JUDGMENT D.P. Singh, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against a termination order dated 30.6.1986 as upheld by the appellate order dated 16.4.1991.
2. This case was taken up on several occasions but none appeared on behalf of the respondent Corporation. On the request of the court Sri Sameer Sharma, who though normally appears for the Corporation but had not been instructed in this case, was asked by the court to assist it. The court expresses its gratitude for his appearance herein.
3. The petitioner was a conductor in the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and while he was conducting a bus from Agra to Delhi having obtained the waybill from Idgah Depot, Agra, a checking party of the Corporation intercepted the bus on 30.9.1984 at 10.40 A.M. It found that some passengers were traveling without tickets and fake tickets were also being used by the petitioner and as such he was removed from service vide order dated 1.10.1984 and four specific charges were framed against him. After due enquiry, he was suspended vide order dated 30.6.1986. Simultaneously, a criminal case was also lodged against him, wherein he was acquitted by order and judgment dated 29.6.1990. He filed a representation in the nature of an appeal before the next higher authority which remained undecided, thus, he filed the present writ petition challenging the termination order. During the pendency of the writ petition, the representation of the petitioner was also rejected by order dated 16.4.1991 which has been challenged through an amendment.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has firstly urged that once the petitioner has been acquitted by the criminal courts the impugned termination order has to be quashed. In support of his contention he has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Ors. [1999 (2) U.P.L.B.E.C. 1280]. The Supreme Court in the case of Paul Anthony (supra) has not laid down any thumb rule that mere acquittal or pendency of the criminal case would disentitle the departmental authority in proceeding with the enquiry or in passing final orders. In the present case, the termination of the petitioner was executed on 30th June, 1986 while the judgment in the criminal court was rendered about four years later on 29th June, 1990. A Division Bench of our court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and Ors. 2003 (2) U.P.L.B.E.C. 1123 after considering a large number of decision of the Apex Court has held that subsequent acquittal is of no consequence and termination cannot be reconsidered. Again, the Apex Court in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, United Bank v. P.C. Kakkar 2003 (4) S.C. 364 has held that even where the acquittal in a criminal case is prior to the domestic enquiry, it would not bar a domestic enquiry. It held in para 15 that :-
Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings At the most the factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to de considered while awarding punishment. It would depend upon the facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application."
5. It is settled principle of law that evaluation of evidence in a criminal trial and departmental enquiry is entirely different. The Apex Court in Paul Anthony's case has held that domestic enquiry may be stayed only if nature of the charge involves complicated questions of law and fact. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out as to how there are any complicated questions of fact and law involved in the present case. From the record, it is evident that the petitioner was given full opportunity in the domestic enquiry which he availed. There is sufficient and clinching evidence on record in support of the charges. Thus, in my opinion, mere acquittal in the criminal case subsequent to the termination order would not ipso facto render the termination order infructuous.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has then urged that the proceedings in the enquiry are vitiated, since the passengers were not examined in the domestic enquiry. He has fortified his argument on the basis of the instructions issued by the Corporation to the Traffic Inspectors, which states that in case passengers without ticket are detected, effort should be made for recording statement of such passengers. In support of his contention, he has relied upon a Single Judge decision of this court rendered in the case of Prem Prakash Misra v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. [ 1994 (2) U.P.L.B.E.C. 1047] and another Single Judge decision of Punjab High Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Mohan Singh [1985 (2) S.L.R. 116] and so also Single judge decision of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Khem Chand v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. [1985 (1) S.L.R. p. 533]. In all the three decisions learned Single Judges have held, on the facts of each case that hearsay evidence has to be closely scrutinized and if the statement of the passengers had not been recorded, it could be taken as a ground for drawing an inference in favour of the delinquent. However, the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Ratan Singh [A.I.R. 1977 S.C. p. 1512], has held that even though there may be some departmental instructions for recording the statement of the passengers, mere non-recording of statement would not render the termination per se illegal and the statement of the checking staff was sufficient. In the case at hand, though the Traffic Inspector was produced as a witness to prove the said charge, the petitioner did not even cross-examine him. Thus, now he cannot say that there is violation of the instructions. If the petitioner had cross-examined him, he would have given the reasons for non-examination of the passengers. Learned counsel, however, contends that non-examination would amount to violation of principles of natural justice. This argument does not appear to be correct. The petitioner has been unable to demonstrate before this court as to how he was prejudiced by the non-examination of the passengers, especially in view of the fact that he did not cross-examine the Traffic Inspector, who was the head of the checking party. The Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. Musai Ram and Ors. 1999 (83) F.L.R. 226 when confronted with somewhat similar circumstances has held in para 6 that non-examination of passengers would not amount to infringement of natural justice, in the following words :
"It is also contended that Sri Pandey had wade his report after recording the statement of the passengers. The respondent was not given copy of the statements of those passengers and those passengers were not examined. Hence, there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. Whether there is such a violation or not, obviously depends upon the facts of each case. In the present case, in the charge-sheet it is clearly stated that what is proposed to be relied upon is a report submitted by the Assistant Traffic Inspector on both the occasions. Although, the Assistant Traffic Inspector was examined and he proved his reports, the respondent did not cross-examine even the Assistant Traffic Inspector. He could have cross-examined the Assistant Traffic Inspector regarding the statement of passengers on the basis of which the report was made. He did not choose to do so. It is, therefore, not possible for him to contend that the enquiry ought to have been based on the statements of the passengers recorded by the Assistant Traffic Inspector or that the enquiry officer ought to have examined the passengers or that he ought to have been given a chance to cross-examine the passengers. When he has not challenged the reports filed by the Assistant Traffic Inspector, there is no question of violation of the principles of natural justice."
7. In the end it is contended that there was no loss or very minimal loss to the Corporation, therefore, extreme punishment like termination was unwarranted. Assuming there may be no loss or the loss may be of a very small amount, but that is not the issue. The conductor holds a post of trust and even an attempt of causing loss to the Corporation would amount to a grave misconduct as held by the Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Hoti Lal 2003 (3) S.C.C. 605 in the following words:-
"..........If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are in built requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with Iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable......."
8. No other point has been urged.
9. For the reasons given above, this petition fails and is dismissed but no order as to costs.