JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J.
1. Present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (in short 'the Act') has its genesis in the order dated 24.12.1993 passed by Mr. Chandrama Singh, 14th Additional District Judge, Moradabad, while acting as a Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Moradabad, whereby the learned Judge allowed the application seeking review of the award dated 3.7.1993 at the behest of the claimants, thereby providing for Rs. 16,000/- more to each of the claimant Nos. 1,2 and 3 towards compensation already awarded to the claimants. The grounds in consideration of which the review application has climaxed into success, are that the Tribunal in its award dated 3.7.1993 had subtracted a sum of Rs. 48,000/- by way of deductions owing to lump sum payment of the compensation.
2. It is beyond the pale of controversy that the Tribunal had initially worked out a sum of Rs. 2,40,000/- as compensation payable to the claimants out of which a sum of Rs. 48,000/-, approximating to 20 per cent of the amount of compensation, was directed to be slashed on the count of lump sum payment of the compensation. After off-setting the said amount to the tune of Rs. 48,000/-, the award of the Tribunal stood reduced to a round figure of Rs. 1,90,000/- by way of compensation. The review application came to be filed by the claimants on the ground that the deductions made on the count of lump sum payment were illegally allowed, in contrariety of the law laid down by the Supreme Court.
3. The only question, cynosure of attention in the instant case, as urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant insurance company, is that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, being not a civil court, is divested of any inherent power to review its order. The learned Counsel urged that according to Section 169(2) of the Act, the Claims Tribunal is invested with all the powers of a civil court only for the purposes specified in the section, i.e., for the purposes of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects, besides the purposes specified in Rule 21 of the U.P. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1967 and since, proceeded the submission, the specified purposes did not include the power of a civil court to review its order, the Claims Tribunal is sans the power of the civil court for review either under Order 47 or Section 151, Civil Procedure Code. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appealing for the respondents emphatically canvassed that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has all the trappings of a civil court and that being so, it will entail all the powers including the power of review as inherent in the civil courts.
4. In the case of Om Prakash v. Rukmini Devi 1983 ACJ 300 (Allahabad), decided by a Division Bench of this Court, it was held that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is not a court inasmuch as it is a creation of special statute and it does not enjoy the status of civil courts. Its orders were accordingly held not amenable to appeal under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
5. In Suraj Bhan Goel v. Dhapo Devi 1969 ACJ 192 (Delhi), Delhi High Court has held that Claims Tribunal has no power to review its order and further that it cannot invoke inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Sardar Singh v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation 1992 ACJ 463 (Allahabad), wherein it has been held, relying upon the Division Bench decision in Om Prakash v. Rukmini Devi 1983 ACJ 300 (Allahabad), that in proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the entire provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply. Rather, only those provisions would apply as are mentioned in Rule 21 of the U.P. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1967.
6. In my considered view, it would be congruent with the object of creation of the Claims Tribunal under the Act to hold that the Tribunal has the power to review its order. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyu-mansinghji Arjunsinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273, the Supreme Court has held "...It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically, or by necessary implication...". Therefore, mere fact that the provisions of Order 47 of the Code have not been specifically made applicable to proceedings under the Act is no ground to hold that the Tribunal has no power to review its order. The Tribunal has, under Section 168, the power to make "an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just" and if due to a patent mistake of fact or law, the award is vitiated resulting in miscarriage of justice, why cannot the Tribunal review/recall its order with a view to doing justice in the case by rectifying the mistake?
(Emphasis added)
7. A Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sarmaniya Bai v. M.P. Rajya Parivahan Nigam 1990 ACJ 862 (MP), has held that the Claims Tribunal has the inherent powers, apart from the powers specified in the Act and the Rules, for acting judicially in trying the case of a civil nature and enforcing the decision rendered by it. Another Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Prakramchand v. Chuttan 1991 ACJ 1051 (MP), has held, relying upon the earlier Full Bench decision in Sarmaniya' Bai (supra) that those provisions of Civil Procedure Code, the application of which is not explicitly excluded by or under the Act to a proceeding thereunder, may be invoked by the parties. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi 1979 ACJ 205 (SC), has upheld the view of Punjab & Haryana High Court that Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to Tribunals which have the trappings of the civil courts.
