission in B.Tech. course. The only issue which has been raised in the writ petition is the question as to whether petitioner's marks aggregate of which admittedly 49.66% are entitled to be rounded of as 50% treating the petitioner to be eligible for the course.
10. The question, which has been raised in the present writ petition, came for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court (of which I was a member) in Vani Pati Tripathi's case (supra). The eligibility criteria in the aforesaid case was having aggregate 50% marks in physics, chemistry and maths in intermediate examination for appearing in MBBS/BDS course. The marks of the appellant in the aforesaid case were 49.67% in physics, chemistry and maths. The submission was raised before the Division Bench that marks should be rounded of as 50% holding the appellant to be eligible for appearing in MBBS/BDS course. The Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment, in paragraph 6 held :
"6. ..................... As observed above rounding up principle has been applied while determining the quota of seats or while determining the majority of votes. The said case relates to seats. Seats and posts cannot be expressed in fraction, hence in this case fraction is founded up but marks obtained by candidate in an examination can be expressed in fraction and when a particular merit is required as eligibility the principle of rounding up of less marks to the next higher percentage cannot be accepted. There is no principle that percentage of marks can only be expressed in round figure. Counsel for the appellant could not able to show any authority or Rule in support of his submission."
The Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment repelled the similar submission, which is being raised in the present writ petition.
11. The sheet anchor of the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner is judgment of the Apex Court in Rameshwar Dass Mehta's case (supra). For appreciating the submission of counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to find out the ratio of judgment in Rameshwar Dass Mehta's case (supra). In the above case, an advertisement was issued for appointment on the post of University Librarian. The prescribed qualification, as noted in the judgment, was as follows :
"Librarian, university library. --(i) Master's degree in library science/ information science/ documentation with atleast fifty five per cent (55%) marks or its equivalent grade and a consistently good academic record.
(ii) One year specialisation in an area of information technology/archives and manuscript keeping, master's degree in an area of thrust in the institution.
(iii) At least ten years as a deputy librarian in an university library or fifteen years experience as a college librarian.
(iv) Evidence of innovative library service and organisation of published work.
Desirable. -- M. Phil./Ph.D. degree in library science/ information science/ documentation/ archives and manuscript keeping."
12. In paragraph 2 of the judgment, the Apex Court noted the facts and questions involved in the, case. Paragraph 2 of the judgment is quoted below :
"2. Appellant and the first respondent in each of these two appeals along with others, filed their applications and after the selection committee interviewed the candidates in question, the appellant's name was recommended and he was appointed to the post by an order made on 4.11.1997. The respondents filed two writ petitions challenging the appointment of the appellant on various grounds. The High Court examined the same and found that the appellant had obtained 54.8 marks in the master's degree which is not the same as 55 per cent of the marks fixed in the requisite qualification, as indicated by the advertisement and, therefore, he could not have been appointed as he did not possess the necessary qualification. The High Court incidentally noticed that in assessing whether any of the candidates have consistently, good academic record did not round off 49.7 per cent marks in B.A. to 50%, obtained by one of the candidates while such exercise had been done in case of the appellant. Although the High Court has noticed that the two respondents did not possess the necessary experience and the respondents were ineligible to be appointed, still the matter has to be examined whether any illegality had been committed by the university."
In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment, the Apex Court noted the contention of both the parties. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Apex Court proceeded to consider as to what is the meaning of qualification prescribed in the advertisement. Referring the judgment of Govinda Rao's case, (1964 (4) SCR 575, University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao), the Apex Court observed that equivalence of the two qualifications is a question which pertains purely to an academic matter and Courts would hesitate to express a definite opinion, particularly, when it appears to the experts that a candidate fulfils the qualification. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Apex Court noted the equivalent grade as fixed by the University. After noting the relevant facts and contention, it was held by the Apex Court in paragraph 7 :
"7. Even in this gradation, there is a gap between 54 per cent and 55 per cent and in what category such a candidate would fall, above 54 per cent but less than 55 per cent would not be clear. Again equivalence in such a case will have to be found by the academic body. When the appellant has secured 54.85 marks in the master's degree and the selection committee is trying to find out as to who would be a suitable candidate and whether he possesses the necessary qualification with reference to the appointment to be made, they found the marks obtained by him is as good as 55 per cent. We do not think the view taken by the selection committee can be the subject-matter of the judicial review as was held by this Court in Govinda Rao's case. In academic matters, particularly pertaining to qualifications, the view taken by the experts would be final. If this approach had been adopted by the High Court, the High Court could not have interfered with the action taken by the university in this case at all. The argument that in the case of one of the candidates in assessing whether he had consistently good academic record or not, a view was taken that although he had secured slightly less marks than 50 per cent in one of the examinations that could have been rounded off, is neither here nor there because in his case, the objection raised by the university is to the effect that the said respondent is not having 10 years' experience as a deputy librarian in a university or 15 years' experience as a college librarian and he is not having one year specialisation in the area of information technology/archives and manuscript making."
13. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that principle of rounding of fraction of marks has been accepted by the Apex Court in paragraph 2 as well as paragraph 7 of the judgment in view of which it has to be held that Apex Court laid down the proposition that fraction of marks is to be rounded up for the purposes of finding eligibility.
14. It is relevant to refer to some judgments of the Apex Court for finding out what is the ratio of a judgment which has to be held binding precedent. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, law declared by the Apex Court is binding on all Courts within the territory of India. It is well-settled that what is the binding in the judgment of the Apex Court is the ratio laid down in a case. The Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansa Sekhar Misra and Ors., AIR 1968 SC 647, while considering what is the precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution laid down that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein or what logically follows from the various observations made in it. The relevant observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment is extracted below :
"(13).......................A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury Labour Court said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495.
"Now before discussing the case of Alien v. Flood, (1896) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all."
It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it."
15. Again Apex Court in Ambika Quarry Works etc. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1073, has held that judgment of the Apex Court is an authority of what it really decides and not what logically follows from it.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasising on following observations of the Apex Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment in Rameshwar Dass Mehta's case (supra) contended that from under quoted observations, it is clear that the Apex Court approved the principle of rounding up of fraction of marks for purposes of finding out eligibility :
"7. ....................... When the appellant has secured 54.85 marks in the master's degree and the selection committee is trying to find out as to who would be a suitable candidate and whether he possesses the necessary qualification with reference to the appointment to be made, they found the marks obtained by him is as good as 55 per cent.........."
17. From the above quoted observation, it cannot be held that Apex Court laid down principle of law that fraction of marks should be rounded up for purposes of eligibility. The observations made immediately thereafter are the reasons given by the Apex Court for deciding the aforesaid appeal which is extracted below :
"7. ............... We do not think the view taken by the selection committee can be the subject-matter of the judicial review as was held by this Court in Govinda Rao's case. In academic matters, particularly pertaining to qualifications, the view taken by the experts would be final. If this approach had been adopted by the High Court, the High Court could not have interfered with the action taken by the university in this case at all....................."
18. In view of what have been noted above, it is clear that Apex Court in Rameshwar Dass Mehta's case (supra) did not lay down any proposition to the effect that fraction of marks should be rounded of to nearest whole for purposes of eligibility of candidate. The Apex Court has neither proceeded to examine the said issue nor shown its concurrence to said proposition. The ratio of judgment, as appears from paragraph 7 of the judgment, is to the effect that in academic matters, particularly, pertaining to qualification, the view taken by the experts would be final. The submission of counsel for the petitioner does not find support from the judgment of the Apex Court in Kameshwar Dass Mehta's case (supra), rather in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court that in academic matters, particularly, pertaining to qualification, the view taken by the experts would be final, the decision of the University not to treat fraction of marks equivalent to 50% cannot be said to be erroneous and has to be given weight. The counsel for the University has submitted that University has not adopted or applied principle of rounding up while determining the eligibility of the candidates, hence no exception can be taken to the decision of the University in the present case holding the petitioner ineligible.
19. In view of the foregoing discussions, the submissions raised by the counsel for the petitioner do not find support from the judgment of the Apex Court in Rameshwar Dass Mehta's case (supra). Controversy in the present case is fully covered by Division Bench judgment of this Court in Vani Pati Tripathi's case (supra).
20. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.