JUDGMENT M. Katju and Krishna Kumar, JJ.
1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the removal order dated 17.4.97 Annexure-H to the petition and for a mandamus directing respondents to treat the petitioner in service.
2. We have heard Shri N. C. Rajvanshi learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sunil Ambwani learned counsel for the High Court.
3. The petitioner was appointed as Munsif Magistrate on 31.5.75 in the U. P. Judicial Service. He was promoted as Chief Judicial Magistrate in 1983 and as an Additional District Judge in 1987. In para 6 of the petition, it is alleged that his service record was throughout good and no adverse entry was ever communicated to him. In para 7 of the petition, it is alleged that even in 1992 he was communicated a good entry. However, he was suspended vide order dated 29.7.92 copy of which is Annexure-A and given a charge-sheet copy of which is Annexure-C to the petition. A true copy of the petitioner's reply is Annexure-D. The enquiry officer found that the main charges are not proved but he found charge Nos. 2 (ii), 4 (iii) and 5 to be proved. True copy of enquiry report is Annexure-E. A chart showing the charges and the findings is Annexure-G to the petition. Thereafter the High Court recommended the removal of petitioner from service and the Governor of U. P. by order dated 17.4.97 Annexure-H to the petition passed the impugned removal order, hence this writ petition.
4. We have perused the counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit in this case.
5. The impugned order dated 17.4.97 mentions three grounds for which the petitioner has been removed from service. The first ground is that in a land acquisition case, he granted compensation 12 times the amount which he had awarded in an earlier case. In this connection, it may be mentioned that each case has its separate facts and hence merely because the petitioner granted higher compensation in a subsequent case, this cannot be the basis for attributing motives to him. In paras 58 to 64 of the writ petition, it has been alleged that the facts of the two cases were totally different. The earlier decision was given on 6.1.90 while the later one was given on 29.5.92, in para 60 of the petition. It has been mentioned that though according to an exemplar the market value of the land was Rs. 200 per square yard the petitioner awarded compensation only at the rate of Rs. 40 per square yards. In para 61 of the petition it is stated that the value of land had gone up due to development activities near NOIDA where big industries like D.C.M. Toyota. Escorts Limited, etc. have come in and hence there was an escalation in the value of the land. The quantum of the compensation granted by the petitioner was not even challenged by the Ghaziabad Development Authority or the State Government in appeal, rather the claimants have filed an appeal, in the High Court for increase of compensation and award of Rs. 200 per square yard Instead of Rs. 40 per square yard. Hence on this ground, the petitioner could not be removed from service.
6. The second ground given in the impugned order is that in a Motor Accidents Claim case, the petitioner granted higher compensation. In this connection the petitioner has stated the factual position in paras 51 to 55 of the writ petition. In para 51 of the petition, it is alleged that the amount of Rs. 19,93,500 was claimed whereas the petitioner granted compensation of only Rs. 3,66.000. The observation made by the Enquiry Judge to the effect that the petitioner granted compensation relying on oral evidence is not correct as the petitioner also relied on the documentary evidence produced by P. W. 4 Ravi Lal, the extract of which is Annexure-M to the writ petition. The deceased was getting salary of Rs. 2.100 per month and in para 52 of the writ petition, it is stated that he was also getting various allowances, which were not taken into consideration. In para 55, it is stated that the deceased had a mother aged 50 years and father aged 52 years and two sisters. The method which the petitioner applied for granting compensation is mentioned in paras 54 and 55 of the writ petition, and the petitioner has alleged that his view is supported by Hardev Kaur and others v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation and others. JT 1992 (2) SC 409, where the multiplier of 24 was applied and an amount of Rs. 4, 18.200 was granted. Similarly in Smt. Prerna v. M. P. State Road Transport Corporation and others, JT 1993 (1) SC 295, multiplier of 24 was applied and less than 1/4 of the amount from the income of the deceased was deducted as personal expenses. As such the compensations awarded by the petitioner could not be said to be exorbitant. In our opinion, even if the compensation granted by the petitioner was excessive, it could be corrected in appeal but no one except the Insurance Company, which only disputed its liability, filed an appeal.
7. The third ground given in the impugned order for removing the petitioner from service is that the petitioner granted ball in a case under Section 307. I.P.C. by stating wrong facts. In this connection it may be mentioned that many Judges have different principles for granting ball. There are some Judges in this Court who grant bail in every case under Section 307, l.P.C. while others do not. Hence the petitioner could not be blamed for granting bail in a case under Section 307, l.P.C. Moreover, the accused remained in Jail for more than 90 days and it was a case of no injury. As staled in para 48 of the writ petition, two other Additional District Judges and even the High Court granted bail to other co-accused in the same case. The Hon'ble Enquiry Judge's report is Annexure-E to the petition. In the last para of the enquiry report dated 19.12.95 (Annexure-E), the Hon'ble Enquiry Judge has observed. "There was no material on record to come to the conclusion that Sri Rudra deliberately mentioned wrong facts." However the Enquiry Judge held that the petitioner was negligent. We do not see how the petitioner could be held to be negligent in such a case. And at any event, this hardly merits removal. The petitioner has given an explanation that he was Incharge District Judge at the relevant time and doing work of three Judges. In none of the cases referred to in the impugned order on the basis of which the petitioner was removed, there was any complaint made by any body. Hence, in our opinion, the three grounds mentioned in the Impugned order do not justify the removal of the petitioner from service.
