The above second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree, dated 26.02.1996, passed in A.S.No.396 of 1994 on the file of the Principal District Court, Tuticorin, confirming the judgement and decree dated 31.10.1994, passed in O.S.No.425 of 1990 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Kovilpatti.
2.Parties herein are hereinafter referred to as they were arrayed in the original suit.
3.Chokkammal (first defendant) is the wife of K.L.V.Veerappan Chettiar.
1)Veerasolai Chettiar (plaintiff) 2)Ganesan Chettiar (3rd defendant)
3)Veeramahalingam Chettiar (4th defendant) and 4)Ramachandran Chettiar (5th defendant) are their sons. 1)Lakshmi Ammal 2)Parvathi Ammal 3)Kannammal and
4)Veerammal (defendants 6 to 9) are their daughters. K.L.V.Veerappan Chettiar and his four sons constituted a joint family. Properties of the joint family were partitioned by a decree in O.S.No.425 of 1990 on the file of the District Munsif, Kovilpatti. As per the decree, the first defendant was allowed to enjoy the present suit property till her life time and after her life time, the property should be shared equally among the four sons. However, the first defendant along with third defendant sold the property to the second defendant by way of a sale deed/Ex.B.2. The suit was filed for a declaration that the sale deed Ex.B.2 as void. Pending suit, the first defendant died. Thereafter, the plaintiff prayed for partition of his one- fourth share in the suit property by amending the plaint.
4. The 4th defendant has also prayed for a decree for allotment of one- fourth share to him.
5.The third defendant filed a written statement and it was adopted by the defendants 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9. They admitted that the family properties were divided by the said decree and the property in question was allowed to be enjoyed by Chokkamal (first defendant). Their case is that Chokkammal executed a settlement deed in favour of the third defendant out of love and affection. Subsequently, the first and third defendants sold the property to the second defendant under a sale deed, dated 14.12.1990. According to them, the plaintiff has no right to question the sale deed executed by the defendants 1 and 3, in favour of the second defendant. They prayed for dismissal of the suit.
6.During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1; The third defendant examined himself as D.W.1, the sixth defendant was examined as D.W.2; the fourth defendants was examined as D.W.3. The plaintiff marked a compromise decree/Ex.A.1. The defendants have marked 11 documents.
7.After considering the evidence on record, the trial court accepted the case of the plaintiff and granted a decree as prayed for. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendants 2, 3 , 6 to 9 preferred an appeal before the Principal District Judge, Tuticorin in A.S.No.396 of 1994.
8.The first appellate court, having found no reason to interfere with the judgment of the trial court, dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the judgment of the first appellate court, the defendants 2, 3, 6 to 9 preferred this second appeal.
9.At the time of admitting the second appeal, the following substantial question of law has been formulated for consideration.
?Whether the pre-existing right of the widow Chokkammal became enlarged by reason of
section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act into an absolute one? if so, whether the alienation effected by the widow is valid and cannot be questioned??
Points:
10.An extent of 68 cents of punja land comprised in Sy.No.261/12 of Pudur Village is the suit property. Admittedly, the joint family consisting of the plaintiff, his brothers and their father partitioned the property by the decree/Ex.A.1. As per the decree, the property in question was allowed to be enjoyed by the first defendant. There is a restriction on her power of alienation. The property will, on her death, have to be shared equally among her four sons. Each of the four sons takes one-fourth.
11.The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants would contend that Chokkammal is to be considered as full owner of the property and not as a limited owner, in view of
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
12.The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff would submit that the present case is covered by sub-section (2) of
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
13.
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads thus:
?14.Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property: (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
2)Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.?
14. A careful reading of the section would reveal that the estate taken by a female under sub-section (1) is an absolute one. Sub-section (2) is an exception to sub-section (1). It is an admitted case of the defendants that the title of the first defendant flows from the decree/ Ex.A.1. It is also not their case that the first defendant had an existing interest in the property. The property was not given to the first defendant in lieu of her maintenance. A careful reading of the decree Ex.A.1 would show that the first defendant was allowed to enjoy the property for the first time without any pre-existing right. Therefore, it must be held that only a restricted right was given to the first defendant and the present case falls under sub- section (2). The substantial question of law is answered against the appellants.
15.In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The judgments and decrees of the courts below are confirmed. No costs. Consequently, connected C.M.P.(MD).No.2708 of 2017 is closed.
To.
1.The Principal District Court, Tuticorin
2.The District Munsif Court, Kovilpatti.