(Emphasis added)
8. In my opinion too, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has all the trappings and attributes of a civil court and as such, it will have the inherent powers to correct/ rectify patent errors of fact or of law committed by itself. In Lachmana alias Hubrafa v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow, the Division Bench of this Court observed as under:
It is, however, settled that every court or Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. This power is based on a legal maxim which is to the effect that no party shall suffer because of the fault of the court or Tribunal.
Relying upon the Division Bench's case in Lachmana v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, K.N. Srivastava, J. in Gaon Sabha Nibi v. D.D.C. Lucknow Camp at Mirzapur, has held as under:
The main point which emerges from these decisions is that even if the Tribunal or court had not been provided under statute with the power to review its judgment, it can do so under inherent power provided the act of the Tribunal or court is not likely to cause injustice to someone else.
In S. Nagraj v. State of Karnataka JT 1993 (5 SC) 27, the Supreme Court has held as under:
Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone... Even the law bends before justice...If the court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as a valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available, where the mistake is of the court...
In Shafiq v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Ballia 1994 RD 59, I had an occasion to consider the question whether the Dy. Director of Consolidation has the power to review/recall or modify an order passed by mistake of law or fact, fraud or misrepresentation, or on the ground that the order sought to be reviewed, if allowed to stand, would result in peipetration of injustice. Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in 5. Nagraj's case (supra), I have held as under:
...Although the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in 5. Nag raj's case (supra) has been made in the context of the power of the court under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure but, in my opinion, the principle of law enunciated therein is of universal application being based on salutary principles of justice and equity. The very object of creation and existence of court or Tribunal is to secure the ends of justice, if necessary by rectifying its own mistake. All that is required is that the exercise of power of review/recall must be bona fide one and it must also conform to the principles of natural justice and it must not be a rehearing like an appeal in disguise.
Section 169(2) and Rule 21 are, in my opinion, illustrative and not exhaustive of the purposes for which the Claims Tribunal under the Act is to be treated as a civil court. In Bhagwati Devi v. I.S. Goel 1983 ACJ 123 (SC), the Claims Tribunal under the Act was held to be a civil court for the purposes of Section 25, Civil Procedure Code, even though it is not specifically stated to be so.
9. In the conspectus of the above discussions, I find that submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review its order on any ground whatsoever, are jejune of merits. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, in my opinion, is invested with the power to review or recall on limited ground that the order sought to be reviewed or recalled is patently illegal having been passed in ignorance of any statutory provision or of any law declared by the superior court or of any fact well established on record.
10. In State v. M.S. Mehta Chetan Das AIR 1981 Raj 36, it has been held that if any dictum of the Supreme Court has not been noticed while giving a decision, the error amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record furnishing a valid ground for review. The question then arises whether the deduction allowed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal amounts to a manifest error of law.
11. In the instant case, deductions made by the Tribunal on account of lump sum payment of compensation was not permissible. The Supreme Court has been consistent in this view as would be evident from its decision in Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi 1981 ACJ 50 (SC) and Manjushri Raha v. B.L Gupta 1977 ACJ 134 (SC). The view taken in the aforesaid decisions was articulated by the Supreme Court in Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation 1992 ACJ 300 (SC), wherein it has been observed as under:
With the value of rupee dwindling due to high rate of inflation, there is no justification for making deduction due to lump sum payment. We, therefore, hold that the courts below were not justified in making lump sum deduction in this case.
The view taken by the Tribunal in making deductions being apparently in conflict with the view taken by the Supreme Court, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the review application. No other point was pressed into service in the appeal.
12. In the result, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs to the parties.