~~~~~~~~~~~ Antony Dominic, J.
The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether an application filed by two retired workmen, under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is maintainable. Before the learned Single Judge it was contended that since retired employees are not workmen as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act' for short), the application filed under Section 33C(2) of the Act is not maintainable. Placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in Sukumaran v. H.M.T.Ltd. [1999(1) KLT S.N.9 (Case No.10)] , Everestee v. District Labour Officer [1999 (2) KLT 560] and Purandaran v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. [2001(1) KLT 867], the learned Single Judge upheld this contention. It is this judgment, which is challenged before us.
2. Facts of the case are that the 1st appellant and the deceased 2nd appellant retired from the service of the 1st respondent in February and March, 1998 respectively. Thereafter, they filed C.P.46/99 before the Labour Court, Ernakulam invoking its powers under Section 33C(2) of the Act and claiming various monetary benefits that were allegedly due to them, from the 1st respondent. By Ext.P3 order dated 15.2.2003, the Labour court partially allowed their claim for annual increments, fixation, earned leave, and DA arrears. This order was challenged before the learned Single Judge and by the judgment under appeal, the order was set aside.
3. As far as the issue whether an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act filed by retired workmen is maintainable is concerned, the learned Single Judge has held that retired workman is not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act and that, therefore, the application filed was not maintainable.
4. Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which defines 'workman', reads thus:
“Workman means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person -
i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.”
A reading of the above shows that the definition of 'workman' includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched and it does not include a workman who left the service of his employer, consequent to retirement on attaining the age of superannuation or availing of the benefit of a scheme for Voluntary Retirement.
5. Section 33C(2) of the Act provides for recovery of money due from an employer. Section 33C(2) in so far as it is relevant reads thus:
33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer.-
(1) xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx “(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months.”
Reading of this provision shows that the entitlement to seek the remedy under this Section is conferred only on a workman. Therefore, if the term 'workman' occurring in Section 33C(2) of the Act is to be understood in the light of its definition as contained in Section 2(s), certainly, in that restricted sense a retired workman is outside the scope of section 33C(2). Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the definition of workman contained in Section 2(s) can be planted into Section 33C(2) of the Act and whether the expression 'workman' occurring in section 33C(2) should be understood in that narrow sense.
6. The historical background in which Section 33C came to be incorporated into the Act, clearly indicates that the legislature having separately provided for investigation and settlement of disputes on the basis of collective bargaining has also recognised the necessity to make a provision enabling individual workman to seek speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights. This Section provides for the forum and procedure for computing both monetary as well as non- monetary benefits in terms of money and also provides the machinery for recovery of such claims.
7. Before proceeding further, we must take notice of the fact that Section 2 of the Act containing the definitions open by stating that the definitions therein will govern “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. The principles while interpreting a definition clause of a statutory enactment with the qualifying words “unless there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context” as occurring in section 2 of the Act were
examined by the Apex Court in the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh [(2014) 5 SCC 189]. In that judgment, after surveying the relevant precedents, the Apex Court has held thus:
“12. In Vanguard Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fraser & Ross one of the questions that fell for determination before this Court was whether the definition of the word “insurer” included a person intending to carry on a business or a person who has ceased to carry on a business. It was contended that the definition started with the words “insurer means” and, therefore, is exhaustive. This Court, repelling that contention held, that statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”.
13. This Court observed: (Vanguard case, AIR pp.974-75, para 6) “6. The main basis of this contention is the definition of the word "insurer" in S.2(9) of the Act. It is pointed out that that definition begins with the words "insurer means" and is therefore exhaustive. It may be accepted that generally the word "insurer" has been defined for the purposes of the Act to mean a person or body corporate etc. which is actually carrying on the business of insurance, i.e., the business of effecting contracts of insurance of whatever kind they might be. But S. 2 begins with he words "in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or contest" and then come the various definition clauses of which (9) is one. It is well settled that all Statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore in finding out the meaning of the word "insurer" in various sections of the Act, the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause. But this is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word has been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. In view of this qualification, the court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances. Therefore, though ordinarily the word "insurer" as used in the Act would mean a person or body corporate actually carrying on the business of insurance it may be that in certain sections the word may have a somewhat different meaning.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Paul Enterprises v. Rajib Chatterjee and Co. where this Court once again reiterated that the interpretation clause should be given a contextual meaning and that all statutory definitions must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the interpretation clause, which created them. In State of Maharashtra v. B.E.Billimoria also this Court restated the principle that meaning of an expression must be determined in the context in which the same has been used.
