JUDGMENT
1. This is a plaintiffs' appeal arising out of a suit for profits under Section 164 of the old Tenancy Act brought against the lambardar. Three plaintiffs sued in the one suit, and it is immaterial whether their shares were equal or unequal. The question was raised whether the three plaintiffs could join their separate claims for relief in one suit. They relied primarily upon Order 1, Rule 1. Both Courts have repelled their contention and have dismissed the suit. The only question then that we have to decide is, whether or no, by the provisions of Order 1, Rule 1, the three plaintiffs were entitled to join together in the one suit. Order 1, Rule 1, declares that all persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief... arising out of the same act... is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise.
2. It is not necessary to consider the other phrases occurring in the rule. We are satisfied that the plaintiffs' several rights to relief arose out of the same act. By Section 163, Tenancy Act, it is laid down that in the absence of any determination of the date by the settlement officer or of an express agreement among the cosharers, profits shall be divisible on such dates as the Local Government may by rules made under the Act prescribe.
3. Dates have been prescribed and no question arises in this case in regard to this point. The section itself only says "shall be divisible," and the phrase is open to the construction that it is not therein laid down that it is the lambardar's duty to proceed to a division of the profits on the date on which they become divisible. It is open to the construction that all that is laid down is that from the date fixed it is open to cosharers to come and claim their share of the profits. The real meaning, however, of these words, as laying down an express duty on the lambardar is made clear by the rules framed by the Board of Revenue in virtue of their powers under Section 234(f), Land Revenue Act. The material rule is to be found at para. 18 (b) of the Circular No. 8-III sanctioned by the Local Government on 24th February 1902. The rule reads as follows:
The duties of a lambardar are... (c) to divide at the appointed time such profits as may be divisible among the cosharers whom he represents.
4. We quote from the most recent edition of the Manual of the Revenue Department for the United Provinces, at p. 63 This, in our view, removes the only possible doubt that might have existed as to the effect of Section 163. In our opinion, therefore, the lower Courts were wrong in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that the three plaintiffs could not join in the one suit. We set aside the decrees of both Courts and direct the trial Court to restore the case to its register of pending suits and to proceed with the determination of the case according to law. The appellant will have the costs of this appeal and the appeal in the lower appellate Court. Other costs will abide the result.