Manjula Chellur, C.J.
Appellants before us were writ petitioners before learned Single Judge. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 02.11.2009. In brief the facts that lead to the filing of this writ appeal are as under.
2. Apparently, the land of petitioners was acquired by Government way back in 1992. After passing of award, they sought reference under Land Acquisition Act which came to be rejected on the ground of limitation. Though the land acquisition officer referred the matter to reference court, reference court dismissed the reference opining that it was barred by limitation. Aggrieved by the same, writ petition was filed and the same came to be rejected as per Ext.P2 wherein it was opined that the judgment of reference court and judgment of learned Single Judge declining interference with the judgment will not stand in the way of petitioners applying for redetermination of the compensation under Section 28A on the basis of any relevant court award. Subsequently, an application under Section 28A came to be made by petitioners,which came to be rejected by the authority concerned. Aggrieved by the same, they filed W.P.(C) No. 36817 of 2008 which came to be dismissed by judgment dated 02.11.2009 confirming the opinion of District Court, therefore, appellants are before us.
3. According to appellants, Section 14 of the Limitation Act deserves to be applied in the present case and the time spent from 14.08.2004 to 03.09.2008 is to be excluded. Learned Single Judge, merely on the question of limitation, was of the opinion, exclusion of time spent in prosecuting the application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be permitted as the application under Sections 18 and 28A work in two different fields, therefore, if history regarding inclusion of Section 28A is looked into, it would clearly reveal that the two proceedings are different, therefore, exclusion of time spent in prosecuting Section 18 application cannot be extended.
4. Aggrieved by the same, appellants are before us contending that the application filed under Section 18 being rejected on the question of limitation, virtually has to be considered as no application being filed under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, there was no adjudication of application under Section 18 on merits. Hence, they are entitled to make an application under Section 28A of the Act. The second contention is that though period of three months is indicated to file application under Section 28A from the date of last award, i.e. 31.07.2004, as he was prosecuting application filed under Section 18 and intending to take it to its logical end, the time spent for such prosecution deserves to be excluded and the fact that after excluding such period, the period of three months would not be over, therefore, the application filed on 03.10.2008 deserves to be entertained and cannot be rejected.
5. Learned counsel appearing for appellants also relies upon a Division Bench judgment reported in District Collector v. Muhammed Kunhi [2012(4) KLT 360], a decision pertaining to submission of an application within three months from the date of award passed by the reference court on an application under Section 28A(3) and also on the basis of an award passed by court after remittance under Section 54 of the Act. According to learned counsel for appellants, in order to achieve goal on equality, provisions under Section 28A came to be introduced more or less which could be termed as a social legislation and deserves to be implemented in its right spirit. Therefore, if introduction of Section 28A is looked into, it is clear that the said provision was brought to benefit owners of the land, i.e. to get more compensation depending upon the date of last award pertaining to another land but under the same notification in which the applicant's land is also notified.
6. The factual situation in the present appeal is, Section 18 reference came to be dismissed on 23.10.2003 and as on that date last award was not even in existence as last award relied upon by appellants is dated 31.07.2004 in L.A.No.202 of 2002. Therefore, though Section 28A was very much in vogue at the relevant point of time, the only recourse open for him was to approach reference court by filing reference application for enhancement which apparently was dismissed on 23.10.2003. On 14.08.2004, order of reference court dismissing the reference came to be challenged by filing WP(C) No.24260 of 2004. By that time, last award was in existence. However, perusal of Ext.P2 does not indicate reference to such award. At the time of disposal of writ petition at Ext.P2 it was open to learned Government Pleader to submit that Section 28A application could have been filed and as a matter of fact learned Single Judge opines that such application could be filed by owner of the land and the authorities concerned shall not be influenced by any of the observations made at Ext.P2 or reference court order. Learned Government Pleader pointed out that on 02.08.2004 application was made to obtain copy of last award and copy was granted on 04.04.2005. By that time Ext.P2 writ petition was pending before the Court. Whether dismissal of reference by reference court which came to be confirmed by Ext.P2 would come in the way of consideration of this application under Section 28A has to be analysed. Section 28A reads as under:
“28A Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.- (1) where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub- section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re- determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section(1) conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section(2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18.”
7. On this question, the apex court had an occasion to refer to various aspects of the matter in Union of India and another v. Hansoli Devi and others [AIR 2002 SCC 3240] and several other matters. This judgment was rendered by 5 judges bench. At paragraph 4 a detailed discussion is made which reads as under:
“4. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of statute. The rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 Cl and F 85, still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect :
"If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver."
