JUDGMENT Prakash Krishna, J.
1. This is second round of litigation in this Court. The revision is Under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act at the instance of plaintiff landlord against the judgment and decree dated 7.11.1998, passed in S.C.C. Suit No. 9 of 1993. The trial court has dismissed the suit for ejectment of defendant-tenant and extend the benefit of Section 20(4) of U. P. Act Nor 13 of 1972 and held that the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw the amount deposited under the aforesaid section. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment and decree present revision has been filed by the landlord.
2. Suit giving rise to the present revision was instituted on the pleas, inter alia that the defendant was tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 150 in respect of the shop situate at Mohalla Purani Sabzi Mandi, Qasba Sasni, district Aligarh. The defendant being defaulter in payment of rent tenancy was terminated by means of notice dated 23.1.1993 demanding arrears of rent from the period 1.6.1991. The said notice was served by refusal on 8.2.1993. Hence the suit was filed.
3. The suit was contested on the pleas inter alia by the defendant that he is not defaulter in payment of rent and paid the rent for 16 months (for the period 1.6.1991 to September, 1992) in cash but the plaintiff did not issue any rent receipt. Thereafter the rent was sent through money order which was refused, thereby compelling the defendant-tenant to deposit rent Under Section 30 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 before the Munsif, Hathras, in Misc. Case No. 23 of 1995. It was further pleaded that in any view of the matter the defendant-tenant has deposited entire arrears of rent together with interest and cost etc. in the suit on the first date of hearing, i.e., 20.8.1993, after adjusting the amount already deposited by him Under Section 30 of the Act. The legality of the notice and its service on him was also challenged.
4. The trial court framed issue to the effect as to whether the defendant tenant is entitled to get benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act or not? This issue was decided against the defendant-tenant by judgment and decree dated 26.4.1996. Aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment and decree, the tenant Sobran Singh, preferred Civil Revision No. 221 of 1996 in this Court which was allowed and the matter was remanded back to the trial court by judgment dated 23.7.1996. The judgment of the court is also in Sobran Singh v. Prakash Chandra Gupta 1996 ARC 440. After remand, this time the trial court has dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 7.11.1998, on the finding that the notice terminating the tenancy was not validly served on the defendant-tenant and the defendant- tenant is entitled to get benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment and decree present revision is at the instance of the plaintiff landlord.
5. Heard Sri Vinod Sinha, learned Counsel for the applicant and Sri A. N. Bhargava, learned Counsel for the opposite party and perused the record.
6. Learned Counsel for the applicant's submission is in two fold. Firstly, that the trial Judge committed illegality in re-examining the question of validity of service of notice after the order of remand passed by this Court on the supposition that the said question was to be examined again. On a correct reading of the Judgment of this Court, it was submitted, the said question was not left open and this Court affirmed the findings of the trial court in its judgment that the notice was validly served on the defendant-tenant. Secondly, that the deposit Under Section 30(1) of the Act being invalid deposit, the defendant tenant could not have adjusted the said amount while making deposit Under Section 20(4) of the Act. The trial Judge has committed legal error in holding that the deposit Under Section 20(4) of the Act is valid deposit. In contra, learned Counsel for the defendant tenant submitted that as a result of order of remand every thing was left open before the trial Judge for fresh consideration. Elaborating the argument he submitted that the question regarding validity of service of notice was also left open by this Court and, therefore, the findings recorded by the trial court in the impugned order being findings of fact, cannot be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Court Act.