15. Reference may also be made to K.V.Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal where this Court made the following apposite observations: (Paul Enterprises case, SCC p.718, para 28) “10.Apparently, it appears that the definition is conclusive as the word "means" has been used to specify the members, namely, spouse, son, daughter, grand child or dependent parent, who would constitute the family. Section 2 of the Act in which various terms have been defined open with the word "in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires" which indicates that the definitions, as for example, that of "Family", which are indicated to be conclusive may not be treated to be conclusive if it was otherwise required by the context. This implies that a definition, like any other word in a statute, has to be read in the light of the context and scheme of the Act as also the object for which the Act was made by the legislature.
11. While interpreting a definition, it has to be borne in mind that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to be served by the Act. A construction which would defeat or was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored and not accepted.
12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is preceded by the words "unless the context otherwise requires", the said definition set out in the Section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied.”
(emphasis supplied) (K.V.Madhu case SCC pp.57-58, paras 10-12)
16. We may also gainfully refer to the decision of this Court in RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. where this Court declared that the best interpretation is te one in which the Court relies upon not only the text but also the context in which the provision has been made. We can do no better than to extract the following passage from that decision: (SCC p. 450, para 33) “33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. In the light of the above principles and considering the object of Section 33C(2) and the context in which the expression “workman” is used in that Section, if the term is to be interpreted in a manner different from Section 2(s), such an interpretation is not prohibited by the Act. Instead, the Act permits such a purposive interpretation advancing the object of the statutory provision.
9. As we have already stated, though the Act is based on the principle of collective bargaining, Section 33C was incorporated in the Statute to provide for a forum and speedy remedy to individual workman to recover his dues from the employer, without having to undergo the process of adjudication of dispute as contemplated under Section 10. When such is the object that is sought to be achieved by Section 33C(2), there is no reason to understand the term 'workman' occurring in the Section in the restricted sense in which it is understood in the context of Section 2(s) and to deprive retired workman, the benefit of that Section, provided his claim is in relation to a period when he was a workman under the employer against whom claim is made.
10. In fact, a similar question was considered by the Apex court in its judgment in N.B.C.Corpn. v.Pritam Singh [AIR 1972 SC 1579]. That was a case where an employee, who was dismissed from service, filed an application under Section 33C(2) for computing the monetary benefits he was entitled to receive from his employer during the period of his employment. The objection that the Labour court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition was rejected and the claim was allowed. This order was upheld by the High Court also. Before the Apex Court, the contention raised on behalf of the employer was that on account of his dismissal from service, the applicant had ceased to be a workman on the date of the application and that, therefore, the application was not maintainable. On the other hand, the workman contended that since the period, in respect of which the benefits were claimed, was during the course of his employment, then, the mere fact, that he was dismissed by his employer later, would not deprive him of his right to claim relief under Section 33C(2).
11. While examining this question, the Apex Court took note of the definition of “workman” under Section 2(s) and though the definition included dismissed workman also, it was held that the crucial point which required consideration was the precise scope and meaning of the word 'workman' used in Section 33C(2) in the background of its definition in Section 2(s). On such examination, rejecting the contentions of the employer, the court held that Section 33C(2) must be so construed so as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims the relief, eventhough he is no longer employed at the time of the application. According to the Apex Court, the term 'workman' used in Section 33C(2) included all persons whose claim, requiring computation is in respect of a right arising from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer and that such a construction alone would advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of inserting Section 33C in the Act.