It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson and Co. Ltd., 1955 (2) All ER 345, Lord Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning of "ambiguous" and held that "a provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word which in different context is capable of different meanings and it would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word. A provision is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in that particular context is capable of having more than one meaning." It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for which the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, 1953 SCR 1 had held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway Light Heat and Power Co. v. Vandray, AIR 1920 PC 181, it had been observed that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act to confer a right of making a reference, who might have not made a reference earlier under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But the Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression "had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18" in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the land-owner has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a land owner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumari's case the three learned Judges, while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application under Section 28-A can be moved, had categorically stated "the person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18". The expression "did not make an application", as observed by this Court would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. We, accordingly answer question No. 1(a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”
8. The above paragraph clearly indicates that if application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. They further opined that dismissal of an application seeking reference is under Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In order to take benefit under Section 28A the applicant ought not to have made an application for reference. Supreme Court had held in the above case that if such application is dismissed on the ground of delay without touching the merits under reference, it is as good as not filing an application under Section 18. So far as the obstacle of filing a reference application which was dismissed on the question of limitation it has to be considered as applicant not filing the application under Section 18.
9. Then coming to the second controversy whether the application filed on 03.10.2008 is within the period of limitation from the date of last award i.e. 31.07.2004, three months time is indicated as period of limitation to file application under Section 28-A. In the normal course from 31.07.2004 it would have come to an end by 31.10.2004. Reference application was made much prior to this 31.07.2004 and the applicant was prosecuting reference matter. Since subsequent to dismissal on 31.07.2004 he filed writ petition on 14.08.2004, the said writ petition was admitted and came to be dismissed on merits on 03.09.2008. Whether the period between 14.08.2004 and 03.09.2008 could be considered as prosecuting the litigation under misconception or before wrong forum as contemplated under Section 14 of the Act would come into play is the question before us.
10. Section 14 of the Act reads as under:
“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.-
(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( 5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.
Explanation- For the purposes of this section,-
a) in excluding the time during, which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted.
b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding.
Misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”
11. According to learned Government Pleader, since copy application was made on 02.08.2004, it was very much within the knowledge of the applicant that there was a last award in existence as early as 02.08.2004. Therefore there is no justification in the present stand of the appellant claiming the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. According to State, Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be pressed into service, as the application under Section 28-A was not presented before any court but before a competent authority under the Land Acquisition Act. In order to conclude whether Section 18 application or under Section 28-A application covers the issue, the learned Single Judge was justified in opining that those two provisions under Land Acquisition Act cover different areas.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the Apex Court judgment in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and other connected matters [(2008) 7 SCC 169]. This judgment was also by three judges bench of Apex Court. While noticing different aspects of the matter, considering whether Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 with reference to Section 34(3) and 43(1) and period of Limitation provided under the Act and also Section 14 of the Limitation Act, their Lordships at paragraph 21 opined that five conditions to be satisfied in order to apply Section 14 of the Limitation Act which reads as under:
“21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said Section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service :
(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;
(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;
(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;
(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and;
(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.”
13. So far as first condition, the proceedings must be of civil nature i.e. both prior and subsequent proceedings. So far as this condition even the Land Acquisition proceedings could be treated as civil proceedings. Then coming to the second condition, the prior proceedings had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith, as a matter of fact, at the time of presenting reference under Section 18 last award was not even in existence. Therefore, question of subsequent proceedings and prior proceedings being prosecuted with due diligence and good faith would not arise. So far as the third condition, apparently the prior litigation was not defective on account of jurisdiction but on account of limitation. Fourth condition says the earlier proceedings and the later proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue. Though the subject matter of earlier and subsequent proceedings was prosecuted for enhancement of compensation, under Section 18, reference is entirely different and so far as Section 28-A it is altogether different and certain conditions in which enhancement should be asked are prescribed. So far as 5th condition, both the proceedings must be in a court. In the present case as on the date of filing reference application the last award did not take its birth. Then in the light of opining that earlier proceedings cannot be considered as a reference as it was dismissed on the question of limitation in the light of 2002 judgment referred above, there was no prior proceedings so far as Section 28-A application. In other words, for considering Section 28-A application there ought not to be a prior reference application. If such reference was dismissed on limitation issue, then it is as good as not filing the application for reference. If such application cannot be taken into consideration, there is no question of any prior proceedings prosecuted before a wrong court in the present case.
14. Then coming to the forum before which applications were considered, both Section 18 and Section 28-A applications are to be filed before competent authorities. So far as Section 18 reference, it will be referred to reference court and Section 28-A application is concerned, the competent authority shall decide such application. The competent authority cannot be equated with a civil court as contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
15. In the light of above observations, Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to the proceedings in which the appellant was prosecuting Section 18 reference as prior proceedings in the matter. Therefore, filing of an application under Section 28-A has to be considered as if there was no reference application at all. Once Section 28-A application is considered as a fresh application without Section 18 reference, then the last award date comes into picture. If the last date award is to be considered, i.e. 31.07.2004, then the presentation of Section 28-A application on 03.08.2008, is beyond the period of limitation as contemplated under Section 28-A of the Act. Therefore, it is beyond the period of limitation. Hence the application deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed.
Manjula Chellur, Chief Justice.
P.R. Ramachandra Menon, Judge.
ttb/23/06