1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri V.K. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents and Sri Ashok Shukla, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3.
2. By means of the present petition, the petitioners have challenged the final seniority list of the Assistant Review Officers employed with the Secretariat of the Government of U.P., Lucknow issued vide office memorandum dated 28.5.2018, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. A further prayer is for punishing the respondents who have deliberately and repeatedly flouted and violated the judgment and order dated 8.5.2015 passed by this Court in Special Appeal No.31 of 2005 and other connected matters while determining the seniority of the Assistant Review Officers, a copy of which is Annexure-9 to the writ petition.
3. At the very outset, this Court is of the view that the petitioners who are praying for punishing the respondents for having allegedly violated the judgment and order of this Court dated 8.5.2015, have the remedy of filing a contempt petition.
4. As regards the quashing of the seniority list dated 28.5.2018, a preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel that the petitioners have an alternative and efficacious remedy of filing a claim petition before the learned U.P. Public Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) which is perfectly empowered to entertain and decide such claims and thus it is prayed that this Court may relegate the petitioners to the Tribunal on the ground of availability of alternative remedy.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that as the impugned seniority list has been issued in violation of the judgment and order dated 8.5.2015 passed by this Court in special appeal, consequently this Court should entertain the writ petition and set-aside the impugned seniority list.
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the contesting parties, what this Court finds is that specific averments have been made in paragraph 18 of the writ petition to the effect that the respondents by an office memorandum dated 16.7.2015 issued the tentative seniority list and by office memorandum dated 8.9.2015 issued the final seniority list of the Lower Division Assistants, which list was not in compliance with the judgment and order dated 8.5.2015 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in special appeal. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid office memorandums, Writ Petition No.5828 (S/S) of 2015 In re: Dr. Kishore Tandon and others vs. State of U.P. and others, was filed in which one of the petitioners was impleaded as respondent. The said writ petition was allowed vide judgment and order dated 21.9.2017, a copy of which is Annexure-10 to the writ petition. It is further contended in paragraph 19 of the writ petition that aggrieved against the said judgment, Special Appeal Defective No.296 of 2018 In re: Onkar Nath Tiwari and others vs. State of U.P. and others has been filed which is pending. The grounds indicated for challenging the judgment and order dated 21.9.2017 in special appeal are that the said judgment has wrongly interpreted the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 8.5.2015 and further grounds to challenge the judgment of the Single Judge have been indicated in paragraph 19 of the writ petition. It is also the specific averment in the writ petition that in compliance to the judgment and order dated 21.9.2017 passed by Single Judge, the tentative seniority list dated 8.5.2018 was issued against which the petitioners preferred their objections which thereafter resulted in the impugned final seniority list dated 28.5.2018. There is also a specific averment in paragraph 25 of the writ petition that the final seniority list, now impugned in the instant writ petition, has been drawn in tacit compliance of the judgment and order dated 21.9.2017 passed in Writ Petition No.5828 (S/S) of 2016.
7. Apart from the aforesaid, the impugned final seniority list has been challenged on various other grounds including (a) the respondents having failed to determine the vacancies; (b) vacancies occurring throughout the year having not been determined in a particular manner; (c) how and when the vacancies have been determined has not been indicated; (d) the respondents having suppressed information pertaining to vacancies; (e) persons not amenable to quota-rota rule have been sought to be covered etc., meaning thereby that various disputed questions have also been raised while challenging the said seniority list. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the impugned seniority list has been issued in violation of the rules of natural justice inasmuch as prior to issuance of the final seniority list, a tentative list had also been issued by the respondents and objections had also been invited, as has been admitted by the petitioners.
8. In the opinion of this Court, the said questions can very well be gone into by the learned Tribunal before which a claim petition can be filed by the petitioners challenging the impugned final seniority list and consequently once the petitioners have got an alternative and efficacious remedy of filing of a claim petition, this Court would not like to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9. This Court while exercising the discretionary jurisdcition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has to exercise the said jurisdiction judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well defined exceptions as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax and Others vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal reported in 2014 (1) SCC 603, as follows:
"15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghur Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field.
Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation."
10. Likewise, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Rashid and Son vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission reported in A.I.R. 1954 SC 207 has held that Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs yet the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere.