7. I have given careful consideration of the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. The main controversy revolves around the extent of scope of question to be decided by the trial court after remand by this Court. A bare perusal of earlier judgment of this Court would show that this Court was of the view that there is no finding of fact in the judgment of the trial court with regard to the contents of composite notice of demand, termination and eviction. It was observed that the notice Under Section 30(1) of the Act should be unambiguous and it should in clear terms signifies willingness of the landlord to accept the rent from the tenant. A perusal of paragraph 5 of the judgment (as published in the report) it is clear that this Court observed "that the only question that remained for decision, whether there was any notice by the landlord notifying his intention to receive rent." Thereafter relevant case laws were discussed and the Court reached to the following conclusion:
9. In this case, the learned court below gave a decision against the tenant simply because the deposit Under Section 30 was made after the service of the composite notice of demand, termination and vacation. As observed above, there is no finding of the fact if the language of demand of rent was open to be interpreted as signifying the willingness of the landlord to accept the rent. In view of the decision quoted above, the notice thought of Under Section 30(1) of the Act should be unambiguous. It is desirable, therefore, that the trial court should examine the notice that was deemed to have been served on the tenant to find if it could be read as one Under Section 30(1) of the Act. In the absence of such finding the refusal to adjust the deposit made by the tenant cannot be sustained.
10. The present revision is, accordingly allowed. The decree by the Court is set aside and the case is remanded back to the trial court for a decision on the point as indicated in the judgment without taking any further evidence from the parties. The Court may, however, hear the parties as to how the notice, could be interpreted and will consider any case law on this point that may be submitted before him. The parties are directed to appear before the court below on 5.2.1996.
8. From the above it is clear that the only question that was left for the trial court was to examine the notice that was deemed to have been served on the tenant to find if it could be read as one Under Section 30(1) of the Act and if it was not so then in absence of such finding refusal to adjust deposit made by the tenant cannot be sustained. To put it differently the purport and import of the earlier judgment of this Court is that if it is found, as a fact that in the notice, the landlord had signified his willingness to accept the rent, amount deposited Under Section 30(1) of the Act, would not be valid and consequently the tenant would not be entitled to adjust the amount deposited Under Section 20(4) of the Act. If it is otherwise and the landlord has not expressed his willingness in the notice to accept the rent the deposit Under Section 30(1) of the Act by the tenant, is valid and consequently he would be entitled to adjust the amount, thus deposited Under Section 30(1) of the Act to claim benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act.
9. With regard to the above there is substance in the argument of learned Counsel for the plaintiff-landlord that the question of validity of service of notice was not left open to be re-decided and thus the trial court exceeded in its jurisdiction while re-deciding the said issue.
10. Apart from the above the finding of valid service of notice, as recorded by the trial court cannot be sustained on merits otherwise. The trial court has proceeded to decide the said issue on presumption and assumption and was influenced by the fact that the endorsement by the postman on earlier two occasions with regard to refusal of the letter is in the same handwriting and the postman was not examined. It has been established by catena of decisions that there is presumption of valid service of the registered letter by refusal if it has been correctly addressed to the addressee and there is endorsement of refusal by the postman. The presumption of correctness is always there in discharge of public duties. This Court in a Full Bench decision in Ganga Ram v. Phulwati , has held that it is not necessary to examine the postman to prove the correctness of endorsement of refusal of the registered document and there is presumption of service on the addressee. (See also AIR 1990 SC 2156 and 1992 ALJ 600).
11. In view of the above discussion the findings of the trial court in holding that notice in question was not validly served on 8.2.1993 when it was refused by the defendant-tenant, cannot be sustained and the same is hereby vacated.
