JUDGMENT D.S. Sinha, J.
1. Heard Sri Vijay Sinha, holding brief of Sri Vijay Bahadur Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Tej Ram, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Respondents No. 1 and 3, at length and in detail.
2. Invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner , an employer, urges this Court to quash the order dated April 13, 1978, passed by the Labour Court II, U.P., Kanpur, the Respondent No. 1, in proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter called 'the Act' initiated by a workman Sri Adinath Misra, the Respondent No. 2, whereby an amount of Rs. 20,344.50 Paise has been computed and determined to be payable to the Respondent No. 2. A true copy of the impugned order dated April 13, 1978 is Annexure-4 to the writ petition.
3. Relevant facts giving rise to instant petition are these ; --
The Respondent No. 2 was an employee of the petitioner. His services were terminated with effect from June 27, 1964, which led to an industrial dispute referred to the Respondent No. 1 under Section 4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication. The Respondent No. 1 gave an award dated December 22, 1971, which was published in the U.P. Gazette of March 4, 1972. By the award it was held that the termination of the services of the Respondent No. 2 was illegal and improper, and it was directed that the Respondent No. 2 be reinstated forthwith with the benefit of back wages form November, 1968 to the date of reinstatement.
4. It appears that the petitioner failed to implement the award. The Respondent No. 2, therefore, initiated the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act by means of the application dated June 10, 1974, a copy whereof is Annexure-1 to the petition. In this application the Respondent No. 2 raised demand for the wages for the period between November, 1968 and April 3, 1972, and for the period between April 4, 1972 and March 8, 1973, together with house rent allowance at the rate of 10% of the wages for the aforesaid period.
5. Above noted proceedings continued to remain pending for over three years, and on March 28, 1978 the Respondent No. 2 moved another application (annexure-2 to the petition) praying for interim order in the case for payment of wages for the period between November, 1968 and April 3, 1972 together with other benefits forming part of the wages under the Act. The petitioner filed objection dated April 13, 1978 to the application of the Respondent No. 2 moved on March 28, 1978. A true copy of the objection of the petitioner is on record as Annexure-3 to the petition.
6. In its objection the petitioner pleaded that the Respondent No. 1 did not have jurisdiction to grant any interim relief or to pass any order by way of interim relief under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The petitioner also raised the plea of waiver of the rights under the award on the ground that the Respondent No. 2 did not turn up to join his duties in terms of the directions of the Labour Court within a reasonable time.
7. The Respondent No. l did not agree with the pleadings of the petitioner with regard to its competence to pass order directing payment of wages to the Respondent No. 2 for the period between November, 1968 and April 3, 1972. The Respondent No. l was of the view that it could lawfully compute the money payable to the Respondent No. 2 in two stages for two different periods, and such procedure was not barred. The Respondent No. 1, therefore, passed the impugned order dated April 13, 1978.
8. Terming the impugned order as an interim order, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends before this Court that the impugned order is totally illegal inasmuch as under Section 33C(2) of the Act the Respondent No. 1 had no power to pass any interim order; and that the impugned order, being in the nature of interim order, is liable to be quashed.
9. Countering the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel submits that the impugned order is not an interim order. According to him, the true nature of the order is that of a final order computing the amount of money due to the Respondent No. 2 under the award for the period between November, 1968 and April 3, 1972.
10. The Court has anxiously and very carefully scrutinised the impugned order as well as the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner but finds itself unable to be persuaded to uphold the same. It cannot be disputed that the respondent was declared entitled to wages by way of salary and other benefits including house rent allowance at the rate of 10% of the wages for the period between November, 1968 and April 3, 1972, under the award dated December 22, 1971. Further, before the Respondent No. l it was conceded on behalf of the petitioner that the monthly wages of the Respondent No. 2 was Rs. 450/- per month. It was also not disputed that the rate of house rent allowance admissible to the workman was 10% of his wages. Computation of the wages and the house rent allowance payable to the Respondent No. 2 has been done on the basis of the rate of wages conceded by the petitioner and the percentage of the house rent allowance not disputed by it before the Respondent No. l. Therefore, no embargo can be taken to the quantum of the money directed to be paid to the Respondent No. 2 by the impugned order.
11. It is nobody's case that the Respondent No. 1 is going to undertake a fresh computation of the amount of wages and house rent allowance payable to the Respondent No. 2, under the award dated December 22, 1971, for the period between November, 1968 and April 3, 1972. So far the computation of wages and house rent allowance for the aforesaid period is concerned it is final and cannot be designated as interim. The Court is clearly of the opinion that the impugned order is a final order, though passed at the interim stage. The impugned order is perfectly legal and not liable to be interfered with.
12. Even if it is accepted though not conceded for arguments sake, that the impugned order suffers from any infirmity, this Court should not interfere in the matter in exercise of its special and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that manifest injustice arising out of an injury resulting from invasion upon a legally protected and judicially enforceable right of the petitioner is sine-qua non for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . In the instant case, it has not been demonstrated that on account of the impugned order the petitioner has suffered any injury resulting in manifest injustice by violation of any statutorily recognized and judicially enforceable right. The Court, therefore, declines to interfere with the impugned order.
13. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The security furnished by the Respondent No. 2 in pursuance of the interim order dated September 20, 1978 shall stand discharged.
There is no order as to costs.