11. Similarly, another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. T.R. Varma reported in A.I.R. 1957 SC 882 has held that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. The High Court may consider the existence of an adequate legal remedy while granting writs and may exercise its discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. For the sake of convenience, paragraph 6 of the said judgment is reproduced below:-
"6. At the very outset, we have to observe that a writ petition under Art. 226 is not the appropriate proceeding for adjudi- cation of disputes like the present. Under the law, a person whose services have been wrongfully terminated, is entitled to institute an action to vindicate his rights, and in such an action, the Court will be competent to award all the relief's to which he may be entitled, including some which would not be admissible in a writ petition.
It is well-settled that when an alternative and equally effica- cious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but, as observed by this Court in Raghid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana , 1950 SCR 566: (AIR 1950 SC 168) "the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs": Vide also K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission, 1954 SCR 738 at p. 747: (AIR 1954 SC 207 at p. 210). And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Art. 226, unless there are good grounds therefor. None such appears in the present case. On the other hand, the point for determination in this petition whether the respondent was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case, turns mainly on the question whether he was prevented from cross- examining the witnesses, who gave evidence in support of the charge.
That is a question on which there is a serious dispute, which cannot be satisfactorily decided without taking evidence. It is not the practice of Courts to decide questions of that character in a writ petition, and it would have been a proper exercise of discretion in the present case if the learned Judges had referred the respondent to a suit.
In this appeal, we should have ourselves adopted that course, and passed the order which the learned Judges should have passed. But we feel pressed by the fact that the order dismissing the respondent having been made on September 16, 1954, an action to set it aside would now be time barred. As the High Court has gone into the matter on the merits, we propose to dispose of this appeal on a consideration of the merits."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan reported in 1988(1) SCC 572 has held that the High Court cannot be justified to exercise the power in writ jurisdiction if an effective alternative remedy is available to the party.
13. Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan reported in (2000)7 SCC 695 deprecated the practice of exercising of writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available and the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
"Though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of Constitution powers of the High Court, it is a well recognised principle which gives judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedy, one or other, before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy."
14. Likewise the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Raja Mahendra Pal reported in A.I.R. 1999 SC 1786 has held as under:-
"it is true that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature which can be invoked for the enforcement of any fundamental right or legal right but not for mere contractual rights arising out of an agreement particularly in view of the existence of efficacious alternative remedy The Constitutional Court should insist upon the party to avail of the same instead of invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court. This does not however debar the Court from granting the appropriate relief to a citizen under peculiar and special facts notwithstanding the existence of alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of the special circumstances are required to be noticed before issuance of the direction by the High Court while invoking the jurisdiction under the said Article."
15. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services, U.P. and others vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya and another reported in (2002)5 SCC 521 held as under:-
"11. These appeals are preferred against the order made by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. W.P. No. 47130 of 2000 etc. on 1.2.2001. A Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad by the impugned judgment has held that the petitioner in the said writ petitions has an alternate remedy by way of petitions before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal (the tribunal), and had permitted the writ petitioner therein to approach the tribunal and directed the tribunal to entertain any such petition to be filed by the writ petitioner without raising any objection as to limitation. There was a further direction to the tribunal to decide the matter expeditiously.
12. Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the remedy before the tribunal under the U.P. Public Service Tribunal Act is wholly illusory inasmuch as the tribunal has no power to grant an interim order. Therefore, he contends that the High Court ought not to have relegated the petitioner to a fresh proceeding before the said tribunal. We do not agree with these arguments of the learned counsel. When the statute has provided for the constitution of a tribunal for adjudicating the disputes of a Government servant, the fact that the tribunal has no authority to grant an interim order is no ground to by-pass the said tribunal. In an appropriate case after entertaining the petitions by an aggrieved party if the tribunal declines an interim order on the ground that it has no such power then it is possible that such aggrieved party can seek remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution but that is no ground to by-pass the said tribunal in the first instance itself. Having perused the impugned order, we find no infirmity whatsoever in the said order and the High Court was justified in directing the petitioner to approach the tribunal. In the said view of the matter, the appeals are dismissed. No costs."
16. Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and others vs. Labh Chand reported in 1993(2) SCC 495 held as under:-
9. When a Statutory Forum or Tribunal is specially created by a statute for redressal of specified grievances of persons on certain matters, the High Court should not normally permit such persons to ventilate their specified grievances before it by entertaining petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution is a legal position which is too well-settled. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Thansingh Nathmal and Ors. v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, (1964) 6 SCR, 655, when had the occasion to deal with the question as to how the discretionary jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, was required to be exercised respecting a petition filed there under by a person coming before it bye-passing a statutory alternate remedy available to him for obtaining redressal of his grievances ventilated in the petition, has given expression to the said well-settled legal position, speaking through Shah, J., as he then was, thus:
The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitation.... Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. (pages 661-662)
10. Preamble to the Act, declares that it is enacted to provide for the Constitution of tribunals to adjudicate upon disputes in respect of matters relating to employment of all public servants of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act provides for Constitution by the State Government two or more State Public Service Tribunals, each called a State Public Service Tribunal. Sub-section (2) thereof requires that each Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member. Sub-section (3) thereof requires that the Judicial Member shall be a serving Judge of the High Court or a person qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge while the Administrative Member shall be a person who holds or has held the post of, or any post equivalent to, Commissioner of a Division. Section 4 of the Act, which provides for reference of claims to Tribunal for their adjudication reads:
4. Reference of claims to Tribunal - If any person who is or has been a public servant claims that in any matter relating to employment as such public servant his employer or any officer or authority subordinate to the employer has dealt with him in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract, or -
(a) in the case of a Government Servant, with the provisions of Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution or with any rules or law having force under Article 309 or Article 313 of the Constitution;
(b) in the case of a servant of a local authority or a statutory corporation, with Article 16 of the Constitution or with any rules or regulations having force under any Act or Legislature constituting such authority or corporation;
he shall refer such claim to the Tribunal, and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall, subject, to the provisions of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, be final:
Provided that no reference shall, subject to the terms of any contract, be made iii respect of a claim arising out of the transfer of a public servant.
Provided further that no reference shall ordinarily be entertained by the Tribunal until' the claimant has exhausted his departmental remedies under the rules applicable to him.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this proviso, it shall not be necessary to require the-claimant (in the case of a Government servant) to avail also of the remedy of memorial to the Governor before referring his claim to the Tribunal.
11. The order of a Division Bench of the High Court refusing to entertain the earlier Writ Petition of the respondent here filed under Article 226 of the Constitution had been made in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction on its view that the petitioner therein had for redressal of his grievance in that petition an alternate statutory remedy before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, an adjudicatory machinery specially created for redressal of such grievances, cannot be disputed. What remains, therefore, to be seen is whether the discretion exercised by the Division Bench in refusing to entertain the earlier Writ Petition for non-availing of alternate remedy and dismissing it, could be said to be an unwarranted exercise of discretion in the light of the said well-settled legal position governing such masters. As the alternate remedy which according to the Division Bench was not availed of by the respondent here before the filing of his earlier Writ Petition, being that available before the Forum of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, it becomes necessary for us to see whether that Forum did provide to the respondent here a remedy which was both adequate and efficacious. We shall now look into the relevant provisions of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 (for short 'the Act') creating the U.P. Public Services Tribunal and the Rules made there under as they would throw the needed light on the exact nature of the Tribunal, and the adequacy and efficaciousness of the remedy available with it.
12. Section 5 of the Act requires the Tribunal to be guided by principles of natural justice in the matter of consideration of the references, making it clear that it is not bound by the procedure laid down in. the CPC, 1908 or the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
13. Section 6 of the Act expressly bars the filing of suits respecting matters to be referred for adjudication under Section 4 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying all the purposes of the Act.
14. The U.P., Public Services (Tribunals) Rules, 1975 (to be referred to as 'the Rules') which are made by the State Government contain elaborate procedural-rules, needed for effective adjudication of matters by the Tribunal.
15. As is seen from the said Preamble, the provisions in the Act and the Rules, the U.P. Public Services Tribunal is intended to be an exclusive and exhaustive machinery or forum for adjudication of claims all public servants including the persons in the service or pay of the State Government, in matters of their employment, inasmuch as, suits in such matters are specifically barred by the provision in Section 6 of the Act. That Tribunal since composes of a Judicial Member who is a serving Judge of the High Court or is qualified to become such Judge and an Administrative Member who holds or has held the post of, or any post equivalent to, commissioner of a Division, it is a statutory Tribunal of the State possessed of expertise to adjudicate claims of public servants in matters of their employment. That the Tribunal in its enquiries being not bound by the technical rules of procedure under the Civil Procedure Code and the technical rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, it could avail of its vast powers of enquiry to redress grievances of public servants concerning matters of their employment adequately and efficaciously. The fact that Section 4 of the Act declares that the decision of the Tribunal is final subject to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution itself shows the nature of high judicial sanctity attached by statute to such decision.