12. The next question which is surviving in the revision is as to whether the landlord has signified his willingness to accept the rent through notice dated 23.1.1993 or not. The trial court has reproduced relevant portion of notice in its judgment. It has noted the contents of the notice and in para 2 thereof it is mentioned that rent was demanded for the period 1.6.1991 to 15.1.1993, @ Rs. 150 per month by the plaintiff from the tenant. In the later part of the notice it is mentioned that notice giver (landlord) does not want to keep the addressee as tenant and his tenancy is terminated after expiry of 30 days on receipt of notice. After noticing the aforesaid contents of the notice the trial court held that since it was composite notice the said notice cannot be termed as the notice Under Section 30(1) of the Act expressing the assent to receive rent. It has examined the statement of plaintiff P.W. 1 and statement of the defendant-tenant D.W. 2. P.W. 1 plaintiff has proved the notice. The comment of the trial court on oral statement that the plaintiff has not stated in his oral deposition that in what manner the notice demanding rent was given is uncalled for. The D.W. 2 defendant-tenant in his deposition has stated that the rent was given in cash but no rent receipt was issued and therefore taking advantage of such situation the plaintiff appellant wants to dispossess him. The trial court thereafter reached to the conclusion on the basis of the fact stated in the earlier part of judgment it is not proved that notice was served on the defendant and consequently the plaintiff has failed to prove that he expressed his willingness to accept the rent. Resultantly, the deposit made Under Section 30 of the Act was valid and was liable to be adjusted towards the deposit made Under Section 20(4) of the Act. It is clear that the things were not as they have been made out by the learned trial Judge which has resulted not only in grave error of law but even gross miscarriage of justice. The scope of inquiry after the remand order passed by this Court was limited one and was confined to the contents of the notice in question. The trial court has noticed that there was a clear demand of arrears of rent by the plaintiff, it went out of track to hold that since it was a composite notice of demand and ejectment consequently the landlord did not signify his willingness to accept the rent. No particular form of notice is prescribed to be given by the landlord to the tenant Under Section 30(1) of the Act. Under the said section the tenant has been permitted to deposit rent for the benefit of the landlord till the landlord expresses his willingness to accept the rent. In the case where the landlord has expressed his willingness to accept the rent, it has been held that any deposit made by the tenant Under Section 30 is not a valid deposit and the same cannot be taken into account.
13. In Mehjagan Begum v. Special Judge, B.C. Act, Etah 2006 (62) ALR 190, is the authority for proposition, if at the time of notice entire rent has been validly deposited, notice demanding rent Under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act was not valid and the tenant cannot be said to be defaulter. In the case in hand neither there is pleading nor there is any evidence nor it has been found by the court below that the tenant ever offered rent to the landlord after deemed service of the composite notice dated 23.1.1993. He straightaway proceeded to deposit the amount of rent Under Section 30(1) of the Act on 8.2.1993. In this view of the matter the deposit Under Section 30(1) of the Act was not valid deposit and the findings otherwise recorded by the trial court cannot be sustained and are hereby reversed.
14. It is not in dispute that the amount deposited Under Section 30(1) of the Act was adjusted by the defendant tenant while making deposit Under Section 20(4) of the Act. It has been held above that the deposit Under Section 30(1) of the Act was not valid deposit. After exclusion of the amount deposited Under Section 30(1) of the Act it cannot be said that the defendant-tenant has deposited the required amount as per requirement of Section 20(4) of the Act. The deposit being short, the benefit of the aforesaid section cannot be extended to the defendant-tenant. The Apex Court in the case of E. Palanisamy v. Palnnisamy and Ors. , in para 5 held as follows:
5. Mr. Sampat the learned Counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance with Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of the tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned Counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance with Section 8 inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned Counsel. The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance with the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straightaway jump to the last step, i.e., to deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal and M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu.
15. A Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Mridula Dayal v. Vllth Additional District Judge 1986 (2) ARC 132, was called upon to answer following question referred to it:
Whether the tenant can claim deduction of invalid deposit made Under Section 30 of U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for taking advantage of Section 20(4) of the said Act.
It answered the above question in negative and held that the deposit made by the tenant, in the circumstances not contemplated under Sub-section (1) of Section 30 cannot be deemed to be payment made to the landlord as provided by Sub-section (6) of Section 30, consequently it cannot be taken advantage for claiming the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act.
16. The cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the tenant opposite party in Indrasani Devi v. Din Ajli 1968 AWR 167 (FB); Balagat Hussain v. Ilnd A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 146 and Farhat Ilahi v. Vth A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 292, are to be noted and need no detail discussion as they are distinguishable and have no application to the present controversy. In the first case, i.e.. India Sahnl Devi (supra) it was held that a tenant is not in arrears of rent for the rent remitted by him earlier by money order but refused by the landlord within the meaning of Rent Control Act. In two other cases on facts it was found that the tenant had made the valid deposit.
17. In view of the above discussion it is difficult to agree with the judgment and decree of the trial court. The same is hereby set aside. The revision is allowed and judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.