12. These principles are laid down in paragraph 7 of the judgment, which reads as under:
“7. Now, it is noteworthy that S.2 of the Act, which is the definition section begins, as is usual with most of the definition sections, with the clause, “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. This clearly indicated that it is always a matter for argument whether or not this statutory definition is to apply to the word “workman” as used in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration, for this word may both be restricted or expanded by its subject matter. The context and the subject matter in connection with which the word “workman” is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing on the question. The propriety or necessity of thus construing the word “workman” is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may turn to the purpose and object of S.33C of the Act. This section was enacted for the purpose of enabling individual workman to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without being compelled to have recourse to S.10 by raising disputes and securing a reference which is obviously a lengthy process. S.33C of the Act has accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour Court with the power similar to those of an executing Court so that the workmen concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the section being to provide the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to the executing Courts it calls for a broad and beneficial construction consistently with other provisions of the Act, which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which S.33C was designed to suppress was the difficulties faced by individual workmen in getting relief in respect of their existing rights without having resort to S.10 of the Act. To accept the argument of the appellant, it would always be open an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by S.33C and compel him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference under S.10 of the Act thereby defeating the very purpose and object of enacting this provision. This in our view, quite clearly brings out the repugnancy visualised in the opening part of S.2 of the Act and such a position could hardly have been contemplated by the legislature. In order to remove this repugnancy S.33C(2) must be so construed as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the application. In other words the term “workman” as used in S.33C(2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computation under this sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer. By adopting this construction alone can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of inserting S.33C in the Act. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the view taken by the Madras decisions and we approve of their approach. According to Shri Malhotra, in cases where there is no dispute about the employee's right which is not denied, he will be entitled to file a suit. Whether or not the right of suit can be claimed by the employee we are not persuaded on the basis of this argument to accept the construction canvassed on behalf of the appellant and deny to a dismissed employee the benefit to speedy remedy under S.33C(2) of the Act.”
13. In the above judgment, the Apex Court approved the judgments of the Madras High Court upholding the maintainability of applications filed under section 33-C(2) of the Act by persons who had ceased to be workmen, which were followed by the High Courts of Punjab, Mysore and Allahabad. This is evident from paragraph 5 of the judgment which is extracted below for reference.
“5. We now turn to some decisions of the High Courts which directly deal with this point. In Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Co. (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court Madurai, (1961) 1 Lab L.J. 729=(AIR 1961 Mad 307) Ramchandra Ayyar J., repelled a similar contention as was raised before us by Shri Malhotra on behalf of the appellant. In the case cited, one Iswaran was employed as a traffic supervisor in Tiruchi- Srirangam Transport Co., (P) Ltd. His services were terminated in December 1956 under a scheme of retrenchment. Later, disputes were raised between the management and other workers regarding bonus for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 and a settlement was reached in April, 1958 pursuant to which the management declared additional bonus and one month's wage for each of the two years. Iswaran having not been paid anything by the way of bonus though he had worked during those two years applied to the Labour Court for necessary relief under Section 33C (2) of the Act. The Labour Court having granted the relief claimed, the management approached the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain Iswaran's claim. The High Court repelled this challenge though on an other point relating to the claimant's right to benefit under the settlement, the case was remitted back to the Labour Court for a fresh decision. It was observed in that decision that while enacting Section 33-C (2), the Legislature did not intend merely to provide a remedy for the limited class of the persons who are in actual employment on the date of the application under that section. The words "any workman" in Section 33-C (2), according to that decision, would mean workman who would be entitled to benefits conferred under the Act and would necessarily include a discharged workman as well. In Manicka Mudaliar (M) v. Labour Court, Madras, (1961) Lab LJ 592 (Mad), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while hearing a writ appeal, from the decision of a learned single Judge of that Court also upheld the competency of a petition under Section 33-C (2) of the Act for arrears of salary and one month's salary in lieu of notice, although at the time of the application, the applicant was no longer in service of the employer. Following these Madras decisions a learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bachittar Singh v. Central Labour Court, Jullunder, AIR 1969 Punj 187 a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in Management of Government Soap Factory, Bangalore v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bangalore, AIR 1970 Mys 225 and the Allahabad High Court in U.P. Electric Supply Co., Ltd v. Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Allahabad, (1966) 2 Lab LJ 714 (All) took the same view. In the Allahabad case, however the provision which directly came up for construction was section 6-H of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, the language of which was considered to be identical with that of Section 33-C of the Act. Incidentally it may be pointed out that Section 6-H of the U.P. Industrial disputes Act has been held to be identical with Section 33-C of the Act even by this Court.”