16. The respondent had, since filed in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, his first Writ Petition, W.P., No. 1980 of 1990, challenging the validity of the Order of the State Government by which he had been compulsorily retired from Government service and claimed several reliefs there to against the State Government, we have to find whether the U.P. Public Services Tribunal if had been approached by the respondent here, could not have, if warranted, invalidated the Order challenged in the Writ Petition and given the reliefs sought for therein. If we have regard to the high status of the members Constituting the Tribunal, expertise possessed by such members to consider the claims of employees in matters of their employment, vast powers invested in them to hold exhaustive enquiries and to grant full reliefs in matters relating to their employment, we cannot but hold that that Tribunal is the highest forum created by the Act to give full and complete relief to public servants in matters of their employment, that too, with expedition. The claims in the Writ Petition since related purely to matters rearing to employment of the respondent under the State Government, the Division Bench of the High Court refused to entertain the Writ Petition on its view that it had been filed by the respondent here bye-passing the U.P. Public Services Tribunal. When the Division Bench had refused to entertain the Writ Petition of the respondent, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on its view that the respondent could not have invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for the redressal of his grievances, bye-passing the special forum created specifically by a statute for redressal of such grievances, efficaciously and adequately, it is not possible for us to think that such exercise of discretion was unwarranted, particularly wher) we have due regard to the settled legal position governing such matters, to which we have already adverted."
17. Very recently, a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shiv Ram and others vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2016 SCC Online All 751 = 2016(6) ALJ 12 (FB) has held as under:-
"11. Rule of alternative remedy is a self imposed restriction and not a rule of law as held by Supreme Court in BALCO Captive Power Plant vs. National Thermal Power Corpn., (2007)11 SCC 234 and Committee of Management vs. Vice Chancellor, AIR 2009 SC 1159. When an aggrieved person has an efficacious, effective alternative remedy under the law, High Court can relegate such person to seek his remedy under the Statute, instead of entertaining writ petition. A constitution Bench of Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, held that Article 226 is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief in a civil suit. When writ petition raises a highly disputed question of fact, High Court can refuse to entertain a writ petition. Supreme Court in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, (1969) 3 SCC 769, held that if, however, on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides, as in the present case, that it should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court in this respect. Similar view has been taken in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, AIR 1974 SC 2105.
12. Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. ITO, AIR 1961 SC 372, A.V. Venkateswaran vs. Ram Chand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506, Full Bench of this Court in Buddhu vs. Municipal Board, AIR 1952 SC 753 and Special Bench in Bijli Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Estate Officer, 1977 AWC 191 held that when the authority passing the order had no jurisdiction or purported to usurp jurisdiction bar of alternative remedy will not apply.
13. Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, held that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.
14. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala, (2009) 1 SCC 168, held that while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, High Court is duty-bound to consider whether:
(a) adjudication of the writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;
(b) the petition reveals all material facts;
(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;
(d) the person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;
(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;
(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.
15. Supreme Court in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, held that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice. In Union of India v. Shri Kant Sharma, (2015) 6 SCC 773, it has been held that it is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice.
16. From the aforementioned cases, it is clear that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court.
(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, High Court may entertain writ petition;
(ii) while exercising discretion High Court may consider that adjudication of the writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;
(iii) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;
(iv) the person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;
(vi) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.
18. When the facts of the instants case are tested on the touchstone of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Full Bench of this Court, what this Court finds is that the petitioner can get suitable relief before the learned Tribunal itself by filing a claim petition and consequently this Court is not inclined to exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Moreover, keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Labh Chand (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone into the constitution of the Public Services Tribunal in the State of U.P. and has found the members constituting the Tribunal possessing expertise for considering the claims of employee in matters of the employment and the vast powers vested in them to hold exhaustive inquiries and grant full reliefs in the matter relating to the employment, thus, would be the all the more reason not to entertain the present writ petition.
19. Accordingly, keeping in view the said propositions of law as discussed above and taking into consideration the remedy of filing a claim petition against the impugned final seniority list, this Court upholds the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and accordingly dismisses the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of filing of a claim petition before the learned Tribunal.
Order Date :- 12.9.2018 Rakesh (Abdul Moin, J.)