8. Reference may be made in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court in Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India. JT 1997 (3) SC 26, in which the Supreme Court expunged the offending remarks made by the High Court against a District Judge of Bihar. In this connection, we would like to point out the difficulties and adverse circumstances in which the Judges of the subordinate judiciary in this State are functioning. Against the norm of 300 cases which each Judge is supposed to have. In fact most Judges have about 3000 to 5000 cases pending in their courts. Against the norm of 75 sessions trials, about 600 to 700 or even more sessions trials are pending in many sessions courts. Apart from this, Judges of the subordinate judiciary are not provided with sufficient and proper facilities for discharging their duties. If proper and sufficient facilities are provided to the subordinate judiciary, we may expect high quality judgments but the truth is that the members of the subordinate Judiciary are not provided with proper facilities and they have to carry a toad 10 to 15 times greater than the normal load. A large number of Courts are lying vacant and the other Courts have to carry this extra load. The number of the Judges has to be greatly increased if high quality Justice is required from them.
9. In our opinion, if certain orders of the petitioner were not as good as they should have been, the District Judge could have been told to instruct the officer orally to the more careful but it is not proper in our opinion to penalise him in such a case. If punishment is given in such cases, in our opinion, the Judges shall not be able to decide cases freely.
10. In our opinion, the Impugned order should not have been passed against the petitioner. This Court should not be too harsh to Judges of the subordinate judiciary and should take into account the tremendous difficulties and pressures under which they are working and only in extreme cases where there is total lack of intergrlty or there is some other serious allegation which is found proved that the Court should take action, otherwise it will lead to demoralization in the subordinate judiciary.
11. In this connection reference may be made to the Supreme Court's decision in K. P. Tewari v. State of M. P.. AIR 1994 SC 1031, where in somewhat similar circumstances, the Supreme Court observed :
"We are, however, impelled to remind the learned Judge of the High Court that however, anguished he might have been over the unmerited ball granted to the accused, he should not have allowed himself the latitude of ignoring judicial precaution and propriety even momentarily. The higher courts every day come across orders of the lower courts, which are not justified either in law or in fact and modify them or set them aside. That is one of the functions of the superior courts. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges and hence provides for appeals and revisions. A Judge tries to discharge his duties to the best of his capacity. While doing so, some times, he is likely to err. It is well said that a Judge who has not committed an error is yet to be born. And that applies to Judges at all level from the lowest to the highest. Some times the difference in view of the higher and the lower courts is purely a result of a difference in approach and perception. On such occasions the lower courts are not necessarily wrong and the higher courts always right. It has also to be remembered that the lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a psychological pressure with all the contestants and their lawyers almost breathing down their necks more correctly up to their nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere of the higher courts to think coolly and decide patiently. Every error, howsoever, gross it may look should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive. It is possible that a particular judicial officer may be consistently passing orders creating a suspicion of Judicial conduct which is not wholly or even partly attributable to innocent functioning. Even in such cases, the proper course for the higher court to adopt is to make note of his conduct in the confidential record of his work and to use it in a proper occasion. The Judges in the higher courts have also a duty to ensure judicial discipline and respect for the judiciary from all concerned. The respect for the judiciary is not enhanced when Judges at the lower level are criticized in temperately and castigated publicly. No greater damage can be done to the administration of Justice and to the confidence of the people in the judiciary when the Judges of the higher courts publicly express lack of faith in the subordinate Judges for one reason or the other. It must be remembered that the Officers against whom such strictures are publicly passed stand condemned for ever in the eyes of their subordinates and of the members of the public. No better device can be found to destroy the judiciary from within. The Judges must, therefore, exercise self-restraint. There are ways and ways of expressing disapproval of the orders of the subordinate courts but attributing motives to them is certainly not one of them. That is the surest way to take the judiciary downhill."
12. Similarly in Kashinath Roy v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 3240. Court observed :
"In cannot be forgotten that in our system, like elsewhere, appellate and re visional courts have been set up on the pre-supposition that lower courts would in some measure of cases go wrong in decision making, both on facts as also on law, and they have been knit up to correct those orders. The human element in justicing being an Important element, computer--like functioning cannot be expected of the Courts : however, hard they may try and keep themselves precedent trodden in the scope of discretion and in the manner of judging. Whenever any such intolerable error is detected by or pointed out to a Superior court it is functionally required to correct that error that may, here and there. In an appropriate case, and in a manner befitting maintaining the dignity of the Court and independence of judiciary convey its message in its judgment to the officer concerned through a process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellow but clear and result orienting, but rarely as a rebuke. Sharp reaction of the kind exhibited in the afore-extraction is not in keeping with institutional functioning. The premise that the Judge committed a mistake or an error beyond the limits tolerance. Is no ground to Inflict condemnation on the Judge subordinate, unless there existed something else and for exceptional grounds. We should, therefore, think, without much adb that the High Court was unkind to the appellant and, therefore, the afore-paragraph deserves to and is hereby pulled out from the orders of the High Court dated 28.1.99 titled Lola Pandey v. State of Bihar and three others decided by the High Court of Patna as well as all other references in the said order which tell upon the functioning of the appellant."
13. In Shiv Prakash Misra v. High Court, 1999 ACJ 927, a Division Bench of this Court quashed the adverse entry given to the petitioner for not passing correct orders.
14. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of removal dated 17.4.97 is quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service within a month of producti on of copy of this order before the Law Secretary, U. P. Government and treat him to be in continuous service. He shall also be paid salary from the date of the Impugned order till reinstatement within three months.