14. In fact, in Bhaskara Menon v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [FLR 1979 (39) 66], a contention was raised before this Court that an application filed under section 33-C(2) of the Act by a workman who had retired from service was not maintainable. In this judgment, following the Apex Court judgment in National Buildings Construction Corporation (supra), this Court rejected the same holding thus:
“In the light of categoric statement of the law by the Supreme Court it must now be taken to be well established that Section 33-C(2) will take within its fold a workman, who was employed in an industry during the period in respect of which he claims relief even though at the time of the application he is no longer so employed. The contention to the contrary advanced by the counsel for the respondents deserves only to be rejected.”
The principles laid down in these judgments completely answer the contention of the employer against the maintainability of the application by the appellants.
15. Judgment under appeal shows that the learned Single Judge has followed three judgments of this Court. The first judgment is in the case of Sukumaran v. H.M.T. Ltd [1999(1) KLT S.N.9 (Case No10). This judgment shows that what is laid down therein is that a retired workman is not a workman as defined in Section 2(s). In so far as the judgments in the case of Everstee v. District Labour Officer [1999(2)KLT 560] and Purandaran v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. [2001(1)KLT 867] are concerned, those cases involved claims raised by persons who had voluntarily retired from service availing of the benefit of a scheme introduced by the employer therein. In Everestee's case (supra), such a retired workman attempted to raise a dispute for adjudication under Section 10 of the Act and when that was declined, approached this Court. Following the judgment in Sukumaran's case (supra), this Court held that such a person is not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) and that therefore dispute cannot be raised. This view is reiterated by the learned Single Judge, who decided Purandaran's case (supra) also.
16. All the aforesaid judgments were rendered in the context of Section 2(s) of the Act and there cannot be any doubt about the correctness of those judgments. However, when it comes to understanding the term 'workman' occurring in Section 33C, we cannot be guided by Section 2(s), and instead, should be guided by the principles laid down by the Apex Court in N.B.C.Corpn.'s case and Bhaskara Menon's case (supra). Therefore, while we affirm the correctness of the judgments followed by the learned Single Judge, we are unable to endorse his view that an application under Section 33C(2) cannot be maintained by a retired workman in respect of his claims with reference to the period of employment under the employer.
17. In the judgment under appeal, the learned Single Judge has also faulted with the appellant that their claims are delayed. As we have already seen the four claims of the 1st appellant have been allowed among which, the annual increment claimed is for the period 1.1.96 to 31.12.1996, fixation and the earned leave claimed are allowed for the period from 1.1.1988 onwards and the arrears of dearness allowance has been allowed for the period from 1.7.1994. In so far as the deceased 2nd appellant is concerned, the arrears of earned leave claimed is for the period from 1980 whereas he claimed for arrears of dearness allowance was for the period from 1.7.1994 onwards. Facts pleaded show that on an earlier occasion they had filed C.P.No.54/1980 claiming the benefits for the period up to 1980. That claim was allowed by Ext.R1(a) and was confirmed in the judgment in O.P.No.3182/1983. Again they filed C.P.No.11/1988 claiming benefits upto 1988, which was allowed by the Labour Court by Ext.R1(c) order. This was also confirmed by this Court in the judgment in O.P.No.103/1990. The judgment in the O.P. was confirmed in W.A.No.1464/1995 filed by the employer. That judgment was rendered on 14.8.1998 and Ext.P1 claim petition in C.P.46/1999 was filed on 15.7.1999. These facts show that there is no culpable delay or laches on the part of the claimants disentitling them for the benefits claimed by them.
For all these reasons, we are unable to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge and it is set aside. The order passed by the Labour Court, Ernakulam in C.P.No.46/1999 will stand restored.
The Writ Appeal is allowed.
ANTONY DOMINIC, JUDGE.
ps/20/6/2014 ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE.